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Summary
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first full-length study to consider how 
Croce’s antimetaphysical method shaped his approach to history. Crocean criticism 
has traditionally tended to focus on the Filosofia dello Spirito as the main source of 
Croce’s ideas. In reality, Croce’s thought is dispersed in a myriad of articles and 
marginalia. Without neglecting Croce’s major works on historiography, I have made 
use of rarely used material: his Epistolario and his Taccuini di lavoro, both published 
in a limited edition by the Istituto italiano per gli studi storici in Naples. Moreover, I 
have used La Critica, Croce’s bimonthly journal which ran for some forty years. All 
this material helped me to reinforce the idea that Croce’s philosophy should be read as 
a series of reflections on historical narrative and literary criticism instead of as an all- 
encompassing idealistic system. Narrative, objectivity and method are the main issues 
discussed by the Italian philosopher.
Each chapter opens with a brief historical account of the context within which Croce’s 
ideas were developed. The introductory chapter provides an overview of the reasons 
for Croce’s demise in the aftermath of World War Two. Chapter two explores the 
origins of Croce’s antimetaphysical method from the outset of his long intellectual 
career. Chapter three analyzes the philosopher’s epistemology of history and its non­
reductionist purpose. The consequences of Croce’s method and its further 
developments in history and historiography are explored in chapter four, whereas 
chapter five analyzes the links between history and action and the concept of the 
contemporaneity of all historiographical explorations. The last section of the chapter 
is devoted to the potential impact of Croce today within a postmodern climate. After 
highlighting similarities between some contemporary thinkers (Gadamer in particular) 
and Croce, I argue that the Italian philosopher still represents a very useful 
interlocutor for those engaged in the discussion of the nature of history and its present 
status in the contemporary debate.
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INTRODUCTION
Un autore rinasce solamente quando viene inteso nel proprio suo pensiero e con do  
collocato nel posto che gli spetta nella storia della filosofia, dal quale prende, o 
riprende a esercitare efficacia nel nuovo pensiero come suo vivo elemento e 
componente.1
Origins of the research
When I started my research on Benedetto Croce I had a number of preconceptions 
concerning his thought. My idea of the Neapolitan philosopher was very much 
influenced by my philosophical studies in Pavia where he was generally considered a 
sort of appendix to Hegelianism with very little to do with contemporary thought. 
Even Croce’s anti-Fascism and his key role in the promotion of a free culture during 
one of the country’s most critical periods were hardly mentioned. However, as soon 
as I began reading Croce’s prose I was surprised by its simplicity and clarity. His 
prose and its continuous appeal, through examples and images, to everyday life did 
not match the convoluted style of the abstract idealist thinker he was supposed to be. 
Moreover, Croce’s long life, far from being dull and cocooned, confined in a golden 
prison in Naples, was full of dramatic events and displayed a high level of civic 
engagement in the fate of his country. Theory and practice, thought and action, were 
inextricably intertwined in Croce.
The turning point of my study was the reading of Gianfranco Contini’s La 
parte di Benedetto Croce nella cultura italiana. Here the celebrated literary critic 
described Croce as the ‘sommo atleta della cultura’ and complained that in the
• • • lpostwar period ‘il pensiero di Croce si trovava in tutti i sensi ad essere volgarizzato.’ 
Contini maintained that ‘il crocianesimo corrente ... era asserzione e applicazione di 
tesi, quasi verita piovute dal cielo ... affermate fuori e sopra la storia.’,4 whereas in 
reality Croce’s teaching was firmly rooted in history and ‘essenzialmente 
metodologico e antimetafisico.’5 Contini blamed the ‘crociani’ for this gross 
misrepresentation of Croce’s thought, maintaining that ‘il crocianesimo in senso
1 B. Croce, Ilcarattere della filosofia moderna, (Bari: Laterza, 1963), p.59.
2 G. Contini, La parte di Benedetto Croce nella cultura italiana, (Turin: Einaudi, 1989), pp. viii-ix.
3 Ibid., p.3.
4 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Ibid.
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proprio e quello di chi, spesso con dialettica speciosa o con prematura senilita, 
appende i suoi nidi e le sue ragnatele al tronco crociano’.6
Contini’s reading of Croce insisted on the fact that the Italian philosopher 
promoted ‘il valore liberatorio del pensiero, della scienza, del metodo’ in order to 
overcome ‘un’insopportabile angoscia.’7 To my amazement Contini argued that 
Croce’s aim was a ‘riforma del metodo positivo, instaurazione di un nuovo 
positivismo.’8 This was in conflict with the received reading of Croce which saw the 
philosopher as a fierce anti-positivist with an anti-scientific mindset dictated by his 
hardcore idealism. Contini argued that Croce on the contrary, was ‘un positivista 
“nuovo” nella radicale distruzione delle metafisiche e dei miti, e nel desiderio ... di 
essere funzionale, nel sogno di una filosofia solo speciale e in atto, “filosofia dei fatti 
particolari’” .9 Contini concluded his brief pamphlet advocating a study which would 
focus on
due elementi della fortuna crociana, oggi ancora minori, non 
abbastanza visibili, ma soli atti a garantire la continuity d’efficacia, 
sono da un lato la premessa dell’ “angoscia” come impulso alia 
tacitazione razionale ... dall’altro la funzionalita e il carattere 
metodologico della fdosofia, cioe il germe di un nuovo positivismo del 
quale non si puo dire che Croce abbia promosso Tinstaurazione. 10
There have been numerous publications on the much debated ‘ritomo di 
Croce’ in the past few years, and many celebrations and commemorative events, but 
little progress has been made in the destruction of the stereotyped image of a 
conservative and idealist Croce.11 There have been few books which go against the 
current, and it is no coincidence that they are all from outside Italy where the image of 
a conservative Croce is still widely accepted. A good example of an original reading 
of Croce’s thought is given by Roberts’ Benedetto Croce and the Uses o f Historicism, 
whose main merit lies in detaching the Italian philosopher from Hegelianism.
6 Ibid., p.53.
7 Ibid., p.6.
8 Ibid., p.4.
9 Ibid., p.8.
10 Ibid., p.52. Italics mine
11II ritomo di Croce nella cultura italiana is a book o f collected essays by the Croceans R. Franchini, 
G.Lunati and F.Tessitore (Milan: Rusconi, 1990). See also P. D ’Angelo ‘II ritomo dell’interesse per 
Croce (1980-1990)’, Cultura e scuola, 117 (1991), pp. 141-46 and E. Giammattei, ‘II ritomo di Croce’, 
La citta Nuova, 5 (1990), pp. 72-75.
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12However, Roberts’ important work does not dispel the charge of conservatism. 
According to the American scholar,
Croce remained preoccupied with ‘history’ - an incredibly overloaded 
category - throughout his career, but he was less interested in the 
questions about method and objectivity that have dominated the 
philosophy of history over the past century.13
Despite Contini’s provocative suggestion, a fresh analysis of Croce’s method has not 
yet been undertaken. Croce’s thought is still widely perceived as provincial, detached 
from reality and conservative. This thesis is in many ways a response to Contini’s 
invitation to rethink Croce’s method of analysis, particularly in the light of his 
numerous, but repeatedly ignored, statements about his own antimetaphysical 
orientation. It is a supreme irony of early 20 century Italian intellectual history that 
the country’s major figure should be so traduced in his own motherland.
The image of Croce as an ‘Olympian’ philosopher detached from events was 
given widespread currency in the aftermath of the Second World War. Here Croce 
was considered essentially a nineteenth century idealist thinker. This perception 
originated the received reading of Croce as an idealist system builder. In reality, 
Croce was not a systematic thinker; he did not want to construct a new philosophical 
view of the world or a definitive scheme. As a matter of fact, Croce was part of the 
group of intellectuals, mathematicians and physicists of the twentieth century who had 
come to realize that many absolute truths in which previous generations had an 
unwavering faith were nothing but convenient caricatures of the complexity of the 
world.
Thus this thesis, taking up Contini’s stimulus to explore the ‘functionality’ and 
the ‘methodological character’ of Croce’s thought, seeks to show that the picture of a 
Croce concerned with reformulating a restructured idealist philosophy is mistaken and 
has its origin in the politically charged atmosphere of post World War Two and, apart 
from the odd exception, is part of the mainstream reading. In reality, Croce’s 
philosophy is much more challenging, dynamic and open-ended than usually thought.
12 ‘Croce was, at bottom, conservative and cautious, and sought to reassemble the cultural pieces in a 
new way as quickly and as safely as possible.’ D. D. Roberts, Benedetto Croce and the Uses o f  
Historicism, (London: University o f California Press, 1987), p.5.
13 Ibid., p. 266.
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Since Croce’s output was colossal (he wrote some seventy books in sixty years) I 
have confined my research to a specific topic. I have chosen what I think is the least 
explored part of Croce’s thought, namely his search for a more open method for 
understanding history. I defined this method ‘antimetaphysical’ since, as I will 
explain later in this introduction, it represented a critical response to a ‘metaphysical’ 
view which, according to Croce, was characterized by transcendence and a strong 
reductionism.
This work analyzes Croce’s method in its relation to the construction of a new 
approach to history.14 Croce’s interest in philosophy was inspired by a practical need: 
to find a suitable method of analysis for history and literary criticism. He realized 
early in his intellectual itinerary that the schematic procedures of the positive sciences 
do not grasp the peculiarity of art and history which require a different and less 
schematic approach.
Meaning of metaphysics in Croce
Croce was against the mentality which he defined as ‘metaphysical’. By metaphysics 
he meant those theoretical constructions which aimed to encapsulate the whole of 
reality, the whole world, within a single theoretical system; in other words the 
tendency to reduce the complexity of reality to one main problem. According to the 
Italian philosopher,
la metafisica disconosce l’ufficio della genuina filosofia, ergendosi 
sopra di lei come ‘filosofia prima’ o ‘filosofia generale’ trattando .... le 
indagini ... logiche, etiche e le altre tutte ... come ‘filosofie particolari’ 
e ‘secondarie’.15
From the very outset Croce was extremely hostile to all reductionist narratives. In 
Croce’s eyes metaphysics promoted a transcendental view of reality, namely a world 
which depends on an external cause such as God, the Spirit, Nature, or the Idea. 
Metaphysics was obsessed with the ‘One Cause’ or the ‘fundamental problem’, as 
Croce put it. Indeed, its very name
14 At this stage, at least, I deliberately avoid claiming that it was an attempt to construct a new ‘theory’ 
of history, given the almost automatic association of such a claim, in our present cultural climate, with 
the idea of a new ‘grand narrative’. There is a sense, however, in which Croce is indeed theorizing a 
new approach, precisely in opposition to such a closed system.
15 Croce, II carattere, p.3.
esprime, nel suo trapasso dall’uno all’altro suo significato, dal post al 
trans, il vano conato di innalzamento da un mondo di oggetti a un 
mondo di entita ... e 1’invito e la spinta al passo della trascendenza, dal 
quale ogni spirito critico sempre rifugge.16
Croce was thus rejecting the traditional ontologies of the Catholic philosophy of his 
time, which analyzed reality in terms of static, universal ‘essences’ transcending 
historical change. But this was not the only target of his attack, because there were 
also more generalized views about the role of philosophy which he sought to 
discredit.
Croce argued that the metaphysical attitude was connected to a very 
conservative view of philosophy as the science par excellence. The traditional 
problems inherited from Scholastic thought (matter and mind, God and the world, the 
essence of reality) had to be replaced by a critical posture which questioned the 
position of philosophy as the formulation, or worse, the regurgitation of received 
systems. Croce rejected the idea of philosophy as a contemplative discipline, and saw 
it instead as a critical tool which had to be applied to specific problems which 
emerged from specific historical conditions. He claimed that the real achievement of 
modem philosophy was its ‘immanence’, its independence from a transcendental 
world view and its focus on an immanent conception of reality. The ‘death of God’, to 
use one of the most famous of Nietzsche’s expressions, had destroyed the possibility 
of a metaphysics, namely the idea of philosophy as a scientia prima, replacing it with 
an immanent view of reality. Indeed Croce argued that
chi continua a considerare la figura del filosofo professionale come il 
piu alto simbolo del pensiero, soggiace a vecchie e oltrepassate 
concezioni, e non potrebbe giustificarle se non attribuendo al filosofo 
la speculazione di cio che e di la o di sopra del mondo o (che e lo 
stesso) di ripensare il mondo con un pensiero diverso da quello 
comune.17
For Croce the identification of philosophy with the notion of a superior realm of 
thought was the cause of its increasing isolation from cultural, political and social life. 
The pervasiveness of the metaphysical attitude was evident in many contemporary 
thinkers, among whom was to be found his friend Giovanni Gentile, preoccupied with
16 Ibid., p.5.
17 B. Croce, ‘Troppa filosofia’, La Critica, i (1923), pp.61-64 (p.62).
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penetrating ‘absolute reality’. It was this attitude which, according to Croce, created a 
gap between philosophy, common sense and practical life. Croce was not concerned 
with the immutable nature of reality. To him, reality was the outcome of a complex 
cultural development rather than a datum, as in empiricism or nai've realism. It is 
through analyzing the historical framework in which ideas and events occurred that 
we can retrieve the elements which make our present situation intelligible.
Philosophy had to surrender its idle and purely speculative remoteness. In an 
immanent perspective there is no fundamental problem to be solved, but only specific 
problems which arise in given historical times and societies. Croce maintained that 
the only viable way of philosophizing was the ‘filosofia particolare’ which focuses on
specific issues without the pretence of explaining what he called T  alone di mistero’
• 18of reality. The polemical target was the tendency to reduce the complexity of reality 
to a series of formulas. Intellectuals need to understand that their own positions are 
conditioned by the time and the society in which they live, and that there are no 
eternal truths.
Another form of ‘metaphysical’ thought in disguise was, for Croce, 
represented by the reductionism present in the natural sciences which philosophers, 
historians, and the practitioners of other humanistic disciplines were frequently 
tempted to import into their own procedures and methods of analysis. The 
methodologies of the natural sciences seek to abstract phenomena from those a-casual 
and indeterminate features which in many ways constitute the essence of humanistic 
pursuits. What can be tested and validated in the laboratory is indeed a part of human 
knowledge. It can give us Taws’ about what will happen under prescribed conditions 
and in controlled circumstances. But to seek to encapsulate the whole of human 
understanding and forms of cognition within these boundaries was to Croce 
grotesque. In this sense one could say that Croce was against those over-zealous late 
19th century positivists who could not see beyond a crude empiricism. From the very 
start of his career Croce had an aversion against all-encompassing systems. The 
illusory allure of such systems in critical periods of history which seemed to be crying 
out for the solutions they offered was not easy to resist. Hayden White has rightly 
observed that,
18 Ibid., p. 26.
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during the years between the two wars, when most of Europe was 
yielding to the fascination of a simple solution for all its complex 
social problems, Croce, virtually alone in the continent, continued to 
launch his work as social critic.1
It took great courage to persist in a position which was easily targeted as lacking in 
commitment and obfuscatory. Yet White has seen that it was precisely in his 
uncompromising critiques of easy solutions that the value of his criticism lay.
Antimetaphysical method
This thesis analyzes Croce’s antimetaphysical method in relation to history during the 
whole span of his intellectual career. I have identified the hallmark of Croce’s thought 
in his antimetaphysical attitude. This focus on antimetaphysical method reveals a 
Croce who was deeply concerned with human freedom and the need to practice what 
he called an ‘immanent’ style of thinking in order to grasp its complexity. The 
monumental idealist philosophy with which he has been so widely associated was in 
reality the antithesis of his project. Rarely, in the history of ideas, has there been a 
figure more profoundly, and consistently, misrepresented than Croce. This change of 
perspective in assessing his thought carries a numbers of important implications. 
Croce did not believe that philosophy was essentially different from common sense. 
Furthermore, the anti-metaphysical method entails the rejection of ‘total history’.
If one looks at Croce’s research as a reaction to an all-encompassing thought 
one can understand his insistence on subjectivity and narration. Croce devised an 
epistemology in which history was related to rhetoric, ideology, ethics, and politics, 
although it could not be reduced to any of these components. According to the Italian 
philosopher, one needs to take into account the different discourses which constitute 
the historical narrative. Equally important, history is an open process in which our 
views are continuously reassessed according to the needs of the present. This 
‘epistemic relativism’, far from opening the doors to skepticism, is the very condition 
for genuine research. Skepticism in its pure form attacks at root our common 
experience of knowing, considering any scientific advance irrelevant, whereas a 
sound epistemic relativism states the provisional achievements of our understanding 
and does not yield to dogmatic conceptions. Croce’s ‘historicism’, if understood
19 H. White, ‘The abiding influence o f Croce’s idea o f history’, Journal o f  Modern History, 35 (1963), 
pp. 109-24 (p. 110).
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correctly, aims at an open conception of history which permits an ‘organic’ vision of 
society and culture, and which is opposed to a mechanistic one. Historical narrative is 
the terrain on which our concepts and ideas are created and tested.
Croce was among the first intellectuals who suggested that philosophers had to 
intervene in cultural and political battles with intellectual integrity and ideological 
honesty. For him the aim of philosophy was not to impose the views of an intellectual 
elite, but rather to become an integral part of the social fabric through its interaction 
with it. This cultural battle was seen as a critical process in historical terms. Here the 
pressing question was what human need should history serve; for example, the 
yearning for a glorious self-affirming past, as in the case of Fascist propaganda, or the 
liberation, however painful, that comes from facing the past through a more complex 
and authentic interrogation? Croce chose the latter, defining history as a process of 
liberation. History enables groups to obtain and maintain power. Historical narrative 
does not reflect an objective past, but provides space for reassessing the use, misuse 
and various forms of exploitation of power and interests. Moreover, for Croce 
historical knowledge was crucial for Tightening the burden of the present’ through an 
awareness of the past, and this didactic function of historical narrative was, for the 
philosopher, self-evident and the very reason for its existence. In this sense, and in 
this sense only, history for Croce was the ‘history of liberty’; not in a Hegelian sense 
but in a very worldly, practical one.
The roots of Croce’s demise
Before analyzing Croce’s antimetaphysical method it is important to examine the 
reasons for Croce’s neglect particularly in Italy. The first chapter provides the genesis 
of Croce’s demise following the end of the Second World War, showing that Croce’s 
marginalization was based on a political agenda rather than a dispassionate analysis of 
its theoretical foundations. Progressive circles, using Gramsci as their theoretical 
champion, targeted Croce as the major exponent of Italian conservativism. The 
interpretation of Gramsci promoted by intellectuals of the calibre of Bobbio, Garin 
and Abbate set the tone of the criticism on Croce. Moreover, the need for a renewal of 
the Italian cultural and philosophical tradition induced intellectuals like Geymonat 
and Abbagnano to unleash a fierce attack on Croce, now seen as the exponent of an 
old-fashioned style of philosophizing. From this point, Croce’s thought on the Italian
12
peninsula was mostly confined to Naples, acquiring that veneer of provincialism with 
which it is still associated.
Core of the thesis
Chapter two analyzes Croce’s intellectual apprenticeship outlining the development of 
Croce’s antimetaphysical terrain in the field of history. It rejects the myth of an 
‘Olympian’ and elitist thinker detached from the rest of the world and shows how 
Croce was deeply involved in the issues of his time. Some space has been given to 
recounting details of Croce’s life, mainly in order to dispel some commonplaces of 
Croce mythology: for example, that the Italian philosopher harboured a deep-seated 
contempt for the masses; that he had a lifelong hostility to the methods of the natural 
sciences, and was responsible for Italy’s alleged backwardness in fields such as 
linguistics, psychology and sociology; that after an initial flirtation with Marxism, he 
became an implacable opponent of Socialism and Communism.
In order to provide a setting for my thesis, I have explored the importance of 
Croce’s first intellectual excursus in the light of his antimetaphysical posture. Here, 
Croce’s main concern was to find a suitable epistemological foundation for history 
and literature. He did not have the much-vaunted prejudicial attitude towards 
positivism which has been widely attributed to him, although he could clearly see its 
limitations when applied to the humanities. Moreover, far from finding a solution to 
the attack from positivism in a revamped Hegelianism, he rejected the latter as an 
implausible ‘philosophy of history’. Most importantly for my research, Croce began 
to examine the subjective component of historical narrative and posed some crucial 
questions which took forward the debate about the status of history started in 
Germany a decade or so before. Objectivity, narration, the openness of the historical 
process, were the themes around which Croce’s investigation was orbiting. He made 
clear that strictly speaking
la storia e il processo storico e questo varia da individuo a individuo ... non 
c’eun problema pratico che sia il medesimo per tutti, cosi come non c’eun  
conoscere storico comune a tutti, ma ... ciascuno ricerca di volta in volta la 
verita storica che a lui urge per i suoi fini riportare alia coscienza.20
20 Croce, II carattere, p.205.
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The encounter with Marxism reinforced Croce’s early skepticism towards 
definitive historical accounts, and made him aware of some important factors in 
history. Indeed, Croce considered Marxism a useful tool to be used in historiography, 
for the analysis of ‘forces’ such ideology and the economy, rather than a 
Weltanschauung to be followed blindly. This view was directly opposite that of 
Gentile who considered Marxism as a ‘vision of the world’.
I have used the correspondence between Croce and Gentile to show that the 
celebrated collaboration, and the subsequent traumatic break between the two 
philosophers, is the result of a superficial reading. In reality, Croce and Gentile had 
very different points of view from the very start of their collaboration. Gentile was 
sympathetic to a systematic, all-inclusive philosophy, which is the ultimate purpose of 
idealism, whereas Croce used philosophy to investigate the theoretical foundations of 
history and literature.
The programme of the bimonthly La Critica has also helped me to show 
Croce’s antimetaphysical intentions. Croce’s aim was to produce a more thorough 
understanding of specific disciplines, and not to enclose the whole knowledge within 
an idealistic system.
The structure of Croce’s epistemology of history has been investigated in 
detail in chapter three. Here, after a brief sketch of the period during which Croce’s 
ideas were formed, I have analyzed what I have called Croce’s ‘modes of critique’ 
giving a different interpretation of the purpose behind the ‘Philosophy of the Spirit’. 
Indeed, whereas this work has previously been interpreted as the monumental 
systematic basis of a neo-idealistic system, I have read it as the attempt to build an 
open and non-reductionist narrative to be applied to historical research. This 
interpretation privileges the normative rather than the ontological value of the 
Filosofia dello Spirito and follows Croce’s suggestion that any ontological attempt to 
explain reality should be abandoned. Thus, Croce’s method becomes a tool for critical 
judgements on history with the help of the aesthetic, logical, economic and ethical 
‘modes’.
Croce’s antimetaphysical method was also the main foundation for his critique 
of the exact sciences and the role they might play in the historical narrative. Croce 
rejected the reductionism of a conception of history based on ‘scientific laws’, 
emphasizing instead the components of subjectivity in the historical discourse. He
14
insisted that history had to find its own methodology embracing, instead of 
eschewing, issues associated with subjectivity.
In chapter four I have underlined the importance of Teoria e storia della storia 
storiografia which, in my opinion, represents the most important point of 
development of Croce’s antimetaphysical method. The Italian philosopher abandoned 
even the external form of philosophical treatises in order to embrace an open theory of 
historiography exploring a number of different issues among which the concepts of 
prejudice, tradition and validity of the historical interpretation. He also explored the 
ethico-political component of historical narrative providing a powerful tool for 
analyzing the dynamics of politics and power as well as the ethical component of all 
historiographies.
The notion of history as a contemporary issue is the main theme which runs 
through chapter five. Here I pointed out how Croce, during a critical phase for the 
Italian state, related history to the needs and interests of the present in order to shape a 
meaningful historical account. In doing so Croce remained faithful to his 
antimetaphysical epistemology. He gave history a purposive dimension, relating it to 
praxis and ‘freedom.’ History addresses the problems we are facing and provides 
crucial suggestions for our activites. Historical discourse in Croce became critical for 
overcoming the past, creating the conditions for understanding the present, and in 
preparing for the future. I also emphasized the differences between Croce’s open 
historical discourse, and Marxism and Hegelianism with their strong elements of 
determinism.
The last section of chapter five has been devoted to the potential impact of 
Croce’s ideas today. I found many similarities with some aspects of postmodernism 
and its suspicion of ‘grand narratives’ and explored the affinity of themes between 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Croce’s idea of history. I have concluded my thesis 
maintaining that Croce can be used as a valuable interlocutor for those engaged in 
discussing contemporary historiographical issues.
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CHAPTER ONE
ORIGINS OF CROCE’S DEMISE IN ITALIAN POST-WAR CULTURE
1.1 PROPONENTS OF A ‘PROGRESSIVE’ CULTURE
This section of the chapter will be primarily concerned with the interpretation of 
Croce’s philosophy as expounded by some important leaders of what we can call 
Italian progressive culture. I include in the definition of ‘progressive culture’ that 
group of post-war intellectuals -  from Marxists to Social Democrats -  who were 
strongly in favour of social and political reforms.
The main aim of post-war progressive intellectuals was to build a radical 
alternative to Fascism, and to 19th century Liberalism which was considered a sort of 
precursor of it. Croce was undoubtedly seen as a great protagonist of an earlier 
renewal of Italian culture (Gramsci) and the ‘moral conscience of Italian anti-
• 91Fascism’. However, his thought was also seen as permeated by a 19th century 
idealist perspective. Moreover, in the eyes of this new generation of intellectuals, 
Croce promoted a politically conservative view which had itself to be overcome in the 
interests of reform.
I believe that the reading of Croce, initiated by Gramsci and carried on by 
prominent intellectuals such as Bobbio, Garin and Abbate during the first half of the 
20th century, is crucial for an understanding of the Neapolitan philosopher’s 
subsequent reception in Italy.
Broadly speaking, their strategy was to ‘reduce’ the thinker’s philosophy to a 
form of idealism embodying a sharp conceptual distinction between theory and 
practice, and so concerned with the theoretical as to deserve the description 
‘speculative philosophy’. Furthermore, the methodological principles underlying 
Croce’s idealism were themselves seen as reflecting his political conservatism. 
Analysing the strategy used by these theorists will take us to the very root of one of 
the most widespread interpretations of Croce’s work.
After Croce’s death in 1952, post-war Italian culture began to settle its account 
with him. This had earlier been set in motion on the left by the communist leader 
Palmiro Togliatti, one of whose first initiatives on his return to Italy in 1944 was to 
establish a theoretical monthly, La Rinascita. In 1944 he penned an article on Croce’s
21 N. Bobbio, Profilo ideologico del novecento italiano (Turin: Einaudi, 1986), p. 141.
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cultural and political role in Italy during the Fascist era, accusing him of ‘an open 
collaboration’ with the regime:
Benedetto Croce, ha avuto, come campione della lotta contro il 
marxismo, una curiosa situazione di privilegio, nel corso degli ultimi 
venti anni. Egli ha tenuto cattedra in questa materia, istituendosi cosi’ 
tra lui e il fascismo un’ aperta collaborazione, prezzo della facolta che 
gli fu concessa di arrischiare ogni tanto una timida ffecciolina contro il 
regime.22
As editor of Gramsci’s Quaderni, Togliatti was fully aware of the potential on 
the left for utilizing the Sardinian’s powerful critique of Croce. Togliatti’s advocacy 
of the Gramscian critique was to have a profound effect on future readings of Croce. 
Gramsci, although he did not live long enough to witness Croce’s developments of his 
own thought from the late 1930’s, nevertheless laid the foundations for an important 
critical account of the Neapolitan thinker. The terrain was so established that at issue 
was the battle between two different conceptions of the world, one being conservative 
and endemically anti-democratic and the other progressive, in favour of radical 
change, and unafraid of the traumatic breaks with tradition that ‘progress’ demands.
22 P. Togliatti ‘Che cosa deve essere il partito comunista’, La Rinascita, 1, June 1944, p.30.
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1.2 GRAMSCI’S ATTACK
After the fall of the fascist regime, the intellectual and politician Antonio Gramsci 
(1891-1937) became one of the most widely read thinkers in the new post-war culture. 
The posthumous publication of both the Lettere in 1947 and the Quaderni between 
1948 and 1951 were undoubtedly major cultural events for the newborn Italian 
republic.
Although fragmented because of the nature of his confinement as a political 
prisoner, Gramsci’s Quaderni represent an exceptional attempt to rethink orthodox 
Marxism and specifically the condition of socialism in Italy after its defeat by 
Fascism. Gramsci devoted a considerable part of his work to the critique of Croce’s 
philosophy, which at that time represented a powerful critique of Marxism as well as 
a challenge to any kind of totalitarian system of thought. Eugenio Garin summarises 
well the main programme of the Quaderni. It was to
mettere a fuoco la funzione degli intellettuali nella storia d’ltalia, ossia 
in una storia singolare d’Europa ... definire una tradizione nazionale 
diversa ricostituita su un passato con canoni storiograflci nuovi, in una 
grande operazione politica quale e sempre la scelta di un passato; 
analizzare criticamente 1’opera di Croce indicata come la piu rilevante 
nella cultura italiana prima del fascismo.
In a recent book David Ward points out how ‘ Gramsci’s relationship to Croce 
was far from simple. Like many young people of his generation he had been drawn to 
Croce in the early years of the century.’24 In fact, Croce was regarded by Gramsci as 
one of the most influential cultural leaders in Italy and Europe. His prestige, he 
maintained, was comparable to that of the Pope in matters of faith and morals. Indeed,
• 25  •the philosopher could be considered ‘una specie di papa laico’ of culture. His 
importance could hardly be underestimated and the influence of the Neapolitan 
philosopher in Italian intellectual life was pervasive.
Croce represented one of the richest sources of cultural ferment in the period 
between the turn of the twentieth century and the First World War. Not only did he 
support a number of reviews and newspapers such as La Voce, L ’Unita’, La
23 E. Garin, Con Gramsci (Rome: Riuniti, 1997), p. 123.
24 D. Ward, Antifascism, Cultural Politics in Italy 1943-1947, Benedetto Croce and the Liberals, Carlo 
Levi and the “Actionists ” (London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), p.67.
25 A. Gramsci, II materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce (Rome: Riuniti, 2000), p. 314.
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rivoluzione liberale, but he was also the editor of the enormously influential La 
Critica.
Gramsci believed that Croce’s work represented a major cultural shift 
comparable with what had occurred in the Renaissance, and his function was 
comparable to that of a religious reformer26 affecting virtually every aspect of both 
the political and cultural life of Italy and Europe:
l’attivita intellettuale e filosofica del Croce si inserisce nella tradizione 
culturale del nuovo Stato italiano e riporta la cultura nazionale alle 
origini sprovincializzandola e depurandola di tutte le scorie 
magniloquenti e bizzarre del Risorgimento.27
Indeed Gramsci maintained that the Neapolitan philosopher’s great merit lay in
• • 98building an alternative cultural perspective, based on ‘immanence’ rather than 
‘transcendentalism’, exerting a powerful secularising influence in Italy and Europe:
Croce e essenzialmente anticofessionale ... e per un largo gruppo di 
intellettuali italiani ed europei la sua filosofia ... e stata una vera e 
propria riforma intellettuale e morale di tipo ‘Rinascimento’. ‘Vivere 
senza religione’ ... e stato il succo che il Sorel ha tratto dalla lettura del 
Croce.29
A substantial part of Gramsci’s appraisal consists of detailed analysis of the 
reasons for Croce’s popularity among European intellectuals. He emphasized the 
moral dimension of Croce’s thought, especially his firm belief in traditional values 
such as reason, truth and freedom which he held to be immutable in the face of 
historical and cultural disaster or upheaval. Indeed, according to Gramsci, Croce’s 
attitude during the First World War exhibited faith in a rational plan, which drives 
history and events, and gives a certain Olympian serenity to his thought even in the 
most critical times:
26 ‘II significato e la funzione intellettuale di Croce ... sono quelli di un riformatore religioso.’ ibid., 
p.234.
27 Ibid., 238.
28 This claim about Croce’s ‘immanence’ despite Gramsci’s simultaneous claim about his ‘idealism’ 
will be discussed later.
29 Gramsci, II materialismo, p.283.
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II Croce e rimasto imperturbabile nella sua serenita e nell’affermazione 
nella sua fede che ‘metafisicamente il male non puo prevalere e che la 
storia e razionalita’.
For Gramsci this faith was a defining element of Croce’s ‘ethico-political’ 
conception of history. Moreover, this detachment from the world was perfectly 
reflected in Croce’s limpid prose, which the communist thinker related to the best 
tradition of ‘Italian scientific prose’:
mi pare ... esatto collocare gli scritti del Croce nella linea della prosa
31scientifica italiana che ha avuto scrittori come il Galileo.
This is the reason why, Gramsci acknowledged, the Neapolitan philosopher found a 
fertile ground in the Anglo-Saxon world:
gli anglosassoni hanno sempre preferito le concezioni del mondo che 
non si presentavano come grandi e farragginosi sistemi ma come 
espressione del senso comune, integrato dalla critica e dalla riflessione, 
come soluzione di problemi morali e pratici.
Gramsci took Croce to be subscribing to a view which was committed to 
values which endure through historical change framed within an idealistic 
metaphysics. Moreover, the immanentist character of Croce’s metaphysics enabled 
him to appeal to practice and common sense. And indeed Gramsci considered that the 
hub of Croce’s whole philosophical conception lay in his continuous appeal to life in 
practice.
This attachment to life made the Neapolitan philosopher a sort of interpreter of 
a ‘common sense view’ complemented by a critique on moral and practical issues. 
Croce’s activity was therefore presented as a critical reflection on traditional thought, 
his aim being the refutation of a number of prejudices typical of philosophy. 
Unfortunately, however, such positive features of Gramsci’s appraisal were swept up 
into the collective amnesia which seems to have captured, with one or two partial 
exceptions we shall discuss, Italy’s powerfully influential ‘progressive’ intellectuals 
in their anxiety to accompany the country’s economic and social reconstruction with a
30 Ibid.,p.231.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p.232.
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‘progressive’ intellectual renewal which only too easily regimented their predecessors
'>'1
into favourable and hostile camps.
In effect, it was easier to focus on Gramsci’s comments which saw Croce’s 
philosophical enterprise in a more negative light. Crucially, Croce’s rejection of 
materialism was held by the Marxist thinker to lead to an intellectualized and 
reactionary conception of value (reason, truth, freedom) which purposely excluded the 
masses from the sphere of political and cultural influence: ‘la morale del Croce e 
troppo da intellettuali ... non puo diventare popolare’34. Croce’s main defect was 
therefore his conscious refusal to ‘go to the people’:
Croce non e ‘andato al popolo’, non e voluto diventare un elemento 
‘nazionale’ ... non ha voluto creare una schiera di discepoli che ... 
potessero popolarizzare la sua filosofia, tentando di farla diventare un 
elemento educativo fin dalle scuole elementari.35
On Gramsci’s reading, Croce’s thought, far from being an impartial and Olympian 
reflection on philosophy, expressed an ideologically driven purpose.
According to the progressive thinker, both the moral tone and the style of 
Croce’s writings are part of an attempt to provide a solid ideological foundation for 
the Italian bourgeoisie. Croce’s thought, despite its claim to be a theoretical 
philosophy ‘super partes’ was the ideology of a specific class which found in the 
Neapolitan thinker a formidable champion for its cause. Indeed, for Gramsci, the 
whole project of the Filosofia dello Spirito, and more specifically Croce’s historical 
account of both Italy and Europe, exhibited an ineradicable reactionary bias.
In particular, Gramsci remarked that Croce’s historical perspective 
marginalized or even ignored revolutionary fractures highlighting only moments of 
restoration, and asked:
e possible scrivere (concepire) una storia d’Europa del XIX secolo 
senza trattare organicamente della rivoluzione francese e delle guerre 
napoleoniche? E puo farsi una storia d’Italia e dell’eta modema senza 
trattare delle lotte del Risorgimento?36
33 Croce was not the only Italian thinker to suffer this form o f ideological marginalization. One could 
point to such figures as the late 19th century sociological thinkers Pareto and Mosca, easily seen as 
‘elite’ intellectuals feeding Fascist ideas.
34 Gramsci, II materialismo, p.314.
35 Ibid., p.283.
36 Ibid., p.242.
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Gramsci saw in Croce a strong exponent of that 19th century European 
tradition of historiography which was afraid of any violent uprising and tended 
systematically to minimize the moments of struggle in favour of those of settlement. 
The result is a historical account which is:
un hegelismo degenerato e mutilato, perche’ la sua preoccupazione 
fondamentale e un timor panico dei movimenti giacobini, di ogni 
intervento attivo delle grandi masse popolari come fattore di progresso 
storico.37
The philosophical system that Croce created provided a sort of introductory education 
ready to be used by the ruling elites, an effective tool of restoration for staving off 
social change and the advent of socialism. In this context, Croce’s critique of Marx’s 
philosophy of praxis was at bottom an attempt to stop the rising power of the masses.
But what Gramsci also stressed was the derivation of the best elements of 
Croce’s thought from Marxism. Despite his fierce critique of historical materialism 
the Neapolitan thinker used it in his analysis of ideologies and in his political theory, 
transforming it into a renewed version of speculative philosophy:
II Croce ha ritradotto in linguaggio speculativo le acquisizioni 
progressive della filosofia della praxis e in questa ritraduzione e il 
meglio del suo pensiero.38
According to Gramsci Croce denied that Marxism had any sort of lasting 
influence on his thought. He had refused to incorporate historical materialism within 
his philosophical framework and assigned to it a merely empirical role. Moreover, 
Gramsci held that the philosopher deliberately made use of historical materialism to 
set up his philosophical views arguing that
una gran parte della filosofia di Croce rappresenta questo tentativo di 
riassorbire la filosofia della praxis e incorporarla come ancella della 
cultura tradizionale.39
For Gramsci this use of Marxism provided a framework for a conservative 
conception of politics, in which historical development remains in the hands of the
37 Ibid., p.235.
38 Ibid., p. 293.
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ruling classes. Indeed, Gramsci thought that Croce’s doctrine of political ideologies as 
instruments for effective political control was derived from Marx’s statement of 
ideologies as tools for obtaining power in the political struggle. More specifically, the 
whole conception of ethico-political history40 was inspired by historical materialism. 
Nevertheless, whereas Marx used these stances to unmask the true nature of 
ideologies as a means of coercion on the part of the ruling classes, Croce exploited 
them to find a justification for ‘political conservativism’ and preservation of the status 
quo.
Another target of Gramsci’s criticism, connected with the notion of ethico- 
political history, is Croce’s separation between ‘intellectual’ and ‘political’ roles in 
society. Gramsci pointed out that intellectuals have an active function in the political 
struggle, to the extent that they influence cultural trends and the ideologies in which 
political views develop.41 The Marxist thinker held that the consequence of Croce’s 
separation leads to the support of the elites in power, and results in a policy of laissez 
faire, or even of support for the established order, on the part of intellectuals.
Here lies one of the major differences between Croce and Gramsci. For the 
latter, intellectuals - who are ‘organic’, and thus not restricted to philosophers, 
historians, artists and alike, but include a broader spectrum of creators of the culture 
of the social formation -  are politicians, they play a direct political role, supporting or 
criticising the form of government in power; for Croce the two roles are detached and 
must remain differentiated.
Gramsci instead claimed that only the identification between intellectual and 
politician and hence that of philosophy and politics could lead to a concrete concept 
of history:
Se il politico e uno storico ... lo storico e un politico e in questo senso 
... la storia e sempre storia contemporanea, cioe politica 42
For Gramsci, the complexity of historical movements in Croce’s thought was reduced 
to an explanation of ideas without reference to social relations. Moreover, the
39 Ibid., p.200.
40 A. Gramsci: ‘L’avvicinamento dei due termini etica e politica  ... e l ’espressione delle esigenze in 
cui si muove il pensiero crociano: Vetica si riferisce all’attivita della societa civile, all’egemonia; la 
politica si riferisce alia coercizione statale e govemativa.’ Ibid., p.240.
41 See A. Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e I ’organizzazione della cultura (Rome: Riuniti, 2000), pp.3-23.
42 Gramsci, II materialismo storico, ibid., p.274.
23
Neapolitan philosopher did not take into account the economic sphere in which men 
live and act.
The consequence of this reading produced an idealistic and strongly 
conservative vision of the past that was represented by Croce’s ethico-political 
approach to history. Moreover, this theoretical construction could not properly be 
defined as history, the Sardinian intellectual insisted; it is ‘niente altro che una 
presentazione polemica di filosofemi piu o meno interessanti, ma non e storia’.43 
Marxism, according to Gramsci, is not a conciliatory or harmonious conception of 
history, it is a realistic one which takes into account the tensions and ruptures 
contained in social and economic changes.
In opposition to Croce’s purely speculative philosophy, Gramsci maintained, 
stands historical materialism which eliminates the duality between theory and 
practice, or transcendence and immanence. Therefore Marxism is the true philosophy 
of history since it encapsulates the practical concerns of human beings in given 
historical conditions and provides concrete answers. Thus theory is absorbed into 
practice.
A final objection raised by Gramsci to Croce’s philosophy of history, concerns 
the so called ‘religione della liberta’,
La liberta come identita di storia [e di spirito] e la liberta come 
religione-superstizione, come ideologia immediatamente
1 • 44circonstanziata, come strumento pratico di govemo.
The pillar of Croce’s conception of history is ‘liberty’ as the core of any attempt to
make sense of our past and ultimately our present.45 But for the progressive
intellectual ‘freedom’ is a conceptual tool to be applied to a particular social group.
Therefore, one cannot talk about liberty in abstract terms or we risk considering all
kinds of historical institutions as embodying the development of freedom, even the
ancient provinces of the tyrannical Persian state:
Se la storia e storia della liberta ... la formula e valida per la storia di 
tutto il genere umano di ogni tempo e di ogni luogo, e liberta anche la
43 Ibid., p.255.
44 Ibid., p.245
45 For example: ‘La liberta come l ’etema formatrice della storia, soggetto stesso di ogni storia. Come 
tale, essa e, per un verso, il principio esplicativo del corso storico e, per l’altro, l ’ideale morale 
dell’umanita. ’ In B. Croce, La storia comepensiero e come azione (Bari: Laterza, 1973), p.48.
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storia delle satrapie orientali. Liberta allora significa solo ‘movimento’, 
svolgimento, dialettica.46
In reality this notion of liberty, Gramsci argued, masks once again a tendency 
in Croce towards a conservative view of politics:
Un concetto come quello di liberta che si presta ad essere impiegato 
dagli stessi gesuiti, contro i liberali (...) non e appunto solo un 
involucro concettuale che vale solo per il nocciolo reale che ogni 
gruppo sociale vi pone? E si puo quindi parlare di religione della 
liberta?47
What Croce calls ‘the religion of liberty’, for the Marxist thinker is simply a political 
ideology, namely the ideology which bestows a leading role on the middle class. 
Gramsci’s point is that Croce’s apparently abstract and trans-historical conception of 
liberty is in fact a very concrete historical conception which embodies bourgeois class 
interests. Croce’s tendency to abstraction, and his denial of the Marxist principle that 
freedom is a concrete conceptual tool, blinded him to his own bias.
To Gramsci, however there was a still deeper flaw in Croce’s notion of liberty. 
It could not have the characteristics and the popularity of the catholic religion, since it 
was not based on a ‘faith’ shared by all strata of society. Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, Gramsci thought that the elitist Croce was not concerned with popularising his 
views because of his aristocratic conception of culture48. For the Marxist thinker 
Croce’s apparent disengagement with the masses is directly connected with the 
philosopher’s conception of liberty. In fact Croce’s notion of liberty could be linked 
with the 19th century tradition of ‘moderatismo’ which harks back to Vincenzo Cuoco 
and his conception of ‘rivoluzione passiva’ that expresses ‘assenza di un’iniziativa 
popolare’ in favour of ‘restaurazioni progressive’.49 Hence, the Marxist intellectual 
concluded that, in the end, the ‘religione della liberta’ was nothing but a vigorous
fhattempt to conserve both the political and economic institutions of 19 century 
Europe.
46 Gramsci, II materialismo storico, p.245.
47 Ibid.p.246.
48 ‘Per Croce e religione ogni concezione del mondo che si presenti come una morale. Ma e awenuto 
questo per liberta? Essa e stata religione per un piccolo numero di intellettuali.’ Ibid.
49 Ibid., p.276.
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Related to this conservative vision of history there was what Gramsci called 
Croce’s ‘obsession’ with historical materialism:
II Croce combatte con troppo accanimento la filosofia della praxis ... 
Questo accanimento e sospetto, puo rivelarsi un alibi per negare una 
resa dei conti.50
We should not forget that when Gramsci was writing his Quaderni dal carcere 
Croce’s fame was at its peak, and his interpretation of Marxism as a pseudo­
philosophy was widespread. That was one of the reasons why Gramsci advocated a 
sort of ‘Anti-Croce’ to counter the philosopher’s views.
The only way to challenge Croce’s supremacy, for Gramsci, was to build a 
strong movement of (Marxist) intellectuals keenly devoted to the critique of Croce’s 
work in order to come to terms with his philosophy. The point worthy of note here is 
Gramsci’s awareness of the great political weight of Croce’s views. The Sardinian 
thinker was conscious of the important cultural operation that Croce was carrying out. 
In the eyes of Gramsci it was not only a question of theory or mere philosophical 
speculation: the aim of Croce’s work of synthesis was to build a radical cultural 
restoration. His philosophy was influencing the whole of Italian - and arguably 
European - society; thus he had to be taken seriously and thoroughly studied in order 
to be defeated:
Occorre ... venire a questa resa di conti, nel modo piu ampio e 
approfondito possible. Un lavoro di tal genere, un Anti-Croce che 
nell’atmosfera culturale modema potesse avere il significato e 
l’importanza che ha avuto YAnti-During per la generazione precedente 
la Guerra mondiale, varebbe la pena che un intero gruppo di uomini ci 
dedicasse dieci anni di attivita.51
If we now move onto the purely theoretical arena, we can see how Gramsci 
outlined a critique of Croce’s use of dialectic, believing that this notion was central to 
the philosopher’s system and had direct repercussions on his conservative political 
attitude. The Marxist intellectual found that Croce’s use of dialectic was quite 
innovative in so far as it introduced the notion of ‘distincts’ (<distinti) which replaced 
that of ‘opposites’ (opposti) given by Hegel. The four-fold distinction within the
50 Ibid., p.250.
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dialectical movement is an essential element of Croce’s method. The four ‘distincts’ 
in Croce’s system are: art, philosophy, economy and ethics. Such activities for the 
Neapolitan philosopher are distinct', however the distinctions lead not to separation 
but rather to interrelations. Distinguishing rather than opposing the ‘distincts’ allowed 
Croce to connect different spheres of human endeavour without privileging a 
particular one. Thus there could be space for interdependent disciplines coexisting at 
the same time.52 Croce claimed that this division was essential for understanding the 
real nature of the cognitive act and avoiding reductionism. It is essential to preserve 
the unique character of these distinct human activities, whether theoretical or 
practical.
Despite Gramsci’s indebtedness to Croce in his own revision of Marxist 
determinism, he was nevertheless deeply concerned by the Neapolitan’s refutation of 
the classical Marxist structure/superstructure division as a piece of metaphysics. 
Indeed, according to Gramsci, the critique of Marxism carried out by Croce was 
mainly based on the argument that historical materialism was an abstract method 
which tended to embody an oversimplified vision of reality centred around the 
economy. The economic discipline served as a kind of ‘hidden god’ (dio ascoso) to 
explain all other aspects of life. But Gramsci argued that the Marxist distinction 
between structure and superstructure had more validity than that of Croce’s 
‘distincts’, and levelled back at the Neapolitan philosopher the charge of 
transcendentalism. The Marxist distinction was an indispensable tool for 
understanding the actual mechanisms of society and avoiding an impressionistic 
conception of its development.
On the other hand, Croce’s notion of distincts, for the Sardinian thinker, had 
the function of weakening the force of the dialectic, rendering it anodyne through 
transformist subterfuges. The result of this operation was ‘speculative philosophy’ 
which had all the characteristics of a theology:
La filosofia del Croce rimane una filosofia ‘speculativa’ e in cio non e 
solo una traccia di trascendendenza e di teologia, ma e tutta la 
trascendenza e la teologia appena liberate dalla piu grossolana scorza 
mitologica.53
51 Ibid., p.250.
52 This topic will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 3.
53 Ibid., p. 241.
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The extent to which this is a justified critique will be dealt with in a subsequent 
section dealing with Croce’s intellectual interaction with Marxism. The point to be 
made at this stage is that the Gramscian critique was influential on a whole 
generation of post-war intellectuals and on their reception of Croce.
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1.3 1955: THE ‘PROGRESSIVE’ ASSAULT
The powerful critique contained in the Gramscian Quaderni began to question the 
position of Croce in Italian culture, and many other critical studies were published in 
the wake of this seminal text. Indeed, shortly after the Second World War we find a 
flood of publications which, in one way or another, tried to come to terms with 
Croce’s philosophy.54 However, the major attack came from the progressive area a 
decade later, namely in 1955. This is a crucial date for the history of criticism of 
Croce’s thought since three important books were published that year: Politica e 
cultura by Norberto Bobbio, Cronache di filosofia italiana by Eugenio Garin, and La 
filosofia di Benedetto Croce e la crisi della societa italiana by Michele Abbate.
The scholar Michele Biscione in an article of 1956 accurately portrayed the 
cultural climate of those times:
Nel campo del pensiero politico un atteggiamento di netta opposizione 
a Croce ha caratterizzato gia da molto ... l’orientamento del marxismo 
italiano. Spezzare una lancia contro Croce era un’ottima prassi e percio 
una teoria senz’ altro raccomandabile, sia per il gregario che per il 
dirigente con incombenze di carattere culturale. II che e stato fatto con 
un’ampiezza che e solo pari alia pesantezza degli interventi, in alto, 
meno in alto e in basso, nella discussione di teorie storiografiche, come 
per questioni di carattere politico ed etico.55
I have already mentioned the fact that the communist leader Togliatti saw 
Croce’s thought as extremely reactionary, and thought that it could influence the 
orientation of large strata of the population in post-war Italy. The context within 
which this conflict took place was mainly a political one since Croce represented, 
both in the eyes of the Communists and of the Christian-democrats, a political enemy 
to be defeated56. The strategy was fairly simple. One needed to create a line of 
continuity between 19th century Liberalism and Fascism and underline the 
conservative stances that both the man, and more importantly, his theory, embodied.
Togliatti had in mind Gramsci’s suggestion regarding the creation of an ‘Anti- 
Croce’, but the Marxist intellectual’s critique was tempered by a deep admiration for
54 For an excellent bibliography on the most important critical writings on Benedetto Croce from 1955 
to 1990 see C. Ocone, Bibliografia ragionata degli scritti su Benedetto Croce (Naples: Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 1993).
55 M. Biscione, ‘Croce e la politica della cultura’, Rivista di filosofia, 3 (1956), pp.247-65 (p.247).
56 We should not forget that the Catholic Church put Croce’s works on the Index in 1932. Indeed the 
philosopher was described as ‘un avvelenatore di coscienze’.
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Croce, whereas Togliatti’s charges were ruthless. Croce’s authorship of the 
intellectual’s manifesto against Fascism cut no ice with Togliatti. Indeed Croce was 
identified as the enemy of Marxism during the Fascist regime and
l’aver accettato questa funzione, mentre noi eravamo forzatamente 
assenti e muti, o perche al bando del paese o perche perseguitati fino 
alia morte dei nostri migliori, e una macchia di ordine morale che non 
gli possiamo perdonare e che egli non riuscira a cancellare.57
In the extremely polarised political atmosphere of the immediate post-war period 
there was no place for what was perceived by some as an ambiguous position towards 
the Fascist dictatorship. Moreover, even the former followers of Croce were of the 
opinion that now the time had come for a more active perspective on politics and 
culture; after all there was an entire nation to be rebuilt on a democratic basis.
In an article on La nuova Europa the once Crocean De Ruggiero pointed out 
how the limit of Croce’s thought was
Una visione troppo retrospettiva del reale: esso concludeva una fase 
del mondo senza aprime una nuova; e in quella fase esso assorbiva e 
scioglieva senza residui, col suo realistico immanentismo, quei valori 
etemi dello spirito, la cui relativa trascendenza di ffonte alia realta 
empirica avrebbe potuto creare un fecondo squilibrio capace di 
schiudere le porte del futuro.58
Thus, from now on, even to former admirers, the thought of Croce was often 
associated with a certain kind of conservatism of the late 19th century and his 
philosophy, once considered to be at the cutting edge of Italian culture, was 
increasingly perceived as old and out of date.
For many of Croce’s critics, to conceive of the future as a simple development 
from the present was to limit the degree to which this future could be radically 
different from the past. Indeed, one of the main reasons why many intellectuals 
jettisoned Croce was that his inherently ‘retrospective’ vision of reality was not 
compatible with the radical change they advocated.
Politica e cultura by Bobbio is undoubtedly influenced by this cultural 
climate. One of the main aims of these collected essays was to cast light on the
57 P. Togliatti, ‘Che cosa deve essere il partito comunista’, p.30.
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relation between politics and culture, discussing the Gramscian idea of the ‘organic 
intellectual’ engaged in the class struggle and responsible for the education of the 
masses. This implied, of course, a settling of accounts with Croce’s philosophical and 
political views. However, Bobbio rejects the Togliattian interpretation of a proto­
fascist Croce, underlining the great importance that the Neapolitan philosopher had 
during the years of the dictatorship:
Non si puo dimenticare che la strada maestra per convertire 
all’antifascismo gli incerti era di far leggere i libri di Croce, che la 
maggior parte dei giovani intellettuali arrivarono all’antifascismo 
attraverso Croce e ... traevano conforto dal sapere che Croce, il 
rappresentante piu alto e piu illustre della cultura italiana, non si era 
piegato alia dittatura. Ogni critica deH’atteggiamento di Croce durante 
il fascismo e astiosa e malevola polemica. Come tale, non merita 
discussione.59
The position of Bobbio could be considered a moderate one: although in 
favour of a radical reform of the Italian state, Bobbio refused any ideological label, 
maintaining that
il compito degli uomini di cultura e piu che mai oggi quello di 
seminare dei dubbi, non gia di raccogliere certezze.60
The intellectual has to keep an independent position so that he or she can exercise a 
fundamental critique on state and society. Thus, for Bobbio, who was in direct 
polemic with Togliatti, the idea of intellectuals subservient to a political agenda is 
uncceptable, since the critical function of free thinkers cannot accommodate the 
imposition of any sort of intellectual strait- jacket.
On the other hand, Bobbio criticises the opposite conception of an apolitical 
culture, believing that no intellectual production can be detached from the society in 
which it flourishes or from the questions that this society poses. Bobbio proposed the 
idea of a ‘politica della cultura’ instead of that of a ‘cultura politicizzata’ promoted by 
most politicians of the left. Intellectuals had to share a common ground and adopt a
58 G. De Ruggiero, ‘Lo storicismo. La fase crociana’ now in II ritorno alia ragione (Bari: Laterza, 
1946), p. 14.
59 N. Bobbio, Politica e cultura (Turin: Einaudi, 1955), p.239.
60 Ibid., p. 15.
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‘posizione di massima apertura verso le posizioni filosofiche, ideologiche, mentali 
differenti’, insisting on ‘cio che e comune a tutti gli uomini di cultura’.61
According to Bobbio, Croce is one of the finest examples of the man of 
culture, grounded in the political terrain, yet without ‘politicising’ culture:
Vi fu nel pensiero e nelle preoccupazioni di Croce un’idea costante: gli 
uomini di cultura ... hanno una responsabilita ed una funzione politica 
in quanto uomini di cultura.62
Indeed, Bobbio maintained that for Croce cultural activity has a political influence, 
since culture serves to expand human knowledge, but this influence is tempered by 
the division between theory and practice. To Croce culture should not be mixed with 
politics; it has its own dignity and purpose which is the enhancement of the life of the 
spirit.
Bobbio has a great deal of sympathy for Croce’s view that the promotion of 
human creativity through art, science, history and philosophy is ultimately the 
meaning of our existence. The major concern for intellectuals like Bobbio was to 
create a new democratic system in which culture would be widely available to the 
people. On the other hand, Croce did not seem interested in what he saw as a merely 
practical issue. Yet, from a liberal democratic point of view to deal with culture was 
also to analyze the institutional framework of society.
In the essay entitled Benedetto Croce e il liberalismo Bobbio argues that the 
Neapolitan philosopher does not take into account the historical institutions in which 
cultural activities are created, and launches a fierce attack on Croce’s conception of 
Liberalism. To talk about the promotion of culture and human creativity without 
considering the actual historical institutions which embody these activities was for 
Bobbio unacceptable. The aim of the essay is very clear:
ritengo sia importante sapere se ed entro quali limiti il pensiero di 
Croce possa dirsi liberale. 3
The main argument of the essay is that Croce’s vision of culture and society is 
a conservative one, and that his Liberalism is not based on a strong theoretical
61 Ibid., p. 35.
62 Ibid., p. 100.
63 Ibid., p.238.
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premise but rather on ‘passion’. For Bobbio, Croce remains essentially linked to this 
conservative vision even when he openly rejected Fascism. This was because Croce 
was liberal ‘per temperamento e per sentimento’, but ‘nessuno aveva potuto conoscere 
in lui un liberale per dottrina.’64 In other words according to Bobbio, Croce’s political 
stance was not to be considered part of the liberal-democratic tradition but rather of 
the conservative one. In order to support this position Bobbio points at Croce’s 
political background:
E’ un fatto piuttosto sconcertante ... che colui che sarebbe diventato un 
coraggioso paladino della liberta e secondo alcuni un insuperato 
teorico del liberalismo, non abbia mai dimostrato nel periodo della sua 
formazione interesse per la storia del liberalismo, anzi abbia mostrato 
forte attrazione per gli scrittori estranei a quella storia o addirittura 
illiberali.65
Bobbio stresses the fact that the first political ‘master’ of Croce was Karl 
Marx, who left a ‘profonda traccia nei suoi orientamenti politici’66. From Marx the 
Neapolitan philosopher inherited a ‘realistic’ vision of history, in which economic 
forces were at work. This realistic concept of ‘force’ was introduced into Croce’s 
thinking, in place of an intellectual tradition utilizing abstract, ideological or 
‘moralistic’ conceptions of justice and humanity.
The other thinkers who attracted the young Croce were George Sorel, well 
known for his theory of violence, and the reactionary German philosopher Treitschke. 
Furthermore, the core of Croce’s political views drew on Machiavelli, another 
political thinker difficult to reconcile with the liberal tradition, with its distaste for the 
ruthless pursuit of power, and its emphasis on correct institutional practices. Later the 
Neapolitan philosopher would discover Hegel whose ill-fated conception, within the 
liberal tradition, of the state as the locus of an absolute power over the individual was 
considered the genesis of a form of totalitarianism. Moreover, Croce did not seem 
very interested in philosophers such as Bentham, Mill, Locke or Hobbes, and in his 
Elementi di politica these theorists, who belong to the liberal tradition, are hardly 
mentioned.
64 Ibid.,p.239.
65 Ibid.,p.240.
66 Ibid.
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Bobbio’s analysis hence underlines how Croce’s pre-Fascist political 
conception, far from being liberal,
Era l’ideale politico, come ognun vede, del perfetto uomo d’ordine, per 
il quale lo stato, questo ente ideale, sempre benefico perche per 
essenza interprete dei bisogni e degli interessi collettivi, ha sempre 
ragione, e gli individui che cercano di perseguire i loro interessi come 
meglio possono, hanno sempre torto. Quanto di piu illiberale, 
insomma, si potesse immaginare.67
Croce’s attitude towards the state and its relations with individuals changed 
after 1925, when the philosopher penned his Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti. 
From that point, Bobbio argues, Croce’s liberalism ceased to be a simple 
‘atteggiamento’ and became part of his philosophical doctrine; his philosophy became 
‘una filosofia della liberta.’68
Henceforth, Croce’s purpose was to tailor his philosophy of the Spirit to the 
needs of the new conception of Liberty which would become the core of his 
opposition to Fascism. However Bobbio, discussing the attitude of Croce in the early 
years of the Fascist dictatorship, maintains that
di ffonte al fascismo Croce aveva assunto in quegli anni 
1’atteggiamento del conservatore, preoccupato delle minacce alia 
stabilita del vecchio stato che provenivano dall’avanzata delle classi 
popolari.69
This ancestral antipathy for the masses, for Bobbio, shows Croce’s essentially 
antidemocratic attitude. This position would not have changed during the Fascist 
regime; for the Turin intellectual, Croce remained faithful to his southern 
conservatism, although he played a key role in defending the civil liberties of the 
Italians against tyranny. This was because Croce saw in the concept of Democracy 
nothing but
il trionfo del meccanico, meramente quantitative, materialistico 
principio dell’egualitarismo. Per lui democrazia significava il dogma
67 Ibid., p.242.
68‘Occorreva risalire ai principi, occorreva una filosofia della liberta ... Ai suoi awersari avrebbe avuto 
un argomento piu solido da opporre ... : la sua filosofia, quella che essi avevano trascinato nella 
polvere delle loro meschine controversie, era una filosofia della liberta’. Ibid., p.22.
69 Ibid., p.219.
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dell’astratta eguaglianza di tutti gli uomini, vecchio anacronistico 
dogma settecentesco, superato dalla concezione storicistica che nella 
fase piu matura del suo pensiero identificava senz’altro con la
• 70concezione liberale della vita.
Bobbio argues that Croce’s conception of liberty is a rather romantic one. It is not 
based on a genuine liberal tradition, but it is rather a sort of sentimental appeal to 
freedom.
Furthermore, the exclusion of the concept of Democracy from Croce’s 
philosophy, compounding his total neglect of the British liberal democratic tradition, 
shows the theoretical weakness of the ‘religione della liberta’. The conception of a 
‘religion of liberty’ had a great appeal during the period of opposition to the 
dictatorship, when people of various parties were engaged in resistance, but it was 
insufficiently concrete to endure during a period in which democracy was in the 
process of being constructed. Croce’s romantic connection between liberty and spirit 
produced a typical disregard for the actual forms in which the above-mentioned
liberty is realized. Bobbio’s remark on the ‘filosofia della liberta’ echoes that of
Gramsci:
se il soggetto della storia e Spirito (e non l’individuo singolo di cui si 
occupa il liberale) e questo Spirito e per essenza creatore e quindi
libero, non si puo non escludere che esso per realizzare se stesso si
debba poter servire tanto dei regimi liberali quanto di quelli non 
liberali e quindi l’esistenza dei regimi illiberali e perfettamente 
compatibile con la liberta della storia.7
It is important to stress once more that Bobbio does not minimize the role of 
Croce as the voice of opposition in Italy during the dictatorship; Croce was essential 
for the function he played as ‘mentor of the opposition’, and his cultural weight was 
widely recognized both in Italy and abroad. Bobbio intended to carry out a 
constructive critique on Croce, pointing out the fact that the Liberalism of the 
Neapolitan philosopher was not the centre of gravity of the Filosofia dello spirito. 
However, the force of Bobbio’s attack raised a number of issues relating to the 
usefulness of Croce’s ‘system’, and it seemed to attribute to Croce’s thought a moral 
rather than philosophical status. Moreover, given Bobbio’s own commitment to
70 Ibid., p.249.
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intellectual renewal, and the importance he attached to his own ‘matrice liberale’ 
within this process, his eagerness to dissociate Croce from the Liberal tradition, and 
essentially to confine his salutary influence to the past, was a powerfully 
disenfranchising statement in relation to Croce’s contemporary relevance in the 
cultural politics of the time.
Whereas Politica e cultura criticises Croce’s notion of Liberalism, Cronache 
di filosofia italiana by Eugenio Garin is a meticulous account of the first forty-three 
years of Italian intellectual history, itself seen through the influence of the Neapolitan 
philosopher. Croce is the methodological guide for Garin’s analysis of what he took to
tilbe the most influential Italian intellectual figures in the first half of the 20 century. 
Through a wealth of documents including magazines and cultural publications of 
different kinds, Garin provides a comprehensive portrait of the intellectual 
atmosphere of pre-Fascist and Fascist Italy up to the beginning of the Second World 
War; a faithful ‘chronicle’ of the dramatic tensions seen through the eyes of the 
protagonists.72
Garin’s analysis of Croce’s cultural role is very sympathetic and takes into 
account both the philosophical and historical perspectives dominating intellectual life 
in Italy, although, at times, the Neapolitan philosopher seems to dominate excessively 
the whole scenario. The scholar shares Croce’s opinion that philosophy is mainly 
historical criticism of the past read through the knowledge and needs of the present. 
Thus, in this spirit the Cronache look at developments in their historical and social 
context, trying to trace their genesis in doctrines and movements. The reading of 
Croce provided by Garin has become part of the classic understanding of Croce’s 
work.
Like many of his contemporaries Garin was highly influenced by Croce as 
seen through the eyes of Gramsci. And, like Gramsci, Garin granted a privileged 
status to the Neapolitan philosopher considering Croce’s political-cultural activity 
fundamental first for the fledgling Italian democracy, and subsequently for the 
opposition to Fascism during the dictatorship.
The image of Croce that Garin offers is a dynamic one: the Neapolitan 
philosopher was an intellectual actively engaged in the controversies of his time
71 Ibid., pp.258-59.
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possessing a genuine commitment to humanistic culture, philosophy and politics. 
Moreover, his was a versatile, anti- dogmatic mind exhibiting both a vivid intelligence 
and a strong sense of reality notwithstanding his idealistic perspective:
fin dalle prime esperienze fine Ottocento, il tema centrale del pensiero 
crociano fu un’esigenza di valori ideali, ma sposata a una rigorosa 
fedelta, all’esperienza del reale.73
For Garin the most relevant part of Croce's work lies in the cultural commitment he 
encouraged with his bimonthly La Critica which, along with Leonardo, was the most 
popular politico-cultural magazine in Italy.74 It is from the pages of La Critica that 
Croce continued his battle against positivism, a philosophical movement that had the 
tendency to impose the analytical and empirical methods of the natural sciences upon 
all domains of human knowledge. Hence, Croce counterposed a humanistic vision of
• • 75culture to the all-pervasive determinism of the positivist movement.
Garin describes extremely well the atmosphere of cultural stagnation in which 
Italy found itself at the beginning of the 20th century and how Croce’s periodical 
brought a breath of fresh air with its intellectual engagement:
La reazione del Croce si muovera riaffermando da un lato le idealita 
dei valori, dall’altro... cercando di precisare, entro i confini rigorosi 
dell’esperienza umana, che cosa siano in concreto arte e storia, a quali 
forme di attivita dell’uomo corrispondano, e come vadano attuandosi e 
svolgendosi.76
The Cronache do not discuss in great detail the specific problems in Croce’s 
philosophy; the aim is rather to sketch a general interpretation in which one could 
distinguish ‘what is living and what is dead’ in Croce’s thought and how some of his 
ideas could still be used to create a new intellectual culture.
72 E. Garin in Cronache di filosofia italiana: ‘ Si e guardato alle riviste e ai giomali, in cui le dottrine si 
affacciarono dapprima, o in cui discesero poi a combattere in una polemica o a volgarizzarsi in una 
propaganda.’ (Bari: Laterza, 1966), p. xi.
Ibid., p. 193.
74 L a  Critica del Croce, dal 1903, si era fatto lo strumento piu’ valido per penetrare in ogni campo del 
sapere. Soprawalutame l’influenza nella storia del pensiero italiano di questo secolo e pressoche 
impossibile.’ Ibid., p. 172.
75 In 1905 Croce famously wrote: ‘tra le corbellerie che nel corso della vita si possono commettere con 
la filosofia e con gli studi in genere, ce n’e una della quale mi compiaccio di essermi tenuto puro, anche 
nei primi anni della mia giovinezza. Non sono mai stato positivista.’ B. Croce, ‘A proposito del 
positivismo italiano. Ricordi personali’, now in Cultura e vita morale (Bari: Laterza, 1955), p.41.
76 Garin, Cronache di filosofia italiana, p. 188.
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For Garin the most relevant elements of Croce’s philosophy are related to its 
connection with Marxism which is seen as one of the main elements of influence in 
Croce’s interest in history and politics. Indeed, the friendship between, and 
intellectual exchange with, the scholar Antonio Labriola gave Croce the opportunity 
to discover the thought of Marx, whose materialist approach to reality would 
condition the philosopher’s vision. Although Croce later criticized many aspects of 
Marxism, Garin points out that the most modem part of his thought can be connected 
with historical materialism:
Quando[Croce], nella Storia d ‘Italia, ando contrapponendo all’esangue 
dialettica degli epigoni dell’idealismo tedesco, quella tutta sanguigna e 
camale, tutta ‘calda e viva’ di Marx; quando al moto immobilmente 
fisso del Logo ricollocato in cielo, oppose una storia umana sospinta 
non gia da cristallini e frigidi ideali, ma da ‘forze’ operose, e fossero 
pure bisogni e passioni ‘materiali’; quando celebro contro il moralismo 
una politica fatta di cose; e poi tutto il suo batter sul mondo, e tenersi 
legato all’opera mondana, e alia sua storia degli uomini e alle 
situazioni concrete; e quel suo studiarle e tramutarle: tutto questo si 
lega intimamente al suo contatto col marxismo.77
Thus Garin isolates the principal elements of ‘realism’ in Croce’s philosophy, 
underlining their relations with Marxism. The Croce portrayed by the Rieti scholar is 
a philosopher with a strong sense of the practical who is constantly aware of the 
actual complexity of reality within history. However, the emphasis on Croce’s 
‘realistic’ works — particularly the Pratica and La storia come pensiero e come 
azione- is counterbalanced by the extremely critical review of the Estetica which 
indirectly
arrivo ... a dare aiuto a quelle tenderize di torbido idealismo che 
andavano celebrando un’orgiastica esaltazione dell’io che crea se 
stesso e il mondo, e la storia tutta, in un delirio di fantasia ebbra.78
Garin maintains that Croce’s ‘realism’ was compromised by his subsequent 
adoption of Hegelian idealism. Croce’s discovery of Hegel is related to his 
collaboration and constant dialogue with the younger philosopher Giovanni Gentile 
whose ‘attualismo’ was widely held to be a rigorous application of Hegelian
77 Ibid., p.207.
78 Ibid., p.239.
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philosophy. For Garin it was under the influence of Gentile that Croce embraced an 
idealistic perspective to the detriment of his original realistic one79. From this point 
onwards Croce would try to reconcile the ‘due anime’ of his system,
quella dello storico ... e quella del ‘logico’, e verrebbe fatto di dir
‘metafisico’, legato ad una fraseologia hegeliana.80
Garin argues that Croce’s embracing of idealism was powerfully influenced by the 
strong speculative tradition of the south of Italy, embodied in particular by Francesco 
De Sanctis and Bertrando Spaventa. Both intellectuals were considered part of the 
‘idealist’ tradition. The former, a famous literary critic, provided a framework for 
Croce’s Estetica, whereas the latter was the theoretical mentor of the so-called 
‘rinascita dell’idealismo’81.
Garin’s labelling of Croce and Gentile as ‘neoidealistic’ created a perception 
of their work which was to achieve enormous influence. Henceforth, Croce and
• thGentile’s philosophies would be indissolubly associated with the 19 century 
speculative tradition of southern Italy. Although Garin does not reduce the complexity 
of Croce’s thought to the influence of Spaventa and De Sanctis, nevertheless he seems 
to accept that there is a strong line of continuity between the two thinkers and the 
‘neo-idealism’ of Croce and Gentile. I will analyze at a later stage the implications of 
this correlation in the reading of Croce’s work.
Hence, for Garin Croce’s embracing of Hegelian idealism was achieved only 
at the expenses of introducing a strong tension with his residual Marxian ‘realism’. In 
effect, the price paid for the scope of his system of speculative philosophy was 
internal incoherence. Garin argues that the Filosofia dello Spirito is the result of an 
idealist turning point that he describes as
un’architettura esposta al pericolo di rendere statico... quello che era
• 89stato un mobile processo di ncerca .
79 ‘Ne in quegli anni fu certo senza gran peso la collaborazione col Gentile di cui s ’indovina, nel buono 
come nel meno buono la presenza: nell’averlo indotto a fare i conti con i grandi pensatori, ma anche, 
probabilmente, nell’averlo confortato nel disegno del trattato sistematico.’ Ibid., p.242.
80 Ibid., p.243.
81 La rinascita dell’idealismo is also the title o f a paper delivered by Gentile at the University o f Naples 
in 1907.
82 Ibid., pp.223-24.
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However, if  Hegelianism was considered one of the open sources of 
contradiction in Croce’s thought, its most serious flaw, according to the Rieti scholar, 
lies in the philosopher’s aversion to science which eventually highlighted the inherent 
weakness of his whole system of thought:
Quanto al sapere scientifico ... l’impostazione crociana ... agi a lungo, 
e non sempre felicemente, sui rapporti con l’indagine filosofica che 
credette, a un certo punto, superato per sempre lo scoglio delle naturali 
investigazioni. Ed analoghi rilievi possono estendersi alia politica, 
all’economia, alia storia.8
The notion of ‘pseudo-concept’ contained in Croce’s Logica, for Garin, 
asserted the substantially non-philosophical status of the natural sciences and 
inaugurated the split between the latter and the humanities. Fifteen years later in the 
appendix to the Cronache Garin would insist on this point maintaining that
Se di difetti e di limiti dell’idealismo si deve parlare, e se ne deve 
parlare, essi consistono nel non aver affrontato sul serio il problema di 
cosa fosse la scienza, appagandosi di relegarla nel campo degli 
pseudoconcetti; consistono nel non aver approfondito i problemi dei 
metodi delle scienze storiche, e cioe proprio di quelle discipline che 
accoglievanell’ambito della ‘scienza’ effettiva, cioe dello spirito.84
Thus, one of Garin’s major critiques of Croce lies in his alleged failure to 
provide more systematic and rigorous reflections on his historical methodology. 
Within the failure, however, of such a refined and accomplished historian of ideas as 
Garin to take seriously, and to see for what they are, Croce’s anticipations of attacks 
on the ‘grand narrative’, we can see the limitations, not so much of an individual, as 
of a historical epoch in search of a ‘progressive’ narrative which would give it 
direction.
Perhaps a more explicitly Marxist critique of Croce is contained in the last text 
I am going to consider in this section, La filosofia di Benedetto Croce e la crisi della 
societa italiana by Michele Abbate. Abbate claims to concentrate on the position and 
role of Croce during the first twenty-five years of the last century, but in fact he 
provides an overall critique of the Neapolitan philosopher’s thought. Moreover,
83 Ibid., p. 172.
84 Ibid., p.595.
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Abbate reinforces the association with‘idealism -  southern Italy’ already pointed out 
by Garin.
Another point worthy of note is the close relationship that Abbate sees 
between Croce and Gentile whose initial theoretical premises, in his view, are almost 
interchangeable:
Nei sistemi che Croce e Gentile venivano elaborando nel primo 
decennio del Novecento, non l’uomo in quanto concreta e dialettica 
storicita, ma lo Spirito e il Pensiero, proiezioni dell’attivita alienizzante 
dell’uomo, venivano riposti come soggetto al centro della realta.85
Interpreted from a strictly Marxist perspective, Croce and Gentile’s thought 
represented a sort of setback86 in the evolution of a socialist culture, since it 
neutralised the political drive present in thinkers such as Spaventa, De Sanctis and 
Labriola in favour of a virtually apolitical conception of intellectual inquiry. The 
result is, for Abbate, a purely speculative philosophy which is detached from 
historical reality:
Trasferendo nella regione dei ‘concetti puri’ questioni legate ai 
problemi dell’avanzamento materiale e spirituale dell’ umanita in una 
ben determinata situazione storica, il Croce e il Gentile trasferirono in 
effetti la battaglia della grande cultura borghese liberale e razionalista 
italiana su posizioni di difesa di astratti valori metastorici, sottratti alia 
critica feconda e rinnnovatrice delle prove reali e posti per defmizione 
sul piano delle verita assolute, da custodire e portare indenni, 
attraverso i turbini del corso storico, dalle offese del materialismo e 
dell’empiria87.
Abbate argues that this tendency to abstraction, typical of idealism, moulded Croce’s 
historical and political views and that it was the driving force behind his reaction to 
Positivism, and also behind the philosopher’s aversion to the Enlightenment. 
Moreover, Croce’s antidemocratic interpretation of Socialism is also the sign of a type
85 M. Abbate, La filosofia di Benedetto Croce e la crisi della societa italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), p. 
53.
86 ‘L’operazione intellettuale che Croce e Gentile misero in atto al principio del novecento costitui... 
un obiettivo arretramento della cultura italiana e meridionale di tendenza hegeliana dalle posizioni su 
cui essa si era portata con Bertrando Spaventa e Francesco De Sanctis e piu tardi in maniera 
profondamente innovatrice, con Antonio Labriola. Individuare la natura di questo arretramento ... e 
presupposto necessario per una ricerca come quella alia quale e dedicato questro libro’. Ibid., p.35.
87 Ibid., p.47.
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of thinking alienated from the concrete historical process, which Abbate links with the 
‘arretratezza’ of the south of Italy with its ‘semi feudal’ system and consequently
nel ristagno reale ci si appaga di un progresso meramente razionale, 
nell’assenza di liberta come, civile, costruttiva operosita, 
signoreggiamento della natura in un mondo di rapporti umani in 
crescente sviluppo, ci si accontenta della ‘liberta spirituale’.88
Therefore, for Abbate there seems to be a direct connection between the mainly 
agrarian society of southern Italy and its idealistic-intellectual output: this 
correspondence would have one of the most significant implications in relation to 
future criticism on Croce and would help to spread the stereotypical image of an 
industrial and progressive Italian ‘settentrione’ opposed to a sleepy agrarian 
‘meridione’.
Abbate also connects Croce’s rejection of the concept of ‘progress’ with the 
philosopher’s comfortable background and the difficulty from this viewpoint in 
dealing with concrete issues such as unemployment or redistribution of wealth. If 
progress does not exist, Abbate points out, there is no space for any advancement and 
the result of such a position is the legitimation of the status quo. Hence, for the 
Marxist scholar, the negation of any ideology of progress, along with the rejection of 
science, makes Croce a reactionary thinker with a strong hostility towards any 
political or social change. For Abbate Croce did not appear to see that the human 
struggle for progress is the driving force of all transformations and ignored
la storicita dei valori che nascono dalle vicende storiche stesse e si 
evolvono nel processo della coscienza sociale e divengono matrici 
della societa umana attraverso il progressive differenziarsi e rioperare 
di questa sull’ambiente materiale; ossia sono l’espressione di unOQ
continuo slargamento degli orizzonti umani.
This attitude towards progress, far from being accidental, is in Abbate’ s view 
connected with the incapacity of a cultural and political elite to come to terms with 
the new challenges of a modem Italian society. Abbate sees Croce as the best known 
and most influential advocate of this deeply conservative outlook. It is a sort of 
j  ’accuse of the entire philosophical foundation of Croce’s thought:
88 Ibid., p.57.
42
II concetto che sono le minoranze a fare la storia, la reazione al 
positivismo spinta sino alia critica del valore conoscitivo della scienza 
e alia negazione dell’idea di progresso mostrano, in effetti, sin dalle 
prime maturazioni del pensiero crociano, la piegatura classista e 
conservatrice del suo sistema speculativo.90
The very origins of Croce’s philosophy are for Abbate formed by this ‘classist and 
conservative stance’ which may be observed, for instance, in the philosopher’s 
dismissal of socialism or in his definition of political parties as ‘abstractions’91. Croce 
- Abbate insists, reinforcing the already mentioned Gramscian argument - was afraid 
of any social reform which would have implied a consequent loss of power for the 
ruling classes. This fear underlay Croce’s adoption of a purely speculative position 
inimical to any practical outcome. Abbate also argues that in the process of expansion 
and consolidation of the Italian bourgeoisie any general reform or political change 
would have been seen as a threat to the established order. Thus, the reactionary 
outlook of Croce’s philosophy is inherent in the system and not an inadvertent 
accoutrement.
In Abbate’s interpretation of Croce’s thought one can see a sort of review of 
all the arguments used by the progressive thinkers discussed earlier, namely southern 
Italian idealism, opposition to positivism, hostility towards socialism and democracy 
and political parties. However, Abbate’s less generous interpretation adds a new 
dimension to the critique of the Neapolitan philosopher, in so far as it relates these 
arguments to Croce’s early theoretical premises.
According to Abbate, Croce’s distorted interpretation of socialism came from 
his ‘storicismo conservatore’ which tended to systematically downplay real political 
confrontation. This attitude could be traced back to the early works of the Neapolitan 
philosopher in which one could see a sort of fear of any kind of mass movement or 
social uprising. Abbate takes as an example Croce’s initial neutralism during the First 
World War which for the Marxist scholar represented a sign of his conservatism. 
Indeed Croce’s position is for Abbate similar to that of Giolitti - the then Italian prime 
minister- a very cautious one, being mainly concerned with the position of the middle 
class and its possible losses. Croce’s later theory of state as ‘potenza’ to which the
89 Ibid., p. 127.
90 Ibid., p. 25.
91‘Croce ... si sbarazzava di partiti e di classi nel mentre agognava l ’unione di un’unico fascio di tutti i 
benpensanti.’ Ibid., p.225.
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individual has to submit, showed, for Abbate, the philosopher’s true colours: the 
individual has to obey the state, namely the elites who are the holders of power; the 
masses, ‘il volgo’, follow. What Croce once called the ‘law of history’ is for Abbate 
nothing but the attempt to impose a conformist vision of the world with a
piattaforma ideologica .... di cui egli [Croce] era e si sentiva
92espressione e portavoce.
Moreover, Abbate argues that the role of the individual in Croce’s philosophy of 
history is a passive one, since one has to conform to the will of the Spirit, a 
transcendental force that limits human action and ultimately its freedom.
In conclusion, Abbate’s critique of Croce’s thought aimed to show the 
intrinsic
incapacity ... del filosofo di aprirsi alia storia salente dal basso, di 
intendere le piu alte e universali ragioni, il piu autentico umanesimo 
che sotto i suoi occhi, ma gia in un secolo che non era piu il suo, si 
facevano strada attraverso le rivendicazioni popolari e attraverso le 
lotte, il sangue ... delle classi proletarie. 93
This analysis would deeply affect the understanding and access to Croce’s philosophy 
for generations to come. Irrespective of the merits or otherwise of these critiques of 
Croce from writers in the ‘progressive’ arena, the cumulative effect of their attacks 
was considerable. Despite the positive features in the critiques of Gramsci, Bobbio 
and Garin, it was the negative features of Abbate’s critique which seemed to 
crystallize and bring together those of the others, amounting to a massive cultural 
assault on the Neapolitan philosopher. The charged political atmosphere which 
dominated the powerful culture of the left in post-war Italy was not conducive to a 
judicious appraisal of the positive features of Croce’s philosophy. The anti-Croce, it 
could be argued, was almost a historical necessity. Later generations would have to 
look back with new perspectives to do greater justice to Croce.
92 Ibid., p. 188.
93 Ibid., p.268. A modem version o f this critique is represented by Ugo Dotti: ‘Croce tradusse il 
pensiero di Marx in termini di antidemocratismo e e di antilluminismo ... per approdare alia negazione 
della lotta di classe la quale, considerate come uno pseudoconcetto era destituita di qualsiasi verita 
scientifica. ’ U. Dotti, Storia degli intellettuali in Italia. Vol. III. Temi e ideologie dagli illuministi a 
Gramsci (Turin: Editori Riuniti, 1999), p. 239.
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1.4 CRITIQUES FROM OTHER DIRECTIONS AND NEW TRENDS
Along with the attack unleashed by the ‘progressives’ there were other critiques from 
groups from heterogeneous cultural backgrounds which contributed to the 
marginalization of Croce’s role in contemporary debates during the post-war period.
The ‘liberation’ of Italy at the end of the Second World War was followed by 
a period of extreme euphoria for the newly acquired freedom. The North where the 
‘Resistenza’ had started began to look for a total renewal of the Italian cultural and 
philosophical tradition. The models came from France (Sartre), Austria 
(Wittgenstein), Germany (Heidegger, Jaspers and Husserl), and the United States 
(James, Dewey and Peirce).
The proliferation of philosophical and cultural journals based in Milan, Turin, 
Florence and Rome was also part of this need for regeneration. Perhaps the magazine 
which best embodied the mood of this period was II Politecnico founded by the writer 
Elio Vittorini in 1945 and published in Turin by the prestigious Einaudi publishing 
house. II Politecnico did not have a well-defined political line, although it gravitated 
around the progressive area. The approach of the journal to literary and philosophical 
issues was at times amateurish, partly because of the young age of some of its 
collaborators, partly because of the ambitious range of subjects it covered. However, 
the journal exerted a considerable influence during the post-war period. For 
intellectuals like Vittorini the most advanced parts of Italian society, represented by 
the centre-north, wanted radical change. The models for this change should not be 
sought in the compromised ‘idealistic’ tradition. The aim of Vittorini was to promote 
a culture which was not detached from society and its problems. Indeed, the writer 
believed, with Gramsci, that this separation had brought about a great defeat for 
Italian civil society. Vittorini appealed to intellectuals from all backgrounds to 
contribute to a radical change which would lead to the creation of a new society.
In a well-known article entitled Una nuova cultura, published in the first 
issue, Vittorini advocated a drastic change in Italian culture:
Non piu una cultura che consoli dalle sofferenze ma una cultura che 
protegga dalle sofferenze, che le combatta e le elimini.94
94 E. Vittorini, ‘Una nuova cultura’, II Politecnico, 1, 29 September 1945, p .l.
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The targets here were intellectuals ‘di vecchio stampo’ like Croce or Thomas 
Mann with their idly abstract speculations. What Italy needed at this point was a 
drastic break with the past:
La cultura italiana e stata particolarmente provata nelle sue illusioni. 
Non vi e forse nessuno in Italia che ignori cosa significhi la 
mortificazione dell’impotenza o un astratto furore. Continueremo, cio 
malgrado, a seguire la strada che ancora oggi ci indicano i Thomas 
Mann e i Benedetto Croce?95
By now, for many young intellectuals, the name of Croce had already become a 
synonym for conservation opposed to change.
On the philosophical terrain, many young academics were attracted by new 
movements such as existentialism, neo-positivism, pragmatism and phenomenology. 
Indeed, a new generation of philosophers (Abbagnano, Preti, Paci and Geymonat 
among others) discussed the possibility of building an alternative to both Gramscian 
Marxism and ‘idealism’. Philosophers like Ludovico Geymonat (1908-1991), rejected 
the whole preceding Italian philosophical tradition, maintaining that culture needed 
new instruments to face the challenges of the modem era. In an article which 
appeared in 1956 in the philosophical journal Contemporaneo under the title of 
‘Troppo idealismo’, Geymonat charged even the ‘gramsciani’ with being the heirs to 
the old idealism against the new trends coming from Anglo-American culture:
La lotta degli ‘scolastici’... contro i nuovi indirizzi filosofici, invece di 
approfondire le esigenze espresse da tali indirizzi e tentame soluzioni 
veramente progressive, si limito a condannarli in blocco, come li 
condannavano i superstiti dell’idealismo.96
What Geymonat advocated was a ‘new rationalism’ which had to be
ben piu agguerrito e penetrante di quelli che caratterizzarono i secoli 
passati: esso deve ... essere aperto, cioe capace di affrontare i problemi 
sempre nuovi che la scienza e la prassi pongono innanzi alio spirito
97umano.
Geymonat insisted particularly on a ‘scientific method’ for philosophical inquiry:
95 Ibid.
96 In G. Vacca, Gli intellettuali di sinistra e la crisi del 1956 (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1978), p.49.
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II nuovo razionalista non va alia ricerca di principi metafisici evidenti, 
etemi e indiscutibili sui quali fondare una scienza assoluta; ma si 
sforza di determinare con estrema precisione, di volta in volta, tutti i 
concetti con i quali opera, tutti i postulati dei quali si serve, tutte le 
trasformazioni che accetta come logicamente corrette. E poi, con 
spirito galileiano, tenta di modificare, ora i concetti, ora i postulati, ora 
i principi logici, per vedere cosa possa scaturire da tali modifiche.98
The most important philosophical centre in the country in these years was 
undoubtedly Turin, which acted as a sort of catalyst for the new intellectual trends. 
The Rivista di filosofia to which intellectuals such as Abbagnano and Bobbio 
contributed, became one of the most important philosophical journals along with the 
Rivista di storia della filosofia based in Milan. In fact Rivista di filosofia served as a 
sort of focus for the ‘area laica’, an intellectual strata which promoted a cultural 
agenda not fed by either the Marxists or Catholics.
In this context Nicola Abbagnano (1901-1990) played the essential role of 
thinker, historian of philosophy and cultural promoter. He tried to reconcile 
existentialism and pragmatism, rejecting any form of idealism. Abbagnano was for a 
philosophy which did not reject empiricism. However, philosophy was not a set of 
laws, but rather a project.
In an article entitled ‘Morte o trasfigurazione delTesistenzialismo’, 
Abbagnano opposed existentialism to romanticism and idealism. Existentialism was a 
philosophy which was against any optimistic view with a predetermined vision of the 
world. Doubt and uncertainty had replaced any kind of consolatory rhetoric. We have 
to be aware of our limitations and our condition as mortal beings. There is no 
assurance of progress in history, and the risk of destruction is always present.
Romanticism and idealism, with their excessively positive perspectives 
ignored ‘events’ such as death, angst and illness relegating them to the realm of 
illusions.99 We live in a problematic world which is neither entirely absurd nor 
rational, therefore we need a new form of Enlightenment that
97 L. Geymonat, Studi per un nuovo naturalismo (Turin: Chiaramonte, 1948), p.viii.
98 L. Geymonat, Saggi di filosofia neorazionalistica (Turin: Einaudi, 1953), p. 23.
99 ‘II romanticismo considera insignificanti certi aspetti negativi dell’esperienza umana come il dolore, 
lo scacco, la malattia, la morte perche essi non toccano il principio infinito che si manifesta nell’uomo 
e percio non esistono per esso’. N. Abbagnano, ‘Morte o trasfigurazione dell’esistenzialismo’ Nuovi 
argomenti, xii (1955) pp.161-74, (p.161).
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smessa l’illusione ottimistica deH’illuminismo settecentesco e il 
pesante dogmatismo del razionalismo ottocentesco, veda nella ragione 
cio che essa e: una forza umana diretta a rendere piu umano il 
mondo.100
Abbagnano’s programme was articulated in three directions: dialogue with 
the natural sciences and their methodologies, particularly with the Anglo-American 
tradition; research for new approaches in the historical and social sciences; the 
rejection of rhetoric in philosophy. This ambitious programme of renewal of Italian 
philosophy was supported by a large proportion of intellectuals from different areas 
and was a sort of declaration of war against idealism.
However, the major influence of Abbagnano was exerted by his Storia della 
filosofia, a series of manuals on the history of philosophy to be used in high schools 
and universities, first published between 1946 and 1950. Abbagnano’s perspectives on 
modem Italian philosophy would have a huge impact on future generations of Italians.
The reading that Abbagnano gave of contemporary Italian philosophy was that 
of an insular phenomenon developed during a dictatorship with virtually no original 
traits. If the assessment of Gentile’s ‘idealismo attuale’ was rather sympathetic 
(Abbagnano had been a follower of the Sicilian philosopher and continued to see a 
vein of existentialism in Gentile’s attualismo) his critique of Croce’s philosophy was 
extremely harsh. Croce’s ‘system’, Abbagnano argued, was a failed attempt to 
resuscitate the 19th century project of a ‘romantic idealism’:
La filosofia di Croce costituisce l’ultima e decisiva crisi dell’idealismo 
romantico. Questo idealismo che si presentava in Gentile ... pacificato 
e felice nella coscienza della perfetta identita tra finito e infinito, si 
presenta in Croce ... come contrasto di posizioni inconciliabili. Le 
esigenze e i problemi, che esso ha cercato di far suoi, rompono il 
quadro delle categorie predisposte e si rivoltano contro di esse.101
Indeed the Neapolitan philosopher is seen as a simple epilogue of Hegel’s 
philosophy:
100 N. Abbagnano, ‘Verso un nuovo illuminismo: John Dewey’, Rivista di filosofia, 39 (1948), pp. 313- 
25 (p.325).
101N. Abbagnano, ‘L’idealismo italiano’, Storia della filosofia, vol.iii ( Turin: Utet, 1993), p.539.
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Lo storicismo crociano e radicalmente diverso dallo storicismo 
contemporaneo ... il quale e il problema critico della storiografia ...
Lo storicismo crociano non e nient’altro che il razionalismo assoluto
102hegeliano.
Croce, Abbagnano argued, had exerted a major influence on Italian culture, 
but his philosophical project was neither original nor coherent. It was rather a 
confused attempt to reconcile opposites. The idealistic system that Croce had built 
collapsed because of its own contradictions without any significant influence or 
prospect of continuity in the philosophical field:
Quest’opera ha esercitato molta influenza sulla cultura italiana fra le 
due guerre. Essa ha agito nello stesso senso della filosofia gentiliana,
nonostante l’inimicizia personale dei due filosofi Tuttavia non ha
dato luogo, nel campo filosofico, ad alcun originale sviluppo ... mentre 
invece ha determinate nuovi orientamenti nella critica letteraria ed 
artistica ... Orientamenti che, tuttavia, vanno oggi rapidamente 
scomparendo anche dalla cultura italiana.103
The critique of Abbagnano, through the means of his school manuals, penetrated the 
cultural fabric of the nation, producing the image of an old-fashioned Croce with 
practically nothing to say to future generations. Thus, the partially positive appraisals 
of individual scholars like Bobbio or Garin were largely neutralized for the mass of 
the educated public. There have, however been small circles of enthusiasts, and also 
individuals, who have attempted to either keep alive or revive interest in Croce’s 
contribution to Italian culture. As early as the late fifties the interest in Croce’s 
thought was confined to the south of Italy, particularly in Naples where the 
interpreters have tended to emphasize both the moralistic and idealistic components of 
his philosophy.
Carlo Antoni, one of Croce’s most distinguished interpreters, in his Commento 
a Croce portrayed the philosopher’s thought as in tune with existentialism focusing 
almost exclusively on the ‘spirituality’ and ‘morality’ of his views:
La concezione crociana della vita e quella di un equilibrio instabile, 
d’armonia faticosamente raggiunta e difesa, sempre precaria, perche 
sempre insidiata. Domina in tutta 1’opera crociana il senso di questa
102 Ibid., p.526. See also Abbagnano’s article ‘L’ultimo Croce e il soggetto della storia’, Rivista di 
filosofia, 45 (1953), pp. 300-13.
103 Ibid., p.539.
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costante immanenza della morte, condizione stessa della vita, e della 
sua funzione dialettica. Lo spirito e un fare che ha come suo opposto il 
non fare, quel nulla che si manifesta nel travaglio sterile, nell’accidia 
inconcludente, nel vuoto smarrimento.104
Books like that of Antoni, undoubtedly against the intentions of the author, reinforced 
the view of the Neapolitan thinker as a moralistic relic of the past.105
Another disciple of Croce, Raffaello Franchini in his Croce interprete di 
Hegel ed altri saggi filosofici, focused on the Hegelian component of Croce’s 
philosophy arguing that the philosopher was
hegeliano contro Hegel ma non senza Hegel, in quanto Hegel fu 
l’espressione piu alta della filosofia, con cui, volere o no bisognava 
fare i conti.106
The historian Giuseppe Galasso, who had the great merit of editing a new 
edition of Croce’s works in the late eighties, maintained that the philosopher ‘ha 
rappresentato un ritomo alia grande tradizione della storiografia europea del ‘700 e 
dell’800’.107 But the association of Croce’s thought with 19th century thought, namely 
with Hegel and ‘the great tradition of the seventeen and eighteen hundreds’, has 
worked to the detriment of the philosopher since it has portrayed his thought as an 
epilogue of the past century rather than the expression of a modem thinker.
Indeed, the ‘burial’ of Croce has also been contributed to by the lack of critics 
who have been prepared to look afresh at his writings with a critical eye to the 
analytical assumptions underlying the major interpretative trends in Croce 
scholarship. The emphasis on the systematic, Hegelian project of the Filosofia dello 
Spirito made Croce’s thought unappealing in an age where notions of system, truth 
and knowledge were being questioned.
A more recent interpreter of Croce, Gennaro Sasso, complained that the 
philosopher
104 C. Antoni, Commento a Croce (Venice: Neri Pozza, 1955), p. 150.
105 See also the preface o f Antoni’s book in which he explains how ‘nel quadro della filosofia crociana 
cio che tendevo a definire altro non era che il venerando, ma quasi obliato concetto dell’anima, che 
tuttavia intendevo non come vecchia sostanza dei metafisici, ma, storicamente, come l ’atto, che, 
neH’attimo ad esso concesso, realizza in se, in maniera assolutamente singolare, l ’universale spirito, 
che altrimenti non si manifesta.’ Ibid., p. 10.
106 R. Franchini, Croce interprete di Hegel e altri saggi filosofici (Naples: Giannini, 1964), p.5.
107 G. Galasso, Croce, Gramsci ed altri storici (Milan: II Saggiatore, 1969), p.80.
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malgrado la grande influenza esercitata, per circa quarant’anni, sulla 
cultura italiana, o forse proprio per questo, e oggi piu noto che non 
realmente conosciuto, e accende bensi polemiche ma, per lo piu
1 ORstanche e repetitive, di seconda mano.
But perhaps part of the responsibility for this lack of interest in Croce’s 
thought is due to the readings of many ‘crociani’ themselves. There is an undeniable 
tendency in Crocean studies to tie Croce’s philosophy almost exclusively to his most 
systematic works -  the Estetica, Logica and Pratica -  in order to find a coherent, 
namely idealistic, line of continuity. The same Sasso, in his monumental Benedetto 
Croce. La ricerca della dialettica, aimed to show the complex ‘idealistic’ project of 
Croce’s thought. Croce, according to Sasso, had attempted the ‘last great philosophy 
of history’, trying to expound the rationality of historical events.109
Moreover, Sasso insisted that a comprehensive critique of Croce’s thought 
had to start from the Tinea unitaria e sistematica di questa filosofia’.110 From this 
perspective all the elements that could not be included within this idealistic 
framework were considered either problematic or faulty. Thus Croce’s whole 
philosophical project was read as a sort of dramatic journey towards the never 
achieved ‘perfect system’. What remains to be saved is once more Croce’s moralism:
La lezione di civilta e, se la parola non fosse cosi logora, di umanita, 
che deve trarsi da questo pensatore, oggi cosi poco conosciuto e cosi 
poco letto, consiste certo nella coraggiosa meditazione sulla vitalita, 
sulla barbarie e sulla ‘fine della civilta’, ma anche nel positivo anelito a 
non indulgere alia contemplazione delle tombe, a ricercare la vita, a 
non consentire a se stessi, innanzi tutto a se stessi i morbidi pensieri 
della decadenza, della rinunzia e della morte.111
Reading these texts one has the impression that the defence of Croce’s 
philosophy has been fought with the wrong weapons. Perhaps it is worth reporting 
what Croce once said about the relationship between philosophers and his disciples:
108 G. Sasso in the preface to Croce, Lettere a Giovanni Gentile (Milan: Mondadori, 1981), p. vii.
109 ‘Quando, il 4 agosto 1943, i selvaggi fiirori della guerra si abbatterono su quell’angolo di Napoli e le 
antiche mura di Santa Chiara bruciarono ... parve che nel tragico rogo bruciasse altresi l ’ultima grande 
filosofia della storia.’ G. Sasso, Benedetto Croce. La ricerca della dialettica (Naples: Morano, 1975), 
p. 1023.
110 Ibid., p. 1021.
111 Ibid., p. 1028.
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Lo scolaro in quanto tale rappresenta l’accoglimento dell’esperienza 
mentale del passato ... II maestro, che ha creato la teoria ... ne awerte 
precisamente i limiti ... conosce i punti sui quali ha accumulato le 
difese perche piu facilmente vulnerabili ... Ma gli scolari proprio su 
questi punti piu travagliati, perche piu deboli, stimano i piu forti, e vi si 
adagiano, e vi collocano pulpiti da prediche ... credono di asserire la 
verita con quella risolutezza ed energia che al maestro e mancata ed 
asseriscono l’esteriorita; immaginano di continuare e compiere il 
maestro, e ne hanno lasciato spegnere lo spirito animatore e
119progrediente.
We have examined the major factors contributing to Croce’s demise in post­
war Italian culture. It now remains to show whether or not his philosophy has 
deserved this neglect.
112 B. Croce, ‘Lo scolaro fedele’, La Critica, ii (1917), 141-44 (pp. 141-42).
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CHAPTER TWO
ESTABLISHING AN ANTIMETAPHYSICAL TERRAIN
2.1 EARLIEST YEARS: CROCE’S INTELLECTUAL APPRENTICESHIP
The climate following the Second World War was not favorable to a dispassionate 
appraisal of Croce’s thought. The ‘operazione Gramsci’ launched by the formidable 
communist machine of Togliatti on the one hand, and the attacks from both the fronts 
of the progressive area and the ‘neoilluministi’ on the other, did not leave space for an 
impartial debate on the value of Croce’s philosophy. Another factor that played a part 
in Croce’s demise was the lack of perceptive critics. We have seen how even ardent 
Croceans such as Antoni and Sasso played the game of the philosopher’s detractors, 
considering Croce’s philosophy as a sort of epigone of western systematic thought.
The image of Benedetto Croce as a detached conservative Neapolitan thinker 
busy writing his hefty volumes of the Philosophy o f  the Spirit has become part of the 
collective imagery, at least in Italy. This representation was in the process of being 
shaped while Croce was alive, and was consolidated in the decades after the 
philosopher’s death. Certainly one direct effect of this portrait was to exclude Croce’s 
thought from contemporary debate. His was a conceptual perspective which both 
Christian Democrats and Communists found difficult to relate to their immediate 
political and ideological needs. Moreover, on the socio-political level Gramsci 
appeared more modem than Croce, and on the purely theoretical terrain neither Croce 
nor Gentile seemed to be attuned to the new trends that began to dominate Western 
culture, namely phenomenology, existentialism and psychoanalysis.1 Italians were 
eager to make contact with new cultural trends after living in a totalitarian state for 
twenty years.
The most important element that contributed to diminishing the reputation of 
Croce’s philosophy in the postwar era was the widespread and notorious Gramscian 
definition of him as a ‘papa laico’ in the preceding period. Indeed ‘lay pope’ became 
an easy way of dismissing Croce’s philosophy as parochial, out of date. The idea that 
Croce had spent his life ensconced in Naples, looking after his properties, cut off from
1 Giuseppe Galasso has recently insisted on the persistence o f this prejudice: ‘La tesi di una 
separazione italiana, di una piu o meno soprawenuta e forzata provincialita ... e molto diffusa ... e 
ancor piu diffusa ... e la tendenza ad addossare all’idealismo, e piu propriamente a Croce, la 
responsabilta, per non dire l ’iniziativa.’ G. Galasso, Croce e lo spirito del suo tempo (Bari: Laterza, 
2002), p. 304.
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the rest of the world, created a stereotype which in different guises penetrated 
virtually all criticism on the philosopher.
These received perceptions of Croce are highly misleading. To begin to make 
my case in this chapter I will examine the early life and writings of the philosopher, 
along with those collaborative enterprises in which he made clear his 
antimetaphysical intentions. It will also become evident that he was anything but a 
leisured and wealthy dilettante in his youth.2 In the case of his collaboration with 
Gentile it will be necessary to take the consequences of this joint venture into the 
1930s. In successive chapters I will then examine the actual development of Croce’s 
intellectual trajectory, one which, I will argue, was not the pursuit of a systematic 
programme.
Croce’s life was much more turbulent than is usually portrayed. He was a real 
protagonist of his age, always actively engaged with philosophical, political and 
cultural issues. If we do not take this into account we will not be able to explain 
Croce’s enormous popularity in the first fifty years of 20th century Italy. Indeed, very 
few thinkers can be compared with Croce when one considers the quantity and quality 
of his output,3 let alone his precociously developed intellectual skills. Croce was also 
an extraordinary cultural promoter, always engaged in broadening the narrow 
boundaries of Italian culture. Indeed, the creation of the monthly La Critica was part 
of his cultural project aimed at modernizing and encouraging a critical attitude within 
the stuffy Italian intellectual world.
Benedetto Croce was bom in Pescasseroli, a village near L’Aquila, in 1866, of 
a family belonging to the southern Italian haute bourgeoisie. He soon developed a 
passion for books which would last for the rest of his life:
Quando tomo alia mia piu lontana fanciullezza per ricercarvi i segni di 
quel che poi sono diventato, ritrovo nella memoria l’avidita con la
2 Galasso maintains that Croce’s early writings were granted ‘un’attenzione minore di quanto sarebbe 
stato opportuno.’ Moreover, ‘il collegamento o rapporto fra quel momento e l ’avvio definitivo del 
pensiero crociano e stato assai poco, per non dire nulla indagato.’ Ibid., p .l 16.
‘Croce pubblico circa trentamila pagine e corresse le bozze di molte riedizioni e ristampe di 
settantadue volumi: quattro di Filosofia dello Spirito, quattordici di Saggi Filosofici, quarantaquattro di 
Scritti di storia letteraria e politico, dodici di Scritti varii. Senza contare le diverse redazioni di alcune 
opere, gli inediti taccuini autobiografici di viaggio e di lavoro, le postille all’eco della stampa e alle 
recensioni raccolte in una settantina di cartelle, e un immenso epistolario ... Ne sono da dimenticare le 
traduzioni (dai dialoghi di Erasmo alle massime di von Platen alle liriche di Goethe, da\YEnciclopedia 
di Hegel al Pentamerone di Basile, da Marullo a Hopkins), le edizioni di numerosi testi ... e le 
bibliografie ... di Vico e De Sanctis.’ N. Badaloni, C. Muscetta in Labriola, Croce, Gentile (Bari: 
Laterza, 1977), p. 18.
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quale chiedevo ed ascoltavo ogni sorta di racconti, la gioia dei primi 
libri di romanzi e di stone che mi furono messi e mi capitarono tra le 
mani, l’affetto pel libro nella sua materialita.4
Indeed, at the end of his life, Croce had a library consisting of about seventy thousand 
volumes. He belonged to a family of five: Benedetto, his parents and two younger 
siblings, Alfonso and Maria. Croce’s mother was the one who introduced the boy to 
books and the arts in general.5
At the age of seventeen Croce’s life was struck by tragedy. In the summer of 
1883 an earthquake occurred on the island of Ischia, near Naples, where the Croces 
were spending their holidays. Benedetto’s parents and his sister were killed and from 
this point onward his life changed radically.
After the family tragedy, Croce and his brother Alfonso moved to Rome 
where their uncle Silvio Spaventa lived. Silvio had been imprisoned by the Bourbons 
during the struggle for Italian independence and had been a close collaborator of 
Cavour. At the time he was a member of parliament in the fledgling Italian state. He 
was one of the major exponents of the ‘Destra Storica’, now in opposition, and his 
house was a centre of debate and discussion on politics, history and philosophy for 
people from all political currents. Although Silvio believed that the State had to play a 
fundamental role in the organization of society, he did not share the Hegelian 
conception of the State6 advocated by his brother Bertrando, a famous professor in the 
university of Naples. Silvio accepted a sort of regulative role for the state, keeping 
firm to the distinction between moral values, which are personal, and the State which
• 7  • . •looks after the common good without any intrusion in matters of ethics. This position 
would influence Croce’s political views.
Croce remembered the years in Rome as the saddest days of his life:
4 B. Croce, Contributo alia critica di me stesso (Milan: Adelphi, 1989), p. 15.
5 ‘Mia madre aveva anche amore per l ’arte e gli antichi monumenti; e debbo a lei il primo svegliarsi del 
mio interessamento pel passato, alle visite che con lei facevo alle chiese napoletane, soffermandoci 
innanzi alle pitture e alle tombe. In tutta la mia giovinezza ... quella mia intima e accarezzata tendenza 
era ... la storia’. Ibid., p. 16.
6 The most extreme interpretation of the Hegelian state conceives the State as the real bearer o f moral 
values, in which individual moral values have to submit to the will o f the state. The concept o f ‘Stato 
etico’ would be reassessed by Giovanni Gentile in his attempt to give a philosophical legitimation to 
Fascism.
7 For a more detailed analysis o f the political differences between the Spaventa brothers see M. 
Bazzoli, Fonti delpensiero di Benedetto Croce (Milan: Marzorati, 1971), pp. 9-12.
55
Quegli anni furono i miei piu dolorosi e cupi: i soli nei quali assai volte 
la sera, posando la testa sul guanciale, abbia fortemente bramato di non 
risvegliarmi al mattino, e mi siano sorti perfino pensieri di suicidio.8
However, at his uncle’s house Croce had the opportunity to come into contact 
with a circle of journalists, politicians and academics. Among them was Antonio 
Labriola, teacher of moral philosophy at the University of Rome, who would become 
his mentor, and introduce Croce to the work first of Herbart and then of Marx9. Croce 
also tried to read the writings of his uncle Bertrando Spaventa finding them ‘arid’ and 
‘abstract’:
La ragione fondamentale della mia scarsa simpatia per gli scritti dello 
Spaventa era nella profonda diversita d’indole che da lui mi divideva. 
Perche lo Spaventa proveniva dalla chiesa della teologia; e il problema 
sommo e quasi unico fu sempre per lui quello del rapporto tra l’Essere 
e il Conoscere, il problema della trascendenza e dell’immanenza, il 
problema piu specialmente teologico-filosofico; laddove io, vinte le 
angosce sentimentali del distacco dalla religione, mi acquietai presto in 
una sorta di inconsapevole immanentismo, non interessandomi ad 
altro mondo che a quello in cui effettivamente vivevo, e non sentendo 
direttamente e in primo luogo il problema della trascendenza, e percio 
non incontrando difficolta nel concepire la relazione tra pensiero ed 
essere, perche, se mai, la difficolta sarebbe stata per me il contrario: 
concepire un essere staccato dal pensiero o un pensiero staccato 
dall’ essere.10
Thus, at this stage of his life, Croce had already abandoned religion and sought an 
alternative moral framework to give his life some sort of purpose. He also rejected 
any kind of transcendental philosophy, focusing instead on concrete answers to the 
questions he was interested in:
Cio che veramente mi suscitava interessamento, e mi costringeva a 
filosofare per brame di luce, erano i problemi dell’arte, della vita 
morale, del diritto, e piu tardi quelli della metodologia storica, ossia 
del lavoro che mi proponevo di esercitare. A questo vivo bisogno
8 Croce, Contribute, p.23.
9‘Nel secondo anno della mia dimora in Roma, mi risolsi ad ascoltare le lezioni di filosofia morale di 
Antonio Labriola, che gia mi era familiare come frequentatore assiduo della casa Spaventa e che 
grandemente ammiravo nelle conversazioni serali, scoppiettante di brio e di frizzi e riboccante di fresca 
dottrina. E quelle lezioni vennero incontro inaspettatamente al mio angoscioso bisogno di rifarmi in 
forma razionale una fede sulla vita e i suoi fini e doveri, avendo perso la guida della dottrina religiosa. ’ 
Ibid., p. 24.
10 Ibid., p.52. Italics mine.
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nessun soddisfacimento trovavo negli scritti dello Spaventa, che mi 
respingevano altresi per la loro forma arida ed astratta ... cosi diversa 
da quella del De Sanctis, semplice, popolare, tutta cose, sempre in 
vivace ricambio con la vita reale.11
Although Croce was enrolled in the faculty of law he never took any exams 
and he found academic life boring and pretentious. He would retain this attitude 
towards academia for the rest of his life avoiding any university job. Indeed, years 
later he wrote a tirade against the university environment worth quoting at some 
length for the insight it provides into Croce’s attitudes:
Nell’ambiente universitario si aggirano awenturieri senza coscienza, 
pronti a difendere qualsiasi tesi purche appoggiata da personaggi che 
abbiano efficacia, se non mentale, pratica, pronti ad aggredire 
canagliescamente cio che reputano ostacolo alle proprie mire personali.
E vi sono manipolatori di scienza, che alia scienza sono stati chiamati 
da quella stessa vocazione per cui tanti indossano, o indossavano una 
volta, la cocolla o la zimarra. E vi sono poi coloro, che hanno 
conquistato la loro ‘posizione scientifica’; che hanno definitivamente 
arredato il loro cervello come una casa nella quale si conti passare 
comodamente tutto il resto della vita; e questi ad ogni minimo accenno 
di dubbio e di discussione vi fanno il viso dell’armi, vi diventano 
nemici velenosissimi ... e, per salvare dalla morte i loro libri (come se 
non fosse questo il destino naturale di tutti i libri), preferiscono 
consacrarsi, essi stessi, alia morte intellettuale e spirituale. Cio che 
costoro difendono con tanto ardore, non e piu la verita, ma la verita 
materializzata, divenuta la ‘posizione’, che puo essere anche la 
commenda e il senato, coronamento sospirato dalla carriera
1 9universitaria; tutto, fuorche la ffemente vita del pensiero.
Croce’s early intellectual life was characterized by research into local history, 
perhaps triggered by the death of his family. Croce wanted to know more about his 
origins as a southern Italian. Naples, with its rich historical legacy embracing 
connections with France and Spain, through the Anjous, the Aragons and Bourbons, 
became a microcosm to be explored by the young scholar. Indeed, in 1892 Croce 
founded the magazine Napoli Nobilissima with his poet friend Salvatore Di
1 o
Giacomo. The journal was one of the first attempts to narrate the cultural history of
11 Ibid., p.53. Italics mine
12 B. Croce, ‘Scienza ed universita’, La Critica, iv (1906), pp. 319-21 (pp. 320-21).
13 The importance of Napoli nobilissima has recently been recognized by Thomas Willette in the essay 
‘E stata opera di critica onesta, liberale, italiana: Croce and Napoli Nobilissima (1892-1906)’, 
contained in The Legacy o f  Benedetto Croce. Contemporary Critical Views, edited by J. D ’Amico, D. 
A. Trafton and Massimo Verdicchio (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1999), pp.52-87.
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the capital of the Mezzogiorno which was one of the most densely populated 
conurbations in the world.14
The young scholar was particularly interested in folk culture, namely in 
legends, myths, proverbs and folk songs.15 Indeed, in this period he began the 
translation from Neapolitan of the Pentamerone by Gian Battista Basile, an invaluable 
17th century collection of folk tales.16 He also wrote a number of monographs on the 
Neapolitan theatre, on heroines of the Neapolitan revolution of 1799 and on art sites. 
Furthermore, Croce revived the study of the Commedia dell ’arte, writing a number of 
essays on the traditional masks of southern Italy. These essays are collected in Saggi 
sulla letteratura italiana del seicento (first published in 1911). At twenty-five he was 
already a celebrity among the learned, having published a series of works in Italy,
• 17France, Germany and Spam.
The widespread neglect of this early historical research conducted by Croce, has
1 8contributed to the picture of a detached and abstract scholar. This could not be 
further from the truth of the real picture of Croce’s personality. There are many 
interesting elements which are usually overlooked. The first evident feature is Croce’s 
interest in and concern for common people which conflicts with the usual image of a 
conservative thinker detached from the masses. The subjects of Croce’s research are 
courtesans, fishermen, and various outcasts who try to make ends meet in a hostile 
environment. Folk knowledge, for Croce, far from being a merely bookish interest 
was the image of life in its concreteness without fiction and abstractions. Moreover, 
he found an evident correspondence between folk culture and philosophy, maintaining
14See G. Galasso, Lo sviluppo demografico in Napoli dopo un secolo (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche 
Italiane, 1961), p.56.
15‘Nella mia adolescenza ... raccolsi anch’io fiabe ... (o cunti, come si dice nel Napoletano) e canti 
(canzoni), assediando la lavandaia, il facchino e la serva di casa, e i contadini che vi capitavano nelle 
feste ... e anche in quel tempo lessi assai volumi di fiabe e canti di ogni parte d’ltalia.’ B. Croce, Scritti 
di storia letteraria e politico, vol. x ( Bari: Laterza, 1918), p.245.
16 ‘L’ltalia possiede nel ... Pentamerone del Basile il piu antico, il piu ricco e il piu artistico fra tutti i 
libri di fiabe popolari; come e giudizio concorde dei critici stranieri conoscitori di questa materia, e, per 
primo, di Iacopo Grimm, colui che, insieme col fratello Guglielmo, dono alia Germania la raccolta dei 
Kinder und Hausmdrchen.’ B. Croce in the introduction to G.B. Basile, II Pentamerone (Bari: Laterza, 
1974) p. xxvii.
17‘Attraverso gli scritti eruditi Croce si era fatto conoscere anche fuori dell’Italia. Era ancora 
giovanissimo, aveva venticinque anni, e dietro di se un bagaglio di minuta preparazione che segnera la 
sua forma mentis per tutta la vita’. M. Corsi, Le origini del pensiero di Benedetto Croce (Naples: 
Giannini, 1984), p. 184.
18Croce’s writings on folk culture and southern traditions have been essential for the anthropologist 
Ernesto De Martino and for the collection o f Italian tales edited by Italo Calvino. Furthermore, the 
writer Dario Fo used Croce’s researches on the origins o f the ‘commedia dell’arte’.
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that ‘il senso comune... ha sovente ragione, perche esprime l’impressione vaga e 
confusa della verita.’19
Thus, for Croce, proverbs, legends and folk traditions represented a precious 
cultural inheritance, essential for understanding the character and the customs of a 
society. Indeed, although popular culture was simpler and less sophisticated in style 
than ‘high culture’ it was nonetheless valuable for this. Its value lay in its authenticity 
and immediacy of feeling. This is in contrast to the general view of Croce’s alleged 
‘elitist’ and hierarchical distinction between the two.
For similar reasons Croce had a positive appraisal of dialects, which represented
the link between varied languages and Italian. Thus his attention to local history was
soon broadened into a wider interest in the European tradition. Indeed, between 1883
and 1886 Croce traveled throughout Europe, consolidating his knowledge of German,
French, English and Spanish.20 His interest in languages was stimulated by a genuine
concern for the actual conditions of southern Italy, once a colony of the French and
earlier of the Spanish. Moreover, both Croce’s uncle Silvio Spaventa and Antonio
Labriola insisted that the young scholar had to learn German which was considered
essential for any serious student of the humanities. We miss a great deal, then, if we
see Croce’s youth as cocooned within a provincial environment, distant from the
modem world. In reality Croce’s interest in municipal history brought him into
contact with the main European languages and the western tradition in general; the
interest for the particular, for the fragment, was accompanied by a broader interest in
European culture. Croce’s travels around Europe were his first serious attempt to
situate his studies on local history within a wider cultural context. Indeed, at that stage
01he was planning a work on the influence of Spain on Italian life.
19 B. Croce, Pagine sparse (Bari: Laterza, 1960) p.475. See also Frammenti di etica: ‘Amo assai il non- 
filosofo, l ’incommosso, l ’indifferente alle dispute e distinzioni filosofiche, che possiede la verita in 
pochi e semplici principi, in limpide sentenze, guide sicure al suo giudicare e al suo operare.’ 
Frammenti di etica (Milan: Adelphi, 1994), p.230.
20Elena, Croce’s daughter, reported: ‘Mio padre parlava il francese con grande padronanza ... e molto 
correntemente anche il tedesco ... Non aveva mai fatto nessuno sforzo per acclimatarsi alle difficolta di 
pronuncia della lingua inglese. Queste tre lingue, e naturalmente lo spagnolo e il portoghese (aveva 
anche, da giovane, studiato l ’olandese e le lingue scandinave) le aveva comunque assai familiari ... Col 
latino e il greco aveva l ’assoluta confidenza di un uomo colto del suo tempo. E. Croce, Ricordi 
familiari (Florence: Vallecchi, 1962), p.39.
21 ‘Mi misi a vagheggiare ... un nuovo lavoro, che sarebbe dovuto innalzarsi ... alia storia nazionale; e 
questa medesima pensavo di trattare ... non come cronaca di awenimenti, ma come storia dei 
sentimenti e della vita spirituale d’ltalia, dal Rinascimento in poi. E, giudicando che questa storia non 
sarebbe stata fattibile senza una particolare conoscenza delle relazioni tra la civilta italiana e i popoli 
stranieri e senza l ’indagine dei loro reciproci "influssi", quasi parte e preparazione del lavoro piu 
generale mi accinsi a investigare l ’influsso della Spagna nella vita italiana. ’ Croce, Contributo, p.30.
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Feeling that he had to provide a more solid theoretical foundation for the great 
variety of his interests, Croce wrote, in 1893, La storia ridotta sotto il concetto 
generate dell’arte, his first philosophical work. The philosopher, however, would 
retain for the rest of his life the passion for both folk tradition and the unique value of 
particular historical events, no matter how insignificant they might appear.
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2.2 HISTORY SUBSUMED
This part of the chapter will be devoted to the very first phase of Croce’s 
philosophical thought, the two years between 1893 and 1895. The papers examined 
here were the earliest attempt by the young scholar to give a coherent framework to 
his studies in the humanities, namely in art and history. He also began to question the 
role of history within the theory of knowledge.
Croce’s debut in the philosophical arena began in Naples at the Accademia 
Pontaniana in 1893 where he delivered, as a paper, his La storia ridotta sotto il 
concetto generale dell ’arte. Its main aim was to examine the nature, the value, and the 
limits of historical knowledge. It was a dispassionate quest for an intellectual 
taxonomy which would prevent history from being considered as a science concerned 
only with the collection and analysis of empirical data. The young researcher
therefore sought an epistemological foundation on which to base his work in history
22and literature, which remained his primary fields of inquiry.
In the preface to his early works published in 1918 Croce explained the 
reasons for this defence of history:
In quel tempo il filosofo che godeva maggior fama e seguito in Italia 
era lo Spencer ... e con lui tanti altri positivisti ed evoluzionisti ... La 
mia prima azione critica si configuro, dunque, come opposizione a 
quell’andazzo disordinato e impetuoso, e segnatamente a quelle forme 
di esso che investivano e travolgevano le ragioni stesse degli studi, da 
me coltivati, della letteratura e della storia.
Positivism was a philosophical movement characterised by an emphasis upon 
science and scientific method as the only sources of knowledge, a sharp distinction 
between the realms of fact and value, and a strong hostility towards religion and 
traditional philosophy, especially metaphysics. An outgrowth of the empirical 
tradition, positivism was first introduced into the philosophical vocabulary in the early 
19th century by Saint-Simon. As developed by Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, 
Ernst Mach, and others, the movement had great influence in philosophy well into the 
20th century. Hostility towards traditional thought was especially strong in Comte and
22 In an article in the French Revue de sinthese historique dated 1902 Croce explained: ‘Done, 
m ’occupant ... des recherches relatives a l ’histoire politique et litterarie, et tourmente par un doute qui 
portait sur la valeur et les limites de la connaissance historique, je fus engage par la a reprendre le 
probleme du caractere de l ’histoire.’ B. Croce, Primi scritti (Bari: Laterza, 1951), p. 181.
23 Ibid., p.ix.
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Spencer, who denied the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, which they held to be 
a stagnant and useless branch of inquiry. They were suspicious of any proposition 
(including scientific hypotheses) that was incapable of being reduced to direct 
observation. Positivism thus redefined the purpose of philosophy, limiting it to the 
analysis and definition of scientific language. Positivism's opponents saw the 
advances of the movement, with its tendency to extend the empirical and analytical 
methods to all enquiries, as threatening the core of humanistic studies. Croce's ‘battle’ 
against Positivism was within this context.
In his 1893 lecture Croce was strongly influenced by the Italian thinkers 
Francesco De Sanctis and Antonio Labriola who initiated, in Italy, a polemical 
engagement with determinism and evolutionism in literature and history 
respectively.24 Croce admired in De Sanctis the passion for literature and the idea that 
criticism in the humanities had to be internal to the disciplines themselves. This view 
opposed the reductionism which advocated application of the ‘scientific method’ in 
all fields of inquiry as being the only reliable path to knowledge, itself conceived 
exclusively in terms of scientific laws. Antonio Labriola’s anti-academic approach, 
his concern for a culture not detached from everyday life, his interest in the 
philosophy of history, were all extremely important for the intellectual development 
of Croce.
Croce’s lecture, which forcefully argued that history was an art and not a 
science, has often been seen as a profession of faith in idealism. Some Italian cultural 
historians, among them Norberto Bobbio, note that the Neapolitan philosopher, 
reacting to the overwhelming determinism of the positivists, embraced the ‘rinascita 
dell’idealismo’25. Hence, the central feature of the paper is usually considered to be 
the critique of the positivist method when applied in fields like history and the arts, 
and the subsequent adoption of an idealistic stance. However, a careful reading 
reveals that in the paper there is no relevant reference to idealism as a philosophical 
doctrine and the few allusions to Hegel are quite critical.
24‘Nascevano queste ... tesi ... da quanto d’allora avevo finora appreso nello studio degli scritti del De 
Sanctis, da una certa disciplina logica ... che fin dal liceo mi aveva dato un tomistico insegnante di 
filosofia, e che si era rinvigorita nell’universita con le lezioni del Labriola, antipositivista ed 
antievoluzionista. ’ Ibid., p.x.
25‘II positivismo aveva fatto della scienza, in special modo della scienza naturale, l ’alfiere di ogni 
forma del sapere umano; l ’idealismo la rimise nei ranghi ... La forma di conoscenza che i positivisti 
esaltarono fii quella propria delle scienze della natura, gli idealisti contrapposero alia scienza della 
natura come conoscenza del generale, la filosofia come sapere universale.’ Bobbio, Profilo ideologico 
del novecento italiano, p. 75.
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Indeed, in a paper entitled Illustrazioni e discussioni, delivered a year later, 
referring to his philosophical position in the 1893 paper Croce made the point:
non sono hegeliano, come taluno mi ha qualificato a proposito dello
scritto sulla storia, che e invece spiccatamente antihegeliano ... una
delle piu assurde concezioni della storia e appunto quella che Hegel
26offfe nella sua Filosofia della storia.
The embarassed silence on this statement among Croce commentators is almost 
deafening. Moreover, Croce’s negative attitude towards positivism, which has often 
been overstated and used mercilessly against him, is not by any means the hub of the 
lecture, despite his later statements. In fact, in La storia ridotta sotto il concetto 
generale dell’arte there is no evidence of a prejudicial attitude towards the natural 
sciences and Croce’s criticism is directed only at the abuse of the above-mentioned 
methods in other disciplines.
One can show in fact through analysing Croce’s epistemological position in 
these years, that the philosopher was somewhat in awe of scientific disciplines, and 
that, at this stage of his philosophical development, he had not questioned the 
‘privileged’ status of the natural sciences. Only later in his intellectual itinerary 
would the Neapolitan philosopher reformulate this early distinction between science 
and history and then maintain that the latter enjoyed epistemological priority in the 
classification of disciplines.
However, the importance of the paper does not lie in the correctness or 
otherwise of the above-mentioned categorization of history within art. It lies rather in 
its pointing out the necessity of questioning the methods of inquiry in humanistic
97disciplines, given that that they cannot be classified among the ‘exact sciences’. 
Indeed, from the very start of his philosophical career Croce sought a distinctive 
method of inquiry for historiography and literature. And from the outset Croce’s 
search was undertaken in relation to the wider debate concerning the nature of history
26 Ibid., p. 54.
27Collingwood was the first who noted the relevance o f the paper in this respect: ‘Only one fertile 
suggestion was made during this period, and this was made by a young Italian whose experience of 
historical work and literary criticism gave him a fresh and first hand view in the subject ... Benedetto 
Croce in 1893, boldly drew the conclusion that art and history were the same thing. This 
pronouncement had nothing to do with the trite observation that the historian must be also an artist in 
so far as he must, incidentally, express himself in prose which ought therefore to be good prose ... This 
did not solve the problem but it brought matters to a head.’ R. G. Collingwood, ‘The philosophy o f  
history’, Historical Association Leaflet n. 79 (London, 1930), p. 12.
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and its methods being conducted in Germany. Indeed, there are a number of 
references to philosophers such as Droysen, Dilthey and Simmel in his debut paper.
This debate was, in fact, one of the most important intellectual issues in 
Germany at that time. The celebrated neo-Kantian Baden school, to which eminent 
philosophers such as Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert belonged, claimed for history 
in particular, and the humanities in general, methodological criteria of their own. 
The work of thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was a sophisticated 
attempt to construct a ‘critique of historical reason’ which would grant validity to the 
sciences of the spirit (Geisteswissenshaften) considered as fundamentally different 
from the natural sciences (Naturwissenshaften). Broadly speaking, the neo-Kantians 
defined history as a discipline which focuses on the particularity of products of 
human culture (myths, legends, values, customs, arts, philosophies etc.) This 
consideration of the objects in their particularity which characterizes the ‘sciences of 
the spirit’ was contrasted with the focus on uniformity and repeatability as expressed 
in the universal laws of the natural sciences. Whereas the scientific method is able to 
generalize and define by means of causal laws (Erklaren), the historical method 
necessarily relies on comprehension (Verstehen), namely the capacity to identify 
feelings, emotions and thoughts of other people.28
In the 1893 lecture Croce appeared to accept that part of the neo-Kantian 
critique which rejected the trend in historiography to imitate the methods of the 
natural sciences. Indeed Croce was fully aware of the ongoing debate in Germany 
about the function of history, since he talked about its developments ‘nei metodi della 
ricerca e della critica come in quelli dell’interpretazione e della comprensione’ and 
his paper was heavily based on these arguments. Thus, when the young scholar 
characterized the specificity of the arts, he provided an answer which was in tune 
with that of the German neo-Kantians:
O si fa scienza ... o si fa arte. Sempre che si assume il particolare 
sotto il generale, si fa scienza; sempre che si rappresenta il 
particolare come tale, si fa arte.30
28 See M. Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique o f  Historical Reason (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 188-89.
29 Croce, Primi scritti, p.4.
30 Ibid., p.23.
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A further insight into Croce’s epistemological development is given by the 
already mentioned 1894 lecture at the Accademia Pontaniana, Illustrazioni e 
discussioni, a polemical answer to the detractors of his philosophical debut. Here 
Croce draws the distinction between ‘scienze di concetti’ or ‘proprie’ and ‘scienze 
descrittive’ or ‘improprie’. Whereas the former deal with concepts, ‘descriptive 
sciences’ deal with facts. To the first category belong mathematics, physics, 
mechanics, chemistry, anthropology, psychology as well as logic, ethics, aesthetics, 
law and so forth. The second category groups disciplines like statistics, geography and 
cosmography. History and the arts belong to the descriptive group since they deal 
with facts, with ‘individuals’ or ‘particulars’, not with concepts:
Due grandi categorie di conoscenze, le scienze di concetti e le scienze 
descrittive restano cosi formate; e le prime sono ... scienze dei principi 
della realta ... e tra le seconde la descrizione e la storia del globus 
naturalis non meno che del globus intellectualis ... La differenza tra 
questi due gruppi e piu profonda di quel che non sembri a prima vista; 
perche le prime conoscenze mirano a un concetto, le seconde a un 
fatto, le prime oltrepassano le cose particolari, le seconde si 
immergono in esse.31
We can see from this distinction that at the time Croce, far from being hostile to the 
sciences, had a respectful view towards them when applied in their proper domain. 
Indeed, his distinction between arts and sciences was purely normative and not 
hierarchical; therefore the two forms of knowledge were equally important although 
they had distinct functions.
Thus, at this stage of his thinking Croce simply advocated a more well - 
defined status for the humanities since he noted that
la categoria generale che comprende Varte e la storia e le altre 
produzioni simili, non e stata ancora riconosciuta nella sua intera 
estensione ed mtrinseca natura.
From what has been argued so far, we can infer that:
1) Despite the traditional reading of Croce’s early thought, his attitude towards 
positivism and natural sciences in general was not prejudicial, but rather sympathetic.
31 Ibid., pp.64-65.
32 Ibid., p.66.
65
Indeed the young philosopher did not question the supremacy of the natural 
sciences.33 He defended the analytical features of natural science and criticized the 
misuse of them when applied to the arts.
2) Croce started his philosophical career not with a preconceived set of rules, or an 
idealistic metaphysics, as mainstream interpreters claim34, but with a concrete need to 
understand the epistemic value of the humanities, specifically history and literature. 
Thus the question of La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell’arte, far from 
being an idle one, involved a discussion about the value and purpose of history as a 
theoretical form of knowledge.
3) The debate on history, far from being an internal feud between Italian positivists 
and anti-positivists, was part of a much larger debate with international interlocutors. 
And the young Croce entered the fray equipped both with a considerable background 
as a historian of local history, and an engagement with the concerns of the wider 
international cultural community.
If we now go on to consider the group of papers between 1893 and 1895 in 
their original features, we find that the most striking feature of these papers is their 
radical questioning of the premises of historical method.
We already know that Croce in La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale 
dell’arte described history as a ‘genere di produzione artistica che ha per oggetto della
o c  ,
sua rappresentazione il realmente accaduto’. Thus, although history is classified 
under the category of the arts, it nevertheless describes ‘real events’. The stress here is 
placed on the narrative. But this is not to be mistaken for a simple narration of 
empirical events. Indeed, Croce maintained that
La storia ha un solo ufficio: narrare fatti; e quando si dice narrare fatti, 
si intende altresi che i fatti debbono essere esattamente raccolti e 
mostrati quali sono realmente accaduti, ossia ricondotti alle loro cause
33Charles Boulay has rightly remarked that ‘en revenant sur sa jeunesse dans des ecrits 
autobiographiques, Croce a incontestablement exagere son opposition au positivisme au cours de sa 
formation culturelle, et ceux qui se sont occupes de ce moment de sa pensee, comme Mario Corsi et 
meme Emilio Agazzi, ont a peu pres neglige cette composante.’ Benedetto Croce ju squ e’en 1911 
(Geneva: Droz, 1981), p.xii.
34 See for example Emilio Agazzi who, in his highly influential book, maintained that: ‘La sua prima 
“sistemazione filosofica” il Croce la tento ... nella memoria del 1893 sulla storia e sull’arte ... Ed il 
compito primario della stessa indagine filosofica, di cui nella memoria Croce aveva fomito un primo 
esempio, risiedeva per lui nella difesa di quei tradizionali valori contro le negazioni e le contaminazioni 
empiristiche, materialistiche e relativistiche.’ II giovane Croce e il marxismo (Turin: Einaudi, 1962) 
pp.554-55.
35 Croce, Primi scritti, p.38.
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e non gia esposti estrinsecamente come appaiono all’occhio 
inesperto. 6
There is no such thing as an ‘innocent’ recounting of factual events.
The philosopher also considered the preliminary work or ‘lavori preparatori’ 
that historians need to undertake in order to write a historical account. For Croce this 
work of research is essential but it cannot be defined as history:
Lo storico, prima di procedere alia sua rappresentazione, prima di 
narrare, ha bisogno di approntare la materia da esporre; e i suoi lavori 
preparatori si chiamano la ricerca, la critica, Tinterpretazione, la 
comprensione storica, e sono piu o meno agevoli e talvolta ottengono 
pieno effetto e talvolta no. Formano essi una sterminata produzione 
letteraria, rispetto alia quale i lavori di storia narrativa sembrano 
piccola minoranza. Ora, codesti lavori preparatori sono essi storia? La 
stessa posizione della domanda include la risposta. Certo che no.37
Thus, what Croce calls history tout court is the completed narrative, as distinct from 
the preliminary research on documents and sources. History here is not seen simply as 
a mere collection of data or a chronological registering of events, but rather an act of 
interpretation.38 In reality, without narrative one cannot talk about history. We need to 
know then what this history-narration consists of. Croce argued that
prima condizione per avere storia vera ... e che sia possibile una 
narrazione. Ma costruire una narrazione compiuta e qualcosa che non 
accade di sovente; e percio la definizione che abbiamo data della storia 
rappresenta un ideale che di rado riesce alio storico conseguire. Nella 
maggior parte dei casi, non si possono offrire se non ... esposizioni 
ffammentarie, turbate da discussioni e da dubbi e da riserve.39
When one tries to construct a historical account, one encounters a number of 
obstacles caused essentially by two factors: the (lack of) sources and their 
interpretation. Indeed, often historians have to supplement the evidence with theories
36 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
37 Ibid., p.39.
38 I do not, however, agree with Mario Corsi that Croce does not distinguish between history and 
chronicle. Indeed, the whole argument of these early papers is based on this distinction. A simple list of 
events put in chronological order is not history for the Neapolitan philosopher. If we do not consider 
this essential distinction we cannot explain why ‘Croce ... riconosce che storia e “elaborazione 
artistica”e quindi non semplice ripetizione del dato.’ M. Corsi, Le origini del pensiero di Benedetto 
Croce, ibid., p.64. For Croce’s own discussion o f this issue see Croce, Primi scritti, pp.36-41.
39 Ibid., p.38.
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and suppositions. Therefore, although the aim is the achievement of an objective 
historical narration, the subjective element is already present at this very first stage: 
facts and interpretations influence each other.
Moreover, Croce mentioned another element connected with the presentation 
of facts which he regards as an essential component of historical narration:
La storia ... sceglie, ossia rappresenta non tutte le cose
indifferentemente, ma, ogni volta cio che le interessa.40
This last statement makes things more complicated: history does not simply narrate, it 
selects certain elements for its narration; it does not simply report whatever happened, 
it chooses according to a certain ‘interest’. Thus, on the one hand subjectivity is an 
obstacle for writing history, since it is present within the selection and construction of 
any interpretation; on the other hand the same subjectivity with its ‘interest’ in certain 
facts is the driving force of historiography. Indeed the subjective element is crucial at 
all stages of the historical narration. The nature of this interest is not fully explained 
by Croce and contains a number of blind spots.
Part of the problem lies in the connotations that Croce gives to ‘interest’, two 
meanings of the term corresponding to the meanings we would give it in English, in 
the two following statements: ‘what an interesting day’ on the one hand, and ‘he gave 
the money out of self interest’ on the other. The first of the usages was in Croce’s 
mind an ‘aesthetic’ statement. Do historians follow an aesthetic criterion when they 
select certain facts? Given the association of art and history, Croce’s early taxonomy 
seems to suggest this reading. The development of Croce’s conception of ‘interest’ is 
a key to understanding the sense of his specific inquiry. At this early stage its sense is 
aesthetic. With an ‘aesthetic view’ the stress falls inevitably on the rhetorical purpose 
of historical narration with little concern for the real forces which mold this interest. 
However, soon the philosopher would abandon the original association and elucidate 
the nature of this ‘interest’ with the help of Marxism which is the subject of the next 
section of the chapter.41
40 Ibid., p.56. Italics mine.
41 At a later stage we will see how this deep-rooted conviction o f Croce’s concerning the importance of 
‘interest’ in the historiographical enterprise acquires additional dimensions. Namely, the way in which 
‘interest’ takes the form o f concern, with a moral dimension, and also the way in which one’s own 
inescapable cultural conditioning will always ensure that readings o f the past make all history 
‘contemporary.’
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Despite some ambiguities in these early papers, Croce’s emphasis on the 
nature of historical inquiry as ‘interest’ draws our attention to the issue of objectivity 
in historiography. Indeed, if one accepts the statement that history is driven by 
‘interest’, one has to admit that in the act of reporting events from the past there is no 
complete objectivity, there are no ‘pure facts’. The consequences of this important 
statement will be dealt with at a later stage. However, this conception of (historical) 
knowledge, which we will later see as an intrinsic component of his anti-dogmatic 
philosophy, is one of Croce’s fundamental tenets.
In a lecture entitled Intorno alia filosofia della storia delivered in 1895, Croce 
drew together the conclusions of his early reflections on history. We have already 
seen that Croce stressed how in history and the arts the use of narrative leads 
inevitably to a level of subjectivity. When one solves a mathematical equation the 
degree of subjective judgment is practically non-existent. Something different 
happens when one gives an opinion about a work of art or attempts a historical 
account. The latter practices have a strong subjective component; indeed they are 
based on ‘individual judgments’:
La storia tratta non di fatti, awenimenti, azioni e persone ... ma di 
questo fatto, di questa persona e via dicendo. [La] scienza ... cerca il 
generale ossia quel che esiste in tutti i singoli oggetti...[la storia] il 
singolo come individuality concreta.42
It is, at this point, important to distinguish between different meanings of 
‘interpretation’. In Croce’s view, although the ineradicability of ‘interest’ and 
‘subjectivity’ necessitate ‘interpretation’ for the narrative to be complete, a different 
set of problems arises when the historian attempts to employ ready-made, grand 
schemes of interpretation. Croce sees the latter as the imposition of ‘metaphysics’ 
onto the narrative. The interpretations required by ‘subjectivity’ and ‘interest’ are 
intrinsic to the representation of the real; ‘metaphysics’, whether treating of God or 
idealism is extrinsic:
La storia la facciamo noi stessi tenendo conto, certo delle condizioni 
obiettive nelle quali ci troviamo, ma coi nostri ideali, coi nostri sforzi,
42 Croce, Primi scritti, p. 18.
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con le nostre sofferenze senza che ci sia consentito scaricare questo 
fardello sulle spalle di Dio o dell’Idea.43
Thus, the very concept of ‘philosophy of history’ is questioned here. Historical 
events do not accept any external cause such as Providence, Reason, Idea, becoming, 
which for Croce all represent the presence of God in disguise:
La filosofia della storia e stata a lungo considerata come una sorta di 
rivelazione del significato della storia, alia quale si perveniva col 
scrutare i disegni della Prowidenza o col determinare il ritmo della 
Ragione, dell’Idea, del di venire universale o in quali altri modi si e 
chiamato il travestimento del vecchio Dio.44
As a result of this critique any philosophy of history is seen with suspicion, as 
a ‘mythology’ which aims to ape the natural sciences with its faith in an all 
encompassing Principle or Rule. On the other hand, the questions that history poses 
are a part of the real world, which is complex and multifaceted, and they are peculiar 
to this discipline:
Trasportata la considerazione storica dal mondo ideale al mondo reale, 
era naturale domandarsi: ... Come nascono, si trasformano e muoiono 
le istituzioni sociali? In qual modo si viene svolgendo, per esempio lo 
Stato e il costume morale? - Queste ed altre domande simili formano 
un ... gruppo che si e chiamato dei principi reali ... o dei concetti sotto 
i quali pensiamo la storia.45
At this stage of his thought Croce did not possess a well-defined epistemic 
framework within which to situate all these issues. Nevertheless he had already 
focused his attention on some important features such as the crucial role of narration 
and subjectivity in history and the distinction between historiography and the group of 
disciplines which speculate about the final meaning of history in metaphysical terms. 
Hence one cannot agree with critics like Roberts when he maintains that ‘Croce’s 
position was quite conventional’ since ‘he had not yet questioned the notion of a 
stable, determined reality of the past’.46
43 Ibid., p.68.
44 Ibid., p.67.
45 Ibid., p.68.
46 Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p.39.
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The attention of the young thinker was also focused on more concrete 
concerns such as the search for a reliable and flexible methodology, which would 
answer the following questions:
Con quali presupposti e con quali metodi si ritrovano e integrano i dati 
della tradizione? Quali sono l’estensione e i limiti dell’affermazione 
dello storico? Quale valore logico ha la congettura storica?47
Paradoxically, the encounter with Marxism would reinforce Croce’s early 
skepticism for definitive historical accounts and make him aware of some other 
‘forces ’ operating in the historical investigation. Paradoxically, since the question 
which naturally comes to mind is: would this not lead him to the ‘metaphysics’ he 
seemed anxious to avoid?
47Croce, Prim i scritti, p.68.
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2.3 DECONSTRUCTING MARXISM
Generally speaking, Croce criticism has not dealt justly with his reading of Marx.
48Widely seen either as an early flirtation in which the glamour wore off, or as an 
interesting approach abandoned in preference for an idealist one,49 the lasting 
influence on his antimetaphysical method of this early contact with Marxism has been 
overlooked.
In April 1895 Croce received a letter from his friend and mentor Antonio 
Labriola:
E uscito a Parigi il primo fascicolo ... del Devenir social, ‘organo 
marxista’. Ci scrivero anch’io: come di fatto ho gia mandato un lungo 
articolo-monografia. Fui pregato di procurare degli abbonati. 
Permettetemi di fare il vostro nome. Son certo che ci troverete da 
leggere. E a proposito dell’articolo mio: mi permettete di mandarvene 
il manoscritto? Vedrete voi se sia il caso che io ne faccia un 
opuscoletto.50
The article sent by Labriola, In memoria del Manifesto dei comunisti, had a great 
impact on the young Croce who reported:
Stavo allora sui ventinove anni, ero passato attraverso molteplici prove 
di studi in letteratura, filologia, e filosofia, e, inconsapevolmente, per 
un intimo bisogno morale, mi venivo rivolgendo all’indagine del 
problema della storia ... cosicche attesi con molta aspettazione il 
manoscritto del suo articolo ... e quando lo ebbi ricevuto, lo lessi e lo 
rilessi, la mente mi si riempi di visioni e concetti per me nuovi.51
Antonio Labriola (1843-1904) was one of the most prominent European 
intellectuals writing on historical materialism and had regular correspondence with
48‘After a youthful flirtation with Marx and other forms of socialism, Croce became a liberal.’ 
Introduction to D ’Amico, Trafton and Verdicchio, The Legacy o f  Benedetto Croce, p. 10.
49A typical example o f this critical attitude is Agazzi in his already quoted II giovane Croce e il 
marxismo: ‘La prospettiva aperta dal marxismo [a Croce] riusciva certamente affascinante: ma era un 
fascino che dava le vertigini perche al fondo di quella nuova strada si poteva intravedere la paventata 
riduzione relativistica dei valori, la loro risoluzione storicistica nella determinata condizionalita delle 
situazioni storico-sociali, ed in ultima analisi dei rapporti economici.’ For Agazzi Croce’s ultimate aim 
was essentially ‘tentare una sorta di “restaurazione metafisica dei valori.’” E. Agazzi, II giovane Croce 
e il marxismo, p. 558. Also the Crocean Caserta from a different point o f view comes to the same 
conclusion: ‘In the intellectual biography of Croce Marxism ... does not mark a decisive turning point 
in the general orientation of his thought. It was a momentary political passion ... a vacillation.’ E.G. 
Caserta, Croce and Marxism (Naples: Morano, 1987), p.9.
50 B. Croce, ‘Come nacque e come mori il marxismo teorico in Italia’, in Materialismo storico ed 
economia marxistica (Bari: Laterza, 1961), p.279.
51 Ibid., p.280. See also Croce, Contributo, p.33.
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Engels. Although the Cassino intellectual is frequently mentioned in many Italian and 
European studies on Marxism, it is rare to come across scholars with direct 
knowledge of his writings. Yet, Labriola’s influence on the understanding and spread 
of Marxism in Europe is extremely important.52 Croce took personal charge of 
editing, financing and publishing his mentor’s books.
When Labriola asked the young scholar to write a series of essays focussing 
on the importance of Marxism and its relevance for both social and political life, he 
accepted willingly, since he found the existing interpretation of the movement given
• 53by Italian academics such as Professor Achille Loria superficial and plagianstic. 
Thus, shortly afterwards Croce wrote in the French Socialist magazine Le Devenir 
social a strong critique of Loria’s interpretation of historical materialism entitled Les 
Theories historiques de M. Loria.54
At that time many European intellectuals were engaged in applying historical 
materialism to their analyses of social and political life. However, the interpretations 
given by scholars like Lafargue, Bernstein, and, in Italy, Loria and Ferri had given a 
portrait of Marxism which seemed arbitrary to many progressive intellectuals.55 
Broadly speaking, the tendency was to reduce Marxism to a prescriptive set of 
economic rules to be applied according to an oversimplified model of society in 
which the economic factor was the determining element. Labriola and Croce reacted 
negatively to this ‘reductionist’ school of Marxism. They objected mostly to the 
simplistic way in which the economic struggles between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat were used as an explanatory category to analyze the social and political 
developments in capitalist society. Their aim was to produce a more rigorous 
literature on Socialism aimed at explaining plainly but without oversimplifications the 
main aspects of this doctrine.
52 Labriola’s book Del materialismo storico, dilucidazione preliminare (Rome: Loescher 1896), was 
one o f the most important points o f reference on Marxism: ‘Questo saggio fondo veramente l ’autorita 
del Labriola come sistematore filosofico del materialismo storico ed ebbe divulgazione intemazionale 
nella traduzione ffancese ... In questa forma lo leggeva, circa in quegli anni Leone Trotzky, durante il 
suo primo imprigionamento nel carcere di Odessa.’ Croce, ‘II marxismo teorico in Italia’, p.290. For a 
thorough account of Labriola’s political relevance see the classic work by L. Dal Pane, Antonio 
Labriola nella politico e nella cultura italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975).
53 Referring to Loria Croce wrote: ‘In Italia ... il materialismo storico e diffuso quasi soltanto nella 
forma spuria datagli da un ingegnoso professore d’economia, il quale se n’e spacciato ritrovatore’. 
Croce, Materialismo storico, p.2.
54 ‘Les Theories historiques de M. Loria’ in Le Devenir Social, ii, (1896), pp.881-905.
55 For an account o f Marxist revisionism see E. Santarelli, La revisione del marxismo in Italia (Milan: 
Feltrinelli, 1966) and G. Marramao, Marxismo e revisionismo in Italia (Bari: De Donato, 1971).
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Years later, in 1928, Croce would remember the influence of Marxism in 
Italian cultural life in these terms:
II socialismo marxistico veniva a riempire il vuoto che vaneggiava nel 
pensiero e negli ideali italiani ... ma sarebbe errato considerarlo 
semplicemente come siffatto riempitivo ... La ricezione del socialismo 
marxistico in Italia e il fermento a cui die luogo, furono, per contrario, 
un complesso di correzioni, ... di migliori awiamenti, di maggiori 
approfondimenti, che ridie contenuto alia cultura italiana, la raccolse 
floscia e cascante e l’appoggio a un’ossatura. Per opera del marxismo, 
nelle cose politiche fu cacciata al secondo piano la considerazione 
delle forme giuridiche degli istituti, sostituita dalle indagini sulla 
produzione e distribuzione economica, e sui bisogni che quelle forme 
esprimevano e tutelavano; non lasciandosi piu sviare dal mero suono 
della parola “liberta”, uso vocale del quale si era troppo abusato per 
trascorrere con quel motto sui problemi reali o per nascondergli agli 
occhi con un colpo di mano ... e tenendo sempre a guardare la realta 
effettuale di la delle apparenze.56
This appraisal, which goes to the heart of the Marxist unmasking of the 
discourse of false bourgeois ideology, was hardly that of a flirtatious youth -  he was 
by now sixty-two years of age. However, Croce and his mentor had very different 
ideas on Marxism from the very outset. Indeed, whereas Labriola was interested in 
spreading both the theoretical and the political influence of Socialism, Croce’s interest 
was focused rather on finding a useful tool for historical inquiry.57 Labriola’s concern 
was to reform Italian Socialism, since he found that ‘II socialismo italiano’ was ‘fatto
58dagli spostati, dagli awenturieri, dagli imbroglioni, e dagli snobisti.’
On the other hand Croce’s interests were not political; in fact he did not have a 
specific political view at this point although he was sympathetic to some of the views 
of the Communist movement.59 Consequently, Croce distinguished historical 
materialism as a tool of theoretical analysis from its encasement in the Socialist 
movement which embodied the political, therefore ideological side, of Marxism. 
Thus, Croce approached Marxism from an enquiring point of view, looking for a
56 B. Croce, Storia d ’ltalia dal 1871 al 1915, (Bari: Laterza, 1967), pp. 142-43.
57 ‘II lavoro scientifico prendeva solo una delle parti della vita del Labriola, che altrettanto e forse piu 
ne dava alia politica e, ormai da alcuni anni al socialismo, e piu da vicino, al socialismo italiano.’ 
Croce, ‘II marxismo teorico in Italia’, in Materialismo storico, p.292.
58 Ibid., p.297.
59 ‘La verita e che io era preso da una passione tacituma e tenace per la ricerca scientifica, indirizzata a 
risolvere alcuni problemi, che ... faticosamente venivo traendo fuori e schiarendo a me stesso ... Era
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useful procedure rather than a political credo.60 Marxism could provide some of the 
categories that the young scholar needed to solve issues on the interpretation of 
history he had encountered in his first papers, namely the unsolved problem of 
‘interest’ that Croce was still developing, the other being the relation between the 
subjective character of historical narrative and the ‘forces’ which shape history.
In his early stage of Marxist reading, Croce did not believe that the doctrine 
was a new vision of the world or a new philosophy of history; on the contrary, the 
value of historical materialism lay for him in its defiance of any all-encompassing 
system of thought, and in its realism. As a matter of fact, from the very outset, Croce 
was less interested in interpreting Marx as such than in discovering what the 
German’s thought had to offer for his own project which he held remarkably firm. For 
when he later became convinced that Marxism embraced metaphysical elements he 
quickly discarded them.
This attitude is shown in the first article on Marxism by Croce, Sulla 
concezione materialistica della storia, which is dated 1896, later included in the 
volume Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica. 61 The occasion of the article 
was a review of the already mentioned book by Labriola, Del materialismo storico, 
dilucidazione preliminare. In his analysis of the book, Croce wanted first to 
emphasize the function of historical materialism as an essential ‘empirical canon’ for 
historical inquiry, and then to present the core of Marxism as a ‘realistic’ critique of 
any arbitrary or metaphysical system of thought. Croce considered Marx
II socialista che intese come anche cio che si chiama rivoluzione, per 
diventare cosa politica ed effettuale, debba fondarsi sulla storia,
naturale che io non potessi sentire il socialismo e la politica in genere, al modo stesso in cui si sentiva 
un uomo di predominante passione e disposizione politica.’ Ibid., p.301.
60 On this subject it is interesting to read the first foreword to Materialismo storico ed economia 
marxistica dated July 1899: ‘E stato affermato, da piu d’uno, che io, da rigido marxista ortodosso, mi 
sia venuto via via mutando e abbia assunto in fine, atteggiamento di critico e di oppositore. Non avrei, 
naturalmente, nessuna difficolta ad ammettere il fatto, se fosse vero. Ma che non sia vero non debbo 
spendervi parole intomo: i saggi qui raccolti, e che sono tutto cio che ho mai pubblicato in materia, 
bastano a provarlo. Si vedra che gia in quello sui Campanella si criticavano le stravaganze filosofiche 
di uno dei piu autorevoli marxisti ortodossi, del Lafargue; che nel secondo ... sono tutte le idee, 
riaffermate poi negli altri, sui limiti entro i quali il materialismo storico e da accogliere ... Dunque per 
quanto io cerchi od altri cerchi, non si riesce a determinare il tempo in cui sarei stato “marxista 
ortodosso”, e il momento in cui sarebbe awenuta la mia conversione.’ Ibid., p.viii.
61 The first edition o f Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica was published in Palermo by 
Sandron in 1900.
62 ‘La reazione filosofica dello spirito critico getto a terra le costruzioni innalzate dalla teologia e 
dall’arbitrarismo metafisico, che adduggiavano il campo della storiografia. La vecchia filosofia della 
storia fu colpita a morte.’ Croce, Materialismo storico, p.2.
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armandosi di forza e potenza (mentale, culturale, etica, economica), e 
non gia confidare nei sermoni moralistici e nelle ideologic e ciarle 
illuministiche.
The great merit of Marxism was its abilty to unmask the real dynamics of 
power through criticizing the naive views of the Enlightenment on the origin of laws 
and institutions. It showed once and for all that there is no such thing as ‘natural law’ 
but that legislation and institutions were connected with the interests of the emerging 
class (the bourgeoisie) who had specific aims and reasons for staying in power. What 
Marx had strongly criticized in thinkers such as Voltaire and Rousseau was their 
inclination to abstractness and their lack of historical perception. Statements such as 
‘all men are equal’ or ‘everybody is equal before the law’ were promoted as deriving 
from ‘natural law’ and not products of a certain civilization expressed in a given 
period of time. The German philosopher had shown how these apparently impartial 
statements were ideologically driven. Later in his life Croce would recall:
Nella concezione politica ... il marxismo mi riportava alle migliori 
tradizioni della scienza politica italiana, merce la ferma asserzione del 
principio della forza, della lotta, della potenza, e la satirica e caustica 
opposizione alle insipidezze giusnaturalistiche.64
It is clear that at this stage Croce did not see Marxism as a ‘grand discourse’. 
Instead, Marxist thought had a great appeal to Croce because he saw in it an insistence 
on ‘reality’ and a concrete approach to analyzing history without any grandiose 
scheme. Marxism had also strongly stated
la dipendenza di tutte le parti della vita tra di loro, e della genesi di 
esse dal sottosuolo economico, in modo che si pud dire che di storie ce 
n ’e una sola; il ritrovamento della forza reale dello Stato ... col 
considerarlo istituto di difesa della classe dominante; la stabilita 
dipendenza delle ideologic dagli interessi di classe; la coincidenza dei 
grandi periodi storici coi grandi periodi economici.65
63 Ibid., p.xiii.
64 Ibid., p.xii. See also Croce, La storia d ’Italia, p. 145: ‘giovava che si lasciassero un po’ stare , 
insieme con la parola “liberta”, le altre di “umanita”, “fratemita”, “giustizia”, e simili ... Quelle parole 
erano state spostate dal loro luogo , fino a ipostatare ... una sorta di aeropago, collocato in un punto 
ideale, presieduto da un Dio o da una Dea, che avrebbe raddrizzato e risoluto ... le contese degli 
uomini ... quasi che le idee sussistano altrimenti che non come lavoro del pensiero e della volonta 
umana e si attuino altrimenti che con l ’opera del braccio.’
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All these elements (economy, state, ideology, hegemony) would enrich and help to 
refine the notion of history that Croce was beginning to develop. Thanks to Marx 
history was now seen in a new light: the economic, ideological, and political terrain 
were, for the young scholar, the real terrain of human activity. For Croce the German 
philosopher was the first to point out the fundamental value of history focusing on its 
immanence, since in Marx history did not deal with abstract structures:
La storia non e un processo dz\YIdea, ossia di una trascendente realta 
razionale, sibbene un sistema di forze: alia concezione trascendente si 
opporrebbe la concezione immanente.66
This injection of realism, with its firm rejection of idealism, crushed all metaphysical 
systems which had constrained historical research. It would be hard to find clearer 
repudiation of the Hegelianism with which Croce has repetedly been associated.
Another element worth noticing is Croce’s insistence on history as a ‘system 
of forces’. The historical process is something complex that cannot be reduced to a 
single causative factor or a simple formula. If history includes a cluster of forces such 
as economy, society, ideology and state, we cannot look for a single original cause 
which is responsible for the whole historical process. Thus any historical perspective 
that reduces events to one source or causative principle inevitably produces a 
simplistic vision of history. This is the case of the theorists who want to establish laws 
of history embedded in such notions as ‘Progress’ or ‘Evolution’. Progress does not 
explain history; it is just a contingent tool to be applied in certain cases in a given 
time to a specific society or state:
La stessa idea di progresso, che e parsa a molti la sola legge storica da 
salvare delle tante escogitate dai pensatori filosofi e non filosofi, e ... 
resa priva della dignita di legge e ridotta a significato assai particolare 
... La storia ci insegna che gli uomini sono capaci di progredire; e noi 
possiamo guardare le svariate serie dei fatti sotto questo angolo 
visuale: non altro.
To discard the idea of progress as the driving force in history implies an open 
interpretation of the sequence of events. Indeed, one of the consequences of writing
65 Croce, Materialismo storico, p. 14.
66 Ibid., p.5.
67 Ibid.,p.8.
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history without the ‘law of progress’ is to prevent seeing the past merely as an 
impoverished prototype of the present. This perspective has important repercussions 
not only in the interpretation of history, but also in disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology and the like. Indeed, if progress is not the decisive factor we cannot 
automatically maintain, for instance, that the city-states in ancient Greece were less 
democratic than our democracy. Or that Australian aboriginal society is less 
developed than ours.
The same criticism can be applied to the concept of ‘Evolution’. This pattern 
derived from the natural sciences cannot be transposed onto the historical field 
without distortion. Evolution in history presupposes a law of development towards the 
perfection, in some way or other, of human activity, namely the unfolding of a 
teleological law embodying itself in the world. Moreover, as in the case of progress, 
in an evolutionary pattern the past is somehow seen as inferior to the present. Such a 
view, although it might satisfy Spencer or the Hegelians, cannot be accepted as a 
general law of history, since it creates a deterministic conception in which our acting 
is controlled by ‘Evolution’.
Finally, the last Taw’ criticized by Croce is that of historical necessity:
Ne meno circostanziale ed empirica e l’idea della necessita storica, 
dalla quale bisogna cancellare ogni traccia di razionalismo e di 
trascendenza, per vedervi il semplice riconoscimento del piccolissimo 
campo che nel corso delle cose e lasciato all’arbitrio individuale.68
Hence, ‘necessity’ in history is, for Croce, an empirical and limited notion. Any other 
attempt to extend this notion beyond this would produce a metaphysics relying on a 
‘fate’ which drives human actions. Croce maintained that this is a transcendental 
conception not dissimilar to theological beliefs with their predetermined schemes. It is 
important to emphasize the fact that Croce did not deny the usefulness of the concepts 
of progress, evolution and necessity per se. What he rejected was an all-encompassing 
explanation of the world subsumed under one of these perspectives. The position of 
Croce is quite clear: it is impossible to give a definitive account of history. The reason 
for this is that any conception of what constitutes the real and definitive necessarily 
derives from an ideological position. Indeed, all our conjectures on reality are based 
on ‘abstract laws’ and we should not confuse our inferences with the real world:
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Tutte le leggi scientifiche sono leggi astratte; e fra l’astratto e il 
concreto non c’e ponte di passaggio, appunto perche l’astratto non e 
una realta, ma uno schema di pensiero, un nostro modo di pensare, 
direi quasi, abbreviato. E se la conoscenza delle leggi rischiara la 
nostra percezione del reale, essa non puo diventare questa percezione
*  69stessa.
There is no direct ‘bridge’ or infallible connection between our intellectual 
constructions and reality. This is the reason why all attempts to build an all 
encompassing philosophy of history, namely an intellectual structure which captures 
the whole of reality, is a desperate task:
La possibility di una filosofia della storia presuppone la riduzione 
concettuale del corso della storia. Ora, se e possibile ridurre 
concettualmente i vari elementi della realta che appaiono nella storia, 
ed e quindi possibile fare una filosofia della morale o del diritto, della 
scienza o dell’arte... non e possibile elaborare concettualmente il 
complesso individuato di questi elementi, ossia il fatto concreto, che e 
il corso storico.70
However, this interpretation of Marxism alarmed Labriola who believed that 
the real hub of historical materialism was to propose an alternative Weltanschauung. 
We have seen that the Cassino intellectual considered Marxism essentially a political 
doctrine in which praxis was fundamental and his main aim was to give Italian 
Socialism a sound theoretical basis, but as a movement. By contrast, Croce was 
interested in the theoretical model of Marxism, particularly in its critique to all- 
embracing systems. Moreover, for Labriola Marxism was a new philosophy of 
history, whereas Croce read it as the liquidation of all definitive systems:
II materialismo storico ... non dev’ essere ne una nuova costruzione a 
priori di filosofia della storia, ne un nuovo metodo del pensiero storico, 
ma semplicemente un canone d’interpretazione storica77.
The consequences of this approach to history are quite significant. Croce 
insisted on the anti-dogmatic, or anti-metaphysical attitude of historical inquiry.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., pp.101-102.
70 Ibid., p.3.
71 Ibid., pp.80-81.
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Findings and discoveries in history are always provisional and open to change since 
historians do not elaborate laws in the manner of natural science but put forward 
‘conjectures’:
Se poi dalle leggi astratte e dai concetti passiamo all’osservazione della 
realta storica, noi troviamo, di certo, i punti di congiungimento dei 
nostri ideali con le cose; ma entriamo anche in quelle previsioni e 
congetture, nelle quali resta sempre non eliminabile . . . la  varieta delle 
opinioni e delle tenderize?2
Consequently historians should not have strong and definitive discourses to propound 
or, in other words, a dogmatic organizing framework for series of events. There is no 
ready-made plan into which one can slot events once and for all. The strength of 
historians lies instead in an open approach, in which ‘facts’ are continuously 
reassessed and corroborated. In this case historical truth, as well as reality, is not an 
eternal and immutable absolute to be conquered once and for all, but rather a process 
of constant reappraisal of events, taking into account the various changes that occur. 
However, this open attitude, Croce maintained, should not be confused with ‘vulgar 
skepticism’:
Non gia che si voglia raccomandare o in alcun modo giustificare il 
volgare scetticismo. Ma occorre nel tempo stesso essere consapevoli 
della relativita delle nostre credenze, e praticamente risolversi quando 
il non risolversi e colpa,74
Croce believed that history could never be a science in the strict sense 
because of its ‘variety of opinions and tendencies’. On the other hand, different 
historiographical views, far from diminishing the importance of the discipline, make it 
essential for an open conception of human knowledge.75 However, although historical 
research accepts epistemological relativism as an integral part of its method, it does
72 Ibid., p. 102. Italics mine.
73‘E appena necessario rammentare come si venga via via superando l ’ingenua credenza comune 
dell’obbiettivita dello storico: quasi che le cose par lino e lo storico stia ad ascoltare e registrare le loro 
voci. Chi si mette a comporre storie ha innanzi documenti e racconti, ossia piccole parti e segni di cio 
che e realmente accaduto; e per provarsi a ricostruire l ’intero processo, gli e necessario ricorrere a una 
serie di presupposti, che sono le idee e le notizie che egli possiede delle cose della natura, dell’uomo, 
della societa.’ Croce, Ibid., p.10.
74 Ibid., p. 103. Italics mine.
75 We will see later, analysing the Logica, that Croce maintained that history cannot be reduced to a 
science: it is rather the terrain in which all concepts develop.
80
not accept skepticism. The relativity of viewpoints does not imply the abandonment 
of historiography.
We can see that from the very outset Croce’s was a critique of the existing 
systems rather than a new system of thought. The search for more effective tools for 
historical inquiry had led the young scholar to a dispassionate analysis of Marxism. 
The result was a deconstruction of historical materialism and its application as a valid 
instrument for historians, neither more nor less. Here lies another great divergence 
between Labriola and Croce on Marxism. Croce denied that historical materialism 
was a science. This was a logical consequence of his conception of Marxism as a 
''somma di nuovi dati, di nuove esperienze, che entrano nella coscienza dello 
storico’.76
Thus, whereas for Labriola Marxism represented a new economic science, for 
Croce it was a comparative sociological economics concerned with a problem of 
primary interest for historical and social life. Marx did not discover any ‘law’ with the 
theory of class struggle or the economic interpretation of history, but he taught us how 
to understand critically the effective reality of society. However, this did not diminish 
the importance of Marxism within historical and sociological studies:
II Marx, come sociologo, non ci ha dato, di certo, definizioni 
sottilmente elaborate della ‘socialita’ come se ne possono trovare nei 
libri di qualche sociologo contemporaneo, dei tedeschi Simmel e 
Stammler o del francese Durkheim; ma egli insegna ... a penetrare in 
cio che e la societa nella sua realta effettuale. Anzi, per questo rispetto, 
mi meraviglio come nessuno finora abbia pensato a chiamarlo, a titolo 
di onore, il ‘Machiavelli del proletariate.’77
This last quotation is particularly interesting for several reasons. Firstly it shows the 
great relevance that Croce attributed to Marx calling him ‘the Machiavelli of the 
proletariat’. The analogy between Machiavelli and Marx, far from being incidental, 
underlines the fundamental reasons for Croce’s interest in the two thinkers. Croce saw 
in both Machiavelli and Marx the exponents of modem political theory with their 
attention to the real mechanisms of politics and society and their separation of ethics
no
from politics. Furthermore, the passage also shows Croce’s interest in sociology,
76 Croce, Materialismo storico, p. 10.
77 Ibid., p .113.
78‘Col marxismo ritomava in Italia quel Machiavelli, che si diceva dagli stranieri che gli italiani 
avessero sempre in mente, e che invece, gli italiani avevano abbandonato e dimenticato ... e in ultimo
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that he was familiar with sociologists such as Durkheim (1858- 1919), and this casts a 
new light on his attitude towards sociology.79
Indeed, the tradition tends to portray Croce as a fierce anti-positivist from the 
very beginning of his philosophical career. We have already seen that in reality the 
philosopher’s position towards science in general was much more sympathetic than is 
usually supposed. It is important to stress that Croce, despite his own later statements, 
did not have prejudicial ideas against sociology or science in general. On the contrary, 
we can see that the philosopher had a very positive view of Durkheim’s and Simmel’s 
social studies.
Croce would later attack sociology and its status as a science because of its
pretensions to explain all social phenomena through ‘social laws’ similar to those of
the natural sciences. When Durkheim stopped describing the reality of society and
started to build a sociological system based on a ‘philosophy of society’ Croce
became a harsh critic. The ‘obsession’ with positivism which would characterise some
80of his future writings was partly dictated by his rhetoric, and not his philosophy. 
Positivism, in its negative aspects, meant for Croce a misuse of scientific methods in 
fields which could not be totally reduced to its laws: fields such as history, the arts, 
society and politics:
E senza dubbio cervellotico l’aborrimento che taluni professano per la
scienza pura e per le astrazioni, giacche quei procedimenti intellettuali
sono indispensabili alia conoscenza stessa della realta concreta; ma
non e meno cervellotica l’esclusiva stima delle proposizioni astratte,
delle definizioni, dei teoremi, dei corollari: quasi che in cio consista
• • 81 non si sa quale anstocrazia dello spirito umano.
87  •Thus, we need to put Croce’s polemic against positivism into context, bearing in 
mind that the actual method of Croce was to analyze problems in their particularity,
era caduto nelle mani dei professori, che nell’esporre il pensiero gli affliggevano prediche 
moralistiche.’ Croce, La storia d ’Italia, p. 145.
79 Daniela Coli has challenged the idea of a Croce hostile to sociology maintaining that: ‘Croce, mentre 
fu sempre polemico con la sociologia italiana e col suo maggiore rappresentante Vilfredo Pareto ... 
guardo sempre con interesse, da Simmel a Durkheim, a Weber, alia sociologia europea.’ Croce, 
Laterza e la cultura europea (Bologna: II Mulino, 1983), p. 82.
80 For a thorough discussion on this topic see the collected essays contained in M. Losito, Croce e la 
sociologia (Naples: Morano, 1995). It includes contributions from academics such as Fulvio Tessitore, 
Giuseppe Cacciatore, Daniela Coli and Friedrich Tenbruck.
81 Croce, Materialismo storico, p. 112.
82 It is worth reporting an extract from a letter of condolences sent by one o f the major exponents o f the 
Frankfurt school, the philosopher Marx Horkheimer (1895-1973) to Croce’s wife: ‘Benedetto Croce e
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without sweeping judgements. Whenever Croce failed to do that he betrayed his own 
method.
We can see how Croce’s early ideas on history, far from being rudimentary, as 
some critics have claimed,83 had already questioned some crucial tenets of 
historiography, such as the notion of an unwavering, determined reality of the past, 
and all forms of perennial truth. Moreover, contrary to what has frequently been 
claimed, these very early ideas are strictly connected with the later developments of 
Croce’s thought.
We have also seen how important Croce’s reading of Marx was in shaping his 
historiography. Critics have frequently been led by their own assumptions about Marx 
as creating a metaphysics of dialectical materialism, or alternatively an economic 
determinism, to ignore Croce’s explicit assertions about his own reading of the 
German thinker. There is a little doubt that what Croce found of value led him in a 
different direction, and helped him to root his historicism in the firm ground of social, 
political and material reality without predetermined schemes. It is not our task to 
discuss the authenticity of the variety of Marxisms, but simply to register Croce’s own 
antimetaphysical reading of the great German, and demonstrate the mistaken nature of 
the ‘early flirtation’ thesis.
It should be clear by now that if we conceive the philosophical path of Croce 
as a struggle to achieve an idealist system we miss the kernel of his thought as well as 
its dramatic internal tensions. Conversely, one of the main features of Croce’s 
thinking is the constant ‘deconstruction’ of systems in order to find their weak points 
and faults. The philosopher would go on use the same method with thinkers like 
Hegel, Vico, Machiavelli and others.
We can already notice that the essence of his particular philosophical inquiry 
lies in analysis rather than synthesis. As we shall see, even what is purported to be the 
most systematic work, the Filosofia dello Spirito, frequently elevated to gargantuan
veramente insostituibile. Non e esagerato affermare che egli appartiene ai pochi che, dopo un’epoca in 
cui la filosofia ... ha minacciato di scomparire tra le scienze positive, ne hanno ristabilito la dignita ... 
Egli tuttavia non appartiene agli epigoni che intendevano ristabilire una metafisica ormai superata, ma 
ha recuperato la tradizione della filosofia speculativa a partire dall’esperienza concreta della sua 
propria situazione ... Cio gli ha permesso una cosa che era preclusa proprio ai pensatori idealisti del 
tempo; di affrontare la problematica della societa reale.’ M. Horkeimer, ‘Lettera di condoglianze di 
Max Horkheimer alia vedova Croce’ in Losito, Croce e la sociologia, p. 157.
83 See for example David D. Roberts: ‘Croce’s earliest position included some rudimentary reactions 
and ideas -  centred on political ideals, political realities, values, and history -  that were not really 
satisfactory.’ Benedetto Croce, p. 42.
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proportions but in reality representing a tiny fraction of Croce’s output, can be 
considered a series of enquiries in different fields, instead of a monument to idealism.
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2.4 CROCE VERSUS GENTILE
By 1896 Croce was already well known among the learned in Italy and abroad. His 
writings on Marxism began to appear in some of the major socialist journals in 
France, Germany and Italy. By now he had restricted the field of his studies to history 
and literary criticism, having a considerable number of publications to his name.
The same year also marked the beginning of the intellectual exchange between 
Croce and Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944). The collaboration and then the dramatic 
break between the two philosophers characterized an entire era and it is not an 
exaggeration to maintain with Eugenio Garin that this relationship was one of the 
most important phenomena in the intellectual history of the first half of twentieth 
century Italy.84 But to understand the complex cultural relationship between Croce 
and Gentile we must distinguish their different approaches to philosophy and method.
When Croce first came into contact with Gentile, the latter was an 
undergraduate at the prestigious Normale university in Pisa. The young Sicilian came 
from a middle class family of Castelvetrano (Trapani). His father was a chemist 
married to the daughter of a solicitor. The father fell into manic depression when 
Gentile was still studying in Pisa. Henceforth the young student had to face moments 
of great financial difficulty. Croce acted as patron-friend for several years during
85 •Gentile’s academic career financing him whenever he needed help. Gentile’s 
professor and mentor Donato Jaia instilled in the young pupil a passion for the 
Hegelian philosophy of Bertrando Spaventa, the rigour of idealism and its obsession
with ‘pure thought’. From that point onwards Gentile’s main philosophical concern
86was to build a system of thought in which theory and practice coincided. The 
political consequences of this philosophical system would later have some unfortunate 
consequences.87
84 ‘II dialogo, poi il contrasto ... fra Croce e Gentile [e] forse il tema piu significative della nostra 
filosofia dell’ultimo cinquantennio.’ Garin, Cronache di filosofia italiana, p. 172.
85 ‘La cosa piu alta di Gentile e stata, in gioventu, e per lunghi anni, la sua poverta. Croce, che lo 
sapeva, non gli regalava oggetti, ma gli dava cinquecento lire. Allora un professore ne guadagnava 
mille in un anno.’ J. Jacobelli, Croce Gentile. Dalsodalizio al dramma, (Milan: Rizzoli,1989), p. 16.
86 ‘Gentile sosteneva l ’unita di teoria e prassi: non c ’e un pensiero che riflette e un’azione che fa. II 
pensiero e un fare, un’azione e l ’azione un pensiero. Con questa formula Gentile stabili un rapporto tra 
politica e storia che influenzo non solo l ’area della destra ... ma anche le varie forme di rinnovamento 
del movimento socialista nel dopoguerra.’ F. Papi, ‘Lo storicismo italiano del novecento’, in Filosofia 
contemporanea, vol.iii (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1992), p.304.
87 For a thorough study o f Gentile’s life and thought see the rather sympathetic account by S. Romano, 
Giovanni Gentile. La filosofia al potere (Milan: Bompiani, 1990). The best English-language guide 
remains H. S.Harris, The Social Philosophy o f  Giovanni Gentile (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 
1960).
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Although it is commonplace to emphasize the collaborative nature of Croce 
and Gentile’s early alliance, there were, in reality, major differences between the two 
from the very outset. In Contributo alia critica di me stesso Croce recalled:
Col Gentile, nel quale rinasceva la tradizione dello Spaventa ... s’inizio
una reciproca efficacia ... e una scambievole correzione pur nelle vie
88alquanto diverse talvolta da ciascuno di noi seguite.
Indeed, Croce came from a solid historical and literary background, whereas Gentile 
had a strong idealistic orientation given by his ‘purely’ philosophical studies. 
However, Croce was attracted by the intellectual rigour of the young Sicilian 
scholar.89 At the age of twenty-one Gentile had published many articles on important 
Italian thinkers such as Rosmini (1797-1895) and Gioberti (1801-1852) and his thesis, 
obtained in 1897, was considered an important piece of philosophical research.90
The first divergence between Croce and Gentile arose at the very beginning of 
their intellectual relationship, many years before 1913, the year in which the polemic 
became public. In fact it was by no means a slight disagreement. In October 1898 
Croce wrote:
Io non so se posso dirmi d’accordo con voi nella veduta fondamentale 
intomo alia filosofia.91
This disagreement reflected not only the dissimilar backgrounds of the two 
philosophers, but, above all, their different frames of mind. Indeed, Gentile was from 
the start keen on a systematic, all-inclusive philosophy, which is ultimately the 
purpose of all idealistic perspectives, whereas Croce aimed essentially to explore the 
theoretical foundations of history and literature, but avoiding all grand discourses:
Croce, Contributo, p.55. Italics mine.
89‘Col Gentile, oltre alcune affinita pratiche, mi stringevano affinita di svolgimento mentale, e di 
cultura, perche anch’esso si era dapprima provato negli studi letterari ... e si era addestrato nelle 
indagini filologiche, e, come me, prendeva piacere in quel genere di lavoro ... che ogni studioso valido 
deve saper compiere da se, pei propri bisogni e secondo i propri fini.’ Ibid., p.36.
90 Croce praised Gentile’s thesis with these words: ‘ Una tesi di laurea che presenti simile maturita in 
ogni sua parte e cosa che capita di rado! La parte storica e eccellente: il metodo di critica e altamente 
scientifico; l ’interpretazione psicologica delle due personality e fmissima.’ B. Croce, Lettere a 
Giovanni Gentile (Milan: Mondadori, 1981), p.28.
91 Ibid.
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Confesso di essermi sempre occupato di problemi speciali ... A me e 
parso sempre ... che la filosofia non appartenga al novero delle 
scienze: che la massima parte di cio che si chiamava filosofia debba 
essere assorbito in scienze speciali.92
Here Croce focused on philosophy as a methodology for the critique of science 
rather than a science itself:
Puo esistere il filosofare per indicare un certo grado di elaborazione 
scientifica, ma non filosofia come scienza ... Se dunque la filosofia 
non e una scienza ... che cosa e? A me pare che la filosofia non possa 
se non recarci alia coscienza cio che e il presupposto di ogni attivita 
razionale dell’uomo, di ogni attivita teoretica e pratica. Cio la distingue 
dalla religione e dalla scienza.93
In this conception philosophy does not represent the true and ultimate view of the 
world, but rather a continuous clarification, or a critique, of the theoretical and 
practical foundations of human activities which follow their own methodologies.
A good example of this sharply contrasting view on philosophy between 
Croce and Gentile can be found in their discussion of the value of Marxism, as the 
Crocean Dario Faucci has pointed out.94 We already know that Croce saw in Marxism 
a useful empirical canon to be used by historians in order to improve the current state 
of historiography. He had carefully avoided all the deterministic components of Marx, 
focusing instead on his potential for liberating history from dogma. Gentile, on the 
contrary, was attracted by what he called the ‘scientific’ side of historical materialism 
and its connections with Hegelianism. Indeed the Sicilian philosopher focused on the 
speculative part of Marx and investigated the links between the leader of historical 
materialism and Hegel. In his first book, La filosofia di Marx, published in 1899, he 
emphasized the formal coherence of this thought:
92 Croce, Lettere a Giovanni Gentile, p.28.
94 I b i d '‘II principio intransigente monistico del Gentile entrava in funzione di contro alia distinzione gia in 
atto nella prospettiva crociana. O tutto o nulla; o scienza o utopia era il socialismo ... Croce non si 
lascio muovere da questo ragionamento piu logicamente trionfante che pacatamente persuasivo. E cosi 
i punti fondamentali del dissidio teoretico tra Croce e Gentile eran gia nettamente segnati.’ D. Faucci, 
La filosofia politica di Croce e Gentile, (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1974), p.26.
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Formalisticamente considerata, la concezione materialistica della 
storia ha tal carattere filosofico ... che non soffre critica alcuna 
d ’ inconseguenza.95
The rigorous analysis carried out by Gentile attracted the attention of Croce 
although the latter did not agree with the conclusions. In a letter to Gentile dated July 
1899 the Neapolitan philosopher reported:
Mi pare che abbiate dato un’ eccellente trattazione della metafisica 
trattata dal Marx ... quanto alia interpretazione restrittiva ed empirica, 
che io do della dottrina di Marx, e che voi non accettate, si potrebbero 
dire parecchie cose per difenderla. Tra le altre questa: che giacche il 
Marx non ha insistito sulla sua metafisica ed ha insistito moltissimo 
sulle posizioni sociologiche, storiche, economiche, e giusto interpretare 
queste indipendentemente, come osservazioni di fatto.96
We know that the metaphysical part of Marxism was marginal for Croce, To focus on 
the philosophical coherence of Marxism was to accept that the doctrine was another 
kind of philosophy of history. The original aspect of historical materialism, Croce 
wrote to Gentile, was its realistic critique of modem society:
Come gia vi accennai credo che 1’interpretare il Marx dichiarando 
secondarie le sue vedute metafisiche, non possa dirsi un procedimento 
comodo ma ingiustificato, giacche e per lo meno tanto giustificato 
quanto l’inverso, e forse piu. Appercepirlo come critico della societa 
presente e come storico di essa, e come politico del movimento 
proletario, e prender Marx in cio che forma la parte veramente
07notevole della sua attivita.
This interpretation of Marxism, focused on the analysis of social structures, 
institutions, and culture, would exert a major influence on thinkers such as Gramsci 
and contribute to a more flexible conception of notions like ‘revolution’, or ‘society 
without classes’, which were also susceptible to dogmatic readings of historical 
materialism as a ‘grand scheme’ destined to determine the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. However, Gentile did not accept Croce’s position. In his opinion Marx’s 
aim was to build a powerful system in which ideas and actions, or theory and practice, 
were integrated. His intentions were not dissimilar to those of Hegel in his ambition to
95 G.Gentile, La filosofia di Marx. Studi critici, in Opere complete di Giovanni Gentile, vol. xxviii 
(Florence: Sansoni, 1955), p. 53.
96 Croce, Lettere a Giovanni Gentile, pp. 55-56.
embrace all aspects of reality. Indeed, for the Sicilian philosopher, Marx was not in 
opposition to Hegel and his philosophy was more than a method, it was a philosophy 
of history:
Cio che vi e di essenziale nel fatto storico e per Hegel l’idea che si 
sviluppa dialetticamente; per Marx la materia (il fatto economico) che 
si sviluppa ugualmente; e se Hegel con la sua idea poteva fare una 
filosofia della storia, ha pure da poterla fare Marx.98
By now, Gentile had completely assimilated Marxism to Hegelianism 
stressing the similarities between historical materialism and idealism. Within this 
perspective Marx’s thought became a continuation of Hegel’s:
L’idea, lungi dall’essere opposta alia realta e per Hegel l’essenza del 
reale ... e la materia del materialismo storico lungi dall’essere estema 
ed opposta all’idea di Hegel, vi e dentro compresa, anzi, e una cosa 
medesima con essa, poiche ... lo stesso relativo ... non solo non e fuori 
dall’assoluto, ma e identico ad esso."
Gentile then proceeded to show the likeness between Hegel and Marx:
L’oggetto equivale al non essere hegeliano, la cui contraddizione 
intrinseca all’essere produce il divenire dell’essere stesso ... sicche 
anche per questa via la correzione del materialismo consiste in un’ 
applicazione alia materia di cio che Hegel aveva esattamente scoperto 
per rispetto alio spirito.100
This logical but extremely schematic reduction of Marxism to Hegelianism was a 
typical example of Gentile’s philosophical method: a few concepts taken to their 
extreme consequences in order to fit an abstract system.101 The complexity of 
Marxism could now be pigeonholed within the grandiose Hegelian framework:
II soggetto, l’attivita pratica di Marx e la tesi; le circostanze, la 
educazione sono l’antitesi, il soggetto modificato dalle circostanze, la 
sintesi.102
97 Ibid., p.57.
98 Gentile, La filosofia di Marx, p.42.
99 Ibid., p.55.
100 Ibid., p.86.
101 Bedeschi has noted that, ‘in realta Marx era, secondo Gentile, un “idealista nato”, il quale, nel 
periodo formativo della sua mente, aveva avuto tanta familiarita con la filosofia di Fichte prima, e di 
Hegel poi.’ G. Bedeschi, La fabbrica delle ideologie (Bari: Laterza, 2002), p.282.
102 Gentile, La filosofia di Marx, p.85.
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Gentile’s argument, far from being banal, picked up on one of the crucial issues of 
Marxism, namely its relation between theory and practice, thought and action. Gentile 
solved the problem by equating the two terms. Strictly speaking, Gentile argued, 
thought is action, and this is the core of historical materialism, not dissimilar to 
Hegelianism in which the subject makes the object. The equation thought-action was a 
sort of anticipation of Gentile’s ‘idealismo attuale’ in which the whole of reality is 
reduced to an abstract unity.
We can now see how their evaluations of historical materialism reflect the 
radically different perspectives of Croce and Gentile. The former did not have a 
metaphysical system to defend. Indeed, we have seen that Croce’s aim was the exact 
opposite, a liberation of history from any deterministic plan which would encase it in 
a ready-made metaphysics. Gentile, instead, started from the very opposite position: 
from his idealistic perspective, thought makes the world, things are made by our 
intellect; without thoughts not only can we not talk about things, but things do not 
exist.
Another point worth noticing in Gentile’s reading of Marxism is the stress the 
young thinker put on the relation between the individual and society. The individual, 
in this perspective, only exists as a function of society as a whole:
L’individuo concreto sociale, tutt’uno con la societa di Marx e 
pratico.103
This conception would be at the centre of Gentile’s notion of the ‘stato etico’ in which 
the individual exists subordinate to the State. When Fascism came to power the 
Sicilian philosopher had simply to apply his theory in order to justify, both morally 
and politically, the dictatorship. If the individual is subsumed within the social, his 
personal ethics coincide with those of the State and there is no space, or indeed need, 
for liberty since the freedom of the individual is embodied in the ‘freedom’ of the 
State.
One can see that the divergence between Croce and Gentile was present from 
the outset, although the Neapolitan philosopher had practical reasons for not stressing 
their differences. Croce saw in Gentile the qualities of a remarkably serious researcher 
with a profound sense of history, as his numerous publications show, and he admired
103 Ibid. p.91.
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these features of the scholar’s work.104 Moreover, he made no secret of the important 
insights that Gentile had given him. If one examines his correspondence with Gentile, 
one can see how open Croce was. For instance, in 1902, after the publication of his 
Estetica, which immediately raised him to the status of one of the most important 
contemporary philosophers, he wrote to his friend:
Mio caro Gentile, io vi ringrazio di tutto cuore di avermi 
straordinariamente giovato ... con la vostra conversazione epistolare 
ed orale ... e spero di non fossilizzarmi cosi presto da non aver da 
aggiungere, svolgere e correggere nulla di quanto ho pensato e ho 
scritto. 05
Although both Croce and Gentile were aware of the deep differences between 
their approaches to philosophy, the former tended to gloss over the differences in 
order to keep the discussion and the friendship alive.106 Indeed, when Croce started La 
Critica, there was a common terrain on which they could work, namely coming to 
terms with the past fifty years of Italian culture, an ambitious plan that the Neapolitan 
philosopher carried out for more than forty years. We will see later in this chapter that 
the programme Croce set for his journal was broad enough to host the different 
philosophical positions of both thinkers, focusing on concrete research rather than on 
their different perspectives. However, differences of views were always present, as 
the following ‘diplomatic’ letter, sent by Croce in December 1906, reveals:
Per conservare l’unita alia rivista e bene che le questioni in cui tra noi 
c’e dissenso siano possibilmente accantonate per essere resolute prima 
fra noi.107
104Among Gentile’s main works we can mention: Storia della filosofia italiana dal Genovesi al 
Galuppi (1903), I  problemi della scolastica e il pensiero italiano (1913), Studi vichiani (1915), II 
pensiero italiano del Rinascimento (1920), Iprofeti del risorgimento italiano (1923). Moreover, he was 
an indefatigable editor and translator o f many classics o f philosophy, such as the works of Spinoza, 
Bruno and Kant. Many o f these studies first appeared in La Critica.
105 Croce, Lettere a Gentile, p. 124.
106 In a letter addressed to an anonymous friend in July the 30th of 1925 Croce wrote:‘II Gentile era 
purus philosophus, io sentivo che la filosofia doveva sorgere e trasfondersi insieme negli studi 
particolari, specialmente negli studi storici. Inoltre, fin d’allora, io notavo in lui quel che poi ho 
chiamato atteggiamento teologico, a me poco confacente ... D ’altra parte a me giovava di aver vicino e 
discutitore uno studioso di indirizzo mentale alquanto diverso, e, in un certo senso, opposto, perche ne 
traevo stimolo al mio personale pensiero.’ B. Croce, Epistolario (Naples: Istituto italiano per gli studi 
storici, 1967), p. 119.
107 Croce, Lettere a Gentile, p.220.
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Another great point of divergence came with the interpretation of Hegel’s 
philosophy. Gentile stressed the metaphysical side of the German philosopher 
insisting on the ontological identity between reality and idea. He tended to accept 
Hegel’s thought as the ultimate reflection on philosophy. Croce, instead, had a more 
critical approach as a letter dated January 1907 shows:
Hegel bisogna digerirlo, e non tenerlo sullo stomaco, come lo teneva 
ancora lo Spaventa. Se il mio digestivo non vi sembra efficace, bisogna 
preparame un altro ... Puo darsi che la via da me scelta non sia giusta, 
ma una via bisogna trovarla per mostrare che i concetti dell’arte, della
storia e della filosofia della natura, cosi come li pone Hegel non
108reggono.
But the great discrepancy between the two thinkers fully emerged when, in 
1911, Gentile, now one of the most important academics in Italy, delivered at the 
University of Palermo a lecture entitled ‘L’atto del pensare come atto puro’109 which 
was an elucidation, in polemic with Croce, of his ‘actual idealism’.
Gentile, by now, had already gathered around himself an enormous following 
of young Italian students, attracted by the mix of rhetoric and ‘activism’ typical of his 
philosophy, who gravitated around the Biblioteca filosofica di Palermo.110 Henceforth 
the already precarious ‘alliance’ between the two thinkers began to deteriorate and 
Croce came out publicly with an article entitled Intorno all'idealismo attuale, 
published in 1913 in La Voce addressed to Gentile and his school:
Miei cari amici della Biblioteca filosofica di Palermo ... il vostro 
idealismo attuale non mi persuade. E debbo dirvelo in pubblico, perche 
non mi piacerebbe di continuare a dirlo solo tra me e me, o in 
conversazioni private.111
By now, Croce felt that the theoretical differences between his conception of 
philosophy and Gentile’s were incompatible and could have grave practical
Ibid., p. 228.
109 In Annuario della Biblioteca filosofica, I (Palermo: 1912-14), pp. 27-42.
110 It is interesting to report Bobbio’s experience as a young student: ‘A ll’inizio dei miei studi, durante 
la composizione della tesi di laurea ... ero piu gentiliano che crociano.... Solo in seguito, allargando 
l’orizzonte dei miei studi ... non tardai a convincermi che la filosofia dell’atto puro era un abile ma 
capzioso e sterile gioco verbale. ’ Preface to Jacobelli, Croce Gentile, p. vii.
111 B. Croce, Conversazioni critiche (Bari: Laterza, 1918), p.67. In Gentile ‘la difesa degli allievi e un 
tema ricorrente ... con Croce tutte le volte che i toni tomano ad essere polemici, anche perche Croce
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repercussions; thus, he decided to make his critique of ‘actual idealism’ public. The 
article was a thorough analysis of a form of thought dominated, Croce argued, by the 
obsession for unity which was the hub of Gentile’s system. In Croce’s view,
L’ unita ... e solo un momento della filosofia; e l’altro momento e la 
particolarita ... Confesso che cio che sempre mi ha suscitato interesse 
e il momento della particolarita, ... E dove lavorando a ben chiarire ed 
approfondire la particolarita, mi sono trovato, infine, a chiarire, per
119quel che a me occorreva, l’umta stessa.
Croce argued that this purely theoretical unity, in its artificial use of an abstract logic, 
ultimately represented a form of mysticism in which any opposition or distinction 
would be cancelled:
II vostro idealismo attuale ... mi sembra una filosofia ... la quale si 
propone di far tacere una volta per sempre le dispute filosofiche ... con 
1’ idealismo attuale il genere umano riceverebbe insomma una
1 i 'y
rivelazione attesa per secoli invano.
In Croce’s view this pompous metaphysics was a pointless attempt to 
subsume once and for all the ‘mystery’ of Reality:
Io la penso diversamente ... e sento la filosofia come affatto 
coincidente con la vita ... e ripugno qualsiasi dottrina che , una volta 
per sempre mi sciolga Yenimma della realta.114
Furthermore, Croce saw from the very beginning the dangerous political 
consequences of Gentile’s perspective. Indeed, what was ethically characteristic of 
this philosophical mysticism was an absence of indignation or protest combined with 
a passive acceptance of Reality, believing that good and evil are part of one and the 
same process:
Cio che soprattutto mi impensierisce ... e la depressione che produce 
nella coscienza dei contrasti della realta, l’acquiescenza al fatto come
odiava le scuole ... e non risparmiava loro attacchi feroci.’ M. Visentin, ‘Croce e Gentile. La fine del 
sodalizio’, Cultura, 2 (1993), pp. 311-21 (p.320).
112 Croce, Conversazioni, p.72.
113 Ibid., pp.72-73.
114 Ibid., p.73.
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fatto, all’atto come atto ... Io temo che voi, miei cari amici, tomiate 
all’indifferentismo teoretico ed etico.115
This article, written twelve years before Gentile’s enthusiastic adherence to 
Fascism, foresaw remarkably well the practical consequences of ‘actual idealism’. 
Indeed, Croce had read the potential ‘applications’ of that philosophical theory and 
was worried about the outcome.116 The separation between theory and practice that
* 117Croce had always maintained and Gentile considered a lack of philosophical rigour 
turned out to be a necessary distinction with important political repercussions.
A number of other articles reveal the tension between the two philosopher 
friends well before the fated break in 1925, the year of the Fascist intellectuals’ 
manifesto written by Gentile and the reply to it, penned by Croce. In January 1923, 
for instance, the Neapolitan philosopher had written:
Paglia e foglie secche mi sembrano le piu delle disquisizioni odieme 
sull’atto puro, sulle forme dello spirito, sull’unita e la distinzione, 
sull’immanenza e la trascendenza, sull’idealismo e il naturalismo, e via 
dicendo. Ne cio, semplicemente per colpa degli individui, per loro 
poca ingegnosita; ma appunto perche quando una crisi spirituale ha 
avuto il suo svolgimento e ne e stato raccolto il frutto, e impossibile 
continuarla ... Non si riesce ad altro, in questo caso, che a ripetere, 
combinare, sottilizzare, ffaintendere ed esagerare il gia trovato. I nuovi 
tempi richiedono altro.118
Croce opposed to a ‘mystical’ vision of philosophy a thinking which was mainly an 
applied critique rather than a series of metaphysical constructions:
Ed ecco perche io non mi stanco di inculcare, con le parole e con 
l’esempio, ai giovani studiosi italiani di volgersi agli studi della critica 
della storia, e a tutte le altre forme di operosita mentale e pratica, e
1,5 Ibid., p.75 and 82.
116 In his recent book on Gentile, Gennaro Sasso does not accept the connection between Gentile’s 
political position and his philosophy. In other words, for Sasso, Gentile’s adherence to Fascism was not 
a direct consequence o f his philosophical view but a sort o f ideological posturing. See G. Sasso, Le 
due Italie di Giovanni Gentile (Bologna: II Mulino, 1998), pp. 568-69. It is difficult to accept this 
argument since in Gentile life and thought were one thing. Indeed, he remained faithful to the Fascist 
ideal until his death in 1944, when he was killed by a partisan. For a thorough analysis o f Sasso’s book 
see David. D. Roberts, ‘Maggi’s Croce, Sasso’s Gentile and the riddles of twentieth-century Italian 
intellectual history’, Journal o f Modern Italian Studies, 1(2002), pp. 125-39.
117 See, for instance Gentile’s article, ‘La distinzione crociana di pensiero e azione’, Giomale critico 
della filosofia italiana, xix (1941), pp. 274-78.
118 Croce, ‘Troppa filosofia’, pp. 62-63.
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raffrenare la spinta istintiva a ll’astratto filosofare, che facilmente si 
disperde nel nulla.119
Croce was witnessing the mental dissipation of young intellectuals 
mesmerized by the hypnotic personality of Gentile. Many of these young students 
would find in Fascism a justification for their over-simplified philosophical scheme. 
But Croce warned:
II filosofare precedente ... nacque da condizioni di fatto determinate e 
non da escogitazioni monastiche, e voile servire al giudizio, e non 
foggiare schemi e idoli logici.120
We will see later in this work that Croce, by now, had rejected all labels for 
his philosophy, after realizing the ambiguities of the word ‘idealism’. The clash with 
Gentile had clarified in his mind the true aim of philosophy which, in his opinion, 
should not be confused with ‘academic philosophy’:
Bisogna cangiare la tradizionale figura del filosofo che sia solo e puro 
filosofo, e ridurla a quella del critico, dello storico e dello scienziato e, 
insomma deH’uomo ... che alia filosofia si volge solo per necessita 
intrinseca al suo proprio processo mentale e pratico.121
Moreover, against Gentile’s position which was becoming increasingly politicized, 
Croce posed his original distinction between theory and practice, philosophy and 
politics:
So bene che, a udir rammentare questa linea di distinzione tra teoria e 
pratica, tra filosofia e politica ... si suol rispondere con l’obiezione ... 
che a questo modo si scinde pensiero e azione e si nega l’efficacia 
pratica delle dottrine. Al che sarebbe da ribattere che, non facendo a 
questo modo, si negano verita e azione insieme, e si ricade in un 
oscuro determinismo.122
In Gentile’s view, as we have already seen, thought and action were directly 
connected and identical. To Croce, this was pure sophistry and he saw the absurdity of 
this position and its disastrous consequences for individual choice:
119 Ibid., p.63. Italics mine.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 B. Croce, ‘Contro la troppa filosofia politica’, La Critica, ii (1923), pp. 126-28 (p. 127).
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Cio che ... nessuna filosofia o teoria puo dare, e la formola che 
permetta di sapere con sicurezza quello che caso per caso sia da 
operare, e risparmi la fatica e la responsabilta della risoluzione 
individuale ... L’azione pratica non si deduce da alcuna teoria ... e non 
si riduce a termini intellettuali, e si giustifica solo in se stessa ... nella 
voce della coscienza.123
These words are not only a clear indication of the unbridgeable gap between 
the two thinkers, but also reveal once again how Croce’s thought, far from being 
dogmatic, as frequently presented by a crystallized critical tradition, was, instead, 
remarkably flexible. The cultural status he had enjoyed for many years did not prevent 
him from being critical towards all institutionalized cultural organizations which had 
a dogmatic position to defend. Indeed, Croce was against what he called To spirito 
professorale’ which
promuove le inconcludenti dissertazioni, con annessa rassegna dei 
dogmata ... che non trovano altri lettori che i loro autori e i concorrenti 
accademici di essi, e non mai rischiarano alcun intelletto ... Al tempo 
stesso lo spirito professorale promuove per Tappunto la ripetizione, 
l’imitazione, la contraffazione, la falsificazione delle filosofie, 
foggiando la ‘scuola’, e compiacendosi del fiorire della ‘scuola’, cioe 
non solo dell’aver attomo qualche imbecille, ma dell’aveme molti.124
The main target of the many tirades written by the Neapolitan philosopher 
against academia were the ‘gentiliani’, of course, but also the Catholics who were 
becoming increasingly influential within the main Italian universities. Croce, who 
chose to be an outsider from the very beginning of his career, did not like the idea of 
having a school of ‘crociani’:
Considero ... nell’ordine regolare delle cose che nello stesso 
idealismo, succeduto al positivismo, si ripresentino ... la scuola, la 
setta e la chiesuola: il che lo avevo preveduto e annunciato molti anni 
prima ... e presi d’impegno di oppormici con tutte le mie forze come 
ora vado facendo.125.
123 Ibid.
124 B. Croce, ‘Filosofia e accademismo’, La Critica, v (1924), pp.317-20 (p. 319).
125 Ibid., p.320.
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The definitive break between Croce and Gentile coincided with the publication 
of the Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti, published at the request of the liberal 
Giovanni Amendola on the 21st of April 1925. After a period of uncertainty towards 
Fascism, Croce went into opposition and wrote the manifesto which was a direct 
response to the Fascist programme written by Gentile. In a few lines Croce defined 
how the regime appeared to a ‘spregiudicato osservatore’:
un incoerente e bizzarro miscuglio di appelli all’autorita e di 
demagogismo, di professata riverenza alle leggi e di violazione delle 
leggi, di concetti ultramodemi e di vecchiumi muffiti, di atteggiamenti 
assolutistici e di tenderize bolsceviche, di miscredenza e di 
corteggiamento alia Chiesa cattolica, di aborrimento dalla cultura e di 
conati sterili verso una cultura priva delle sue premesse, di 
sdilinquimenti mistici e di cinismo.126
The rupture with Gentile was inevitable when Croce fully understood the political 
implications of the latter’s thought, and even the long-term friendship came to an end. 
Gentile’s thought had by now succeeded in becoming the ‘established’ philosophy, 
and his Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, started in 1920, was one of the most 
prominent academic journals.
In an article published in 1930 Croce analyzed with lucidity the reasons for the 
popularity of Gentile’s philosophy, focusing on the needs, or ‘bisogni’, that the 
doctrine of actual idealism tried to meet:
L’idealismo attuale offriva ... l’attrattiva del sublime e del facile 
insieme, perche la dottrina, in questa parte, assai permetteva e 
prometteva. Non solo infatti liberava dal naturalismo e dal positivismo, 
ma da tutte le filosofie precedenti ... tutte, a sua sentenza, peccanti di 
falsa posizione, cioe di naturalismo, per non aver compreso che il reale 
non e se non l’attualita del pensiero che pensa.127
The main defect of Gentile’s philosophy was for Croce its tendency to create a 
definitive system, whether it was about the ultimate form of state, or the ultimate 
philosophy. Instead of using idealism as a tool to interpret the preceding tradition in a 
more rigorous and less schematic way, this form of idealism had taken the tool for the 
whole of reality, dividing history into precursors of idealism on the one hand, and
126 B.Croce, Filosofia -  Poesia -  Storia (Milano-Napoli: Ricciardi, 1951), p. 1058.
127 B. Croce, ‘Osservando il corso delle cose’, La Critica, v (1930), pp. 317-20 (p.317).
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‘naturalists’ on the other, who had misinterpreted or failed to understand that reality 
consisted in the ‘pure act’. This one-dimensional view of philosophy and culture gave 
people the impression of embracing the whole complexity of the world within a few 
well-polished formulas:
Dinnanzi a qualsiasi piu particolare o piu complesso problema, la 
soluzione propugnata era il riportamento all’attualita del pensiero.128
The simplistic approach of ‘idealismo attuale’ to complex issues had also been the 
key for penetrating Italian academia:
Quella dottrina, formatasi nel seno dell’universita italiana, si univa, in 
quanto filosofia universitaria, alle speranze della filosofia accademica, 
alia fortuna che le sarebbe toccata quando i suoi rappresentanti
• 129avessero potuto acquistar forza e predominio nella vita accademica.
In reality a deeper analysis of ‘actual idealism’ revealed a half-baked mix 
of rhetoric, nationalism, and pseudo-Hegelian logic which was, for Croce, a sort of 
parody of German idealism:
Esso era ... la forma piu semplicistica dell’idealismo filosofico; e gli 
Hegel e gli altri vecchi idealisti l’avrebbero considerata non il
• 1 TOperfezionamento ma la caricatura del loro pensiero.
Moreover, the mystical tone of Gentile’s philosophy, despite its proclaimed 
anticlericalism, seemed to appeal to some parts of the Catholic church:
L’ ‘idealismo attuale’ aveva, tra l’altro, un certo tono teologico, come 
di affermazione del vero Dio, e praticamente si atteggiava verso il 
cattolicesimo come chi dicesse: ‘possiamo in qualche modo intenderci 
e dividerci il dominio: a voi le masse, coloro che hanno bisogno di Dio 
sui Sinai; a noi gli eletti che lo ritrovano, atto puro, nell’attualita del 
proprio pensiero.131
12S Ibid., p.318.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., p.320. Giuseppe Prezzolini wrote in 1923: ‘Tutti sentono in Gentile uno spirito religioso. Nel 
suo scrivere sembra negare il suo pensiero; questo e di una dittatura idealistica e raziocinativa che 
spaventa, ma quello sembra avere invece un ritmo rispondente ad un segreto, piu intimo bisogno di 
spirito, il bisogno religioso.’ La coltura italiana (Florence: Vallecchi, 1923), p.88.
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Croce’s analysis of ‘actual idealism’ is essential in order to understand his 
conception of philosophy and culture in general. The purpose of all intellectual 
enquiries is for Croce a better understanding of the world in which we live. The 
conflict-collaboration with Gentile helped Croce to distance his position from an 
extreme form of idealism and keep firm the distinction between theory and practice, 
thought and action. For Croce, the world in its multifaceted aspects cannot be reduced 
to thought, although thought is the only instrument we have to comprehend it. For 
Gentile idealism was a profession of faith, the ultimate truth of philosophy, the 
resolution of ideas and reality into a single system. However, the greater level of 
‘reality’ that Gentile was seeking clashed dramatically with the antimetaphysical 
attitude of Croce’s thought. Croce approached idealism with a very pragmatic aim, a 
powerful tool to employ in his researches in history and literature.
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2.5 THE PROGRAMME OF LA CRITICA
The received critical tradition has emphasized the ‘idealistic core’ of Croce’s thought 
seeing this as the source of his philosophy. As we have already demonstrated, he 
simply intended to utilize idealism to develop a method through which one could 
better explore reality in its concreteness. In the next chapter it will be shown how 
Croce made use of certain elements of idealism in order to clarify his philosophical 
view. In this context he would find history to be the informing principle of all his 
research, since this discipline represented for Croce the privileged terrain on which 
philosophical inquiry develops.
By keeping in mind Croce’s aim, which was not to construct an idealistic
system which would encapsulate the whole of knowledge, but produce better
analytical tools for elaborating discourses in specific disciplines such as history and
literature, we will be able to appreciate better the importance of his specific critiques
in the humanities. An important instrument in this respect was La Critica, the
pioneering bimonthly started by the philosopher at the turn of the twentieth century.
La Critica would become one of the most significant cultural journals of the first fifty
years of 20th century Italy. Divided into two series (1903-1914 and 1915-1944), and
centred on the personality of its editor, the periodical contributed to Tiberare la
1 ^cultura itahana dal suo mediocre provincialismo’. The great success of the journal 
has to be ascribed to its formula. La Critica broadened the horizons of Italians beyond 
the narrow and stuffy confines of specialist academic frameworks. Indeed, Croce 
avoided ‘professorial jargon’, insisting on an effective and straightforward discourse:
Nella forma letteraria del filosofare mi ero industriato di adoperare
meno che potessi vocaboli e parole di scuola, che danno nel gergo,
persuaso che molta buona filosofia si puo fare con le parole di • • 1 ^  ^ordinana conversazione.
Croce’s intellectual development had taken place mostly outside the academic 
environment and we have already seen how defiant he was of official educational
132 Garin, Cronache di filosofia italiana, p.276.
133 B. Croce, ‘Osservazioni su libri nuovi’, in Terzepagine sparse, vol. II (Bari: Laterza, 1955), p. 85. 
The originality o f Croce’s prose has been recently recognized by Emma Giammattei who maintains 
that ‘quella no vita di scrittura ... lo fece subito diverso e separato rispetto ai filosofi maneggianti i 
linguaggi specialistici, alio stesso modo in cui l ’armatura concettuale lo aveva gia reso sospetto alia 
dottrina spicciola dei letterati di professione.’ Retorica e idealismo. Croce nel primo Novecento 
(Bologna: II Mulino, 1987), p.5.
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institutions. The intrinsic intellectual conservatism of universities and schools ran 
counter to Croce’s critical conception of philosophy: the fierce attacks on the 
‘professors’ should be read in this context.134 His polemic was, above all, directed at a 
certain way of conceiving culture, particularly philosophy, history and literature as 
detached from reality:
Serbato insieme il sentimento della vita reale, e della letteratura e della 
scienza come nascenti da essa ... indirizzavo le mie censure e le mie 
polemiche per una parte contro i dilettanti e i lavoratori antimetodici, e 
per l’altra contro gli accademici adagiati in pregiudizi.135
From within such horizons the programme of La Critica was drafted in November 
1902 and published with the first issue in January of the following year:
Abbiamo in Italia molte riviste speciali, di storia politica, di filologia,
di filosofia, di arte, e, specie, di storia letteraria, talune delle quali sotto
ogni aspetto ottime. Ma, dovendo ciascuna d’esse tener dietro alia
copiosa produzione di un singolo ramo di studii, ed informare i lettori
su tutte le questioni e controversie minute, e naturale che non possano
soddisfare al bisogno di chi desideri un ragguaglio critico e, come una1 ^scelta, dei libri d’interesse generale.
The purpose of the journal, Croce reported, was to provide a critical examination of 
modem Italian history and literature,137 with an eye on other European cultural 
traditions, particularly the French and the German.
Croce advocated a ‘svecchiamento’, or renewal, of Italian culture which was 
not conceived as a rejection of the preceding tradition, but rather a reinterpretation of 
it from a different perspective. For Croce we need to ‘make peace’ with our past in 
order to fully understand the present and prepare the future. Thus, the departure from 
the past had to be accompanied by a critical assimilation of it through ‘un ponderato
134 ‘Questo tono disdegnoso verso la filosofia dei “professori”, che e costante nell’opera del Croce, ... 
non fu cosa accidentale o riducibile al consueto moto polemico di un pensiero ribelle ed originale che 
rompe in guerra contro cristallizzazioni ormai scolasticizzate. Lungi daU’esaurirsi in stroncature 
singole, e il tema che esprime la direzione di tutto un modo di filosofare: e il rifiuto battagliero della 
filosofia come “metafisica” evidente o larvata, in nome di una “critica” come consapevolezza 
metodica’ Garin, Cronache, pp. 175-76.
135 Croce, Contributo, p.42.
136 B. Croce, ‘Introduzione’ in La Critica i (1903), pp.1-5, (p. 1).
137‘L’Italia, ha in questo mezzo secolo, lavorato assai, anche nel campo intellettuale; e dell’opera 
compiuta, e dei meriti e delle deficienze di questa non si ha ancora una cognizione precisa ed 
equilibrata, oscillandosi tra giudizi vaghi ed improvvisati, ottimistici o pessimistici, con prevalenza 
degli ultimi.’ Ibid., p. 4.
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ritomo a tradizioni di pensiero ... nelle quali rifulgeva l’idea della sintesi spirituale, 
l’idea deWhumanitas.’ 138 The idea of humanitas is crucial in Croce’s thought, since it 
represents the possibility of grounding history, literature and science in the figure of 
the transcendentally free and creative individual. Edmund Jacobitti in his 
Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in modern Italy (1981) has provided a 
useful comment on this notion:
The foundation of humanist historicism is the belief that a true 
understanding of man can come only from an objective assessment of 
man as he is, not as he ought to be, man as he is revealed in the 
historical record rather than man as revealed in the visions of
1 IQtheologians and philosophers.
Indeed, Croce’s antimetaphisical method aimed essentially at a liberation from all 
types of transcendence in order to construct a fully human history. The issue here was 
the status of humanity as possessing an autonomy and freedom that cannot be fully 
grasped or comprehended by the exact sciences concerned with causes and effects. 
Marx had taught the philosopher to be suspicious of all ‘tentativi di mettere le brache 
al mondo e di persuadere gli adulti a farsi bambini’,140 and it was the Marxist critique 
which led Croce to adopt a demystified approach to reality.
Important for our purposes, we find, in the programme, from the very 
beginning, Croce expressing the need for
Un’ ‘idealismo nuovo’ da designarsi meglio come idealismo critico o 
idealismo realistico e perfino ... come idealismo antimetafisico.141
The above passage, with its stress on ‘antimetaphysics’ attests to the caution 
with which Croce employed the term ‘idealism’. His use of the qualifiers ‘critico’ and 
‘realistico’ work in the same direction. The philosopher was fully aware of the 
different nature of his method in relation to classical idealism.
We may well argue with Croce’s interpretation of idealism, but if we read 
him attentively there is no mistaking the fact that far from being identified with a
138 Ibid., p.3.
139 E. Jacobitti, Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1981), p. 4.
140 Croce, ‘Introduzione’, p.3.
141 Ibid.
102
specific philosophical movement, idealism represented for him a critical, realistic and 
antimetaphysical attitude which had to be adopted by historiography and literary 
criticism. Indeed, we have seen that Croce was well aware of the fact that when one 
approaches history, for instance, there is no immutable ‘reality’ to which one refers 
with complete objectivity. There are instead ‘theories’, hence ideas, which we employ 
to refer to this ‘reality’. The naive approach to reality which mistakes theories for 
facts does not take into account that
Ogni fatto ... e gia una teoria ... il ... semplice e un composto ... I 
fatti, ... sono alcuni pretesi fatti, limitati quantitativamente, e 
manipolati ed alterati qualitativamente.142
The target of Croce’s polemic was the attitude of
molte persone geniali che, infischiandosi della storia delle idee e dei 
fatti, si mettono a risolvere audacemente ardue questioni sulle quali 
l’uomo si e travagliato per secoli, sicure di afferrarle con un colpo 
sbrigativo della loro asserita genialita.143
Research in the humanities required, Croce maintained, a much more complex 
weaponry, based on documentation and philology (‘il metodo della ricerca e della 
documentazione’)144 and the clear awareness, on the part of the historian or literary 
critic, of the need to promote ‘un determinato ordine d’idee’.145 Hence, here, by 
‘idealism’ Croce meant the acknowledgement of the structuring role of ideas and 
values whenever one begins to expound a theory, and not the illusion that idealism 
can provide a ready-made and systematized mirror copy of reality itself. It is not 
incidental that in the programme of La Critica we do not find any reference to Hegel 
whose philosophy would be ‘digested’ by Croce only later in his career when the core 
of his method was already formed. The analysis accomplished by Croce would be 
similar to that on Marx: ‘deconstruction’ of certain components useful for clarifying 
some specific problems of history and for the elimination of all metaphysical 
elements.
142 B. Croce, ‘II sofisma della filosofia empirica’, La Critica,\\ (1907), pp. 495-98, (p. 497).
143 Croce, ‘Introduzione’, p.4.
144 Ibid., p.3.
145 Ibid, p.2.
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On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that Gentile, who was editing the 
strictly philosophical section of La Critica was attracted by Hegel. However, we have 
seen that Croce did have a different view of the German philosopher as the following 
extract from an article dated 1904 shows:
Che fossimo hegeliani o neohegeliani, non ce n ’eravamo accord. Io 
per conto mio (parlo per un istante in prima persona singolare) ho nel 
mio modesto bagaglio parecchie critiche della filosofia della storia e 
dell’estetica hegeliana; ne della metafisica in genere mi sono sinora
146mostrato troppo tenero.
In this chapter it has been shown that what we called Croce’s intellectual 
apprenticeship, far from being conditioned by an alleged obsession with an 
idealistic project, was mainly concerned with finding a direction, namely a specific 
method for his research in literature and historiography. This search for a method 
was accompanied by a number of works on local history and literature and a 
continous dialogue with European ideas and trends.
Moreover, it has been shown that this inquiry was driven by a strong 
antimetaphysical posture which is revealed to be the main feature of Croce’s 
theoretical preoccupations. Indeed we have seen that, from the early dissertation 
delivered at the Accademia Pontaniana through the scrupulous deconstruction of 
Marxism and the conflict-dialogue with Gentile up to the drafting of the 
programme of La Critica, Croce’s chief preoccupation was to root his work on a 
solid conception of knowledge in close contact with the problems of his time, and 
capable of grasping the ‘particularities’ of the world in a manner which avoided the 
abstract systematization with which he has been associated. It should be said at this 
point that Croce, when founding his journal, was still within what we might call a 
predominantly negative phase of his epistemology. He was clearer about the ‘grand 
discourses’ to be rejected than he was about the precise features of the approach to 
analysis in the humanistic disciplines he wished to propose. The advantages of the 
grand theories of history, whether Marxist or Hegelian, which he rejected, was that 
they offered ready-made schemes of historical analysis from which clear 
methodologies could flow. Croce was in the uncomfortable position of not being 
able to adopt such methods of analysis, at least with their all-encompassing claims.
146 B. Croce, ‘Siamo noi hegeliani?’ in La Critica iii (1904), pp. 261-64 (p. 202). Italics mine.
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What can, however, be partially salvaged from the claims made about Croce’s 
idealism is that this philosophy offered him a terrain from which he would be able 
to begin to chart his own itinerary in a more positive way.
The following chapter will delineate the uncharacteristic ‘idealism’ that 
Croce employed to solve the problem of method in his theory of history. If we 
focus our attention on the ‘system’ that Croce was supposedly building up, we 
misunderstand his objectives and miss the most original features of his thought. To 
construct grand narratives, essentially a metaphysical project, was for Croce an 
impossible task, and he would maintain this position until the end of his life. To 
focus on his three-volume Filosofia dello Spirito as the creation of an idealistic 
system is to misread the enterprise. Attention to his method of analysis makes it 
very clear that he consistently opposed grand narratives of this kind. In a 
postmodern epoch, this is easier to understand. In this sense, Croce was ahead of 
his time, and subsequently fell victim to readings which were not attuned to his 
major theoretical preoccupations.
105
CHAPTER THREE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF HISTORY
3.1 THE GIOLITTIAN ERA (1901-1914)
Having outlined the embryonic features of Croce’s antimetaphysical terrain, we will 
now begin to examine how these are developed with particular regard to the problem 
of history and historiography. But first we need some preliminary clarifications on 
both Croce’s activity during the years between 1900 and 1914 and the intentions 
behind his Filosofia dello Spirito.
This period is usually considered to be that of Croce’s prime. Referring to it 
Gramsci even talked about a ‘dittatura culturale’ of the philosopher. It is undoubtedly 
true that the philosopher represented, to a certain extent, the ‘centro di convergenza 
dei movimenti intellettuali del tempo.’1 Indeed, at the turn of the 20th century Croce 
had already published a series of studies on Marxism (Materialismo storico ed 
economia marxistica), on history (La rivoluzione napoletana del 1799 and La Spagna 
nella vita italiana durante la Rinascenza) and literature (I teatri di Napoli dal 
Rinascimento alia fine del secolo) in addition to a large number of publications in 
journals in Italy and abroad. In this period, Croce had direct links with many major 
European intellectuals, such as George Sorel in France, Windelband and Vossler in 
Germany and Collingwood in Britain.
La Critica soon established itself as one of the most widely read periodicals 
and in 1903 Croce supported, financially and intellectually, the young publisher 
Giovanni Laterza in the launching of what would become one of the most important 
cultural enterprises in Italy. Talking about the publishing house Daniela Coli reported:
Sorta all’inizio del novecento in una Puglia completamente emarginata 
dal panorama editoriale italiano, [Laterza] riusci ... a diventare centro 
di diffusione culturale in grado di sostenere il confronto con le piu 
riuscite esperienze europee.2
Rather than entrust his intellectual efforts to established publishers, which would have 
been the easier route for the ‘detached intellectual’ which much Crocean mythology
1 Bobbio, Profilo ideologico del Novecento italiano, p.74.
2 D.Coli, Croce, Laterza e la cultura europea (Bologna: II Mulino, 1983), p.7.
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has created, he chose to invest his money in an obscure southern Italian publishing 
house, which tells us something about his practical and concrete commitment to the 
‘Mezzogiomo’.
International eminence had come with the publication of Estetica in 1902 
which was hailed as an avant-garde book on the theory of art and attracted a number 
of admirers from the very start, including such figures as Marinetti and the Futurists 
in general. The work became so significant that the Italian philosopher was invited to 
a conference at the University of Houston, Texas. He did not take part in the 
conference but sent a paper which became one of his most popular books, Breviario
di Estetica, a sort of elaboration and summary of his first oeuvre. In 1923 the
philosopher received the degree ad honorem from Oxford University and in 1929 the 
Encyclopedia Britannica commissioned Croce to write an entry on Aesthetics.
The Estetica was followed by Logica4 and Filosofia della Pratica (1909). The 
three books formed the so-called Filosofia dello Spirito and made Croce one of the 
most prominent philosophers of his time. Croce embodied a new way of conceiving 
culture, with his wit and ingenuity in tackling cultural and political issues and a 
polemical attitude towards Italian academia. Croce’s popularity lay in his ability to 
speak to a very diversified audience. Many young Italian intellectuals found in the 
philosopher an ally in the renewal of the stifling climate of Italian culture, and 
historians and literary critics were soon to face, for the first time, a set of problems of 
which they did not even suspect the existence. However, despite Croce’s great success 
we cannot talk about ‘cultural dictatorship.’ In reality, a closer look at the cultural 
climate of the time presents us with a varied and multifaceted intellectual Italy. For 
the first time the country was experiencing the feeling of independence and
democracy and this was reflected in all aspects of life, including culture.
The general elections in 1900 inaugurated the so-called Giolittian era which 
witnessed a period of enormous economic expansion and social change. In addition to 
creating sufficient social and political stability for the development of industry and 
commerce, especially in the North, the ‘social pact’ between the prime minister and
3 See ‘Aesthetics’, in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., 1929, pp.263-72. The essay was later 
published in Italian with the title Aesthetica in nuce.
4 Croce drafted an early version o f his Logica in 1905, ‘Lineamenti di una logica come scienza del 
concetto puro’, a dissertation presented at the Accademia Pontaniana in Naples. However, he recast it 
entirely for the definitive second edition published in 1908. The original version of the Logica is 
collected in A. Attisani (ed.), La prima forma della ‘Estetica ’ e della ‘Logica ’ (Messina: Principato, 
1924).
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the founder of the Socialist Party Filippo Turati, allowed Italy to introduce the first 
modem welfare measures, such as the limit of eleven hours of work for women and 
the suppression of child labour, forbidding the employment of children under the age 
of twelve. Furthermore, in exchange for Turati keeping the extreme left in order 
Giolitti would attempt to stop censorship and anti-union legislation. The 
government’s new policy would be to intervene as little as possible in labour disputes. 
Also, one of the most important changes before 1914 was the general increase in 
literacy. Although illiteracy was still high compared to other European countries, it 
was decreasing very rapidly. Thus the press boom of the period was a natural effect of 
greater literacy. Croce’s activity was part of this new atmosphere of regeneration.
Indeed, there was a proliferation of journals and publishing houses, 
particularly in Florence, Rome, Turin, Naples and Milan. Besides the daily papers 
such as II Corriere della Sera, La Stampa, Giornale d Italia and II Mattino there were 
many monthly publications. The periodical Leonardo, based in Florence and directed 
by the intellectual maverick Giovanni Papini, La Voce edited by Giuseppe Prezzolini 
and II Regno by Corradini, are only some examples of the thriving cultural life of pre- 
Fascist Italy. There were also a number of Catholic publications, gravitating around 
periodicals like Cenobium or Rinnovamento, which would later create modernism, an 
influential movement which injected a heavy dose of historicist thinking into 
Catholicism. Alongside this movement, eventually condemned by the Church, there 
was the powerful Neo-Thomist revival in all areas of Catholic thinking rivalling the 
philosophies of Croce and Gentile. All these movements and periodicals were 
producing effects in the cultural life the country which render the frequently vaunted 
thesis of a Crocean ‘cultural dictatorship’ naive in the extreme.5 Perhaps because of 
their mix of devotion and antagonism intellectuals like Gramsci, Salvemini6 and 
Togliatti later blew the cultural role of Croce out of proportion.
5In this respect, Martin Clark’s view on Croce’s role at the beginning o f the twentieth century appears, 
to say the least, simplistic: ‘Croce’s friendship with the publisher Giovanni Laterza enabled him to 
issue hundreds of suitable books or translations o f literature, philosophy and history, and virtually 
control what literate people read.’ M. Clark, Modem Italy 1871-1995 (London and New York: 
Longman, 1998), p. 173. For a thorough account o f the life o f these periodicals see the irreplaceable 
Garin, Cronache di filosofia italiana, pp.21-43.
6Gaetano Salvemini (1873-1957), who spent twenty years in exile fighting Fascism, contributed to a 
distorted reception of Croce’s philosophy abroad. During his stay in America, teaching history at the 
University o f Harvard, he wrote a number o f articles against the ‘abstruse’ Croce’s ‘idealist’ 
philosophy, considering the philosopher a political adversary. See R. Vivarelli (ed.), Scritti sul 
fascismo , Vol. 3 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1974), p. 440.
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There is also the myth of a conservative Croce hostile to young intellectuals. 
In reality, in this period, up until when his famous polemical interview on the death of 
Socialism appeared in La Voce in 1911,7 Croce’s political sympathies were still for 
the left,8 although he had made clear that he intended to keep the theoretical and the 
political spheres separate. In his private life, moreover, Croce had an unconventional 
relationship with Angelina Zampanelli, a working class woman who was his partner 
till her death from heart disease in 1913.9 We should not forget that in Catholic Italy a 
relationship with a woman outside marriage was considered extremely improper.
Furthermore, many of the young intellectuals to whom Croce was supposed to 
be hostile published their works with Laterza or collaborated with the publishing 
house; among them Nitti, Giovanni Amendola, Gobetti, Leone Ginsburg, Papini, 
Prezzolini and many others.10 Giuseppe Prezzolini, who in 1909 would become the 
first biographer of Croce wrote:
Devo al Croce l’ordine delle cose umane, la fede nel mondo storico, la 
conquista deH’umanita di me stesso, la vita morale, il dovere dello 
sforzo, il bisogno d’una disciplina, la visione dell’umile giomata come 
una missione, il senso dell’eroico quotidiano prosaico: l’equilibrio ... il 
valore dell’uomo di genio (ma anche dell’imbecille e il valore del
7 B. Croce, ‘La morte del socialismo italiano’ in La Voce, iii (1911), pp. 501-2.
8 Croce paid a considerable subscription of a thousand lire in support o f the Socialist paper L ’Avanti 
and made friends with Filippo Turati. Moreover, Giolitti rejected his senatorship because he was 
considered by the police as Socialist ‘sympathiser and supporter’: ‘Nel 1896, per la nascita dsffl Avanti, 
il giomale del partito socialista fondato in Italia nel 1892, Benedetto Croce sottoscrisse mille lire: una 
somma allora ragguardevole ... Quando Giustino Fortunato lo propose a Giolitti ... per la nomina a 
senatore del Regno emerse nelle informazioni di ufficio formate dai carabinieri la sottoscrizione ... e 
dovette tener conto di quel precedente considerato negativo per i criteri dell’epoca.’ G. Galasso, ‘L’ 
“Avanti!” applaudi il “compagno Croce’”, Corriere della Sera, 25 October 2001. During the Fascist 
dictatorship Croce continued his relationship with Turati meeting him and other socialists in Paris: 
‘Personalmente rividi piu volte a Parigi Turati, Treves ed altri socialisti ed ebbi con loro relazioni 
affettuose.’ B. Croce, Nuove pagine sparse, vol. ii (Bari: Laterza, 1966), p.420. For the friendship 
between Turati and Croce see S. Bonechi (ed.), Turati e Croce. Un fascetto di lettere inedite offerto a 
Mario Agrimi per i suoi settant ’anni (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1998). Introduction by E. Garin.
9 Croce wrote in his Taccuini: ‘Tristezza di dover rivedere carte e oggetti, in cui si chiude il ricordo di 
vent’anni di mia vita, spezzati in questo punto. Ho cominciato a riordinare la casa dove sono rimasto 
solo.’ In G. Sasso, Per invigilare me stesso. I  taccuini di lavoro di Benedetto Croce (Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1989) pp.36-7. It is interesting to see that the ‘illicit’ relationship with Zampanelli is not 
mentioned in Nicolini’s ‘Olympian’ biography on Croce. The mention o f the association with a 
‘popolana’ would probably have spoiled the image o f a stem and conservative philosopher.
10 See D. Coli, Croce, Laterza, p.8. Croce collaborated with many journals reflecting various political 
views. He also promoted from La Critica the newborn monthly paper Leonardo: ‘La rivista Leonardo e 
opera di alcuni giovani legati tra loro da una concezione filosofica ... della liberta e dell’azione. E vale 
certamente meglio delle solite riviste filosofiche dei professori, che infilzano a scopo accademico ossia 
di “carriera”, compilatoriamente, pagine e pensieri altrui, accompagnandoli con pigri e frigidi 
commenti. I redattori del Leonardo sono scrittori vivaci e mordaci.’ Croce, Conversazioni critiche, 
p. 137. For a complete account on the relations between Croce and La Voce see P. Colonnello, Croce e i 
vociani (Genoa: Studio Editoriale di Cultura, 1984).
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farabutto); la riduzione totale, assoluta, senza residui di Dio nell’uomo; 
l’accettazione della realta non criticabile ma su cui costruire.11
This statement, which reads like a ‘declaration of faith’, encapsulates the strong 
feelings that many of the young had for Croce.
Another young intellectual, the liberal Piero Gobetti (1901-1926), perceptively 
denounced the risks of a ‘beatification’ of Croce:
Odio i crociani: sono vuoti, parolai, inerti come gli anticrociani. Li 
disprezzo quanto ammiro Croce. Chi sono i crociani in Italia? Sono i 
professori privi di originalita, pedanti, meccanici, che si sono studiati a 
memoria VEstetica dell’intuizione, facendone un nuovo Vangelo. Sono 
in una parola quelli che non hanno mai capito Croce. E sono tanti, 
perche il destino dei grandi e proprio di essere incompresi. Croce 
presenta il suo sistema come strumento di lavoro, come punto di 
partenza per nuove ricerche, e gli incoscienti accettano pigramente il 
suo sistema per fermarsi. Negano cio che nel sistema crociano e tutto: 
lo svolgimento.12
We will return to the concept of ‘svolgimento’ in Croce. It is almost impossible to 
overstate the extent to which Gobetti was one of the few who understood the 
intrinsically open outlook of Croce’s thought. This component would be noticeably 
underplayed by later criticism in favour of a Hegelian reading of Croce.
The relations of Croce with many of these young intellectuals changed shortly 
before the beginning of the First World War, when they adhered enthusiastically to 
Italy’s intervention in the conflict.
Comincio contro di me -  these are Croce's words reported by his
friend and biographer Nicolini- una sequela e quasi un vezzo di
manifestazioni ostili, che non erano gia la polemica dei diversamente
pensanti nella cerchia intellettuale ... ma il provocato intervento degli
incompetenti e ignari a gridar contumelie e a tentar di soffocar pensieri • • • • • 1 ^  e giudizi, ai quail la loro mente era chiusa.
11 In I. De Feo, Croce: I ’uomo e l ’opera (Milan: Mondadori, 1975), p.201.
12 P. Gobetti,‘I Crociani’, in Energie nuove, II (1919) pp.78-80, now in P. Gobetti, Scritti politici, 
(Turin: Einaudi, 1969), p.46.
13 F. Nicolini, Benedetto Croce (Turin: Utet, 1962), p.269.
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From the columns of Lacerba, Papini advocated a cathartic bloodletting in the 
name of a sort of palingenesis for humankind:
L’awenire, come gli antichi dei delle foreste, ha bisogno di sangue 
sulla strada. Ha bisogno di vittime, di cameficine ... II sangue e vino 
per i popoli forti, il sangue e Folio di cui hanno bisogno le ruote di 
questa macchina enorme che vola dal passato al futuro ... Abbiamo 
bisogno di cadaveri per lastricare le strade di tutti i trionfi ... ben 
venga l’assassinio generale collettivo.14
The same tone was used by Corradini who, paradoxically, saw in the war an important 
aspect of humanitarianism:
L’umanita e legata alia tragica necessita della guerra, perche, appunto, 
non e un’unita ma una totalita di popoli ... Le nostre conclusioni sono 
opposte a quelle degli umanitarii. Questi condannano la guerra per 
ragioni di umanita; noi al contrario vediamo chiaramente che le sue 
ultime finalita sono umanitarie.15
In this atmosphere of excitement Croce’s initial neutral position and his 
appeal to calm seemed to many of these young a sign of weakness. In reality, Croce 
was against the nationalistic fever which seemed to have spread among the 
intellectuals as well as the elites. In 1914, referring to the attitude of most of the 
Italian press he wrote:
Non si tratta di quesiti razionali, ma di urti di passioni; non di soluzioni 
logiche, ma di asserzioni d’interessi, che ... sono nazionali ossia 
particolari; non di ragionamenti, ma di fmti ragionamenti costruiti 
sull ’ immaginazione.16
14 G. Papini, ‘La vita non e sacra’ in Lacerba, I, 1913, n.20, p.224. Gramsci gave a significant portrait 
of Papini’s personality: ‘In Papini manca la rettitudine morale. Nel primo periodo della sua carriera 
questo non impressionava, perche Papini basava la sua autorita su se stesso, era il “partito di se stesso”. 
Divertiva, non poteva essere preso sul serio se non da pochi filistei ... Oggi Papini si e inserito in un 
vasto movimento da cui trae autorita: la sua autorita e divenuta percio canagliesca nel senso piu 
spregevole, dello sparafucile, del sicario mercenario.’ A. Gramsci, Letteratura e vita nazionale (Turin: 
Editori Riuniti, 2000), p. 195.
15 E. Corradini, Pagine degli anni sacri (Milan: Treves, 1920), p.250.
16 B. Croce, Pagine sulla guerra (Bari: Laterza, 1965), p. 14.
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Moreover, from La Critica Croce strongly condemned what he defined as ‘la 
psicologia dell’odio’ against other countries, unmasking the chauvinistic drive of 
many intellectuals:
Gran parte del malumore contro le mie noterelle e stato ... suscitato 
dalla mia avversione agli ‘intellettuali’ che manifestano o promuovono 
sentimenti di odio contro questo o quel popolo ... Un ... professore, 
ha, tra gli altri, pubblicato un articolo consigliante l’odio e riboccante 
di odio contro i tedeschi.17
Croce, who had previously focused on the moment of force in history,
insisting on Machiavelli and Marx against the abstract values of the Enlightenment
tradition, found himself charged with betraying his own ideas. The reaction on the
part of many ‘Crociani’ was disbelief and resentment which led them to unleash
personal attacks against him. Papini and Marinetti, who had previously praised the
• • • 18Estetica for its revolutionary emphasis on creativity and intuition, advocated a Croce 
against Croce in an apology of chaos and anarchy.
Groups writing for La Voce, Leonardo, II Regno and Hermes, transformed the 
journals into propaganda machines; they began a slander campaign against non­
interventionist intellectuals, singling out Croce as the champion of the chicken- 
hearted middle class. The ‘Pragmatism’ promoted by Papini, the Futurists and the 
like, in polemic with Croce’s ‘Idealism’, was a sort of blind interventionism in the 
name of the supremacy of praxis over theory. Among the others, on the side of the 
radical Socialists the young Benito Mussolini from the paper II Popolo d'Italia urged 
the nation to take part in the conflict and abandon prattle in favour of action.19
Evoking these years in 1928, during the Fascist dictatorship, Croce 
remembered:
,7 Ibid., p. 116. See also the comments o f Gramsci on Croce’s attitude on the First World War: ‘II 
Croce reagisce contro l’impostazione popolare (con la conseguente propaganda) della guerra come 
guerra di civilta e quindi a carattere religioso.’ A. Gramsci, II materialismo storico, p. 226. And further 
on, ‘Cio che importa al Croce e che gli intellettuali ... capiscano che altro e l ’ideologia, strumento 
pratico per govemare, e altro la filosofia e la religione che non deve essere prostituita nella coscienza 
degli stessi sacerdoti.’ Ibid., p. 227.
18 For a detailed account o f the influence of Croce’s Estetica on movements such as Futurism and 
‘ermetismo’ see R. Raggiunti, II problema del linguaggio nella filosofia di Benedetto Croce (Florence, 
Cadmo, 1997). See also Jean-Louis Ferrier, Art o f  the Twentieth Century (Turin: Edition du Chene, 
1999), p.41. The importance o f the poetic element in Croce is discussed by Alberto Caracciolo in 
L ’estetica e la religione di Benedetto Croce (Genoa, Tilgher, 1990).
19 Many o f these young intellectuals, including Marinetti, Papini and Prezzolini, embraced Fascism and 
continued the attacks against Croce.
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L’ideale socialistico, amore di vent’anni innanzi, non parlava piu ai
giovani, ne a quelli stessi che erano stati allora giovani ...
L’immaginazione e la bramosia della nuova generazione, e dei delusi
di quella di poco antecedente, si rivolgevano, come gia prima in
Inghilterra, Germania e Francia, all’ ‘imperialismo’ o ‘nazionalismo’,
del quale padre spirituale fu in Italia il D’Annunzio, che l’aveva
preparato sin da giovane con tutta la sua psicologia, culminante nel
• • 20 sogno della sanguinaria e lussunosa rinascenza borgiana.
The writer Gabriele D’Annunzio, with his rhetoric and nationalism, was by now the
real influence for a generation of young Italians.
One can see from the above sketch that Croce’s intellectual life, from the very
start, far from being the alleged ‘Olympian dictatorship’, was rather a continuous
struggle to clarify and defend his position. In this respect Bobbio is right in
maintaining that the philosopher ‘fu protagonista, proprio perche non dimentico mai
in ogni momento di essere antagonists’21
I have attempted to bring out the importance of the Giolittian era for an
appreciation of the context and the climate during which Croce was forging his
epistemology of history. It was a turbulent period, so that to see it as the phase during
which, rising above the contingent issues of the period, Croce produced his
‘Olympian’ ‘filosofia dello spirito’, is to associate oneself with those interpreters so
rightly taken to task by Gobetti.
Moreover, such a view of Croce’s ‘filosofia dello spirito’ itself entails an
epistemological separation between his polemical writings, seen as secondary and
theoretically contingent excursions, and his serious and profound philosophising, a
view explicitly rejected by the Italian thinker. Indeed, if we want to understand the
full extent of the philosopher’s antimetaphysical enterprise, we need to be constantly
aware of the polemical targets to which Croce addressed his criticism. If one takes
into account this component, one could understand, if not justify, certain positions
taken by the philosopher. After all Croce himself maintained that
Filosofia e critica della filosofia sono la cosa medesima, perche ... 
l’aspetto critico, o negativo, e inseparable dal positivo, e ogni filosofia 
e sempre polemica come si puo osservare analizzando qualsiasi 
scrittura filosofica.22
20 B.Croce, Storia d ’ltalia dal 1871 al 1915 (Bari: Laterza, 1967), p. 234.
21 Bobbio, Profilo ideologico del Novecento italiano, p.74.
22B.Croce, Logica come scienza del concetto puro, (Bari: Laterza, 1971), p. 191. Maurice Finocchiaro 
has acutely remarked that ‘Croce was a philosopher, not merely in addition to being a critic but 
because he was a critic; his philosophy may be the first methodology of criticism in the history o f
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3.2 CROCE’S ‘MODES’ OF CRITIQUE
Postmodernism has taught us to look at discontinuity as a value instead of a defect. In 
other words, thought does not need to be systematic to be culturally or philosophically 
productive. Philosophers like Nietzsche or Benjamin were against systematic thought 
which, in their view, was unsuitable for philosophical inquiry. Closer to our times, 
Michel Foucault, in his Archeology o f Knowledge, has underlined the importance in 
philosophical discourse of the ‘use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture, threshold, 
limit, series, and transformation’23 in order to escape a language which otherwise 
misrepresents reality. We will see that, despite the common view of Croce as a system 
builder, his way of thinking was closer to some aspects of postmodernism than to 
Hegelianism. It is clear that the writings of Croce, like those of Heidegger or 
Foucault, for instance, involve a sort of reading that Russell, Ayer and Dewey do not. 
If we consider Croce’s thought from this optic the charges of inconsistency that are 
frequently levelled at his ‘system’ lose a great deal of force.
In reality, the repeated emphasis on the systematic aspects of Croce’s 
philosophy has concealed the originality of his thought. The ‘coherence’ of Croce’s 
thinking is in part the result of critiques which have tended to smooth out its 
contradictions in order to create an idealistic framework, which was then considered 
to be the main source of his philosophy. However, these critiques seem to forget that 
Croce himself maintained that
il linguaggio di uno scrittore non e gia quello che egli adopera in tutte 
le sue opere, quasi una media che si ricavi da esse; ma quello che 
adopera in una data opera, in una data fase del suo pensiero sotto 
determinate influenze.2
If we apply this criterion to Croce we will find that each work has its specific tone 
which is distorted if we insist on harmonizing it with other works. The philosopher 
was clear about his project, arguing that it was necessary to have a more dynamic way 
of conceiving philosophy, to the point of advocating its ‘dissolution’:
thought.’ M. A. Finocchiaro, Gramsci and the History o f  Dialectical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p.29.
23 M. Foucault, Archeology o f Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 21.
24 B.Croce, ‘Le contradizioni degli scrittori’, La Critica, iii (1906), pp.162-64, (p.163).
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Annullare l’idea della filosofia ‘generale’ e insieme annullare il 
concetto statico del sistema filosofico, surrogandolo col concetto 
dinamico delle semplici ‘sistemazioni’ storiche dei gruppi di problemi, 
delle quali cio che persiste e soprawive sono i singoli problemi e le 
loro soluzioni, e non gia 1*aggregate e l’ordinamento estemo, che 
ubbidisce ai bisogni e ai tempi degli autori e passa con questi, o si 
serba e si ammira solo per ragioni estetiche, quando pure abbia tal 
pregio.25
Moreover, the fact that Croce might have considered in a certain phase of his 
thought the possibility of a systematic path does not necessarily mean that the 
philosophical significance of the thinker remained within this feature. In reality, the 
most fertile part of Croce’s thought lies beyond his alleged idealism, which might 
indeed be a component, but certainly not the most important one, of his philosophy.
The years between 1900 and 1914 are generally considered to be those of the 
‘systematization’ of Croce’s philosophy in which the thinker abandoned the purported 
naive realism of his youth and embraced Hegelian idealism.26 Critics traditionally 
distinguish three periods in Croce’s thought: a pre-idealistic phase in which the young 
philosopher tried to relate history to art, the celebrated phase of the Philosophy o f the 
Spirit in which Croce embraced idealism, and a final period after Fascism with the 
crumbling of the ‘system’ and the emergence of the ‘vital’, the obscure force which 
lies behind the rational ‘Spirit.’27 Such interpretations consider the Philosophy o f the 
Spirit the peak of Croce’s work and insist on the overarching philosophical and
25 B.Croce, Logica come scienza del concetto puro (Bari: Laterza, 1971), p.x.
26 Gino Bedani, for instance, maintains that Croce departed from an ‘epistemological framework o f  
uncritical realism’ to ‘shift into its opposite, idealism’. G. Bedani, ‘Art, poetry and science: theory and 
rhetoric in Croce’s early anti-positivist epistemology’, Italian Studies, 49 (1994), p.93.
27 This is roughly the scheme we find in the already mentioned Benedetto Croce, la ricerca della 
dialettica by Gennaro Sasso. See also Paolo Bonetti, Introduzione a Croce (Bari: Laterza, 1992). 
Michele Maggi in his recent La filosofia di Benedetto Croce (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1998) addresses this 
problem which has been an obstacle to a correct understanding o f Croce’s task. In his opinion Croce’s 
philosophy suffered from a ‘closed’ interpretation which assimilated the philosopher to German 
idealism. On the other hand, an excessively ideologically orientated interpretation o f Croce’s thought 
has led to a marginalization of his position. However, Maggi’s way o f showing Croce’s relevance 
nowadays is very similar to Sasso’s La ricerca della dialettica. Indeed, it emphasizes the final phase of 
the philosopher in which the reflections on the ‘end of civilization’ make Croce a sort of existentialist. 
This interpretation, despite its good intentions, neglects Croce’s original contributions to literary 
criticism and historiography and avoids once again the crucial question of the method in his 
philosophy. For a further discussion of Maggi’s book on Croce see the already quoted D. D. Roberts 
‘Maggi’s Croce, Sasso’s Gentile’, pp. 116-25.
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conceptual unity of the three volumes which allegedly form the all-encompassing 
‘Crocean system.’28
However, this view does not square with the image of Croce we have sketched 
so far. Indeed, we have seen that the main aim of the young thinker was to develop his 
research in specific fields, namely history and literary criticism, avoiding grand 
schemes and concentrating on the issues and methodologies which were directly 
connected to those disciplines. We have also defined this attitude as antimetaphysical, 
since it aimed to avoid abstract questions and concentrate on the nature and the limits 
of well-defined subjects, namely history and literary criticism. Why would Croce 
have diverged from this original purpose in order to build a ‘metaphysical’ system of 
thought?
Moreover, if we go on to consider the three books of the so-called Filosofia 
dello Spirito more closely, we find that the compact and rigid structure of the works is 
more apparent then real. Indeed we will see that each book can be considered as a 
work on its own exploring a main theme with open-mindedness. Each work has its 
own ‘centre of gravity’ and should be analyzed accordingly without a preconceived
O Q  •view on Croce’s position. In this respect, the label ‘Hegelian’ or ‘neo-Hegelian’ has 
undoubtedly contributed to the discrediting of Croce’s philosophy, despite the 
philosopher’s repeated denials:
La ... mia concezione e stata piu volte chiamata ... ‘hegelismo’ o 
‘neohegelismo’; ma potrebbe altresi chiamarsi, a libito e con pari 
diritto, ‘nuovo positivismo’, ‘nuovo kantismo’, ‘nuova teoria dei 
valori’, ‘nuovo vichismo’ e via dicendo: denominazioni che tutte, 
come la prima, non ne colgono il carattere proprio.30
And further, in the same book Croce insisted:
28 See for instance the introduction to the recent The Legacy o f  Benedetto Croce, p.5 in which Massimo 
Verdicchio maintains that ‘ Croce’s three-volume Filosofia dello Spirito’ is ‘based on a refinement of 
Kant and Hegel, to develop a systematic understanding o f human knowledge and activity. ’
29 ‘Hegeliano e il sistema del pensiero crociano e Vanimus che lo percorre. Per quanto il filosofo 
napoletano cerchi di prendere le distanze da Hegel ... manifesta un debito essenziale nei confronti 
dell’autore delV Enciclopedia’ S. Nicolosi, ‘Dialettica hegeliana ed eterodossia crociana’ in A. Bruno 
(ed.), Benedetto Croce trent’anni dopo (Bari: Laterza, 1983), p. 222. See also Caserta: ‘His [Croce’s] 
historicism, in truth, is a modernized version o f Hegelianism.’ Croce and Marxism, p. 40.
30 Croce, Contributo, p.58.
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La Filosofia come scienza dello Spirito, da me disegnata, non e la 
prosecuzione, ma la totale eversione dello hegelismo.31
The essentially non-Hegelian nature of Croce’s thought, first suggested by 
Hayden White, has been recently stressed by David D. Roberts who finds the ‘centre
• ' X'J »of gravity’ of Croce’s philosophy in his ‘absolute historicism’. Although I am in 
debt to Roberts for the suggestion of Croce’s non-Hegelian perspective, I do not share 
either the methods or the conclusions of his analysis. Indeed, in order to make Croce 
more relevant to contemporary thought, Roberts relates the philosopher to virtually all 
contemporary currents of thought. The result is a rather distorted image of a Croce as
tlia ‘precursor’ of the main philosophical trends of the 20 century, from Existentialism 
to Psychoanalysis, from Hermeneutics to Structuralism. The conclusions of Roberts’ 
book are also disappointing since he fails to explain where the originality of Croce’s 
thought lies. Indeed, despite the insistence on Croce’s ‘absolute historicism’ as the 
hub of the philosopher’s thought, Roberts does not explain how the philosopher 
constructed it, namely his method. Moreover, according to Roberts, Croce, in his 
historicism, did not question the role of method and narrative in history and relied 
partly on a 19th century conception of history.33 In reality, Croce began his 
investigations on the nature of history and the arts precisely because he intended to 
find a suitable method for these disciplines, and one of his first and major concerns 
was the question of objectivity in the humanities. However, despite its limitations, 
Roberts’s book remains one of the most important contributions for a new 
understanding of Croce’s thought.
All philosophical and scientific doctrines, in Croce, are regarded as partial 
visions of truth, which we must expect to be replaced sooner or later by more suitable 
ones. This is a basic principle of the history of ideas and requires humility as well as 
flexibility, since it denies all definitive answers.34 The letter to the philologist Karl 
Vossler (1872-1949), dated 9th June 1910, with its rejection of the idea of a definitive 
system, expresses clearly Croce’s view on this point:
31 Ibid., p.59.
32 Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p. 17.
33‘ Croce made a promising beginning in rejecting the generally positivist canons, but in retrospect we 
can see that he only scratched the surface of these sets of questions about the active role of the 
historian.’ Ibid., p.285.
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Non credo al sistema nel senso tradizionale, e cioe come carcere in cui 
si chiuda la verita e tutta la verita. Percio non ho inteso dare un sistema 
in questo senso; ma nel senso puramente letterario che in tre volumi ho 
trattato tutti i problemi che mi hanno occupato, naturalmente 
connettendoli tra di loro. Ora e assai improbabile che abbia risolto bene 
i problemi tutti che mi sono proposto.35
Thus, following Croce’s own indications, we can talk about a ‘system’ of the 
Philosophy of the Spirit only ‘nel senso puramente letterario’, a style of discourse 
which enabled him, as he said himself, to reflect on all the problems which had 
occupied his mind. His weak statement (‘naturalmente connettendoli fra di loro’) of 
connections between the various strands of his thought was misread by many 
commentators and transformed into a tight idealist system. If we regard the Filosofia 
dello Spirito as a series of open explorations in specific fields related but not rigidly 
connected which each other, we might be able to understand Croce’s purpose better. 
This latter interpretation insists on the normative value of the philosophy of the spirit 
rather than an ontological one. Within this perspective, the Estetica, Logica and 
Pratica are not monuments to Beauty, Truth, Useful, and Good but simply ‘strumenti 
di lavoro’ that Croce used to develop his research in specific fields of inquiry:
Ogni filosofo, alia fine di una sua ricerca, intravede le prime incerte 
linee di un’altra, che egli medesimo, o chi verra dopo di lui, eseguira.
E con questa modestia ... io metto termine al mio lavoro, porgendolo 
ai ben disposti come strumento di lavoro.37
This interpretation, which considers Croce’s philosophy as an ‘intellectual instrument’ 
rather than a metaphysics, had been perceived by Gramsci as a possibility:
E da porre addirittura la questione se ... il crocismo ... non sia 
essenzialmente una ‘tecnica’ ... La tecnica del pensiero, elaborata 
come tale, ... dara giudizi di controllo e correggera le storture del 
modo di pensare del senso comune.38
34‘L’infinita della filosofia, il suo continuo cangiare, non e un fare e disfare, ma un continuo superarsi: 
la nuova proposizione filosofica e possibile solamente merce l ’antica’. Croce, Logica, p. 189.
35 B.Croce, Carteggio Croce-Vossler 1899-1949 (Bari: Laterza, 1983), p .129.
36 The critic Cesare Luporini encapsulates this position: ‘Forse Croce e stato l ’ultimo filosofo, di 
rilevanza intemazionale a produrre un sistema ... E questo un aspetto, visto oggi, molto arcaico.’ L. 
Colletti, A. Del Noce, C. Luporini, R. Romero, ‘I conti con Benedetto Croce’, Mondoperaio, 12 
(1982), pp. 75-86, (p. 77).
37 B. Croce, Filosofia della Pratica: economia ed etica (Bari: Laterza, 1973), p.406.
38 A. Gramsci, II materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, pp. 74-75.
118
Hence, it offers a technique rather than a dogmatic set of rules, and this 
technique enables us to form critical judgements on reality. And we already know 
that, for Croce, philosophy can be conceived ultimately as a critique which is not 
different in essence from the ordinary thinking of what Croce calls ‘common sense’ 
{buon senso).39 Nevertheless, its unremitting questioning leads to a greater depth of 
theoretical inquiry:
Ecco, dunque dove soltanto puo essere collocato l’orgoglio del 
filosofo: nella coscienza della maggiore intensita delle sue domande e 
delle sue risposte.40
Even when the philosopher adopted an exterior ‘systematic’ framework, as in 
the case of the Filosofia dello Spirito he did not intend to build a definitive 
philosophy since he made clear that no philosophy ‘puo pretendere a valore di totalita, 
o ... di soluzione definitiva.Al In reality, Croce with the philosophy of the spirit 
aimed precisely at avoiding all metaphysical conceptions, and wished to construct an 
epistemology which would avoid reductionism.
Also, the bizarre-sounding word ‘Spirito’, if correctly understood, does not 
create any particular problem. Indeed, with ‘spirit’ Croce indicated the free activity of 
our mind as opposed to mind as a passive instrument of study for Psychology. Many 
critics tend to equate the word ‘spirito’ with the German ‘Geist’.42 However, we 
should not forget that this term has its own complex philosophical tradition in Italy. 
Indeed, philosophers like Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Telesio and Vico used it to 
express human immanence as opposed to the transcendental world. Moreover, Croce
39‘Ogni uomo ha una sua filosofia, rudimentale o sviluppata, piu o meno lacunosa, e nessuno e uomo di 
nessuna filosofia. II piu povero giudizio sull’attivita pratica e guidato dal lume di un concetto 
filosofico.’ Croce, Pratica, p. 66. See also Gramsci: Tattivita del Croce si presenta essenzialmente 
come critica, incomincia col distruggere una serie di pregiudizi tradizionali, col mostrare falsi e 
inconcludenti una serie di problemi che erano il comico “dada” dei filosofi precedenti ecc., 
identificandosi in cid con l ’atteggiamento che verso questo vecchiume aveva sempre mostrato il senso 
comune.’ Gramsci, II materialismo storico, p.232.
40B. Croce, Breviario di estetica, (Bari: Laterza, 1913), p .11. Croce maintained that there was no 
difference in essence between philosophy and what he called ‘pensiero ingenuo’: ‘II pensiero ingenuo 
... meglio forse si chiamerebbe sommariamente o germinalmente filosofico ... Che cosa manca al 
pensiero ingenuo, alia filosofia germinale? Implicitamente nulla ... La verita dunque assai diversa per 
il grado di elaborazione, non potra non essere sostanzialmente la stessa; ed e cattivo segno quando la 
filosofia e in contrasto con la coscienza ingenua.’ B.Croce, Cid che e vivo e cid che e morto della 
filosofia di Hegel (Bari: Laterza, 1967), p. 13.
41Ibid.
42‘Croce picked up the troublesome term “ the spirit”, o f course, from Hegel and the German idealist 
tradition.’ Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p.63.
119
was not interested in producing a complicated linguistic apparatus to expound his 
view. Rather than reading ‘spirito’ in a transcendentalist Hegelian sense, we should 
bear in mind that Croce often deliberately chose simple terms, used words in their 
everyday sense. For instance, when we refer to the ‘spirit of the age’ or ‘times’ we 
simply refer to a set of ideas, beliefs and aims which are typical of a particular period 
in history. Besides, Croce specified:
Non c’e di la lo spirito di qua l’uomo, di la una prowidenza, di qua un 
fantoccio che tira i fili, di la un universale e di qua un individuate ma 
... lo spirito ... non e altro che la stessa vita che noi viviamo, logica di 
questa vita.43
In connection with this clearest of statements about the ‘immanent’ meaning Croce 
attaches to his use of the term ‘spirito’, it is remarkable how little attention, with few 
exceptions, has been given to the simple fact that in Hegel it is a predominantly 
‘trascendentalist’ concept, which underpins his whole philosophy of history, whereas 
in the case of Croce it is never used in this sense.
In reality, Croce, interested in the activity of mind, used the concept of 
‘spirito’ in order to distinguish this sphere of activity from those more adequately 
analyzed by the exact sciences. It is true, however, that Croce’s idea of philosophy 
was, in a broad sense, a spiritual one, namely a constant exercise in change and 
critical modification, an open approach to ‘truth’ which was to be achieved through 
constant effort. In this sense, for Croce, philosophy was ‘love of wisdom’ and in this 
sense his philosophy can be called ‘philosophy of the spirit’, since it presupposed the 
‘human spirit’:
La filosofia dello spirito, cioe la filosofia vera e propria ... in verita 
non e stata mai, per lo meno da Socrate in poi, se non indagine dello
. .  4 4spinto umano.
However, we should not mistake Croce’s undertaking as a kind of moralistic 
reflection on humanity. In this sense, I am uneasy with the interpretation of many
43 Croce, Cid che e vivo e cid che e morto, p 84.
44 B. Croce, Discorsi di varia filosofia, vol. I (Bari: Laterza, 1945), p.76.
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Croceans45 who read the whole of Croce’s work as directed toward the development 
of a single philosophical path in which ethics is the core. Of course, one of Croce’s 
concerns was to preserve values as an essential part of knowledge. This should really 
be seen as a permanently-abiding component integrated into the fabric of human 
cognition, rather than a reference to ‘moral judgements’ which can be applied to 
particular situations or even historical events. Nevertheless it is obvious that each 
book that Croce wrote was dictated by a specific concern or approach which went 
beyond the simple defence of the humanities. In other words Ethics does not occupy a 
privileged position in Croce’s philosophy, although at times the thinker felt the need 
to emphasize its role.
Following this reading of the philosophy of the spirit, Aesthetics, Logic, 
Economics and Ethics are useful tools to distinguish different fields of philosophical 
inquiry which require different methods. In this perspective, understanding, for Croce, 
is an activity aimed at clarifying problems in which we can distinguish different 
forms. Discrimination (distinzione) between different modes of cognition enables us 
to give meaningful judgements on reality; hence, different spheres of the 
philosophical critique require different methods or ‘modes’. Indeed, Croce argued in 
his Logica that knowing is a continuous process of clarification through questions in 
tune with the problem we are facing. He maintained that
Ogni definizione e la risposta a una domanda, la soluzione di un 
problema; e non vi sarebbe luogo a pronunciarla se noi non facessimo 
domande e non ci proponessimo problemi. Perche ci daremmo 
quell’incomodo? Quale bisogno ci costringerebbe? Come ogni atto 
dello spirito la definizione nasce da un contrasto, da un travaglio, da 
una guerra che invoca pace, da un’oscurita che cerca luce, ossia, come 
abbiamo detto, e una domanda che chiede risposta. Ne solamente la 
risposta suppone la domanda, ma tale risposta, tale domanda. La 
risposta deve essere intonata alia domanda, perche altrimenti non 
sarebbe risposta, ma elusione di risposta. II che toma a dire che la 
natura della domanda colora di se la risposta, e che una definizione, 
considerata nella sua concretezza, appare determinata dal problema che 
la fa sorgere.46
45 See for instance Vincenzo Terenzio, ‘La storiografia fra etica e politica’ in Rassegna di studi 
crociani, 2 (1991), pp. i-iv. Teresio reads in Croce ‘una marcata ispirazione moralistica’ which results 
in a sort o f ‘provvidenzialismo storico.’ (p.i).
46 Croce, Logica, ibid., pp. 126-27.
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The formulation of a problem within a specific domain enables us to look for a 
clarification of it which will remove the threatening mystery of the unknown and 
render ‘familiar’ the ‘unfamiliar’, to use an expression of Hayden White.47 For Croce,
la filosofia vera e propria, ben diversa dalle esangui disquisizioni e 
trattazioni delle scuole ... soddisfa i bisogni col rimuovere le oscurita 
mentali che la travagliano ... Ella, non che pascersi di una sterile 
contemplazione e adorazione della divina vita dell’universo ... si 
travaglia partecipando alia continua creazione di un mondo sempre
48nuovo.
The context in which a question is posed is fundamental (Ta risposta deve 
essere intonata alia domanda’) since it defines its relevance. This leads us to discuss 
the Crocean division of domains, or ‘modes’, within philosophical and historical 
inquiry.
Croce, partly inspired by the philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744),49 
believed that our logical knowledge is based on non-logical premises, which Croce 
called intuition.50 An intuition is characterized by its figurative form and is the basis 
of logical thought although independent of it. Indeed, it is what the philosopher called 
the intuitive or expressive moment of the mind. The emphasis on a non-intellectual 
form of knowledge, epistemologically prior to the logical one, is one of the most 
original features of Croce’s Estetica although the Italian philosopher was not alone in 
the discovery of another dimension of the ‘spirit’, or the activity of our mind. Indeed, 
The Interpretation o f Dreams by Freud is dated 1900, L'Evolution Creatrice by 
Bergson was written in 1907. Between the two works stands L ’Estetica (1902). Both 
Croce and Bergson talked about intuition as a mental faculty, both philosophers found 
science limiting and unsuitable for expressing the real movement of life. For both 
philosophers, there is a different dimension in the human mind which had not yet 
been explored, and which required to be theoretically acknowledged. Of course the
47 H. White, Tropics o f  Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), p.5.
48 Croce, II carattere, p.22. Italics mine.
49 ‘From Vico ... Croce derived what was most vital and imaginative in his own theoretical work. Vico 
had been the earliest o f his philosophical masters -  as he was the first in historical time and 
geographically the closest to home. ’ H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (Brighton: Harvester 
Press, 1979), p. 208.
50‘Continuamente si fa appello, nella vita ordinaria, alia conoscenza intuitiva. Si dice che di certe verita 
non si possono dare definizioni; che non si dimostrano per sillogismi; che conviene apprenderle
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positions of Croce and Bergson are different, even if the starting point is the same, 
namely, to highlight creative activity which cannot be thought within the confines of 
scientific knowledge. Bergson would come to identify intuition with the ‘duree’, the 
becoming of consciousness, and this interpretation would be highly influential in 
contemporary literature at the beginning of the century. The ‘stream of consciousness’ 
style developed by such writers as Joyce, Proust and Woolf is just one example of the 
influence of Bergson's 'intuition1. However the notion of intuition in the French 
philosopher would have an irrational outcome, relegating history, logic and science to 
an inferior position and privileging what Bergson called the ‘personal’ and ‘authentic’ 
dimension of knowledge. Croce, instead, devised a framework for the cognitive 
faculties avoiding the extremes of both scientism and mysticism alike.
Intuition and expression in Croce are synonyms.51 This stage coincides with 
the spontaneous production of language before all conceptualizations. Here language 
is considered in its creative element which, for Croce, is an essential part of the 
activity of our mind.52 Expression is not qualitatively different from poetry and art. 
Strictly speaking, Croce maintained, expression is poetry.53 Hence, poetry, in its 
figurative and symbolic dimension, represents the essence of language. For Croce, 
poetry and art create language since they are essentially a dimension of our mind, or 
‘una forma della coscienza’.54 They create the world of words, images and symbols 
we use. In this sense, for Croce, Vico was right when he maintained that poetry was 
the childhood of humanity.55 However, Croce transforms Vico’s chronological 
division into a mental or ‘spiritual’ one.56 This is the aesthetic ‘mode’ which is the 
first stage of Croce’s epistemological framework.
intuitivamente.’ B. Croce, Estetica come scienza d e ll’espressione e linguistica generale. Teoria e 
storia (Milan: Adelphi, 1990), p. 4.
‘La conoscenza intuitiva e la conoscenza espressiva. Indipendente e autonoma rispetto 
all’intellezione; indifferente alle discriminazioni di realta e irrealta.’ Croce, Estetica, p. 16.
52 See ibid pp. 181 and 188.
‘I limiti delle espressioni-intuizioni, che si dicono arte, verso quelle che volgarmente si dicono non -  
arte e impossible defmirli. Un epigramma appartiene all’arte, perche no una semplice parola? Una 
novella appartiene all’arte: perche no una nota giomalistica?’ Ibid.,p.l9.
54 Ibid., p.278.
55‘La poesia e la “lingua matema del genere umano”; i primi uomini “furono da natura sublimi poeti”. 
II che viene riconosciuto anche in altro modo da quanti notano che il passaggio ... da sensibilta animale 
ad attivita umana si compie per mezzo del linguaggio (o ... dell’intuizione o espressione in genere).’ 
Ibid., p.34.
56 In this respect Croce was much more influenced by Vico than Hegel. In his famous study o f the early 
eighteenth century Italian philosopher {La filosofia di G. B. Vico, published in 1911), Croce used the 
latter’s historical delineation o f the three epochs o f human ‘modes’ of understanding to form his 
epistemological distinction. For further elaboration see G. Bedani, Vico Rivisited. Orthodoxy, 
Naturalism and Science in the ‘Scienza Nuova ’ (Oxford, Hamburg, Munich: Berg, 1989), pp.39 ff.
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At a later stage our ‘expressions’ are shaped into a logical framework which 
organizes them into a certain order. It is in this analytical phase that our ‘intuitions’ 
become ‘concepts’, and try to render identifiable to us the indefinite by means of 
classification and categorization. Once we have words and images, namely instances 
of expression, we can create concepts. An ‘intuition-expression’ can subsist without a 
concept, but a concept needs expressions to be formed.57 Here we enter the logical 
‘mode’ which is distinct from, but related to, the aesthetic. In order to have a concept, 
for Croce, we need to have formed intuitions. Intuitions and concepts are the two 
forms of the theoretical activity of the mind.
The theoretical part of the ‘spirit’ uses intuitions and concepts to make sense 
of reality. Croce talks about ‘creating’ reality in the sense that thanks to intuitions and 
concepts we can make sense of the world. As in Kant, these categories are a priori 
schemes of our active mind, thus they cannot be demonstrated empirically or by 
induction. However, we will see later in this chapter that Croce added the historical 
dimension to them. Thus concepts and history are inextricably connected.
However, not only do we express (aesthetic mode) and conceptualize (logical 
mode), we also make use of our knowledge. In other words in addition to a theoretical 
activity of the mind there is a practical one. The practical activity includes the 
Economic and Ethical ‘modes’. After classifying and categorizing our experiences, 
both aesthetically and logically we are impelled to manipulate, reproduce them. It is 
in what Croce called the economic ‘mode’ where we can distinguish a series of 
practical disciplines such as the exact sciences, politics, and economics.
Finally, not only do we theorize and make use of reality, we also evaluate it in 
terms of what it is ethically desirable, the good, which is the realm of the ethical 
‘mode’. The economic and moral involve the use of the aesthetic and logical ‘modes’ 
although they cannot be reduced to the simple sum of them. However, as in the case 
of the theoretical ‘modes’, the practical ‘modes’ are distinct but related, and the 
former can subsist without the latter but not vice versa. The Ethical mode presupposes 
the Economic one. In other words, for Croce ‘la moralita vive in concreto 
nell’utilita’.58 There is no disinterested ethics, but nonetheless the latter cannot be 
confused with economics. Indeed, Croce rejects a utilitarian interpretation of Ethics
57 ‘Se la forma logica e indissolubile da quella grammaticale (estetica), questa non e dissolubile da 
quella.’ Estetica, p. 182.
58 B. Croce, Pratica, p.238.
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maintaining that not all useful actions are moral actions although moral actions are 
always useful.59 For Croce Ethics cannot be reduced to Economics but needs to be 
considered in distinction from it.
Theory and practice are connected in the same way, they are inter-dependent 
but distinct activities (‘attivita distinte’) of the mind. Croce used the metaphor of the 
circle (circolo) to express the relation between them.60
At first sight this epistemological classification may appear rather arid and 
schematic. On this subject, Garin talked about a kind of mechanical procedure in the 
‘scheme’ of the philosophy of the spirit61 and there is undoubtedly a rather schematic 
approach borrowed from the ‘trattati’ of the 19th century. Croce himself saw this 
problem. This is why, after the publication of the Pratica in 1909, he stopped writing 
philosophical treatises in favour of specific inquiries in form of essays. It is 
remarkable that little or nothing in Croce criticism has been devoted to the study of 
this break in what amounts to a clearly antimetaphysical intention in his changed style 
of discourse.
Moreover, if  we take into account the provisional character that Croce gave to 
these three books our view may change. Indeed, it has been shown that Croce’s 
theorizing was typically not for its own sake but in response to the demands of a 
specific historical and critical project. The main aim of the philosopher was to widen 
and render more dynamic the critical weaponry in the humanities protecting them 
against the risk of reductionism, and globalizing visions of reality. The aesthetic, 
logical economic and ethical ‘modes’ could then be conceived simply as theoretical 
constructions which enable us to distinguish different aspects of reality which cannot 
be reduced to a one-dimensional form of knowledge. Hence, the epistemological
59 It is worth reporting Croce’s own words: ‘L’utilitarismo, in effetti, ha potuto condurre sempre 
vittoriosamente la controdimostrazione che non vi sia azione, per alta che si pensi, la quale non 
risponda a un utile personale; perche l’eroe ha pur il suo utile nel pro patria mori ... Ora la polemica 
corretta non deve assumere l ’insostenibile impegno di negare questa evidenza, ma deve anche 
concedere... che non v ’ha azione alcuna la quale non risponda a un libito individuale, perche 
l ’individuo e colui che la compie ... E con cio ammesso verra poi a dimostrare ... che l ’azione utile 
puo o restare meramente personale o progredire ad un’azione universale-personale, etico-utile; e che 
per l ’appunto l ’azione etico-utile e la nuova categoria spirituale, che l ’utilitarista non e riuscito a 
scorgere.’ Ibid., p.240.
60 ‘Teoria e pratica, non sono parallele, ma due linee tali che il capo dell’una si congiunge alia coda 
dell’altra; o se si desidera ancora un simbolo geometrico, esse formano non parallelismo ma circolo’. 
Ibid., p. 203.
61 ‘II movimento si ritrova ... nello sviluppo del pensiero crociano, nel suo scavare dentro ogni 
problema per fame scaturire nuovi problemi e nuove “soluzioni”: ma specialmente le trattazioni 
sistematiche, i “trattati” assumono fin nell’andamento stilistico una fissita a volte stanca, quasi di 
catalogo.’ Garin, Cronache, p.224.
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framework that Croce devised was originally dictated by his aversion towards 
metaphysics and represented an attempt to achieve a non-reductive form of criticism.
Furthermore, the four ‘modes’ can serve as models for historiography. In fact, 
the distinction between different ‘modes’ of understanding not only allowed Croce to 
address different questions according to the specific ‘mode’ but, most importantly for 
our purpose, served as a model for historical discourse in general. Indeed, it will be 
shown how the distinctions between an aesthetic, conceptual, political and ethical 
levels of discourse are the hub of Croce’s investigation on the nature of 
historiography. When we try to come to terms with the writing o f history we need to 
take into account all these different ‘modes’ which are equally important. This is 
linked to his conviction that any grand scheme will in the end reduce all of the 
‘modes’ to one of them. Thus, in the final analysis a fully-fledged idealism will 
reduce history to some form of theoretical determinism, the dominance of the 
economic ‘mode’ within a Marxist ‘metaphysics’ will reduce the others to expressions 
of material conditions, and so forth. In each of them, the autonomous historically 
creative activity of aspects of human creativity are impoverished. Croce’s continous 
elaboration of his theory of history is an attempt to retain the full force of each 
‘mode’, together with discourses appropriate for each, with a different emphasis in 
different periods of his life.
Hence, we can consider the first stage of Croce’s reflections on history as the 
one which focused on the aesthetic mode, with its questioning of the scientific status 
of historiography and its emphasis on the role of subjectivity and rhetoric. In a second 
phase Croce explored the conceptual construction of history connecting it with the 
‘theory of judgement’ and the notion of truth which will be the topic of the last 
section of this chapter. In a later and final stage he explored the relations between 
history and ‘action’ with particular attention to the dynamics of ethics and power. 
These progressive ‘readings’ or ‘modes’ of interpreting history do not exclude each 
other. They could be represented as different strata, or layers which form the 
backbone of Croce’s peculiar ‘historicism’. The idealistic aspects in this perspective 
should not, therefore, be seen as creating a system of the ‘metaphysical’ kind. They 
are functional to Croce’s antimetaphysical project which was to establish a method for 
history and the arts.
What I have tried to demonstrate in this section is that Croce’s Philosophy o f 
the Spirit should not be read as a holistic idealistic system. Rather, its different
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components are theoretically functional ‘modes’ of analyzing different aspects of 
‘reality’. The Estetica, Logica and Pratica describe different postures which can be 
applied to the reading of history. This is a way of remaining faithful to Croce’s 
repeated emphasis on the need to avoid constructing definitive metaphysical systems. 
But before exploring in detail the development of Croce’s characteristic method of 
narrating his conception of history we need to clarify the frequently misinterpreted 
philosopher’s position on the exact sciences.
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3.3 THE ROLE OF THE SCIENCES
We have already noted that a factor which contributed to discrediting Croce’s
• • 62philosophy was his purported hostility towards scientific thought . Indeed, to many 
critics Croce’s alleged inability to understand the importance of the exact sciences 
represented his major flaw. The otherwise sympathetic Garin encapsulates the attitude 
of a long-established critique:
Quella che al Croce puo sembrare ‘una tranquilla rivoluzione 
filosofica’, ossia il rifiuto del valore delle ‘scienze’, non solo non era 
rivoluzione, ma non era ne filosofica, ne tranquilla: era una risposta 
mistificante ai problemi reali, che fini coll’offfire facili formule alia 
pigrizia mentale63.
This harsh verdict on Croce, which saw in the philosopher the main intellectual 
obstacle to the development, in Italy, of a vigorous scientific perspective, has become 
commonplace, as we have seen in the first chapter.
One text in particular, namely the Logica, has been considered a paradigmatic 
example of Croce’s opposition to the exact sciences. It must be conceded that there is, 
indisputably, a certain rhetorical antagonism64 towards the method of science with its 
tendency to generalization. Croce saw in the method of the exact sciences a powerful 
tool for ‘managing’ reality, but he also saw the dangers of producing over-schematic 
frameworks of understanding when used in disciplines such as history and art.
However, talking about the purpose of his Logica, Croce had made clear that 
the book did not represent an attack on science but rather a reaffirmation of logic:
Quando questo libro fu per la prima volta pubblicato, parve a molti che 
esso fosse in guisa precipua una assai vivace requisitoria contro la
62 The Crocean Gembillo has rightly remarked that, ‘quando si riferisce alle valutazioni espresse da 
Croce nei confronti delle scienze si tengono presenti quasi esclusivamente le considerazioni ... critiche 
che egli ha manifestato nei confronti del positivismo (cioe di una determinata concezione filosofica) ... 
mentre si tengono in poco conto i giudizi da lui espressi sugli scienziati e sulle scienze in quanto tali. ’ 
G. Gembillo, Croce e ilproblema del metodo (Naples: Flavio Pagano, 1991), p.7.
63 E. Garin, ‘Appunti sulla formazione del pensiero crociano’, Intellettuali italiani del X X  secolo 
(Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1974), p.24. See also Paolo Rossi: ‘La tesi crociana della scienza come attivita 
pratica e classificatrice, la negazione gentiliana deH’impossibilita di una storia della scienza, 
lasceranno, anche nel dopoguerra, tracce profonde.’ P. Rossi, ‘La storia della filosofia, il vecchio e il 
nuovo’, Rivista di filosofia, 2-3 (Bologna: II Mulino, 1988), p.556.
64A  scholar has appropriately drawn attention to Croce’s style ‘fondato sulla scissione e sul paradosso 
polemico.’ E. Giammattei, La Biblioteca e il Dragone. Croce, Gentile e la letteratura (Naples: 
Editoriale Scientifica 2001), p.211.
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Scienza; pochi vi scorsero cio che soprattutto era: una rivendicazione 
della serieta del pensiero logico.65
Moreover, a deeper level of analysis shows that his critique on the status of the exact 
sciences, far from being provincial, as many detractors of Croce have maintained,66 
was in tune with the general trend of Continental philosophy. Indeed, the philosophies 
of Nietszche, Bergson, Heidegger, Husserl, to mention but a few, had all questioned
• • 67the condition of science within the framework of philosophical speculation.
Furthermore, the references to Bergson, Ernst Mach, Avenarius and Poincare show
68that Croce was following fairly closely the contemporary debate on epistemology. 
Thus, Croce’s position has to be understood in the broader context of European 
thought.
It is true that in the Logica Croce made use of the infamous and unfortunate 
term ‘pseudoconcetti’, to distinguish concepts used in the sciences from those used in 
philosophy.69 However, Croce simply aimed to stress the difference of method 
between the sciences and the humanities. It is important to stress once again that the 
differentiation that the philosopher made between the two disciplines was simply 
methodological and not ontological like that of the neo-Kantians. For Dilthey, for 
instance, the difference between the sciences of Nature and those of the Spirit was one 
of essence since the two ‘sciences’ were concerned with domains which were 
ontologically different. In Croce, on the other hand, it is the method which makes the
65 B. Croce, ‘Per la terza edizione della Logica’, in La Critica, III, (1917), pp.200-02,( p.200).
66See, for instance, Emilio Agazzi, ‘Filosofia della prassi e filosofia dello spirito’ in La citta futura 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1959), pp.2519-20.
67 ‘Croce established, differently from Hegel, a distinction between mathematical and empirical 
knowledge and philosophy attributing to them different contexts and functions. Their differences aside, 
Croce’s Logic also had affinities with Husserl’s Philosophical investigations and with Heidegger’s 
early analysis on judgment.’ R. Viti Cavaliere, ‘Croce’s theory o f judgment’ in D ’Amico, Trafton and 
Verdicchio, The legacy o f  Benedetto Croce, p.99.
68 See Logica, pp.326-329. Here Croce supports his instrumentalist view of the sciences with the 
theories o f the above-mentioned epistemologists. Viano, however, does not seem to have read these 
pages, since he argues that ‘Croce e Gentile accolsero in generale l ’interpretazione pragmatistica della 
scienza, ma senza utilizzare le argomentazioni di filosofi pragmatisti e di scienziati come Poincare e 
Mach: a loro premeva disfarsi della scienza.’ C.A. Viano, ‘Filosofia’ in C. Staiano (ed.), La cultura 
italiana del novecento (Bari:Laterza, 1996), p.253.
69 Myra Moss has justly remarked that: ‘the Crocean sphere o f the practical with its pseudoconcepts 
never held a lesser position in relation to the theoretic pure concepts. At times ... Croce used adjectives 
‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ to express the phenomenological relations o f dependency that held among the 
expressions o f human spirit. He did not, however, mean that the pseudoconcepts were o f inferior value 
than the pure ones. Instead he meant to describe the asymmetrical relations that held between 
theoretical and practical activity.’ M. E. Moss, Benedetto Croce reconsidered. Truth and Error in 
Theories o f  Art, Literature, and History (Hanover and London: University Press o f New England, 
1987), p.78.
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exact sciences radically different from the humanities. Thus, there is a methodological 
distinction between the procedures of science and those of philosophy.
For Croce the common procedure of the exact sciences is to provide schemes 
in order to control a given process. Their purpose is therefore instrumental. Indeed, 
Croce talked about the ‘carattere pratico o economico delle scienze matematiche, 
fisiche e naturali’.70 When we make use of ‘fmzioni concettuali’ or ‘pseudoconcetti’ 
we do not question reality or values but look at general applicability. Here lies the 
crucial methodological difference between science and philosophy. Science is an 
instrumental form of knowledge, concerned with usefulness, philosophy, on the other 
hand, is a critique o f culture and it involves values as well as judgements on reality. 
Science, in Croce, presents theories that develop our control of nature, it broadens the 
range of knowledge and widens the sphere of our practical life, it provides us with a 
greater and more penetrating insight into reality, but it is not reality. These are 
constructs, or hypotheses, on reality:
Le cosiddette scienze naturali ... calcolano, misurano, pongono 
eguaglianze, stabiliscono regolarita, foggiano classi e tipi, formano 
leggi, mostrano a loro modo come un fatto nasca da altri fatti: ma tutti i 
loro progressi urtano sempre in fatti che sono appresi intuitivamente e 
storicamente. Perfino la geometria afferma ora di riposare tutta su 
ipotesi, non essendo lo spazio tridimensionale o euclideo se non uno 
degli spazi possibili.71
Indeed, for Croce, we always operate using theories. In this sense every science is 
based on a ‘philosophy’. Pure observation, the famous objective perception, does not 
exist. All observations are made through the filter of a given theory.72 Croce observed 
that the main assumption on which science is based is the uniformity of nature:
A fondamento delle leggi o concetti empirici sta il postulato della 
costanza o uniformita della natura. Ma ... quella costanza e uniformita 
che si postula e nient’altro che la stessa opportunity pratica onde si 
libera di trascurare le differenze ... II postulato deH’uniformita della 
natura e la richiesta di una trattazione della realta per ragioni di 
comodo73.
70 Croce, Logica, p. 324.
71 Croce, Estetica, p. 39.
72 ‘II procedere astrattivo, quantunque non modificabile filosoficamente, e condizionato dalla filosofia-, 
e sono i pensieri che determinano l ’uno o l ’altro indirizzo in cui debbono eseguirsi le astrazioni.’ B. 
Croce, ‘Noterelle di critica hegeliana’, in La Critica, v (1912), pp. 370-81, (p.380).
73 Croce, Logica, pp.200-01.
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For Croce science neither creates values nor grounds the premises on which it 
is ultimately based, since these premises are the result of pre-established sets of 
theories which have to meet laboratory conditions. These theories are schematic 
‘abstractions’ of our experience and are valid in so far as they provide a practical 
outcome. However, the use of abstractions, or hypothesis in science far from being 
derogatory to them is the condicio sine qua non for the physical sciences. From this 
point of view, there is no real conflict between science and philosophy but rather 
different methods of inquiry and aims.74 The question of ‘truth’ in science is
75meaningless and should be replaced with ‘suitability’ or ‘exactness’.
We can fruitfully compare Croce’s position with that of Thomas Kuhn in The 
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions'.
A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessors not 
only in the sense that it is a better instrument for discovery and solving 
puzzles, but also because it is somehow of what nature is really like. 
One often hears that successive theories grow even closer to, or 
approximately more and more closely to, the truth. Apparently 
generalizations like that refer not to the puzzle-solutions and the 
concrete predictions derived from a theory, but rather to its ontology, 
to the match, that is, between the entities with which theory populates 
nature and what is ‘really there’.76
Like Croce, Kuhn does not accept an ontological view of reality and remarks that the 
idea of ‘what is “really there’” is misleading:
Besides, as an historian I am impressed with the implausibility of the 
view. I do not doubt, for example, that Newton’s mechanics improves 
Aristotle’s and that Einstein’s improves on Newton’s as instruments of 
puzzle-solving. But I can see in their succession no coherent direction 
of ontological improvement.77
74L’antinomia, di cui molti parlano, tra scienza e filosofia, e un sogno’. Ibid., p.210.
75 Renata Viti Cavaliere relates this distinction between ‘exactness’ and ‘truth’ to Hermeneutics: ‘From 
a different position, Croce thought through the distinction between exactness and truth, which 
represents what is theoretically interesting, in the logical-theoretical investigations o f this century taken 
as whole and which is still the dividing line between analytic philosophers and followers of  
Hermeneutics.’ Viti Cavaliere, ‘Croce’s theory o f historical judgment’, p.99.
76 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1970), p.206.
77 Ibid.
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The similarities between Kuhn and Croce’s argument are striking. Indeed, they both 
insist on the instrumental value of science and both rule out all ontological concerns 
about ‘real nature’ to concentrate on the usability of scientific paradigms.
It should be clear by now that Croce’s polemic is on the schematic procedure 
of science which is not considered a suitable method for the humanities, which require 
a different approach. In order to know how we should live we do not need the 
schematic and abstract formulations of the exact sciences. Only a one-dimensional 
conception of knowledge would consider the method of the exact sciences the only 
form for comprehending reality. For Croce, the sciences are free from values, they do 
not consider them and this is their strength. Indeed, science is unable to provide 
values precisely because in this field the question of values is irrelevant.78
Croce’s target is the blind transposition of the scientific method onto the 
‘sciences of the spirit’, which creates ‘abstract philosophies’:
II distacco che vi si compie della filosofia dalla scienza non e distacco 
da do  che nella scienza e verace conoscere ... e percio e, nel tempo 
stesso un ricongiungimento con quanto vi ha di vivo, di concreto e 
progressivo nelle cosidette scienze. E se alia distruzione di qualcosa vi
7 0si mira, cio non e chiaramente altro che la filosofia astratta.
Science and the humanities have different purposes which are interrelated but 
nevertheless distinct. Indeed, it is a big mistake, for Croce,
concepire le scienze naturali, non solo la preparazione, ma addirittura il 
primo abbozzo ... del blocco di marmo che la filosofia ridurra a 
statua. In questa concezione si sacrifica, senz’avvedersene, o 
l’autonomia delle scienze naturali o quella della filosofia; secondo che 
come unico metodo a volta a volta si ponga o quello filosofico o quello 
naturali stico.80
However, this methodological discrimination between humanities and the exact 
sciences does not imply incommensurability between the two:
78‘Nelle scienze lo scopo prevalente e quello deWutilita al quale viene sottomesso ogni altro scopo 
(bellezza, verita, etica, ecc.) mentre nella filosofia-storia lo scopo prevalente e la verita che sussume e 
strumentalizza ogni altro.’ R. Franchini, La teoria della storia di Benedetto Croce (Naples: Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 1988), p. 70.
79Croce, ‘Per la terza edizione’, p.200.
80 Croce, Logica, p.211.
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L’autonomia delle scienze che qui si proclama e loro legittima 
persistenza accanto, o meglio, oltre la filosofia ... viene anche fraintesa 
come un’asserzione della vita separata della filosofia e delle scienze, 
l’una e le altre tra loro indifferenti. Ma, quando si parla di autonomia 
delle scienze ... non si vuole affermare altro se non che le scienze 
rappresentano il momento ... praticamente necessario alio spirito
umano.81
On the one hand philosophy provides a series of critical reflections on the procedures 
of the sciences, focusing on the historical, ideological, and cultural dimensions on
which the latter are based; on the other hand the schematic procedures of the sciences
are an essential component for a coherent classification of knowledge and have to be 
used in disciplines like linguistics and philology:
Le scienze naturalistiche del linguaggio e dell’arte, della morale, del 
diritto, dell’economia ... non sono semplicemente il cosidetto stadio 
empirico delle corrispondenti discipline filosofiche, ma persistono e 
persisteranno sempre accanto alle filosofiche perche rendono servigi 
non surrogabili. Non c’e filosofia del linguaggio, dell’arte, che possa 
scacciare dal seggio che loro spetta ... la grammatica, la fonetica, la 
morfologia, la sintassi, la metrica, con le loro categorie empiriche ... o 
che sia in grado eliminare le classificazioni dei generi artistici o 
letterari.82
Far from displaying hostility to the natural sciences, Croce here shows their 
usefulness, even necessity, in the pursuit of the humanities. Hence, his 
epistemological distinction preserves the autonomy of both disciplines allowing 
science to operate on ‘abstract’ models and philosophy to inquire on the nature and 
theories behind them.83
What remained important to Croce, however, was that the humanities should 
not be totally reduced to nothing hut science or its discourses. In other words, 
humanistic disciplines can never be reduced to purely pragmatic concerns. Indeed, 
Croce observed that all attempts to transpose the scientific method to the humanities
81 Croce, ‘Noterelle’, p. 380. Italics mine.
82 Croce, Logica, p.212.
83 Francesco Barone ignored the caution with which Croce discussed the role of the sciences within the 
humanities and maintained that ‘Cio che non convince dell’epistemologia crociana e soprattutto la 
messa al bando della verita dall’ambito della scienza, e in genere la netta contrapposizione tra la 
categoria del’utile e quella del vero. In realta ... le due categorie non sono esclusive l ’una dell’altra.’ F. 
Barone, ‘Croce e la scienza’, Mondoperaio, 11 (1982), pp. 77-83 (p.77).
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had ended up in their impoverishment.84 In reality, what was lost in this operation of 
reductionism was precisely the peculiar understanding of the humanities; subjects like 
history, literature and the arts in general had to be dealt with by different methods.
84‘L’ultimo cospicuo esempio storico di empirismo, quello che da Augusto Comte prese il nome di 
positivismo, professo chiaramente il disegno di ridurre la filosofia a nient’altro che a una 
classificazione, la quale ... sarebbe andata ... dall’astratto via via al meno astratto, senza mai per altro 
attingere il concreto. II positivismo pareva non avvedersi che i fatti, sui quali pretendeva di lavorare ... 
erano gia determinazioni filosofiche, e solo in virtu della filosofia potevano essere ammessi come fatti 
positivV. Croce, Logica p. 242.
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3.4 NARRATION, LOGIC AND HISTORY
It has already been suggested that Croce’s division into ‘modes’ (aesthetic, logical, 
economic and ethical) can be viewed as an epistemological endeavour to be open to 
history in its complexity, in its multifaceted levels and manifestations. Here history is 
sometimes considered as an object (in the form of historical events perceived by the 
historian) or as a narrative (historiography). Thus, Crocean epistemology applies to 
both the historical events and its narrative.
The conversion of history into historical narrative required a sophisticated 
apparatus, and the fourfold division into ‘modes’ had its raison d'etre in explaining 
and articulating both history itself and the historical narrative in a non-reductive way 
or, to use Croce’s terminology, with an antimetaphysical method. It is important to 
underline once again that Croce’s aim was to devise an open epistemology o f history, 
not a metaphysics of historical ‘reality’. In this respect the emphasis on historicism as 
the ultimate truth has been as misleading as the strictly idealistic reading of Croce’s
OC t
thought. There are, of course, blind spots in Croce’s philosophical undertaking, 
particularly when, writing the Estetica, Logica and Pratica, he ‘borrowed’ some terms 
from the idealistic tradition. However, deeper analysis reveals that the philosopher 
was mainly concerned with a liberation of history from metaphysics.
In his first characterization of historical narrative, the dissertation of 1893, 
Croce had focused on its rhetorical side, classifying history as an art and focusing on 
the intrinsic subjectivity of all historical accounts. After reading Marx the 
‘ideological’ element in history began to emerge. The ‘historical emplotment’, to use 
Hayden White’s term, was not only driven by rhetoric but also by ‘interest’, or rather 
groups of ‘interests’ which produced in turn different kinds of historiography. 
However, at this stage, Croce was still lacking the appropriate epistemic framework 
into which he could fit these important reflections.
The solution to which Croce came was the epistemic division into ‘modes’ of 
philosophy first sketched in the Estetica. Croce had realized by now that history and 
historiography could not be reduced to any of these ‘modes’, but that it was the result 
of their combination. His subsequent works would concentrate on these different
85 Much as I admire David D. Roberts’ work I cannot agree with his view when he maintains that 
‘Croce was audacious enough to identify history with God. History in other words, is the ultimate 
reality, or absolute.’ Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p. 181. We will see that Croce’s ‘storicismo assoluto’ 
does not imply the reduction of all cultural manifestations to history. Instead, it refers to the historical 
component present in culture.
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‘modes’. However, we should not forget that the distinction into ‘modes’ was 
accompanied, corroborated, and corrected by a series of original and specific studies 
on history and literary criticism. These studies raised important theoretical questions 
relating to the nature of history and art and, despite the opinion of many interpreters, 
they do not form an a comprhensive system of thought but rather a series of 
‘incursions’ into the theory of specific disciplines as Croce made clear in 1915:
Quando, terminato che ebbi di pubblicare la Filosofia dello Spirito, 
molti m ’invitavano al riposo, perche (dicevano) avevo compiuto il mio 
‘sistema’, io sapevo che in realta non avevo compiuto ne chiuso nulla, 
ma solamente scritto alcuni volumi intomo ai problemi accumulatisi
• R  f i... sin dagli anni della giovinezza.
This does not imply, of course, that Croce did not possess a clear sense of the aims 
and purpose of his research; it simply reveals that the philosopher did not have a pre­
conceived path to follow. In this sense, Croce’s alleged idealism can be considered 
functional. Moreover, in this view, the Filosofia dello Spirito ceases to be the rock 
upon which the ‘Crocean system’ was built and becomes rather the springboard for 
further research and ‘svolgimenti’.
In the Estetica Croce’s main concern was to establish the importance of art 
and find a method for literary criticism, hence the references to history and 
historiography are rather scant. Nevertheless, we can find some essential 
developments on the nature o f narrative in history and the work of the historian. Here 
the historical account is not conceived of as a naive collection of ‘facts’ or ‘causes’ 
but rather an articulate ‘narration’ of the past:
Chiunque non sia semplice raccoglitore di fatti slegati, mero 
ricercatore, o incoerente cronista, non pud non mettere insieme la pm 
piccola narrazione di fatti umani se non possiede un suo criterio 
determinato, un proprio convincimento circa il concetto dei fatti di cui 
assume di narrare la storia. Dall’ammasso confuso e discordante dei 
fatti bruti non si sale all’opera d’arte storica se non merce 
quest’appercezione, che rende possibile ritagliare in quella mole rude e 
indigesta una rappresentazione pensata.87
86 Croce, Contribute, p.65. Italics mine.
87 Croce, Estetica, p. 169. Italics mine.
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The ‘rappresentazione pensata’ here indicated the use of a rhetorical level and a 
logical one in narrating history. The nature of this logical level was still to be 
specified, but Croce’s emphasis was on the imaginative and narrative constraints to 
which history, as a form of realistic depiction, is subject.
Furthermore, Croce reiterated the importance of subjectivity in the historical 
account and the absurdity of the notion of a ‘pure historian’:
Non possiamo estenderci nel dimostrare la necessita e l’indefettibilta di 
questo criterio soggettivo ... in ogni narrazione delle opere e vicende 
umane. Basta leggere un qualsiasi libro di storia per scoprire subito il 
pensiero dell’autore, se questi e tale che sia degno del nome di storico 
e conosca l’arte sua. Vi sono storici liberali e storici reazionari, 
razionalisti e cattolici, per cio che riguarda la storia politica e sociale; 
storici metafisici, empiristi, scettici, idealisti, spiritualisti, per quanto 
riguarda la storia della filosofia: storici puramente storici non ve ne 
sono e non ve ne possono essere88.
The new element introduced by Croce with respect to ‘subjectivity’ treated in the 
1893 dissertation is its ideological nature which is recognized as a fundamental part 
of historical narration. The empirical-analytical approach to history did not take into 
account the great importance of these elements in historiography. However, for Croce, 
historians are not scientists, in the sense of providing definitive certainties or 
formulas. Historiography itself, for Croce, is a continuous reassessment of the past in 
the light of the present. It is clear at this stage that in Croce the emphasis was on the 
construction of the narrative of history rather than on the documents, the ‘hard
evidence’ of the historian-scientist. This, does not, for Croce, diminish the
• • 80  importance, in general terms, of historical validation.
In his famous critique of the philosophy of Hegel, Cio che e vivo e cid che e
morto della filosofia di Hegel, published in 1906, Croce, criticizing the panlogism of
the German philosopher’s conception of history, returned to this point:
La storia diversamente dall’arte presuppone il pensiero filosofico quale 
sua condizione; ma come l’arte ha il suo materiale nell’elemento
88 Ibid., pp. 169-70.
89 See Croce, Teoria e storia: ‘parlare di una storia, della quale non si posseggano i documenti, 
sembrera tanto stravagante quanto parlare dell’esistenza di una cosa qualsiasi, della quale si afferma 
insieme che manca una delle condizioni essenziali della sua esistenza ... Una storia senza relazione con 
il documento sarebbe una storia inverificabile. ’ p. 6.
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intuitivo. Per cio la storia e sempre narrazione e non mai teoria o 
sistema.90
Indeed, for Croce, if we have a preconceived scheme of history we end up with a 
philosophy of history, which is ‘il disconoscimento della storiografia a beneficio 
dell’astratta filosofia.’91 This is the main flaw of Hegel’s philosophy:
Hegel doveva porre, e pose, l’idea di una filosofia della storia ... Che 
questa storiografia filosofica debba avere metodo proprio, diverso dal 
metodo della storiografia ordinaria, Hegel afferma rivendicandole il 
carattere di costruzione a priori. Senonche Ya priori ... e ... una 
storia bell’e compiuta che ha bisogno soltanto di essere rivestita di 
nomi e date.92
The ‘living part’ of Hegel’s philosophy was, for Croce, the discovery of 
dialectic as a form of logic which, divested of any form of teleology, could be 
fruitfully applied to historiography. Indeed, in Croce, logic consisted in exploring the 
sense of the four ‘modes’, or levels, defining the historical process leaving aside any 
eschatology or final synthesis, whereas in Hegel logic became the movement which 
replaces reality with a pre-determined scheme of history. Thus, ‘Hegel prima di 
cercare la realta di fatto sa gia quale questa deve essere.’93 We will see that Croce’s 
antimetaphysical attitude towards ‘historical systems’ and the consequences for the 
historical narration would have more radical developments in Teoria e Storia della 
Storiografia (1915).
The nature of the logical ‘mode’ was thoroughly explored by Croce in the 
Logica (1909, definitive edition):
Senza l’elemento logico, non e possibile nemmeno affermare che il piu 
piccolo, il piu volgare caso, pertinente alia nostra vita individuale e 
accaduto: che io mi sono levato stamane alle otto o che ho fatto 
colazione alle dodici, perche (per non dir altro) queste proposizioni 
storiche importano il concetto dell’esistenza o effettualita, e 1’altro 
correlativo della inesistenza o possibility, onde nell’affermarle si nega 
insieme che io abbia solamente sognato di levarmi alle otto o di far 
colazione alle dodici.94
90 Croce, Cid che e vivo e cid che e morto, p.89. Italics mine.
91 Ibid., p.91.
92 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
93 Ibid., p.93.
94 Croce, Logica, p. 182.
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The main notion in the Logica, however, is that concerning the formal identity 
between philosophical and historical judgements.95 Here Croce aimed to provide the 
epistemological foundations for understanding history and historiography which, he 
believed, were different from those of the physical and natural sciences. Whenever 
we make use of a concept, Croce maintained, we use it within the historical 
framework in which this concept is created:
La domanda, il problema, il dubbio e sempre individualmente 
condizionato: ... il dubbio di un tedesco dell’anno 1800 non e quello di 
un tedesco delTanno 1900.96
Understanding a concept in its full meaning implies a knowledge of the cultural and 
social structures in which it has its roots. It is therefore important to understand that 
the concepts and categories with which we think are not eternal forms of 
understanding separated from our daily experience, but on the contrary they are 
informed by our historical condition. This is a crucial difference between Kant and 
Croce. Indeed, in the German philosopher basic concepts and categories are entirely a 
priori, independent of history and experience, whereas with Croce they are created in 
a given time, society and culture:
In effetto, una proposizione filosofica o definizione ... nasce dalla 
mente di un determinato individuo, in un determinato punto del tempo 
e dello spazio e tra condizioni determinate', ed e percio sempre 
storicamente condizionata. Senza le condizioni storiche che pongono 
la domanda un sistema non sarebbe quello che e. La filosofia kantiana 
non si poteva avere al tempo di Pericle, perche presuppone, per non dir 
altro, la scienza esatta della natura, svoltasi dal Rinascimento in poi, 
come questa le scoperte geografiche, Tindustria, la civilta capitalistica 
o borghese, e via discorrendo: e presuppone ancora, lo scetticismo di 
Davide Hume, il quale a sua volta presuppone il deismo dei principi 
del secolo ottavo, che a sua volta rimanda alle lotte religiose dei secoli 
decimosesto e decimo settimo.97
95 It is important to stress that Croce did not intend to reduce philosophy to history. Indeed, he 
maintained that, ‘Affermare l ’etema natura storica di ogni filosofia ... e imporre al filosofo “di scrivere 
(materialmente) libri di storia”, mi pare che siano due cose diverse, e la seconda puerile.’ In other 
words Croce intended to deny ‘un concetto di filosofia che sia mero sforzo verso l ’universale astratto: 
proposizione religiosa, questa, ma non critica.’ B. Croce, ‘Che cos’e la filosofia?’, La Critica, n. iii, 
(1922), pp. 125-28 (p. 127).
96 Croce, Logica, p. 127.
97 Ibid., p .184. Italics mine. This is not to deny the statements in section 3.2 that to Croce ‘intuition’ 
was an ‘a priori’ mode of cognition. The point that is being made is in relation to the content o f basic 
notions, even o f space and time, which Croce was more inclined to accept as historically conditioned.
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Croce rejected all absolutes. In this respect, classic idealism and empiricism 
were both impracticable for providing a correct understanding of the historical 
process. The knowledge we possess, the concepts we utilize, cannot be elucidated 
either as mere reflections of the external world, nor as rising above experience. 
Instead, Croce suggested, it is history, namely the society, culture, the totality of 
practices and customs of a given period, which sustain and form our concepts and 
make it possible to use them. For Croce, when a philosophy fails to deliver an 
understanding of this historical reality it becomes ‘senza applicazione’ or ‘infeconda’:
C’e una pietra di paragone, ossia puo indicarsi un segno estemo, un 
indizio che aiuti a far riconoscere l’indirizzo filosofico schietto e 
valido, tra i molti spurii e inconcludenti. Questa pietra di paragone e la 
Storia. Perche ogni storia ha per suo presupposto e condizione il 
pensiero filosofico. Ogni filosofia deve sboccare nella storia, cioe dar 
l’intelligenza della realta concreta e viva, la quale e e non puo non 
essere, realta storica. Quando una filosofia rimane staccata dai fatti, 
indifferente ad essi, impotente a dominarli, o come comunemente si 
dice senza applicazione; e da sospettare, con buon fondamento, che 
quella filosofia abbia un grosso difetto d’origine, cagione di quella 
infecondita.98
With the definition of concepts as historical formations, Croce aimed to avoid a 
purely speculative conception of philosophy remote from the problems of the present, 
and insisted that
bisogna conoscere il significato dei problemi del proprio tempo; il che 
importa conoscere anche quelli del passato per non iscambiare gli uni 
con gli altri e dar luogo ad un’impervia confusione."
This ‘hermeneutical’ operation, in Croce, involved taking all disciplines as 
historical formations. Thus,
bisognera conoscere anche le scienze naturali, fisiche, matematiche ... 
in quanto conoscenze storiche circa lo stato delle scienze naturali, della 
fisica, della matematica, per intendere i problemi filosofici che 
concorrono a suscitare.100
98 Croce, ‘La pietra di paragone delle filosofie’, La Critica, i, (1908), pp. 155-57. (p.155).
99 B. Croce, Logica, p. 186.
100 Ibid.
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However, the formal identity between historical and philosophical judgements did not 
simply mean that there is no understanding of facts or experiences without the 
necessary historical foundations. Croce’s proposal was meant to demonstrate an 
identity between the defining of any judgement and its historical elucidation. For 
Croce, all judgements are ontologically historical.101 Above all, this identity implied a 
firm rejection of ‘timeless philosophies’. Indeed, whenever we make a judgement, for 
Croce, this judgement communicates in concrete the ‘logic’, or rationale, of the world 
in which it is expressed. In this sense it can be defined as historical. Our present 
aesthetic, analytical, economic and ethical references form the framework in which 
judgments are articulated. We can say that the logic we use to judge now relies on the 
current concepts and categories which are linked to our cultural and social interactions 
in the present. The interdependence between theory and history, ideas and facts 
implies a theory of knowledge in which both aspects are taken into account.
The acknowledgment of a logic relative to a certain period of time was in 
sharp contrast with the neo-Kantian conception of changeless ‘patterns’ forming the 
structure of our understanding. Conversely, for Croce, the concepts we employ can be 
explained in their full meaning only if they are related to their historical context. 
Thus,
l’etemita di ogni preposizione filosofica ... e da negare quando si
intenda come fantastico isolamento dalle condizioni storiche, e
102affermare bisogna invece la relativita di ogni filosofia.
Since concepts and historical context are interrelated we cannot isolate only 
one aspect. We need to understand the concept in its relation to the historical context 
in which it was created. Indeed, it is in the historical paradigm with its ‘modes’ that 
we can find the elements to analyze a given period. Moreover, for Croce, a historical 
period, a thought, a new tradition, is always reacting to its historical or ideologically 
constructed predecessor. Historicity and dialectic are the main structural features of
101Croce rejected the Kantian distinction between analytical and synthetic judgements maintaining that 
analytical judgements (mathematical operations and so forth) do not supply us knowledge but control 
over reality. They are both useful and indispensable tools. However, ‘i giudizi di valore, in quanto 
veramente giudizi, coincidono coi giudizi individuali o storici’. Croce, Logica, p. 338. Croce’s 
distinction between pure and empirical concepts (or ‘pseudoconcetti’) aimed to stress the difference 
between ‘historical’ judgements, which give us a deeper knowledge o f reality, and procedures such as 
mathematical operations which have an instrumental purpose in the investigation.
102 Croce, Logica, p. 189.
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the concepts we use. The four ‘modes’ are an essential tool for discriminating and 
therefore understanding the various strands of the historical process. If, for instance, 
we are examining slavery in ancient Greece we need to know what were the 
categories through which the idea, or concept, of slavery was thought. In other words, 
the historian has to investigate the rhetorical, the rational, the practical and the ethical 
drives behind the emergence of this concept, focussing also on the polemical 
intentions that all discourses reveal. Years later, in II carattere della filosofia 
moderna, Croce specified:
La prima regola per interpretare una proposizione filosofica e di 
domandarsi contro chi o contro che cosa polemicamente si rivolga, e 
quale ‘angoscia’ ha superata o si e sforzata di superare. Fuori di questa 
seria interpretazione storica, anche le teorie dei filosofi prendono, al 
pari dei sistemi delle metafisiche, aspetto di una sequela di asserzioni 
vacue e senza significato e Tuna e l’altra contrastanti ... e lo 
scetticismo si asside nel cumulo delle sue rovine, ridendo del suo riso 
insulso.103
It should be clear, by now, that when Croce used the term ‘concept’ he did not 
refer to a kind of transcendent component of understanding. Croce did not assume a 
pre-existing ideal reality, a universal model for individual and society. On the 
contrary he made clear that
ogni concetto non esiste altrimenti che in quanto e pensato e chiuso in 
parole, ossia in quanto e definito, e, se le definizioni variano anche il
104concetto vana.
However, the historical flexibility of concepts does not jeopardize their heuristic value 
since
ammessa la condizionalita individuale e storica di ogni pensamento del 
concetto ossia di ogni definizione (condizionalita donde si origina il 
dubbio, problema, la domanda a cui la definizione risponde) si deve 
ammettere altresi che la definizione, la quale contiene la risposta e 
afferma il concetto, nel fare cio illumini sempre quella condizionalita 
individuale e storica, quel gruppo di fatti da cui essa sorge.105
103 Croce, II carattere, p.22.
104 Ibid., p. 127.
105 Croce, Logica, p. 128.
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Croce maintained that concepts cannot totally encapsulate the complexity of 
history, they rather guide us through its maze of interpretations. Hence, concepts 
represent the indispensable tools through which history is interpreted. Moreover, the 
distinction between pure and empirical concepts allowed Croce to distinguish two 
different functions relating to our understanding, one evaluative-normative106 and the 
other distinctively practical. In other words, within the realm of concepts we can 
differentiate one set concerned with norms and values from another set connected 
with practice (in Crocean terms: concetti puri and pseudoconcetti). The first group of 
concepts can be considered the theoretical and ethical kernel of the historical 
interpretation, the second the analytical -  empirical component. Consequently the 
‘concetti puri’ form our normative and ethical views whereas the ‘pseudoconcetti’ 
freeze them in an epistemological structure. Thus, the fluidity of the relation between 
norms, values and practices reflects that of thought and action.
The broader consequences of this conception would appear in the later 
developments of Croce’s thought. However, at this stage, it is fundamental to 
distinguish between Croce’s insight on the connection between logic and history and
ththe misleading connections some contemporary critics have made between 19 
century historicism and that of Croce.107
In the Logica Croce made the historical dimension the central concern of 
philosophical thought. Indeed, for Croce, it is in constant dialogue with the past 
evoked in the present that one finds the rationale of the historical account. If, on the 
one hand, this notion reiterated Croce’s firm refutation of all metaphysical views, on 
the other hand it rejected the shifting sands of philosophical skepticism. In reality, the 
historization of concepts did not deny the possibility of knowledge; it simply denied 
the conception of an ultimate and eternal Truth to which our intellectual endeavors 
have to conform. In Contributo alia critica di me stesso Croce maintained:
106 In the distinction Croce made between ‘pure concepts’ and ‘pseudoconcepts’, the former do not 
consist simply o f theoretical judgements but include the value-laden components of cognition (the 
‘morale’ and the ‘bello’).
107 Pietro Rossi is perhaps the most illustrious contemporary exponent o f the opposite view: 
‘Ricondotta nell’ambito della “filosofia dello spirito” la teoria crociana della storiografia si fonda su 
una concezione della storia di derivazione hegeliana ... la logica della storia diventa, in tal modo, una 
logica prowidenzialistica e assume la funzione di teodicea.’ P. Rossi, ‘Croce e la storia’, Mondoperaio, 
35 (1982), pp. 109-15 (p. 109). See also Rossi’s section ‘Benedetto Croce e lo storicismo assoluto in 
Storia e storicismo nella filosofia contemporanea (Milan: II Saggiatore, 1991), pp.222-61.
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La verita non si lascia legare una volta per tutte ... Posto il concetto di
* • • • • • • ] 0 8una verita extrastorica, lo scetticismo e inevitabile e invincibile.
History is central in Croce because it is never written definitively. It is in the 
constant dialogue with the past that one finds the reasons for facing and building the 
future. However, Croce’s position was not a relativist one as some critics have 
claimed.109 If one understands his notion correctly one finds that the relativity of 
views as history develops is a resource and not a problem. The real problem, for 
Croce, was rather the ‘perfect’ account of history, the obsession
di ridurre la storia a scienza .. cioe di fare ch’essa sia in modo perfetto 
quello che ora sarebbe solo in modo imperfetto: classificazione e 
statistica della realta.110
This would lead to an unacceptable form of determinism which would ossify history 
into a sort of schematized account of the past, ‘sostituendo alia narrazione individua 
l’esibizione di pallidi schemi e vuote astrazioni, che si adattano a tutte o parecchie eta 
insieme.’111
Moreover, the ‘scientific selection’ based on pre-conceived and timeless schemes 
to be applied to all ages encourages the pernicious distinction between ‘relevant’ and 
‘irrelevant’ facts in history:
Si e anche affermata ... l’importanza della distinzione tra awenimenti 
storici e awenimenti non degni di storia, personaggi storici e non 
storici ... Ma non e da credere che ... quegli individui e awenimenti 
vengano soppressi, non diciamo nel campo della realta (che sarebbe 
troppo manifestamente assurdo) ma in quello del racconto della realta 
... Cosi abbiamo veduto la vita domestica e sociale trascurata dai 
vecchi storici, non solo acquistare a poco a poco rilievo, ma gettare 
nell’ombra le guerre e i negoziati diplomatici; le cosidette ‘masse’, 
trascurate a pro dell’individuo geniale, riavanzarsi facendo quasi 
sparire nel loro ampio grembo gli eroi ... Esempi di codeste 
fluttuazioni offfe anche la recente storiografia italiana, che nel periodo 
del Risorgimento giudico sommamente importanti, e per eccellenza 
storici, la formazione delle nazionalita, il costituirsi delle borghesie e
108 Croce, Contributo, pp. 61 and 63.
109 See M. Mandelbaum, The Problem o f Historical Knowledge: an Answer to Relativism (New York: 
Liveright Publishing Company, 1938), pp. 17-82 and 166-74. Mandelbaum considers Croce, along with 
Dilthey and Manheim, a relativist. The extent to which Croce’s views can be considered relativist will 
be discussed in depth in chapter five.
110 Croce, Logica, p. 181.
1,1 Ibid.
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dei comuni, le ribellioni delle popolazioni contro gli stranieri o contro i 
tiranni; e, ora, sotto l’efficacia del moto socialistico, si e volta di 
preferenza ai fatti economici, alle lotte di classe, alle ribellioni 
proletarie.112
All ‘grand discourses’ in other words, are ultimately reductionist. Judgements 
about the relevance or irrelevance of facts, Croce would specify later, are dictated by 
the ‘spiritual interests’ of an epoch, namely by the relation of the present with past.
Our analysis of Croce’s epistemology of history has taken us to the core of his 
antimetaphysical method. We have shown that the received perception of the 
‘filosofia dello spirito’ as a grandiose project is misconceived and that it should, 
instead, be interpreted as an epistemic tool to be applied to historical narrative. 
Indeed, the philosopher’s division into ‘modes’ was the heuristic device that he 
employed to avoid reductionism in historiography.
We have also seen that for Croce history is an open process to be narrated 
through historiography. Historiography itself was not a simple process for Croce, but 
the result of a rigorous critique of the devices through which it is expressed. Thus we 
cannot agree with Roberts who maintains that ‘Croce was vague about the mechanism 
of interaction between the questioning historian and the particular chunk of historical
1 1 0
reality that his answers illuminate’. Nor can we agree that Croce did not say much 
about historical narrative. Narrative was so central in Croce’s reflections on history 
that it was the problem which triggered his early dissertation and led him to devise a 
non-reductive epistemological approach to historiography.114 In effect, Croce’s 
philosophy was an attempt to offer more suitable narratives for the complexity of 
‘reality’.
We approach the external world with a historical baggage which is ‘spiritual’, 
namely a cultural construction which has been handed down to us throughout time. 
Whenever we attempt a historical narrative we need to take into account the various 
‘modes’ in which the culture of the period under scrutiny is transmitted. In order to 
make a meaningful account we need to explore the reception of these ‘modes’ in the 
period. This exploration does not occur through a kind of uncanny empathy or
112 Ibid., p. 182.
113 Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p. 160.
U4‘While R.G. Collingwood and others talked about “complex stories”, Croce seemed to imply that 
everything on this level was self-evident, even that the historian relies simply on linear narrative which 
is itself unproblematic.’ Ibid, p. 162.
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Erlebnis with the chosen historical time as in Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians: the 
historicism which requires the historian to divest himself of the culture of his age is 
engaging in a fiction, since the manner of any attempt to do so would be governed by 
the very framework of the culture which enables any historian to think at all. Our 
reflections on history are necessarily conducted through a continuous critical 
assessment of the past in the light of the cultural (Croce would use the word 
‘spiritual’) needs of the present. We already know that these ‘needs’ are not, for 
Croce, only of an economic nature, but also aesthetic, logical and ethical. History, in 
its double aspect of res gestae and historia rerum gestarum, needs to be understood in 
its complexity.
The philosophy o f the spirit was not an attempt to create an idealist system o f  
interpretation. To treat Croce’s ‘trilogy’ in this way is to ignore his to ignore his 
repeated assertions to the contrary about his intentions. It is, in effect, to see his 
enterprise as the creation of a metaphysics which he never tired of denouncing.
Another aspect of Croce’s antimetaphysical stance was his methodological 
defiance of attempts to deal with transcendental issues. Philosophy does not deal with 
‘eternal truths’ but accepts that the very fabric of our concepts is in constant historical 
flux.
Moreover, the aknowledgement of the historical value of concepts brought 
Croce to devise an epistemology in which exact sciences play an instrumental role, 
namely they are concerned with effectiveness more than truth. Nevertheless exact 
sciences play a crucial role in historiography. We have also seen that his position on 
the sciences, far from being a relic of nineteeth century thought, as many detractors of 
Croce maintain, was, in reality, in tune with the main developments of contemporary 
science. Teoria e Storia della Storiografia and La Storia come pensiero e come azione 
would go on to clarify the practical implications of these ideas and of the other 
components of Croce’s antimetaphisical posture we have so far introduced.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BREAKING THROUGH THE ‘SYSTEM’
4.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN CROCE’S CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 
(1915-1925)
The aim of this section is to provide a brief description of Croce’s intellectual life 
during the years between the beginning of the Great War and the advent of Fascism in 
Italy and slightly beyond. The analysis of this decade is crucial to an understanding of 
the developments of Croce’s theory of history in the light of the dramatic events 
which completely changed the political and intellectual map of Europe. In this context 
the philosopher had to face new questions which forced him to develop and partly 
reorientate his reflections on history and historiography.
The period from 1915 to 1925 is characterized by an ‘approfondimento’ of the 
practical side of historiography, namely its relation to ethics, politics and power. This 
is generally known as the ethico-political phase of Croce. Both the ethical and 
political elements became essential for the construction of historical narrative. Croce 
insisted on the interdependence of ethics and politics although he carefully 
distinguished their spheres of application. Within the ethico-political perspective 
history assumed a more pragmatic dimension, namely it was not simply confined to 
the field of pure speculation but historiography had to confront the world of which it 
became interpreter. In this period, as Stuart Hughes put it, in Croce ‘activity and 
theory, history writing and philosophical elaboration, were inextricably entangled’.1
The year 1915 marked a decisive phase in Croce’s thought. He felt the need to 
stop and think about his intellectual career as historian and literary critic as well as 
‘philosopher’. The result was an open intellectual autobiography, Contributo alia 
critica di me stesso which represented in the author’s own words ‘una sorta di 
“hquidazione del passato’” . We have already seen that Croce’s private life had been 
deeply affected by the death of his twenty-year partner in 1912. In 1914 he married 
Adele Rossi, a high school teacher from Turin. 1915 also marked Italy’s entry into the 
Great War, when, ‘comincio a farsi chiaro che con la guerra europea si era entrati in 
una nuova epoca storica.’3 This ‘new historical epoch’, despite the common view
1 Hughes, Consciousness and Society, p. 215.
2 Croce, Contributo, p.69.
3 Ibid.
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which sees Croce isolated in a sort of fatalistic aloofness, was lived by the 
philosopher in great trepidation. If we browse through his correspondence we can see 
the apprehension with which the philosopher followed the dramatic events. In a letter 
to Prezzolini, for instance, Croce wrote:
Non mi uniro a coloro che confondono i loro vecchi odii giolittiani col 
problema gravissimo delle decisioni che l’ltalia staper prendere ... Se 
si decide la guerra, saro tra quei molti italiani che appresteranno il loro 
animo alia nuova situazione e faranno quello che potranno. Ma non 
vorrei rimproverarmi di aver aiutato a provocarla.4
Another insight into Croce’s feelings during this turbulent period comes from a letter 
to his friend Andrea Torre:
Tutto il mondo sul quale e col quale ho lavorato vacilla e minaccia di 
crollare ... la mente e paralizzata, il cuore contratto.5
These words do not match the picture of Olympian philosopher whose theory of 
history was supposed to transcend ‘the moral and political horizons of the 
individuals.’6 Croce felt very deeply the responsibilities of the man of culture and the 
Italian citizen. This was the reason why he was not prepared to confuse the two levels. 
Hence, we cannot maintain with Gramsci, Bobbio, and other interpreters that Croce’s 
attitude towards the war was a detached one. His neutralist position was dictated by a 
genuine concern for the fate of his country. In his private correspondance we find him 
stating:
Non e lecito lasciar correre e credere alle favole circa la barbarie 
germanica, perche le favole non giovano alio spirito di un popolo ... 
Non e ... lecito neppure seguire gli impulsi dei socialisti rivoluzionari 
o dei repubblicani che vogliono una Guerra con 1’Austria non per
n
ragioni nazionali ma per fare la rivoluzione in Italia.
4 Letter dated 16th May 1915, in Croce, Epistolario /, p.5.
5 Croce, Epistolario I, letter to Andrea Torre 8th November 1917, p. 17. See also the letter to Professor 
Vitello dated 25th November 1915: ‘La leggenda della mia impassibility e una leggenda. Io procuro di 
non perdere la testa: ecco tutto. E nondimeno cio mi e costato e mi costa sforzi dolororosi.’ Ibid., p. 18.
6 G. Bedani, ‘The anti-populist politics o f Croce’s religione della liberta’, Italian Studies, 35 (1980), 
pp. 81-97, (p.81)
7 Letter to Professor Henry Bigot, 25th Dicember 1914, Croce, Epistolario I, p.3.
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We already know that Croce had held a neutralist position and was now 
increasingly concerned about the rising nationalism, and the hostility towards the 
Germans. From the pages of La Critica and other periodicals, such as II Giornale 
dItalia  and L ’Unita, Croce began to ‘combattere l’aizzamento dei popoli l’uno contro 
l’altro’ in an attempt to calm the overheated Italian public opinion. In ‘L’entrata in 
guerra e il dovere degli studiosi’, published in May 1915, Croce reported:
Storcere la verita e improwisare dottrine ... non sono servigi resi alia 
patria, ma disdoro recato alia patria che deve contare sulla serieta dei 
suoi scienziati ... Lo scienziato non deve entrare in gara con le 
passioni, quando sono intente all’opera loro di creare fantasmi di 
amore e di odio.8
Croce’s main concern, during this critical time, was to distinguish political 
propaganda from culture in opposition to a nationalist fever which tended to merge 
the two:
Abbiamo ... adempiuto altrove, come potevamo, l’ufficio di cittadini, 
propugnando tesi politiche e rendendo quei servigi che credevamo di 
poter rendere; e forse, altrove, piu volte, ci siamo lasciati andare anche 
noi alle immaginazioni, e perfino al chiacchierare; ma ci siamo ben 
guardati di fare di questa rivista, consacrata alia scienza, la tribuna del 
nostro patriottismo.
We have already described how the frenzied responses to the war, from both 
the nationalist front and the majority of the socialists, was perceived by Croce as a 
worrying sign of intellectual disorientation which could lead to ruinous outcomes. The 
rising nationalism, which tended to blow the history and the role of Italy in the 
European continent out of proportion, was harshly criticized by Croce from the pages 
of La Critica and other papers. To the myth of an Italian state which harked back to 
Roman glory the philosopher opposed the history of a young nation with a very short 
liberal-democratic life:
In modo contrario ai pregiudizi e alle parole tradizionali della 
storiografia corrente, e tuttavia in modo non discordante dalla comune
8 Croce, Pagine sulla guerra, pp. 54-55.
9 Ibid., p.55. Hughes has justly remarked that Croce ‘strove to maintain intact the idea of an 
international community o f scholars and to combat the tendency among the intellectuals o f the warring 
nations to fall prey to the passion o f the masses.’ Hughes, Consciousness and Society, p.214.
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coscenza, ... la storia della nostra Italia e una storia non antica e 
secolare, ma recente, non strepitosa, ma modesta, non radiosa ma 
stentata.10
Indeed, the philosopher was aware of the critical phase that the fragile Italian 
democracy was going through. Despite the pervasive propaganda, Italy’s political 
weight on the European continent could not be compared to that of Germany, France, 
or Britain. Nationalist rhetoric, instigated by D’Annunzio, Corradini, Papini, and the 
like, claimed that Italy had a long and prestigious history going back to Roman times. 
Croce maintained, instead, that Italian history was
storia di un secolo e mezzo, a farla lunga: storia recente. E come si fa a 
vedere nella fisionomia italiana odiema i tratti dominanti della 
romanita, del borghesismo medievale e dell’uomo del Rinascimento?11
This vision of the fledgling Italian state at the beginning of its precarious but lively 
democratic life, was in tune with Croce’s inherently anti-rhetorical conception of 
history and politics and did not change when Fascism promoted the image of a new 
empire directly descended from the Romans. Croce’s major preoccupation was the 
‘distinzione’ between concepts, which help us to read events in a constructive way, 
and avoid empty rhetoric. This attitude required a sharper critique of the methods of 
philosophy, history and their purposes. Indeed, with the Great War, for Croce, the old 
conception of philosophy as a grand discourse which aimed to explained the ‘secret of 
the world’ had definitely crumbled:
Se ... si osservi ... la moltitudine di ansiose domande che ha suscitato 
la grande guerra europea -  sullo Stato, la storia, il diritto, ... la civilta, 
la cultura, la barbarie, la scienza, l’arte, la religiosita, il fine e l’ideale 
della vita ... si acquista la chiarezza sul dovere che spetta ai filosofi di 
uscire dalla cerchia teologico-metafisica, nella quale essi continuano a 
stare rinchiusi.12
At the end of the First World War, after the dreadful carnage and desolation, 
in a letter to the English philosopher Wildon Carr, Croce, reflecting on the general 
disorientation and loss of values of an entire generation, advocated the need for a new
10 Croce, Pagine sulla guerra, p. 137.
11 Ibid., p. 138.
12 Ibid., p. 147.
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kind of ‘lay faith’, devoid of transcendental dreams, to embrace specific and concrete 
problems through a detailed analysis of their historical origin:
Io sono profondamente convinto che la societa modema, e 
specialmente i paesi occidentali hanno bisogno di smettere tutte le 
vaghe e vuote idee che sono traduzioni in linguaggio laico di vedute 
metafisiche e trascendenti, e sforzarsi di conquistare la particolarita.
La cura alia quale devono sottomettersi e la piu acuta distinzione dei 
concetti e il concreto pensamento della realta storica. In cio ...i ^
troveranno la vera e modema forma della religiosita.
For Croce, as for many contemporaries like Husserl and Freud, the crisis involved the 
whole of Western society in its very roots. Croce linked the crisis of Western world 
and its disorientation to a deep-seated lack of historical perspective. The philosopher 
feared that neglecting critical attention to tradition would lead to disastrous 
consequences. The emergence of a new geopolitical situation and the crumbling of the 
old European order required a radical reapprisal of history which, for Croce, was 
crucial for understanding the present and preparing the future. However, we will see 
that Croce was not, in any sense, advocating a sort of return to the ‘good old days’, 
but rather readdressing the question of a new epistemological method which took into 
account the complexity of the past in order to face the present in a more constructive 
way. The true form of ‘lay religiosity’ Croce was referring to consisted of a critical 
analysis of the past in order to face the problems of the present and build a sustainable 
future.
Croce’s cry for an immanent philosophy which would abandon the ‘vedute 
metafisiche e trascendenti’ focusing instead on specific problems was reflected in his 
change of narrative style. After the publication of the second edition of the Logica in 
1909 he preferred the essay form to ‘philosophical treatises’, a series of ‘explorations’ 
in specific fields dictated by the varied interests of his research. Thus, the rejection of 
‘all definitive systems’ was accompanied by an impressive number of specific works 
of literary criticism14 (those on Goethe, Ariosto and Shakespeare are regarded as 
classics of literary criticism) and historiography {Storia della storiografia italiana del
13 Letter addressed to the English philosopher H. Wildon Carr, Naples 18th February 1918, in Croce, 
Epistolario I, p.26.
14 Between 1915 and 1918 Croce published twenty six critical essays in La Critica: on Alfieri, Monti, 
Schiller, Werner, Chamisso, Walter Scott, Foscolo, Leopardi, De Vigny, Manzoni, Berchet, Giusti, 
Heine, George Sand, Feman Caballero, De Musset, Balzac, Baudelaire, Flaubert, Zola, Daudet, Ibsen, 
Maupassant, Mallarme.
151
XIXsecolo, La Spagna durante la vita italiana durante la Rinascenza). Croce’s most 
important theoretical work of this period, Teoria e storia della storiografia, also the 
result of a series of enquiries he conducted in many European journals, was first 
published in German under the title Zur Theorie und Geshichte der Historiographie 
(Tubing: Mohr, 1915).
We have already argued that, from the very start of his career, Croce’s 
intention was not to construct an all-inclusive philosophy but a suitable ‘strumento di 
lavoro’ for his various interests in the fields of history and literary criticism. However, 
Croce himself realized that his Filosofia dello spirito could be interpreted as a 
grandiose venture, and although he would maintain the epistemological division into 
‘modes’, he stopped writing in treatise form. This is the reason why he changed style, 
preferring the form of essays, articles and marginalia to that of treatises. He wanted a 
closer identification between the form of his writing and the epistemology underlying 
historiography and other fields.
The importance of the ‘dissolution’ of systematic thought in favour of a more 
flexible way of dealing with contemporary issues has constantly been underplayed by 
virtually all Crocean critics who prefer an image of a coherent and systematic 
philosopher to a more multifaceted and problematic one.15 Only very recently 
Giuseppe Galasso has pointed to this great neglect of this essential component of 
Croce’s thought:
L’importanza del motivo costituito nello sviluppo dello spirito e del 
pensiero di Croce della dissoluzione del ‘sistema’ e sfiiggito e sfugge 
ancora tuttora alia letteratura su Croce.16
Another element which needs to be discussed is the political engagement of 
Croce between the period following the Great War and the Fascist coup. Croce took 
on for the first time the role of active politician. Indeed, in 1920, at a moment of acute 
crisis for the Italian state, the old Giovanni Giolitti was recalled as Prime Minister.
15 Recently scholars such as Sasso and Maggi have warned against the allegedly disastrous 
consequences o f dismembering Croce’s thought. The philosopher, they maintain, cannot be considered 
outside the idealistic framework through which he is traditionally read. This ‘philological’ attitude is 
typical o f a certain group of Crociani who have, unfortunatlely, developed into something o f a closed 
circle o f ‘faithful’ interpreters, but more akin to a school o f disciples than open hermeneutic 
investigators. See G. Sasso, ‘Croce a pezzi’ in La Repubblica, 1 April 1989 and M. Maggi, ‘Nuove 
prospettive per Croce? Parliamone’ in La critica politica, 3 (1993), pp. 7-16.
16 Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.514.
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Croce, who had been nominated Senator in 1910, was asked to join the Cabinet as 
Minister of Education. In a letter to his German friend Karl Vossler the philosopher 
wrote:
Mi pare di fare con ritardo il servizio militare e di riparare, in parte, a 
una troppo comoda condizione avuta, se non goduta, durante la 
guerra.1
This political ‘parenthesis’ was extremely important for Croce. Indeed it has 
been maintained that
Croce’s public activity sharpened and altered his abstract notion of 
politics, while this in turn reacted on his theoretical view of history. By 
the same token his writing of history itself took a new shape and 
dimension.18
However, despite the importance of Croce’s political ‘parenthesis’, one should be 
careful in drawing too direct a correspondence between his activity as a Senator of the 
Realm, and then of the Republic, and his intellectual pursuits. Too often Croce’s 
personal political choices have been confused with his philosophical stances, creating 
a distorted image of the Italian thinker.
In 1921 Bonomi succeeded Giolitti and Croce’s brief experience as a minister 
came to an end. Sixteen months later Mussolini would seize power. Initially the 
philosopher gave the Fascist regime his endorsement, as he believed that the 
‘revolution’ would invigorate the nation. However, after a period of hesitancy, in 
1925 Croce’s attitude changed into firm opposition. Indeed in his Manifesto degli 
intellettuali antifascisti Croce dissociated himself from the Italian authoritarian 
regime, becoming effectively the moral leader of the opposition. ‘During the four 
years between 1927 ad 1929’, Hughes reported, ‘he repeatedly spoke out against the 
consolidation of the dictatorship.’19 Indeed, the Camera dei deputati had been 
quashed and only a small group of Senators led by Croce dared to raise any form of 
protest.
17 Croce, Carteggio Croce-Vossler, 27 July 1920, p. 273.
18 Hughes, Consciousness and Society, p.215.
19 Ibid., p.216.
153
The period between the First World War and the consolidation of Fascism was 
also the period in which Croce’s ideas were most popular. His insistence on the 
autonomy and immanence of the historical process along with his analysis of the 
relations between ethics, politics and power attracted a large number of young 
admirers from different political positions. We have already remarked how Gramsci, 
Togliatti, Amendola, Gobetti, Ginzburg and Salvemini, to mention only a few, were, 
in one way or another, profoundly influenced by Croce’s views. After the advent of 
Fascism Croce, in tune with his conviction that history is always responding to 
contemporary ‘interests’, would focus on the ethical ‘mode’.
For the next twenty years Croce represented one of the few internal voices of 
dissent in a totalitarian country. Now history came to represent the preservation of 
memory, of all the creative elements, in opposition to the destructive ones. In this 
context liberty became the central component of contemporary concerns. On the one 
hand, Croce readdressed the problem of liberty in the light of a changed situation 
constructing a true ‘rhetoric of freedom’ aimed at resisting the totalitarian regime and 
giving hope to the regime’s opponents from all political parties. On the other hand, he 
insisted on the need to preserve history as a vital form of knowledge in order to 
understand the present and prepare for the future. It is in this context that we need to 
read Croce’s historiographical output of the time.
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4.2 METHODOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, AND TRADITION
The aim of this section is to analyze the clarifications and developments of Croce’s 
antimetaphysical method in Teoria e storia della storiografia. Particular importance is 
given to the philosopher’s discussion of methodology and the incompatibility between 
the forms of knowledge his own produces and metaphysics, and the consequences of 
Croce’s methodological notion in the field of history and historical narrative. The 
antimetaphysical attitude present in Croce’s thought from the very outset of his 
intellectual career had become in Teoria e storia a fully conscious methodology to be 
applied to historiography through the four critical ‘modes’he had earlier explored in 
the ‘filosofia dello spirito’. Through the analysis of the book, it will also be shown 
that the widespread view of this work as a sort of epigone of Hegelianism is false, 
and by contrast how remarkably dynamic are Croce’s views of tradition, individual, 
and historical narrative.
The second part of the section treats Croce’s analysis of Enlightenment, 
Romanticism and Positivism as essential forms in the process of construction of 
modem historiography. It will be shown that Croce’s view of the Enlightenment ideas 
was dictated by his antimetaphysical methodology and not by his alleged 
conservatism as is usually argued. Additionally, it will be demonstrated that Croce’s 
evaluation of Positivism demolishes the view of him as a philosopher prejudicially 
hostile to the movement.
The publication of Teoria e storia della storiografia, commissioned by the
University of Halle in Germany, appeared in Italian in 1917. The fact that the book
was published with a very well known German institution tells us something about
9 1Croce’s popularity in Continental Europe at that time. The book represented a break 
with the ‘quasi-systematic’ season of Estetica, Logica and Pratica. Indeed, Croce 
abandoned philosophical treatises for essays and polemical articles. As a matter of 
fact, if we compare Croce’s Filosofia dello Spirito with his other writings (articles, 
essays, polemics, and commentaries) we find that there are only three volumes out of
20 For the scholar Fulvio Tessitore Croce’s Teoria e storia is part o f a Hegelian historicism which 
results in a closed conception of history. Tessitore maintains that Croce ‘compi la scelta della 
storiografia universale contro la storiografia pluralistica, la prima fondata da Hegel, la seconda fondata 
da Humboldt.’ F. Tessitore, Contributi alia storia e alia teoria dello storicismo, vol. iii (Rome: 
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1997), p.366. See also his article ‘II giudizio di Croce su Ranke’, in La 
Cultura, 2 (1993), pp. 283-93.
21 While’s Croce’s fame was at its peak in Germany, it began to decrease in France after his neutralist 
position during the First World War. See Sergio Romano, in Per la conoscenza di Croce in Francia 
(Naples: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, 1984).
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seventy which were conceived in a ‘systematic’ way and we have already stressed 
that Croce’s intention was not to build an all-encompassing project but to provide a 
useful epistemological division.22
An important insight into the philosopher’s intellectual interests of this period 
is contained in his Contributo alia critica di me stesso:
Mi ridetti a vivere la vita e leggere libri non di filosofi quanto di poeti 
e storici; e dopo un po’ sorsero spontanee le mie meditazioni intomo 
alia Filosofia del Vico, le dissertazioni sulla Teoria e sulla Storia della 
storiografia, i Frammenti di Etica; tutti saggi che rompono i cancelli 
del preteso sistema.23
It is fundamental in the above passage to look at Croce’s emphasis on ‘breaking the 
portals of the alleged system’ and his concentration on ‘non -  philosophical’ authors, 
all of which amounts to a tangible sign of his broader conception of philosophical 
inquiry. Croce was aware that many critics had misinterpreted his work, and was 
eager to present his research as series of inquiries in specific fields.
Teoria e storia not only represented a review of Croce’s own reflections on 
history and historiography but was also a critical exploration and application of these 
conceptions on periods ranging from antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, the book is divided into two parts, namely the epistemological and the 
historical. This division is not just a question of style. We have already seen that in 
Logica Croce maintained that speculation could not be separated from the historical 
process in which it is created. In other words, we need to understand the history of 
concepts and ideas and how they were formed to be aware of their foundations. 
Teoria e storia concluded the theoretical premises of Logica24 maintaining that 
philosophy is essentially methodology o f historiography.
For Croce, Hegel was right to think that there was a historical relation between 
concepts and facts. However, we have already seen that the German philosopher’s 
way of perceiving this relation was to subsume history into philosophy, creating a
22 ‘La filosofia sistematica ... comprende soltanto una parte dell’effettivo filosofare, il quale non di 
rado e piu vivo ed energico ... nelle manifestazioni episodiche o monografiche.’ Croce, Storia dell’eta 
barocca in Italia (Bari: Laterza, 1967), p.60.
23 B. Croce, Contributo, p.65.
24 Teoria e storia, reported Croce in the introduction to the book written in 1916, ‘non forma una nuova 
parte sistematica, ed e da considerare piuttosto come approfondimento ed ampliamento alia teoria della 
storiografia gia delineata in alcuni capitoli ... della Logica. Croce, Teoria e storia , p. v.
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25ready-made scheme to which historical events had to be made to conform. By 
contrast, Croce maintained that history is an immanent and free process which could 
not be encased in any preconceived plan. Thus Croce’s way of solving the problem 
was the opposite of Hegel’s: it is history which establishes the rules according to 
which thought develops, not vice versa. Consequently, for the Italian philosopher, it 
was philosophy that had to be subsumed into history:
La Filosofia, in conseguenza della nuova relazione in cui e stata posta, 
non puo essere necessariamente altro che il momento metodologico 
della Storiografia: dilucidazione delle categorie constitutive dei giudizi 
storici, ossia dei concetti direttivi dell’interpretazione storica.26
Whereas in earlier writings Croce had insisted on their interconnectedness, at 
this point, he firmly establish the epistemological priority of the historical over the 
conceptual. Instead of a grand philosophical scheme to be applied to history Croce 
underlined the importance of taking philosophical concepts to their historical genesis. 
In other words, a correct understanding of philosophical questions, in Croce, required 
an understanding of their specific history. This was also the criterion by which to 
judge the value of a theoretical problem:
Se un problema filosofico si dimostra affatto sterile per il giudizio 
storico, si ha in cio la prova che quel problema e ... malamente posto 
... Se la soluzione di un problema, cioe di una proposizione filosofica, 
invece di rendere meglio intelligibile la storia, la lascia oscura o la 
confonde, o vi salta sopra e la condanna e la nega, si ha in cio la prova 
che quella proposizione, e la filosofia con la quale si lega, e 
arbitraria.27
Croce maintained that the notion of philosophy as methodology was the result of 
an antimetaphysical conception which rejected all forms of transcendence to 
concentrate on the relation between concepts and history. We have already seen, in 
analyzing Croce’s ‘modes’ of critique, that this perspective was most useful because
25 This charge may or may not be true; Hegel himself was aware o f the objection and tried to refute it in 
the Introduction to the Philosophy o f  History. However, I am here concerned with Croce’s view of  
Hegel rather than the true interpretation o f the German philosopher’s thought.
26 Croce, Teoria, p. 136.
27 Ibid., pp. 136-37.
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of its capacity to approach concrete problems in a non-reductive way. Indeed, he 
argued that
la superiority della filosofia come Metodologia sulla filosofia come 
Metaflsica, e dimostrata dalla capacita della prima a risolvere, 
criticandoli e assegnandole la genesi, i problemi della seconda, 
laddove la Metafisica non e capace di risolvere non solo quelli della 
metodologia, ma nemmeno i propri problemi senza dare nel fantastico 
e nell’arbitrario.28
The metaphysical attitude, Croce argued, is obsessed with one fundamental 
problem in philosophy from which the others necessarily flow. This is expressed by 
its fixation on grounding thought in an external, or transcendent, cause (God, Reason, 
Idea, or Progress) which would explain all aspects of reality. Croce maintained 
instead that
noi trascorriamo di problema in problema filosofico sotto la 
sollecitazione della nostra vita vissuta ... E se guardiamo al piu largo 
... spettacolo che offfe la storia .... della filosofia osserviamo il 
medesimo: che cioe secondo i tempi e i popoli, ora i problemi filosofici 
della morale, ora quelli della politica ora della religione ora delle 
scienze naturali e delle matematiche hanno avuto le prime parti ... ma 
non mai s’incontra un problema generale, per se stante, della 
filosofia.29
Thus the conception of philosophy as methodology, by contrast with its 
metaphysical status, which is obsessed with the ‘problema generale’, allows us to read 
the past in a more flexible and dynamic way, focusing on specific problems and 
broadening the spectrum of our philosophical enquiries:
II ... nuovo concetto invita a rivolgere l’attenzione a pensieri e a 
pensatori, che sono stati a lungo trascurati o tenuti in grado secondario 
e considerati non propriamente fllosofi, perche non trattarono 
direttamente del ‘problema fondamentale’, della filosofia, o del grand 
peut-etre, e si occuparono nei problemi particolari ... E semplice 
effetto di pregiudizio stimare un Machiavelli che pone il concetto dello 
Stato modemo ... o un Vico, che rinnova tutte le scienze dello spirito, 
o un Hamann che ha cosi forte sentimento del valore della tradizione, 
per filosofi minori ... sia anche di un Cartesio o di uno Spinoza, che si 
posero altri problemi, ma non superiori ai problemi di quelli.30
28 Ibid., pp. 138-39. Italics mine.
29 Ibid., p. 140.
30 Ibid.
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Another consequence of the adoption of this methodology, which considered 
history and thought closely interwoven, is a different and more flexible approach to 
past philosophies:
Alla filosofia come ‘problema fondamentale’ corrispondeva ... una 
storia della filosofia schematica e scheletrica: alia filosofia come 
metodologia deve corrispondere una storia della filosofia assai piu 
ricca, varia e pieghevole, che consideri come filosofia non solo cio che 
si attiene al problema della immanenza e della trascendenza, del 
mondo e dell’altro mondo, ma tutto cio che e valso ad accrescere il 
patrimonio dei concetti direttivi e I ’intelligenza della storia effettiva, e 
a formare la realta di pensiero nella quale viviamo.31
The above passage, like many others present in the book, was deliberately ignored,
tin • •when it came to branding Croce as a relic of a 19 century idealism with little 
connection with contemporary issues.32 However, we miss the essential part of 
Croce’s thought if we fail to notice his great attention to a new approach to history. 
The implications of this methodological view are extremely important. Indeed, 
philosophy conceived as methodology rejects the conception of a ‘definitive 
philosophy’ which is the outcome of all conceptual preoccupations with a 
‘fundamental problem’ since
La filosofia definitiva, contenuta come esigenza nella concezione del 
problema fondamentale, contrasta con l’esperienza storica.33
Hence, historical experience is the authentic terrain on which knowledge is tested. 
Our thought, implicitly or not, is always conditioned by the past.
Since, for Croce, philosophy had ceased to be a ‘theological’ discipline 
obsessed with the ultimate Truth, the role of the philosopher in society had to change 
accordingly. He was not an awakened or ‘risvegliato’, a sort of Buddha34 who 
possessed an esoteric knowledge closed to common people; he became instead an 
individual engaged with the issues of his contemporary culture, aware of his 
theoretical methods:
31 Ibid., p. 148. Italics mine.
32 See for instance M. L. Salvadori, ‘Croce sapore di classico’, La Stampa, 17 July 1990.
33 Croce, Teoria, p. 143.
34 Ibid., p. 145.
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il filosofo mistico o apolitico della decadenza greco-romana poteva 
bene distaccarsi dal mondo: i grandi pensatori che inaugurarono la 
filosofia modema, potevano, come Hegel, ... concepire una sfera dello 
spirito assoluto ... ma la figura ... del filosofo beato nell’Assoluto, 
quando si cerchi di rinnovarla nel nostro mondo modemo, si tinge di 
comico.35
Here not only is there a polemic with Gentile and the philosophers who used a sort of 
mystical jargon to which only the initiated could gain access, but also with a 
conception of the philosopher as a thinker detached from mundane knowledge. Croce, 
instead, advocated the disappearance of the ‘pure philosopher’, to be replaced by 
researchers fully aware of the philosophical assumptions underlying procedures in 
their specific fields of operation:
un forte avanzamento della cultura filosofica dovrebbe tendere a 
questo effetto: che tutti gli studiosi delle cose umane, giuristi, 
economisti, moralisti, letterati, ossia tutti gli studiosi di cose storiche, 
diventino consapevoli e disciplinati filosofi; e il filosofo in generale, il 
philosophus purus, non trovi piu luogo tra le specificazioni 
professionali del sapere.36
Another corollary of the conception of philosophy as methodology is that 
there is no privileged literature, there are no ‘holy texts’, which philosophers employ. 
Their efforts are instead broadened to the great wealth of tradition with a different 
attitude:
Un preconcetto turba ... il modo di cultura che gli studiosi di filosofia 
si sogliono dare, e che consiste nel frugare quasi esclusivamente i libri 
dei filosofi ‘in generale’, dei sistematori della metafisica: cosi come il 
dotto in teologia si formava sui sacri testi. Questo modo di cultura ... e 
affatto inconseguente e inadeguato in una filosofia immanente e 
storica, che trae materia da tutte le piu varie impressioni della vita.31
Thus, philosophy as a ‘mystical’ discipline disappears to be replaced with
critical reflections on the method of a given discipline, and philosophical style
changes accordingly:
Ora che ... la filosofia si esplica come dilucidazione delle categorie 
dell’interpretazione storica, non la grandiosa architettura da tempio, e
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 145.
37 Ibid., p. 147. Italics mine.
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non la lirica dell’inno sacro si confa per l’istituto, ma la discussione, la 
polemica ... che non e astretta ad osservare le regole che sembravano
. . , 38proprie del contenuto teologico o religioso.
If we now apply this methodological procedure to the historical narrative there 
are several consequences to be underlined. Firstly, we notice that in Croce there is no 
privileged viewpoint or ‘metastoria’39 from which historians see the historical 
process. Consequently, historical narrative and approaches change with historical 
paradigms and their necessities:
La storia, in ogni istante, si travaglia nel perfezionarsi, ossia nel 
proprio arricchimento e approfondimento, e non c’e storia che 
pienamente ci contend perche ogni nostra costruzione genera nuovi 
fatti e nuovi problemi e sollecita nuove soluzioni. Cost si narra sempre 
di nuovo, lumeggiandola sempre diversamente, la storia di Roma e di 
Grecia e del Cristianesimo e della Riforma e della Rivoluzione 
ffancese e della filosofia e della letteratura e di qualsiasi altra 
materia.40
Secondly, there is no absolute concept which reveals the final meaning of 
historiography, but rather groups of questions to be answered. We have already seen 
in chapter two that Croce was defiant of any ‘philosophy of history’ which aimed to 
replace historical events with abstract constructions. Transposed onto the field of 
historiography this attitude produces grandiose projects of ‘universal history’ that 
Croce named effectively ‘romanzi teologici’. The impossible aim of these all- 
embracing accounts is,
ridurre in un quadro tutti i fatti del genere umano, dalle origini di esso 
sulla terra al momento presente; anzi ... dall’origine delle cose sino 
alia fine del mondo; donde la sua tendenza a ... romanzi teologici ... e 
... delineare in qualche modo l’awenire, o con rivelazioni e profezie 41
Instead, philosophy had to be conceived as a method o f critique to be applied to 
specific problems which change with time, with the nature of research, and the 
interests dictated by the ‘spiritual’ situation (aesthetic, logical, economic and ethical) 
of an epoch. We apply concepts and categories only to specific problems in specific
38 Ibid., pp. 146-47. Italics mine.
39 Ibid., p. 114.
40 Ibid., pp.36-37. Italics mine.
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periods. For instance, we can talk about the evolution of techniques and study how 
they have been changing throughout various epochs, to solve a specific problem 
(housing, eating or motion, for example), but we cannot apply the concept of 
evolution or progress to ‘humanity’ in general, since we cannot know the final stage 
or aim of our race. Our questioning has to be focused on the particular, or individual, 
rather than the general, or universal:
Abbiamo negato ... l’idea di una storia universale ... come quella di 
una storia generale e fatto valere l’opposta ... sentenza: che la storia e 
sempre particolare ed e sempre speciale42
The third consequence, in historiography, of Croce’s antimetaphysical 
method is an anti-teleological approach to events43 There is no final aim, or 
eschatology,44 in the historical process, which is entirely immanent and free and has to 
be studied in its specificity. Croce’s conception of history is an open one. Indeed, for 
Croce, history, as an entirely immanent process, does not have a telos or end. We will 
see that even when Croce identified history with liberty his aim was, beyond the 
immediate ‘political’ and rhetorical purposes, to emphasize the free course of both 
narrative and events against the big ‘philosophies of history’ of Hegel or Oswald 
Spengler.45 These grand narratives were, for Croce, fictions which attempted a 
definitive account of events.
Another implication which derives from Croce’s hostility to dogmatic thought, 
is his view of tradition. We have already seen that for Croce historians have to 
acknowledge that all attempts to narrate a ‘definitive’ history are misplaced, and 
historical narrative is conceived as an open process free from any reductionism. In 
this context tradition plays a crucial role. Indeed, for the philosopher, tradition is 
essential for understanding the epistemological framework of our present. It is the 
unremitting reading and questioning of the categories through tradition which allows 
us to identify the attributes of the present in an open narrative. We have seen that for
41 Ibid. p.46.
42 Ibid., p. 126.
43 The Crocean Franchini rightly remarked that ‘la storia ... non ha un fine fuori di se ne un valore che 
la trascende e nemmeno puo risolversi nel mito di una totalita in se che possa dettame il progresso.’ 
Franchini, La teoria della storia di Benedetto Croce, p. 85.
44 Among the authors o f eschatological histories Croce mentioned Polybius, Saint Augustine and 
Hegel. See Teoria e storia, pp. 45-48.
45 On Oswald Spengler see Croce’s review ‘Der Untergang des Abendlandes’, La Critica, xvvii (1919), 
pp. 236-39.
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Croce historiography does not reflect an immutable ‘reality’ but, ‘narra sempre di 
nuovo’, namely creates new connections and interpretations of the past. But how can 
we be sure that our judgements are true? For the philosopher, only a critical 
engagement with past practices, institutions and customs (what Croce called ‘history 
of the spirit’) could give us the right weaponry to reflect on our present time. Many 
critics have interpreted this ‘epistemic’ dedication to tradition on the part of Croce as 
a sign of an intrinsically conservative posture. However, Croce’s outlook on the past 
is much more multifaceted and challenging than is usually thought. In reality, 
tradition was not conceived of by the philosopher as a monolith to which one has to 
remain faithful,46 but rather as a powerful element which conditions and somehow 
shapes the views of our present life. In II carattere della filosofia modema the 
philosopher would reply to his critics:
Non ha senso la corrente accusa data alio storicismo che esso, 
spiegando ... il passato, induca all’adorazione del fatto compiuto e al 
quietismo, perche ... il passato che cost si pensa non fu  mai compiuto 
e stabile, ma sempre in movimento e cangiamento, ed e iscindibile dal 
nostro presente, inquieto anch’esso e non adagiantesi in soluzioni, ma 
laborioso nel porre nuovi problemi che saranno nuove soluzioni47
This fluid conception of history and tradition should be remembered when we 
analyze the similarities between Croce’s theory of history and hermeneutics. In the 
Logica the philosopher had shown that what we usually perceive as permanent or 
immutable such as political and social institutions, values and even individuals are the 
result of a given historical tradition to be explored in its aesthetic, logical, economic, 
and ethical implications. Indeed, in Teoria e storia Croce maintained that individuals 
are not atomistic entities separated from history and society; on the contrary, they 
interact with this complex web of relations. This notion implies that we cannot 
separate individuals from their historical context which moulds their identity. Croce 
spumed the idea of individuals as totally free agents in favour of a notion of 
individuals as having an identity which is at least partly given before any decisions or 
choices can be made. Croce here wanted to show the ‘historical construction’ of what
46 For Badaloni, for instance, Croce’s historicism is ‘accettazione integrale del passato’ N. Badaloni, 
Marxismo come storicismo ( Milan : Feltrinelli, 1975), p .135.
47 Croce, II carattere, p. 100. Italics mine.
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we call ‘individual’ which was again a direct consequence of his anti-metaphysical 
method. Indeed, the individual as an immutable substance does not exist:
II nostro ‘io sostanziale’, la gemma fulgida e dura che dovremmo 
possedere in noi ... non esiste altrove che nella fallace escogitazione 
delle metafisiche e tra i fumi deH’amor proprio inebriato.48
For Croce, individuals are the result of a composite process of relations between 
history and other individuals, not fixed in a permanent condition. Individuals are bom 
in an aesthetic, logical, economic and ethical framework to which they refer. They 
might refer to it in a polemical, or a critical way, but they are formed within a given 
historical tradition which will be expressed by its norms, customs, tastes and values. If 
we grant that tradition is a dynamic force which conditions our identity, views, and 
values, we cannot accept the idea of an unchangeable individual in a timeless 
situation. That is the reason why Croce maintained that ‘gli uomini non sono ma 
diventano in perpetuo’.49 Thus we become individuals through our history, we are 
‘made’ by it.
However, the philosopher made clear that his emphasis on historical context 
did not imply a view in which ‘gli individui sono formiche che il masso schiaccia’.50 
It is essential to note that, for Croce, the individual does not passively and uncritically 
adopt externally imposed standards from tradition. In other words, Croce’s 
recognition of the individual subject’s relation to a given tradition did not imply the 
liquidation of the subject.51 Indeed, the philosopher warned that
Chi taglia fuori dalla storia gli individui ... ha tagliato fuori, con essi, 
la storia stessa.52
48 Croce, Etica e politica, p. 125.
49 Ibid., p. 143.
50 Croce, Teoria e storia, p.87.
51 Roberts has justly remarked that, ‘when Croce seemed to downplay individual agency, he was often 
attacking one o f two important tendencies. First, any cult o f the individual ... Second, Croce wanted to 
counter the tendency to overemphasize the role of the great person in history.’ Roberts, Benedetto 
Croce, p. 130.
52 Croce, Teoria e storia, p.93.‘La storia concepita sopra e fuori gli individui e che preme sugli 
individui imponendo presunte leggi e regole fisse, e, tutt’insieme annullamento della storia e 
annullamento di ogni dovere.’ Croce, II carattere, p.209.
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Hence, the question was not, as the argument of many detractors of the philosopher
• 53goes, the annihilation of the individual in favour of an idealistic form of history. In 
fact, Croce clearly stated that
Individuo e idea, separatamente presi, sono due astrazioni equivalenti e 
inadatte l’una e l’altra a fomire il soggetto alia storia54.
We have already stressed how Croce’s notion of individuals was in line with 
his hostility towards reductionism and his antimetaphysical method. In addition, we 
can say that this view had important repercussions in historiography since it rejected 
the artificial opposition between a ‘collectivist’ history and an ‘individualistic’ one:
II contrasto tra una storiografia ‘collettivistica’ e una storiografia 
‘individualistica’, non si comporra mai, fintanto che gli uni 
assegneranno alia collettivita il potere creativo delle idee e delle 
istituzioni, e gli altri all’individuo geniale, essendo entrambi le 
affermazioni vere in cio che includono e false in cio che escludono55.
Hence, it is the interaction rather than the opposition between the individual and the 
collective which allows a more balanced and multifaceted historical construction. It 
should be clear by now that the investigation of the past, for Croce, is not a sort of 
antiquarian pastime entrusted to a few scholars, but a vital need in order to understand 
and assess the authenticity of our present, as individuals and as part of a social, or 
‘spiritual’, context. We are aware of thoughts and actions when we are able to read 
the history behind them. History, our present life and identity, in this vision, are 
inextricably connected. This is the real sense of Croce’s famous statement that ‘ogni 
vera storia e storia contemporanea.’56 From this viewpoint, in Croce, history ceased to 
be a mere academic discipline to become a way of understanding reality common to 
all human beings. However, this conception does not imply that Croce was not 
interested in the technical or methodological side of history, as many critics have
53 See for example Sartori: ‘L’individuo sparisce in Croce per ragioni idealistiche ... Ci sono 
componenti di valori concreti che Croce ha ignorato o anche ucciso: il valore dell’individuo persona e 
il valore della normativa etica.’ ‘Croce. L’etica, la politica. Conversazione con Giovanni Sartori.’, in P. 
Bonetti, Per conoscere Croce (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998), pp. 67-89 (p. 73).
54 Croce, Teoria e storia, p. 93.
55 Ibid., p. 92
56 Ibid.,p. 4.
165
maintained. On the contrary, we have seen that Croce’s main effort was to provide a 
suitable method for narrating history.
Croce’s famous polemic against philology should be read in this context. 
Indeed, Croce used as a polemical target a certain kind of historian who had 
Tingenua credenza dei filologi di tener chiusa nelle loro biblioteche, musei, archivi, 
la storia.’57 The ‘philological’ attitude in history does not take into account the 
complexity of the historical account, its repercussions on both the theoretical (rhetoric 
and logic) and the practical (ethics and politics) fields:
Le cronache ripulite tagliuzzate, ricombinate, riordinate, restano pur 
sempre cronache, cioe narrazioni vuote: i documenti restaurati, 
riprodotti, descritti, allineati, restano documenti, cioe cose mute. La 
storia filologica si riduce al travasamento di piu libri o di piu parti di 
vari libri in nuovo libro ... onde la storia filologica pud essere bensi 
corretta ma non vera ... e come e priva di verita e priva di interesse 
storico, ossia non reca luce intomo a un ordine di fatti che risponda a 
un bisogno pratico ed etico.
In other words, the philological conception of history left the discipline in the hands 
of a few ‘experts’ turning it into an arid exercise for ascertaining sources and 
references.
However, it is important to state that Croce did not underplay the role of 
philology in history; he simply reacted polemically to a certain kind of historiography 
which tended to ossify the dynamic process of the past. We have seen that this broad 
conception of history did not exclude, at least in principle, any narrative which 
attempted an account of the past to better explain our present.
If we bear in mind Croce’s dynamic perception of history and tradition we can 
also fully appreciate the significance of the second part of Teoria e storia. Here, the 
philosopher tested different conceptions of historiography in order to clarify the 
genesis of philosophy conceived as methodology, aware of its historical limitations, in 
opposition to an all-encompassing conception of knowledge.
Fundamental for our purpose, which focuses on Croce’s anti-metaphysical 
method, is the critique of the main movements which created modem thought, namely 
Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positivism. We have already remarked that for
57 Ibid., p. 19.
58 Ibid., pp.20-21.
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Croce, the main flaw of Enlightenment was its dogmatic conception of rationality, 
regarded as completely detached from any historical context, and its tendency to 
consider institutions and values as timeless and universal.59 The consequence of this 
attitude was the exclusion of the historical dimension from the sphere of knowledge. 
Noteworthy is Rousseau’s judgement on history, defined as Tart de choisir entre 
plusieurs mensonges, celui qui resemble mieux a la verite’.60 This view led to an 
oversimplified form of historiography in which,
i sacerdoti ingannano, i cortigiani intrigano, i saggi monarchi 
escogitano ed attuano buone istituzioni, combattute o rese presto vane 
dalla malignita altrui e dalla plebea ignoranza, e nondimeno perpetuo 
oggetto di ammirazione e di gratitudine per gli spiriti rischiarati.61
Reason, explained Croce, was conceived of as a sort of universal power, an 
inaccessible divinity to which every aspect of life conformed, instead of the result of a 
given historical development. More generally, this attitude created a gap between 
philosophy and concrete human experience. It resulted in an abstract universalism in 
all fields. Furthermore, this tendency lost the substance of morality in scholastic 
reflections of ‘good’, ‘virtue’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’. The philosopher drew attention 
to the barely concealed theological language of this conception as this ironical 
passage shows:
Tutti sentono e dicono che si e usciti non solo dalle tenebre ma dai 
chiarori antelucani, e il sole della Ragione e alto sull’orizzonte e 
rischiara gli intelletti e li irradia di luce vivissima. ‘Luce’, 
‘rischiaramento e simili, sono le parole che si pronunziano ad ogni 
tratto e con sempre maggiore persuasione ed energia, onde il nome ... 
dell’ ‘illuminismo’, che si da dal periodo che va da Cartesio a Kant.62
Thus, within this perspective, the assertive power of reason was praised with religious 
zest and Croce observed how
59 ‘Atteggiamento tipico della dottrina illuministica era ... postulare, conformemente a certe aspirazioni 
utopistiche dell’uomo, degli istituti che non fossero sottoposti alia inesorabile legge della usura storica, 
delle istituzioni definitive che garantissero una stabilita perenne alia societa umana. Ma proprio contro 
questa concezione Croce si pone, vedendone l’aspetto mitico ... utile forse in momenti in cui e 
necessario suscitare emozioni ... per raggiungere fini pratici immediate, ma inaccettabile dal punto di 
vista logico.’ G. Cotroneo, Croce e VIlluminismo (Naples: Giannini, 1970), pp. 163-64.
60 Croce, Teoria e storia, p.24.
61 Ibid., p.229.
62 Ibid., p.224.
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A nessuno pud rimanere celato il carattere religioso di questa nuova 
concezione del mondo, che ripete in terminologia laica i concetti 
cristiani di Dio che e verita e giustizia ... di paradiso terrestre, di 
redenzione, di millennio e via discorrendo; e che al pari del 
cristianesimo oppone a se 1’ intera storia precedente e la condanna, e 
appena qua e la vi ammira qualche consolante barlume di se stessa.63
Croce found a similar inclination in some contemporary philosophies which 
entertained the project of re-drawing the definitive forms, or ‘essences’ of reason.64
We have seen that for the Italian philosopher one cannot isolate concepts from 
their historical framework if one wants to understand their effective significance. 
Hence, a proper understanding of a philosophy or a cultural movement has to refer to 
a precise relation between the directive categories and the historical context we are 
considering. We have already seen, in analyzing the Logica, that the separation of the 
two, for Croce, creates an unresolvable problem. Indeed, if we consider the categories 
of a certain period, ignoring their implicit historicity, we are left with mere 
abstractions. On the other hand, we have already seen that for Croce history itself, to 
be explained, needs to rely on categories which disclose the meaning of what we are 
studying.
It is worth noting that this critique of the Enlightenment’s principles and its 
fundamental incapacity to grasp the historical dimension of concepts and institutions 
was to be taken up by the philosophers of the Frankfurt school and later in France by 
the ‘nouveaux philosophies’ like Foucault, Derrida and Ricoeur. Moreover, in Britain, 
thinkers like Isaiah Berlin and Alasdair MacIntyre made similar critiques of the 
Enlightenment era.65 What is astonishing in all these analyses is the absence of any 
reference to Croce’s vital contribution to the dissolution of the ‘Enlightenment myth’. 
Indeed, the major reference to the critique of the Enlightenment is to R.G.
63Ibid., p.227.
64 See, for instance Wittgenstein’s introduction to the Tractatus logico-philosophicus written in 1918: 
‘The truth o f the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am therefore 
of the opinion that the problems have in essential finally been solved.’ L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus (Routledge: London and New York, 1998), p. 27.
65 See A. MacIntyre, ‘Why the Enlightenment project of justifying morality had to fail’, pp. 51-61, 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1994). MacIntyre’s critique of what he 
suitably calls the ‘Enlightenment project’ and its failure to deal with the historical is surprisingly 
similar to Croce’s.
168
Collingwood and his The Idea o f History which is mostly based, on the author’s own 
admission, on Croce’s investigations.66
It is essential here to stress that Croce's polemic with the Enlightenment was 
part o f his antimetaphysical posture and not an endemically anti-democratic
67consequence o f his alleged conservative standpoint, as many critics have claimed. 
Indeed, Croce’s polemic with Enlightenment did not fall into the merely political 
domain, but was a much more complex theoretical critique linked to his dynamic 
perception of the nature of thought in history.
The same argument can be applied to Croce’s critique of liberal-democracy. 
Croce’s antimetaphysical conception of history rejected the claim of classical 
liberalism to be the absolute and ultimate political form. Liberty, Croce maintained, is 
a concept which cannot be reduced to the liberal-democratic theory but has to be 
understood each time in its particular historical framework. To maintain that Anglo -  
American liberalism, for instance, is the highest political form for all times is to 
disregard other political forms which did not stem from that tradition but that could be 
felt to be equally effective, or ‘free’. However, Croce’s conceptual separation between 
the liberal-democratic tradition and the idea of ‘liberty’ which does not necessarily 
coincide with the Anglo-American tradition, did not imply a political hostility on the 
part of the philosopher to democracy and its practices. It simply confirmed an 
essential consequence of Croce’s antimetaphysical attitude which rejected perpetual 
forms, either theoretical or political, to be applied to all people at all times. Later, 
Croce’s political position would become more ambiguous, partly because of his fear 
of a Bolshevik dictatorship following Fascism, partly because of the extremely 
polarized atmosphere which followed the end of the Second World War. However, 
we need to take into account the fact that ‘liberty’, on the political terrain, will 
become a formidable rhetorical tool for organizing the resistance to Fascism, 
involving groups from different political backgrounds.
66 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea o f  History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946). The degree of  
Collingwood’s debt to Croce has frequently been object of debate. For a sense o f the issues see B. 
Haddock ‘Croce, Collingwood and the characterization of historical knowledge’, Criterio, 10 (1992), 
p p .10-25.
Several critics, following Bobbio’s critique of the mid-fifties in his already mentioned Politica e 
cultura, see in Croce’s hostility to the Enlightenment’s principles a sign of the endemically anti­
democratic character o f his thought. For the ‘liberale’ Giuseppe Bedeschi, for instance, there was in 
Croce a ‘concezione ferina ... della vita dei popoli e degli Stati e dei loro rapporti; concezione 
hegeliana che escludeva ... qualunque teoria dello Stato come giustizia’. Bedeschi, La fabbrica delle 
ideologie, p. 106.
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A historic reaction to the role of absolute reason was initiated by the Romantic 
Movement. It is with Romanticism, for Croce, that European thought started to reflect 
on the relation between history and ideas. We have already seen, however, that, 
earlier than this according to Croce, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico had 
been the pioneer of a ‘modem’ conception of history where ideas, truth, and facts 
were in close relation:
Nella Scienza Nuova ... Vico critico l’illuminismo solo ai suoi inizi, e 
nondimeno penetro meglio che gli altri dipoi nei suoi riposti motivi e 
meglio misuro le conseguenze logiche e pratiche. Onde contrappose al 
superficial schemo esercitato verso il passato in nome dell’astratta 
ragione lo spiegarsi della mente umana nella storia, come senso, 
fantasia e intelletto.69
However, Vico’s insights on history were overshadowed by Descartes’ abstract 
rationalism which did not leave space for any other discipline except for the exact 
sciences. This, despite Vico’s own trenchant critique of Cartesian rationalism and its 
relegation of history to a discipline of secondary importance. The Italian philosopher 
had to be rediscovered in the twentieth century as an important theorist of history and 
Croce, with his friend and collaborator Fausto Nicolini, played a major role in
7 0reassessing Vico’s importance.
The Romantics, however, felt it necessity to turn to tradition with the 
emergence of the modem nation-states. The conception of history of the Romantic 
period was influenced by a strong demand for national identity and, mainly driven by 
rhetoric and historiography, ‘entro in istretta relazione e scambio col nuovo genere
• 71 •letterano, il romanzo storico’. Croce charachterized this kind of narrative history as
79  •‘storiografia nostalgica’ or ‘storiografia restauratrice’. In other words the Romantic 
conception of history was driven by an idealization of the past and a need for
68 This issue will be analyzed in detail in chapter 5.
69 Croce, Teoria, p.248.
70 Croce could be considered the discoverer of Vico’s relevance in philosophy: ‘For better than half a 
century the late Benedetto Croce labored to establish Giambattista V ico’s claim to originality, and his 
right to a prominent, not to say unique place in the history of European thought. Seconded and 
supported by his colleague Fausto Nicolini, Croce consistently reiterated his belief in the breadth and 
fecundity of Vico’s achievement. And the extent o f Vico’s current fame, as well as the high prestige 
that Vico enjoys in so many different disciplines, is attributable in considerable part to their tireless 
advocacy o f his cause. To deny as much would be both imprecise and niggardly.’ H. White, Tropics o f  
Discourse, p.218.
71 Croce, Teoria e storia, p.244.
72 Ibid.,, p. 243.
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restoration. Nonetheless, Romanticism conceived human institutions and customs as a 
development, or ‘svolgimento’, depending on a given tradition which implicitly gave 
history a new epistemological status:
Tutta la storia e ora concepita come svolgimento necessario, o percio tutta 
implicitamente, e piu o meno anche esplicitamente redenta, tutta appresa 
con sentimento sacro, quale gia nel medioevo si riserbava a quelle sole parti 
di essa, che rappresentavano la potenza di Dio contro la potenza diabolica. 
Talche il concetto di svolgimento fu esteso all’eta classica, e poi, col
I'Xcrescere delle cognizioni e dell’attenzione, alle civilta orientali.
Hence, according to Croce, the great merit of Romanticism is its view of 
history as in essential relation with human customs and culture. The abstract concept 
of ‘nature’ of Enlightenment thinking was replaced by the awareness of a past which 
forms our views. The consequences of this new attitude towards history was a re- 
evaluation of customs and epochs neglected by the Enlightenment, such as the Middle 
Ages, which resulted in a new approach to religious studies and a new awareness of 
the complexity of historiography:
Diventa allora detto comune che non si puo intendere la letteratura 
senza conoscere le idee e i costumi, la politica senza la filosofia ... o il 
diritto e i costumi e le idee senza l’economia.74
According to Croce, Idealism, the theoretical form of Romanticism, 
established the theoretical link between ideas and historiography with Hegel’s vast 
philosophical project. However, the German philosopher ended up with constructing a 
panlogistic system which separated the realm of ideas from that of events, and 
reduced historical phenomena to empty empirical data subordinate to a transcendent 
idea of Spirit hovering over human actions. The reification of the Idea, now seen as 
the supreme principle in history, led Romantic historiography to
Una storia apriori che sarebbe la storia vera, dedotta da puri concetti 
...una storia piu o meno di versa dagli awenimenti e fatti umani, e, 
come storia filosofica, lasciante fuori di se, quasi rifiuto, una storia 
meramente narrativa?5
73 Ibid., p.249.
74 Ibid., p. 253.
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This aprioristic conception of history, with its distinction between a philosophical and 
a narrative history produced, inevitably, along with several outstanding classical 
works of historiography, a metaphysics o f history, or ‘filosofia della storia’.
Positivism reacted violently against this tendency with the rejection of 
‘philosophy’ and a form of historiography based on ‘pure facts’. Philosophical 
speculation was then considered ruinous for a correct understanding of history. 
Instead, one had to go back to ‘reality’, namely to documents and hard evidence. 
Philology, dismissed by the Romantics as a waste of time, was adopted as the main 
tool to validate historical statements of fact.
It is interesting to see here Croce’s assessment of the merits of Positivist 
historiography:
Sarebbe erroneo credere che gli acquisti del romanticismo andassero 
perduti nel positivismo, perche guardando ... piu attentamente le storie 
di questo periodo, si vede come si fossero tutti serbati. II romanticismo 
l’aveva fatta finita col dualismo storico, pel quale c’erano nella realta 
fatti ... eletti e reprobi: e il positivismo ripeteva che tutti i fatti sono
• 7 f \fatti e tutti hanno pari diritto a entrare nella storia.
These words, which are part of a seventeen-page section entitled ‘La storiografia del 
Positivismo’,77 contradict the common view of a Croce obstinately closed to the 
importance of this movement. Positivism, for the philosopher, had produced
un beneficio durevole. I libri di storia, divennero, per virtu del 
positivismo, meno semplicistici e piu ricchi di fatti, specialmente di 
quelle classi di fatti che il romanticismo aveva trascurate, come le 
disposizioni ... naturali, le ... illusioni psicologiche, gli interessi che si 
dicono materiali, la produzione e distibuzione della ricchezza, ossia 
l’operosita economica.
For Croce, Positivism and Romanticism, far from being movements in conflict 
were instead complementary and contributed to create a new sensibility for 
historiography. On the one hand Romanticism had insisted on the importance of 
history in the formation of our culture, nation and civilization, on the other Positivism 
developed this ideas with particular reference to society:
75 Ibid., p.259.
76 Ibid., p. 278.
77 Ibid., pp. 265-82.
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II romanticismo, agli abissi e ai salti che la storiografia anteriore 
introduceva nel corso degli awenimenti aveva sostituito il concetto di 
svolgimento e il positivismo ripeteva quel concetto chiamandolo 
evoluzione. II romanticismo aveva periodizzato lo svolgimento, sia per 
circoli di fasi come il Vico ... sia in ordine lineare, come i romantici 
tedeschi ... e il positivismo rinnovava queste concezioni ... II 
romanticismo aveva non solo rafforzato le storie dei valori ideali, ma 
concepitele in organica connessione; e il positivismo insisteva sulla 
interdipendenza dei fattori sociali e sulla unita del reale?9
Another great merit of Positivism was, for Croce, its rejection of 
transcendent causes to explain the complexity of historical events. This disposition 
had started during the Romantic era but it was only with Positivism that it became 
part of historians’ consciousness.80 Positivism drew attention to other elements 
which shape the historical account, namely social, economic and political factors. 
The conclusions of Croce’s analysis of Positivism would disorientate those critics 
who maintain that he was prejudicially disposed towards this movement:
Tutto intento a negare i valori della trascendenza e ad osservare le cose 
che lo attraevano, il positivismo si sentiva, ed era per questa parte, nel 
vero; e chiunque di noi presta la dovuta attenzione a quegli ordini di 
cose e rinnova quella negazione, raccoglie il ffutto del positivismo, e 
per tale aspetto e positivista.81
However, despite this correct claim for an historical knowledge free from a 
transcendent form of philosophy and concerned with ‘facts’, the disciples of 
Positivism ended up denying the influence of any philosophy, namely theory, in 
historiography with grave consequences for methodology in history. Indeed, their 
rejection of transcendence was accompanied by the exclusion of the theoretical in 
favour of the ‘factual’, which became the fetish to which historiography had to be 
reduced. ‘Facts’ were not considered the result of a philosophical perspective, a point 
of view given by a specific methodological standpoint, but simply units within the 
changeless taxonomy of a scientifically conceived historical form of knowledge. Thus 
priority was given to statistics and history reduced to a prototype in which only 
quantitative, measurable ‘facts’ were admitted. The obsession with ‘general laws’ and
78 Ibid., p.281.
79 Ibid., pp.278-79.
80 ‘II positivismo ... aveva di mira la metafisica dogmatica e trascendente, infiltratasi nel pensiero di 
Kant e nei suoi successori.’ Ibid., p.280.
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deterministic patterns left out other factors (particularly theoretical premises and 
narration) creating an unacceptable form of reductionism.
It is important to emphasize once again that Croce did not underestimate the 
achievements of the Positivist movement with his highlighting the pragmatic aspects 
of historiography neglected by the Romantics. He, nevertheless, indicated how the 
very nature of historiography, which he conceived as an open narrative free from any 
kind of determinism, could within a doctrinaire Positivism become an ossified 
scheme, another version of ‘philosophy of history.’ The uniqueness of the historical 
event, which required to be studied in its complexity, had been reduced to a 
mechanical plan. In the end Romanticism with Ideas, Positivism with Progress, 
developed the same dogmatic blueprint asphyxiating the historical dimension into a 
lifeless scheme.
We can now see how Croce’s antimetaphysical method with its constant 
dialogue- polemic with the past allowed him to ascertain the grounds of a new 
sensibility in relation to history and its narrative. Moreover, Croce’s analysis of 
Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positivism provides a good example of Croce’s 
dynamic relation with past and tradition.
Since we are approaching the end of the section, it is time to summarize what has 
been acknowledged so far and draw some provisional conclusions on Croce’s 
methodological approach to history.
Croce had always insisted on presenting history as an entirely immanent and 
open process. The result was a historiography, or historical narration, which rejected 
any reductionism or ‘providentialism’ and focused on the individuality of historical 
events. Within this perspective, the past was seen as a constant discovery which 
required unending re-articulation through the aesthetic, the logical, the economic and 
the ethical ‘modes’. Tradition, with its rich depository of successive articulations of 
history and knowledge, plays a crucial role.
Thus, Croce’s view, far from being the outcome of conservatism or Hegelian 
idealism, was dictated by the philosopher’s hostility towards all grand systems of 
thought, including Hegel’s philosophy, which obscured the openness of the historical 
process. This attention to the ‘particular’ in history was accompanied by a firm 
opposition to a priori constructions, whether Idealist or Positivist. Moreover, Croce
81 Ibid., p.281.
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showed through his analyses of Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positivism both the 
implicit reductionism and the transcendental tendencies inherent in these movements. 
However, these critiques did not imply an indiscriminate dismissal of the merits of the 
above-mentioned movements. Indeed, Croce saw in them the beginnings of modem 
thought.
It is astonishing to see how this cluster of philosophical questions on tradition, 
‘particularity’, and reason, carefully analyzed by Croce, was transformed into a 
charge of woolly conservatism. In reality, it has been shown that in Croce’s 
conception of history there is no opposition between ‘traditional’ and ‘radical’, since
both are essential components of the same movement of regeneration and
82conservation.
82 ‘Certo, il ritmo della vita e della storia si svolge con quei due momenti, della conservazione e del 
progresso, e con la loro sintesi.’ Croce, Storia d ’ltalia, p.22.
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4.3 ETHICO-POLITICAL HISTORY
We have seen how Teoria e storia represented a breakthrough in Croce’s reflections 
on history and historiography. Here the philosopher had summarized, expanded, and 
explained in detail his antimetaphysical method showing that history is an immanent, 
and open process inextricably linked to the present. Consequently, historical narrative 
was conceived as an open dialogue with the past through the means of the four 
‘modes’ Croce had devised in his Filosofia dello Spirito. The result was a very broad 
historiographic programme in which the different dimensions of historical narration 
were distinguished in order to avoid any kind of reductionism. However, after 
analyzing the theoretical ‘modes’ in historical inquiries and the consequences for the 
historical narrative, Croce had to specify the particular nature of the relation of history 
with the present. The crucial question was: in what sense does contemporaneity shape 
our historical viewpoint? And also: how can we make sure that our account of history 
is an adequate one and not simply ideologically driven? Is there any way of escaping 
skepticism in historical narration? This cluster of questions arose in what Croce 
described as the ethico-political conception of history.
Of course, it is not purely coincidental that Croce started to explore the 
‘practical’ dimensions of historiography around 1915, when uncertainty and cultural 
displacement occasioned by the First World War seemed to pervade the whole 
European continent. History became for Croce the terrain on which some fundamental 
problems of modernity could be addressed. Indeed, we have seen that according to the 
philosopher only engagement with past traditions and awareness of our fundamental 
historicity could provide answers for the present. In Croce, historiography had ceased 
to be a purely academic discipline and became more directly connected with the 
fabric of everyday life. It was in connection with this development that Croce drew 
out further implications of the ethico-political narrative dimension of historical 
writing.
This section considers how this ethico-political aspect of Croce’s conception 
of history has often been misinterpreted in its theory and aims. The first part of the 
section is devoted to the relation between State, civil society, and government, and the 
second part to the role of the ethical ‘mode’ in Croce’s conception of history. Indeed, 
we can divide Croce’s ethico-political reflections into two phases, namely the one in 
which the philosopher concentrated on the relations between politics, power and civil
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society with respect to history, and the other in which he stressed the ethical ‘mode’ 
as an essential part of our perceiving history and constructing historiography.
In the first phase there is in Croce an emphasis on the political aspect of 
history, particularly on the relations and tensions between civil society and state. 
Croce, inspired by Marx and Machiavelli, intended to analyze the mechanisms with 
which power is acquired and held. It will be shown how the charges of conservatism 
or proto-fascism levelled against the philosopher are spurious and often ideologically 
driven. In reality, the antimetaphysical method adopted by Croce, and his quest for a 
more open form of historiography was the genuine force behind his challenging 
analysis of ethics, politics, and power. In order to make my case I will use some 
suggestions from Gramsci who understood from the very beginning the importance of 
this new dimension for Croce’s reflections on history.
In the second phase the emphasis is on the ethical aspect of historical 
narration. The advent of Fascism forced Croce to go beyond the purely political 
interpretation of history and explore in detail the implications of the ethical ‘mode’. 
From this point, both politics and ethics became fundamental for historiography.
It is common to consider Croce’s reflections on the ethico-political dimension 
of history as the definitive and only constituent of his ‘historicism’. Indeed, for many 
critics the philosopher had readjusted all his previous ideas on history and
o*> .
historiography to embrace the ethico-political as history par excellence. However, it 
will be shown that in Croce there is no ethico-political system and that this dimension 
is just one component, although an essential one, of his multifarious notion of history. 
If read in the proper context the etico-political dimension adds another element to the 
complexity of historical narrative. Indeed, we have seen that for Croce history is 
expressed by an ever-open narrative. In reality, the ethico-political dimension does 
not amount to a sort of ‘total history’ which rises above particular ones. Such history, 
for the philosopher, would be vacuous. Croce, in conformity with his epistemological 
distinctions, intended simply to explore the practical ‘modes’, namely ethics and 
politics, in the light of his conception of the historical narrative.
We have already seen that Croce had talked about the role of ‘interest’ in 
historiography and analyzed with the help of Marxism the cluster of forces which
83 ‘Only ethico-political history could provide the core of the culture’s self-understanding, and thus it 
was history par excellence.’ Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p.274.
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shaped history and historiography. However, in the analysis carried out before the 
epistemological division into ‘modes’, there remained many unanswered questions.
Croce had formulated his epistemology in terms of ‘modes’ and analyzed the 
rhetorical and logical aspects of historiography. Indeed, in the introduction to Teoria e 
storia, written in 1916, he admitted that,
II problema della comprensione storica e quello verso a cui tendevano
• • • • 84le indagini da me condotte intomo ai modi dello spinto.
Now Croce was interested in developing the practical implications of the study of 
history and the writing of historiography, namely in their connections with the ethical 
and political ‘modes’. There were political and moral dimensions to history which 
needed to be investigated further. Croce’s reflections on what we can call the 
‘practical side’ of history were begun with a series of articles mostly published in La 
Critica from 1915 to 1931, later collected in a volume entitled Etica e politica. The 
work was initially published in three books: Frammenti di etica, first appearing in 
1922 and expanded until 1931; Elementi di politica, published in 1925, and Aspetti 
morali della vita politica, appearing in 1928. These texts, together with Croce’s 
intellectual autobiography, Contributo alia critica di me stesso, later formed Etica e 
politica. As we can see from the morphology of the volume, we are not faced with 
one text, but rather a multifaceted work composed of different layers, which display 
the philosopher’s reflections on history and its connections with ethics and politics. 
Indeed, Croce underlined the Tibero andamento’ of these writings specifying that they 
were not,
composti sopra un disegno ma suscitati via via dalle piu varie 
occasioni dalla lettura di un poeta o di un filosofo, da un incidente 
politico, da un caso personale.85
This is a very important indication of Croce’s way of writing which did not follow a 
preconceived scheme but took up, so to speak, issues as they arose. Thus, it would be 
misleading to consider the ethico-political reflections in Croce as if they constituted a
84 Croce, Teoria e storia, p. iii.
85 Croce, Etica epolitica, p. 15.
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monolith. We can talk, instead, of a new series of enquiries into the nature of 
historiography.
Another element which needs to be mentioned is Croce’s style. Indeed, the 
language of the essays was very plain; it avoided philosophical jargon and aimed to 
capture the attention of a larger audience. It consisted of the application of the 
principles he was theorizing in Teoria e storia. We have already seen that in Croce’s 
mind philosophy does not deal with a quintessential, or metaphysical, problem but 
with particular issues as they arise and work themselves out in concrete historical 
situations. Thus, philosophical inquiry is important insofar as it provides a critical 
outlook on specific problems. Croce’s reassessment of non-systematic philosophers 
like Machiavelli, Pascal and Vico worked in this direction.86 There is no need for a 
‘fundamental question’, which to him is always a metaphysical posture. Rather, we 
need to concentrate our attention on the problems which come from our engagement 
in the world. Consequently, philosophy was conceived as a critical clarification of 
everyday issues, not a theoretical construction of another linguistic universe separate 
from everyday language. In one of the Frammenti di etica Croce remarked:
l’aristocratismo del vero, ossia l’idea che il vero sia cosa estranea alle 
moltitudini umane, privilegio di pochi, se puo dare gioia orgogliosa 
agli spiriti rozzi, egoistici ... e malinconia ai fini e delicati, che si 
vedono, per effetto della coscienza del vero, distaccati e straniati dagli 
altri uomini, e questi ridotti a volgo irredimibile e quasi animalesco, 
negli ingegni aweduti e critici suscita invece il dubbio, che l’affermato 
vero debba essere illusorio, appunto perche si presenta come possesso 
astrattamente individuale, senza legame, senza radici nella mente del 
genere umano.87
A good starting point for helping us to understand Croce’s ethico-political 
conception in relation to history is provided by Gramsci in his Quaderni. Gramsci had 
immediately realized the importance of this notion in Croce and its repercussions in 
historiography. Indeed, the Marxist thinker remarked how Croce’s view represented a 
reaction to a tendency in historiography to merge all the elements into the category of 
the economic:
86 See Croce, Teoria e storia, p. 148.
87 Croce, Etica e politica, p. 211.
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La concezione storiografica del Croce della storia come storia etico 
politica non deve essere giudicata come una futilita da respingere 
senz’altro. Occorre invece fissare con grande energia che il pensiero 
storiografico del Croce, anche nella sua fase piu recente, deve essere 
studiato e meditato con la massima attenzione. Esso rappresenta 
essenzialmente una reazione aH’“economismo” e al meccanicismo 
fatalista.88
Analyzing Croce’s view on Marxism we have seen that the philosopher did not 
underestimate the importance of economics as a concrete force which influences 
history. What Gramsci had perceived, however, was that Croce’s efforts were directed 
at combating reductionist schemes, in this particular case the mechanistic Marxism of 
the Second International which the Communist intellectual also wished to defeat. 
More broadly, he could see that Croce’s methodological approach to historical 
analysis, in dealing separately with its four ‘modes’, allowed him to relate the 
economic dimension to other elements of the historical process without reducing them 
to camuflaged expressions of the economic relations in society.
We have seen how Croce had already talked about the practical ‘modes’ (the 
ethical and the ‘economic’89) in Filosofla della pratica. He maintained that ethics and 
politics are in dialectical relation, namely one implies the other. This means that they 
are distinct but related. Ethics had to be related to politics and vice versa, there is no 
‘pure’ ethical or political view. However, the connection between the ethical and the 
political is a very complex matter. We know that for Croce moral conventions do not 
come from abstract principles of reason but are the result of a complex historical 
development and cannot be reduced to the economic ‘mode’.90 On the other hand, 
even the seemingly purest political-economic operation has its own ethical dimension. 
The ethical represented, for Croce, the general or ‘universal’ principles of a society,
88 A. Gramsci, II materialismo storico, pp.250-51.
89 It has already been argued that the category o f the economic in Croce includes all disciplines which 
have a direct connection with practice. Croce also used the term ‘l ’Utile’, the Useful, to describe them. 
The exact sciences and politics, as well as economics, are part of this category. The ethical in Croce is 
not limited to the category of ‘utilita’ although it is part of the practical ‘modes’ o f the spirit. Ethics 
takes into account the general or ‘universal’ validity of values.
90 ‘La morale resterebbe un’astrattezza se non s ’appoggiasse o alleasse a qualche forza vitale o 
interesse economico piegato a suo mezzo. Cosi l ’alta spiritualita del cristianesimo lotto contro i barbari 
e a se li sottomise, non gia disarmata ... per la semplice virtu della bellezza morale ... ma anzi in 
quanto era armata di armi vitalmente, utilitariamente ... Senza queste e consimili armi il cristianesimo, 
nonostante la sua altezza morale, sarebbe rimasto praticamente impotente o in perpetua attesa di 
condizioni favorevoli, al pari di un’utopia.’ Croce, II carattere, pp. 240-41.
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the political a particular set of rules to govern a given society91. Croce intended to 
underline how historical narration has to refer to an ethico-political horizon if it does 
not want to become anecdotal. Indeed, for the philosopher, history was not a 
divertissement and transcended the simple rhetorical and logical dimension. Thus, in 
focusing on the ethico-political element Croce was opposing the kind of 
historiography which reduced the complexity of the historical narration to a series of 
economic statements overlooking the relations with morality, politics and power. He 
was opposed, as we have seen, not only to the ‘metaphysical’ economism which 
reduces the whole of history to its material dimensions, but also to the untheorized 
empiricism of economic science, which, in its reduction of the economy to a series of 
fixed Taws’, refuses to acknowledge that the economic is a ‘human’ activity engaging 
values (the ethical ‘mode’).
Moreover, Gramsci had immediately recognized the originality of this view 
when he identified the ethical element in Croce with civil society and the political one 
with the state:
L’avvicinamento dei due termini etica e politica per indicare la piu 
recente storiografia crociana e l’espressione delle esigenze in cui si 
muove il pensiero storico crociano: l’etica si riferisce all’attivita della 
societa civile, la politica si riferisce all’iniziativa e alia coercizione 
statale-govemativa.93
When we analyze history from the ethico-political point of view we take into account 
both these components. The dichotomy between societa civile and Stato is an 
essential element in Croce’s historiography.
In 1924 he published Elementi di politica which represented the peak of his 
ethico-political reflections on history. In this particular period Croce focused on the 
forces which provided the political backbone of the State. This conception was very 
similar to that of the political theorist Gaetano Mosca. Indeed, in 1923 the 
philosopher had reviewed, in La Critica, Mosca’s Elementi di scienza politica. Here
91 ‘La coscienza etica e morale e coscienza di umanita e di totalita, la coscienza economica e politica e 
coscienza di parte o di interesse particolare.’ Croce, Etica e politica, p.205.
92 These approaches, in the case o f economics, were the two sides of the same coin, and lay behind 
Croce’s rejection o f classical Liberalism as an economic doctrine, and were at the centre o f his polemic 
with the Liberal economist Luigi Einaudi. The debate between Croce and Einaudi is now in P. Solari 
(ed.), Liberismo e liberalismo (Milan-Naples: Ricciardi, 1957).
93 Gramsci, II materialismo storico, p.240.
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Croce maintained that the fundamental concept ‘necessario alia interpretazione della 
storia politica’ is ‘il concetto della classe politica o dirigente, nella quale e veramente 
riposta la vita politica dello Stato, classe, che quantitativamente e una minoranza, ma 
qualitativamente maggioranza perche sa e puo.’94
Following a political tradition, which went back to Machiavelli, considered by 
the philosopher the founder of political philosophy,95 Croce insisted on the classe 
dirigente as the main source of power in governing the State. Indeed, when we 
approach history with the ethico-political aspect,
Si tratta ... di vedere se presso un dato popolo o un dato periodo ci sia 
stata o no una classe dirigente, o meglio ( poiche una certa classe 
dirigente c’e sempre in ogni momento ... ), quale sia stata la coesione, 
la persistenza, il vigore, la fisionomia.’96
Croce’s strong sense of realpolitik was repeatedly interpreted as inherently 
conservative and we have seen how it was used by post-war progressive cultural 
forces and also in Togliatti’s political strategy. More recently an otherwise balanced 
account on 20th century Italian ideologies, Bedeschi’s La fabbrica delle ideologie, 
suggested that Croce’s thought was a sort of precursor of Fascism97. However, 
Croce’s was an investigation into the complex relations between ethics and politics 
rather than a mere ideological posture. Indeed, for Croce, as for Mosca, there is an 
inherent tendency in the political organization of society for control to be exercised by 
minority groups. This position, which is neutral taken per se, has often been used to 
accuse Croce of political conservatism. However, he is simply pointing to the fact that 
in any society a minority will tend to assume a guiding role. Even in the most 
democratic systems there is an elite which guides, manoeuvres and manipulates a 
majority. Thus we should talk about ‘realism’ rather than conservatism in Croce’s 
position.
94 Croce, Nuove pagine sparse, vol. II (Naples: Ricciardi, 1949), p. 168. The review first appeared in La 
Critica, xxi (1923), ‘Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di politica’, pp.374-78.
95‘E risaputo che il Machiavelli scopre la necessita e l ’autonomia della politica, della politica che e di 
la, o piuttosto di qua, dal bene e dal male morale, che ha le sue leggi a cui e vano ribellarsi, che non si 
puo esorcizzare e cacciare dal mondo con l’acqua benedetta. E questo il concetto che circola in tutta 
1’opera sua e che quantunque non vi sia formulato con quella esattezza didascalica e scolastica che 
sovente si scambia per filosofia ... e da dire nondimeno concetto profondamente filosofico, e 
rappresenta la vera e propria fondazione di una filosofia della politica. Croce, Etica epolitica, p.292.
96 Ibid., p. 164.
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Moreover, in Croce, the elites are not only political but they include 
intellectuals and artists. Hence, political elites are never totally separate from the rest 
of society. Furthermore, for the philosopher, they do not simply impose their will on 
the people. Indeed, their being in power depends on the moral, cultural, and 
intellectual life of a given society which is shaped by thinkers, intellectuals and 
writers as much as by politicians. In other words, by ‘classe dirigente’ Croce meant a 
group of people who are aware of the cultural, moral, and intellectual life of a given 
society and actively operate to maintain, improve or destroy it. Indeed, ethico-political 
history considered
non solo lo Stato e il govemo dello Stato, e l’espansione dello Stato, 
ma anche cio che e anche fuori dello Stato, sia che cooperi con esso, 
sia che si sforzi di modificarlo, rovesciarlo, sostituirlo: la formazione 
degli istituti morali nel piu largo senso, compresi gli istituti religiosi e 
le sette rivoluzionarie, compresi i sentimenti e le fantasie e i miti di 
tendenze e contenuto pratico.98
We can see from this quotation how open Croce was to the different forces operating 
in history. Furthermore, we can see how misleading it is to simply select what he said 
about elites and infer from this a conservative politics. His theory of history is not a 
theorization of society’s ‘legitimate’ authorities. As we can see, it takes into account a 
variety of forces, including the revolutionary and seditious.99 This is an aspect of 
Croce’s approach which needs further investigation. For the philosopher history is not 
about the legitimation of the status quo as many of his detractors have maintained.100 
It is a mistake, then, to assume that Croce adopts a negatively moralistic attitude 
towards forces outside society’s ‘legitimate’ structures.
Gramsci realized the novelty of this position and would use Croce’s 
reflections on politics to elaborate his concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘organic 
intellectual’. For the Marxist thinker, with this approach it was possible to appreciate
97 For Bedeschi in Croce ‘c ’era un vero e proprio culto della forza, e dello scontro tra forze, come legge 
suprema, e starei a dire sublime, della vita e della storia.’ G. Bedeschi, La fabbrica delle ideologie, p. 
106.
98 Croce, Etica e politica, p. 219.
" ‘Quando c ’e contrasto tra etica e politica, tra esigenze della liberta ed esigenze della forza, tra societa 
civile e Stato-govemo c ’e crisi e il Croce giunge ad affermare che il vero “Stato”, cioe la forza direttiva 
deH’impulso storico occorre talvolta cercarlo, non la dove si crederebbe, nello “ Stato” giuridicamente 
inteso, ma nelle forze private e anche nei cosi detti rivoluzionari.’ Gramsci, II materialismo storico, 
p.240.
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the importance of the cultural dimension and the function of leading intellectuals. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned approach provided a tool for examining the process 
through which hegemony is established in society:
II pensiero del Croce ... ha energicamente attirato l’attenzione 
sull’importanza dei fatti di cultura e di pensiero nello sviluppo della 
storia, sulla funzione dei grandi intellettuali nella vita organica della 
societa civile e dello Stato, sul momento dell’egemonia e del consenso 
come forma necessaria del blocco storico concreto.101
However, whereas Croce’s aim was to investigate the role of politics in the light of 
history, Gramsci was more concerned to provide a political diagnosis of society. 
Thus, we can maintain that for Gramsci the historical dimension is a function of the 
political one, whereas in Croce history is the centre of gravity and politics an 
important function of it. Indeed, we have already explained that we cannot reduce the 
complexity of the historical account to the political. Croce himself warned against the 
misuse of his reflections on the political aspects of history when Fascism tried to use 
them for its ideological purposes, as the following extract from his Taccuini shows:
La sera e venuto Prezzolini ... Cercando un alibi per se stesso, mi ha 
chiesto il permesso di dirmi liberamente che del fascismo io sono tra i 
principali responsabili. E il perche sarebbe che ho sostenuto la teoria 
che lo stato e la politica e forza. Gli ho risposto che sostengo anche 
oggi questa teoria, ma che interpretarla a quel modo sarebbe come 
interpretare la legge della caduta dei gravi per la libera verticale per un 
consiglio alia gente di gettarsi a capo in giu dalla finestra.102
Indeed, the idea that the State, government and political society represent the element 
of ‘coercion’ in society is a universally accepted principle of all political doctrines 
with the exception of anarchism. It is in Croce’s ethical ‘mode’ that analysis of how 
this ‘coercive’ element is applied (seeking consensus, aggressively, for the general 
good, for the benefit of an elite, etc.) is taken up. But Prezzolini’s comments are a
100 Alberto Asor Rosa maintained that Croce ‘fomiva un’ideologia per la classe dominante.’ Storia 
d ’ltalia, v o l.v i. Pt. II, La cultura (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), p.1535.
101 Gramsci, II materialismo storico, p.251. This passage shows, in my view, how crucial Croce’s 
ethico-political analysis was for Gramsci. For a very convincing analysis on the influence of Croce on 
Gramsci see also R. Bellamy, ‘A Crocean critique of Gramsci on historicism, hegemony and 
intellectuals’, Journal o f  Modern Italian Studies, 6 (2001), pp. 209-229.
102 B. Croce, Taccuini di lavoro (Naples: Arte Tipografica, 1987), p.488. The passage is dated 21st June 
1935.
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good illustration of how Croce’s ‘modes’, conceived as tools for clarifying different 
historiographical dimensions, could equally be approached with a conservative or 
radical standpoint since they had no direct political implications. 103 It would be 
foolish to deny the ‘political’ applications of Croce’s thought. Indeed, one can accept 
that his reflections on politics were often used as an ideological tool for ‘conservative’ 
or even reactionary purposes, but one cannot reduce its theoretical and critical 
complexity to a political posture which the philosopher aimed to avoid. In other 
words, we should distinguish between Croce’s historiographical insights and 
perspectives, and the way in which they were ideologically presented and often 
exploited by others. We have already seen when we analyzed Croce’s 
‘deconstruction’ of Marxism that his aim was not political. Croce’s way of doing 
‘politics’ was to work as a critic and scholar:
Nel lavorare alia Critica, mi si formo la tranquilla coscienza, di 
ritrovarmi al mio posto, di dare il meglio di me, e di compiere opera 
politica, di politica in senso lato; opera di studioso e di cittadino
• • 104msieme.
Moreover, the philosopher had always insisted on the instrumental value of political 
parties and the relativity of either a conservative or a radical position:
C’e chi sente che il suo ufficio sociale e di conservatore, e chi sente 
che e di rivoluzionario, chi di liberista chi di antiliberista ... chi di 
tollerante chi d’intollerante, e via dicendo, anche variando, secondo le 
circostanze. Senza dubbio, accade che ciascuno predichi il suo fare 
come di valore assoluto: illusione, utile, in certi limiti, ma che presto si 
dissiperebbe ... o si convertirebbe nel contrario, se tutti facessero come 
lui.105
In an article which appeared in Salvemini’s L ’Unita in 1912 Croce had 
demonstrated his skepticism in relation to political parties as possessors of ‘truth’ or 
‘justice’. Instead, he conceived of them as simple coalitions with a limited role to play
103 It has rightly been pointed out that in the philosopher, ‘II modo vocazionale e autentico di fare 
politica era nel fare cultura, nel determinare attraverso la cultura moti e reazioni della coscienza 
morale del paese, mentalita e idee della classe dirigente, orientamenti ed entusiasmi dei giovani 
intellettuali ... E in cio non agivano tanto presunzioni, certezze, preoccupazioni, tradizioni di classe ... 
[quanto] una reale convinzione circa la propria vocazione e le proprie attitudini.’ Galasso, Croce e o 
spirito del suo tempo, p. 131.
104 Croce, Contributo, p. 32.
105Croce, Etica e politica  p. 224.
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in society.106 Here, political effectiveness was clearly distinguished from morality. 
Indeed he warned readers to
non darsi troppo pensiero della signora Democrazia o del signor 
Socialismo, tanto difficili a definire in idea, quanto, per quel che 
sembra, difficili a trovare impersonati nella realta della presente vita 
italiana; e di badare a trattare questioni determinate e concrete,
107secondo gli ottimi saggi di cio che hanno dato.
Following the advent of Fascism his emphasis on the ethical ‘mode’ became 
increasingly important. The attempt by Fascist intellectuals to rewrite history in the 
light of the victorious ‘Marcia su Roma’ and invalidate the importance of recent 
Italian history forced Croce to specify and partly reorientate his conception of 
historiography. The target of the dictatorship was the beginning of the Italian state, 
the Risorgimento in particular, but also the whole pre-Fascist era up to Giolitti. The 
ideological purpose was to present an ‘Italietta’ by contrast with the alleged greatness 
of the new Fascist era. In this context Croce advocated greater scrutiny of the moral 
dimension in order to avoid a gross distortion of this period. The problem of a ‘true’ 
view of history was now strongly linked with the ‘moral motivations’ underlying the 
historical narrative.
Perhaps the most important document in this new attention to the ethical 
dimension is the letter that Croce addressed to Charles Beard, distinguished historian 
and head of the American Association of History:
La vita del pensiero storico e strettamente congiunta con la vita 
intellettuale e morale ... il risanamento e il progresso dell’una tira con 
se il risanamento e il progresso dell’altra ... Considerata piu 
specialmente come la storia di atti morali e pratici, essa e storia 
dell 'ethos umano la quale io ho proposto di definire etico-politica per 
far intendere che, diversamente dalla mera storia politica, ha il suo
106 ‘I partiti sono necessari, ma necessari nella propria cerchia, come derivazione e non come 
scaturigine dell’azione politica, come conseguenza e non come premessa .’ Croce, ‘II partito come 
giudizio e pregiudizio’, in Cultura e vita morale, p. 197. Galasso has explained this point with clarity: 
‘Appunto in quanto ... presumevano di essere portatori di valori che potevano invece risultare 
dall’insieme del processo storico, i partiti politici erano teorizzati da Croce come pregiudizio. Che 
poteva essere una filosofia gradevole al trasformismo, ma poteva egualmente alimentare una volonta 
rivoluzionaria di rinnovamento a destra e a sinistra; ed e con questa latitudine di possibility di 
influenza, oltre che per il suo intimo significato, cosi ben corrispondente alia fase di evoluzione della 
cultura italiana in quel tempo, che si spiega la eccezionale diffusione subito guadagnata dal pensiero 
crociano in tante parti della cultura italiana di allora, dai giovani ... della “Voce” ai quelli che poi 
faranno 1’ “Ordine Nuovo”.’ Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.245.
107 Croce, ‘II partito come giudizio e pregiudizio’, pp. 197-98.
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centro nella coscienza morale, e ... include la politica, l’economia, e
• 1 0 Rogni altra forma dell’attivita pratica.
The letter is fundamental for understanding Croce’s position, and for clarifying in 
what sense the ethical ‘mode’ in history became crucial for the philosopher.
Firstly, Croce drew attention to the relation between the historical output of a 
culture and the intellectual climate in which this is produced. We already know that 
for our philosopher historians are not isolated and detached observers of historical 
events. On the contrary, their work is inextricably linked with the time and society in 
which they work. Hence, the historian approaches history with a baggage of ‘pre­
conceptions’. Any analysis of the ideas, values and customs of an epoch is always 
presented from a particular standpoint, or ideology to use the Marxist terminology. 
However, in Croce the ideological element is only one element of our pre­
conceptions, the other being the ethical. In other words, in the philosopher we have a 
distinction between ideology and morality which is not present in Marx. For Croce we 
cannot reduce the ideological to the ethical.
Another characteristic worth noticing is the non-reductive function of the 
ethical ‘mode’. Indeed the letter to Beard shows clearly that to focus on the ethical 
aspects of historiography does not imply the neglect of the other components, namely, 
‘politica, economia e tutte le forme dell’attivita pratica.’ Thus we cannot maintain that 
the philosopher, in considering the importance of the ethical mode, was excluding 
other elements. Also, Croce specified that a ‘moral’, or ethico-political dimension in 
history should not be confused with a moralistic one:
Senza dubbio, riaffermati il diritto e l’esigenza della storia morale, 
altrettanto urgente e determiname esattamente il contenuto, e 
soprattutto discemerla da una sua forma falsa, che l’ha ... discreditata. 
Intendo quella che si dovrebbe chiamare non storia morale ma 
moralistica, perche scambia e confonde l’atteggiamento del moralista 
con l’altro, totalmente diverso, dello storico.109
In Croce the ethico-political stance represented a deep-level characteristic of all 
human history, and should not be confined to the ‘storia della vita morale’:
108 Croce, Epistolario I, p. 173. The letter is dated 24th June 1933.
109 Croce, Etica e politica, p.320. Italics mine.
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La storia della vita morale o civile che si dica di un popolo ... questa 
sola sembra la sola senz’altro, la storia per eccellenza; e ci sono buoni 
motivi perche sembri cosi, quantunque la cosa non sia poi ... cosi, non 
potendosi concepire alcuna forma di storia che sovraneggi fra le 
altre.uo
In all historical narrations, for Croce, there is an ethico-political element 
which transcends the purely ideological one. Every historian starts his or her research 
with a set of values which, in one way or another, find their way to the narrative 
process. They are not to be equated with ideological or political positions, but are 
more akin to modes of cognition or sensibility, in the sense that they form value-laden 
dispositions which can be found in protagonists of left or right-wing ideologies. The 
ethical ‘mode’, therefore is akin to such a disposition or sensibility, and enters the 
interpretation of historical events as a mode of perception. Even the Marx of Capital, 
despite his claiming to write an ‘objective’ examination of the proletariat, had an 
ethico -  political thrust which automatically produced a sympathetic view of the 
working class as the essential element for building a fairer society. Croce, through the 
ethical ‘mode’, aimed to avoid the risk of falling into an implausible form of historical 
narration such as the purely materialistic one in which everything is reduced to the 
economic, or the racist one where history becomes the expression of a privileged race 
elected by nature:
una storia cosi intesa ... e coltivata liberera da due false storiografie 
che hanno avuto molta fortuna negli ultimi cinquanta anni e oggi si 
fanno sentire dappertutto, e, in alcuni paesi non solo predominano ma 
dominano senza rivali. Dico la concezione materialistica della storia e 
la concezione etnica o razzistica: la prima delle quali nega i valori 
ideali e morali e li considera come semplici maschere degli interessi 
economici; e la seconda li nega parimenti sostituendoli con pretesi 
valori naturalistici ... Sono due forme di ottusita storiografica che 
bisogna perseguitare non tanto allorche si presentano nella loro 
pienezza dottrinale di affermazione e di applicazione (perche in questi 
casi il loro assunto e evidente), ma nelle loro conseguenze meno 
appariscenti e piu insidiose, nelle disposizioni intellettuali che hanno 
ingenerato, nei pregiudizi che hanno introdotto e coi quali sviano e 
infiacchiscono il pensiero e contaminano i racconti dei libri storici.111
110 Ibid., p.318. Italics mine.
1,1 Ibid.
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It has to be stressed once again that Croce, in drawing attention to ethico- 
political history, did not wish to promote moralistic forms of history. The task of 
historians is not to discriminate between good or bad actions, which is a moralistic 
act. There is a crucial difference in Croce between the moralist and the historian:
II moralista infatti e un ... censore, che mira a tener saldo e inflessibile 
l’ideale morale ... esaminando la correttezza delle singole azioni e la 
maggiore o minore bonta dei singoli individui. Ma lo storico non bada 
alle serie delle belle azioni moralmente ispirate ed eseguite ... quanto 
al carattere delle azioni compiute e al significato che esse prendono 
nello svolgimento storico.112
If historians cease to investigate ‘il carattere’ and ‘il significato’ of the events there is 
no history but chronicle, which represents a non-critical account of events, and the 
very significance of the discipline is completely lost.
Hence, the ethico-political component is an essential element of any ‘true’ 
narration of events, which also requires the rhetorical, logical and economic to be 
complete. The ‘modes’ are distinct, each with their own disciplines and requirements, 
and the precise calibration of their respective weight in the narrative will depend upon 
the nature and the requirements of the historical period or events under scrutiny.
From all that has been maintained above, we can see that for Croce the ethico- 
political dimension of history was not necessarily an element which was palpably 
apparent in the narration on the surface of the text, although we will see that at any 
particular stage in a nation’s development this might become crucial. Moreover, it is 
also evident that the readings which have labeled Croce’s historicism as 
fundamentally conservative have really missed the genuine theoretical thrust and 
complexity of his discourse.
Another source of misunderstanding, connected with Croce’s alleged 
reactionary position, is his claim that history is always ‘positive’. Indeed in Teoria e 
storia Croce had stated that,
Un fatto che sembri meramente cattivo, un’epoca che sembri di mera 
decadenza non puo essere altro che un fatto non istorico, vale a dire 
non ancora storicamente elaborato, non penetrato dal pensiero, e 
rimasto in preda al sentimento e all’immaginazione.113
112 Ibid., p.320-21.
113 Croce, Teoria e storia, p. 65.
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The above extract does not suggest that all events are good, or that historians justify 
all atrocities in history with a sort of inert fatalism. Croce would say that, in this 
respect history is closer to tragedy than idyll.114 It simply points to the fact that 
historical events have to be approached in their genesis and consequences without 
moralism.115 Hence, historical events taken in themselves are ‘positive’, namely 
subject to a convincing explanation which requires an articulated epistemological 
framework aiming to avoid reductionism. Historical experiences such as the 
Inquisition, for example, might well tempt the contemporary historian to garnish his 
narrative with expressions of abhorrence, disgust, and even indignation.116 To Croce, 
such expressions would be moralizing ‘intrusions’ in the historian’s work rather than 
the serious application of the ethical ‘mode’. The latter would require an analysis of 
the general sensibility of the period, the location of the phenomenon in this setting, 
etc., leading to an understanding of the ‘logic’ of the events in the overall historical 
picture. An evaluation of the ethical climate of the period, and an assessment of the 
phenomenon in this context, moreover, is more likely to contribute to an 
understanding of how we have arrived at our own standards of morality than are the 
judgemental comments of the ‘committed’ historian. In this sense, all historical events 
are ‘positive’ in so far as they have contributed, in one way or another to the present.
Thus, ‘positivity’ in history does not imply the preference of specific historical 
facts to the detriment of others; it rather focuses on the need to find a valid elucidation 
of historical events. Indeed, our understanding the historical process in its complexity 
is one thing, but is our moral response to the events in which we are taking part is 
quite another. Consequently, Croce maintained that
L’azione pratica non si deduce da alcuna teoria ... Se l’azione pratica o 
politica fosse conseguenza di una teoria tutti dovrebbero operare per lo 
stesso verso, come tutti debbono accogliere una proposizione 
scientificamente stabilita ... Alla vanitosa prosunzione di possedere la
114‘Tutto il peggio del peggior passato puo sempre tomare, sebbene tomi in condizioni nuove ... 
l ’epopea della storia e piu vicina alia tragedia che all’idillio. II non aver ben meditato questa verita, e 
l ’essersi lasciati andare a quel fatuo e pericoloso ottimismo, e la principale cagione del presente 
pessimismo e della presente sfiducia, che innanzi alle diffkolta sopraggiunte ... invece di disfarsi delle 
proprie illusioni e correggere la propria leggerezza, non trova miglior partito che di disfarsi dell’ideale 
stesso e rimanere ... in una sorta di stupefazione, che rende l ’uomo preda delle forze che gli turbinano 
intomo.’ Croce, II carattere, p. 119.
115 The contradiction between this open perspective and Croce’s famous evaluation o f Fascism as a 
‘disease’ which is not part o f the historical ‘DNA’ o f Italy will be discussed in the next section.
116 See Croce, Filosofia della pratica, pp. 363-65 and 404-05.
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verita politica bisogna sostituire negli animi l’umile coscienza di 
rappresentare la parte che la voce interiore ci comanda.117
Furthermore, the ‘positivity’ of history also poses the question of the grading 
of historical events in terms of ‘importance’. The discrimination between relevant and 
irrelevant event, we have already seen, depends on the concerns and the priorities of 
our present. Since history is an open process defined by the ‘interests’ of the present, 
one cannot define aprioristically what is of historical significance and what is not. 
Croce would reiterate this point in II carattere della filosofia moderna where he 
maintained:
La storiografia conosce volta per volta, nell’individuality del fatto che 
ricostruisce e giudica ... e volta per per volta da e scema rilievo, 
colloca in primi e secondi piani e distribuisce luci e ombre come 
adopera l’artista.118
Historiography changes when the needs and interests of the society change, thus the 
problem, ‘e per lei [la storiografia] non di separazione e distaccamento di certi fatti, 
ma d iprospettiva.,U9
117 Croce, Cultura e vita morale, p.247.
118 Croce, II carattere, p. 260.
119 Ibid. Italics mine.
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4.4 CROCE’S HISTORIOGRAPHY (NAPLES, ITALY, AND EUROPE)
Having examined Croce’s theory of history in the years between the First World War 
and the consolidation of the Fascist regime, we can now turn our attention to Croce’s 
historical output. We will discuss here some of what are generally reputed to be his 
major works, namely Storia del Regno di Napoli (first published 1925), Storia d ’Italia 
dal 1871 al 1915 (published in 1926), and Storia d ’Europa del xix secolo (published 
in 1932) in relation to Croce’s philosophical views on historiography.
We are fortunate in having in Croce not only a thinker who wrote extensively 
on the theoretical issues associated with historical writing, but also a practitioner of 
the craft. His historical writings have not, however, always been seen as a straight 
application of his theoretical views. A further problem is that these disjunctures were 
seen in relation to questionable conceptions of what Croce’s theoretical views actually 
were. Croce himself, however, had begun his speculations on the nature of history in 
order to clarify his concrete research as a scholar of local history first and then of Italy 
and Europe. The aim of this section is to examine the issue of the relationship 
between Croce’s theory of history and his own historiographical output. It will be 
shown, for example, that, despite some undeniable limitations, Croce’s works on 
history display many aspects which have often been overlooked. We will find once, 
for example, that the frequent charge of conservatism does not do justice to the 
complexity of these works. This is not, however, to deny that there were tensions 
between Croce’s historical theory and its practice in the field of historiography.
One eminent historian who in some ways overrated the disjuncture between 
theory and practice in Croce’s historiography was Federico Chabod, the first director 
of the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, founded by Croce a few months before his 
death. Chabod wrote what can be regarded as a seminal study on the major historical 
works of Croce, with an article appearing in 1952, just after the philosopher’s death, 
entitled ‘Croce storico’. He maintained that Croce’s historical works were relevant 
despite their philosophical premises. In other words, for Chabod, we need to 
distinguish between Croce the philosopher of history, or metaphysician, who 
speculated about the final meaning of the discipline, and Croce as a ‘practical’ 
historian who had a strong sense of reality. Croce’s best historical works are, 
according to Chabod, the ones which have a stronger feel for historical detail and for 
the place of the individual in history. He found that Croce had had an instinctive sense 
of history:
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Prima ancora che nell’elaborazione concettuale, questo senso del
passato, cioe della storia egli lo aveva per cosi dire d’istinto, nel
120sangue.
Thus, in assessing Croce’s historiography Chabod selected as successful the moments 
in which
lo svolgimento storico [e] colto e fermato nelle figure, maggiori e 
minori, che di quello svolgimento sono attori, vivi attori, e in esso
191apportano ... qualcosa di personale.
The Storia del Regno di Napoli, for instance, according to Chabod, was written with 
great attention to the human element in history, ‘di continuo creata dagli uomini, vivi 
ciascuno nella propria umanita.’122 Here Croce had managed to ‘ricreare uomini vivi, 
corpi e anime individuali, che nel procedimento generale della storia stampano la
19^  •propria inconfondibile orma ed imprimono il proprio personate dramma.’ Also in 
Storia d ’ltalia, for Chabod Ta storia e riposta negli uomini e nelle loro coscienze.’124 
Since Chabod liked attention to detail in historical narration he found Storia
1 9 Sdell’eta barocca and Croce’s historical biographies very significant with their
1 9Aattention to Ta storia dei sentimenti, della vita spirituale e della vita morale.’ 
Indeed, Chabod maintained that Ta nota iniziale, caratteristica del gusto delle cose 
umane rimarra costante fino all’ultimo, e grazie ad essa Croce scrivera le sue pagine 
piu alte.’127 Thus, in Chabod’s interpretation,
a mantenere in altezza la storiografia crociana evitandole di cadere 
nell’astrattezza intellettualistica, e, anzitutto, quel senso del particolare 
umano di cui si e detto, cosi profondo e possente in Croce dalla prima 
alia piu tarda eta.128
120 F. Chabod, ‘Croce storico’, Rivista storica italiana, iv (1952), pp. 473-530, (p. 473).
121 Ibid., p.488.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., pp. 491-92.
124 Ibid., p.492.
,25A11 Croce’s historical biographies are about women: Lucrezia D ’Alagno, Eleonora Fonseca 
Pimentel, Luisa Sanfelice and Giulia Gonzaga, now in Vite di awenture, di fede e di passione, (Bari: 
Laterza, 1936).
126 Ibid., p.498.
127 Ibid., p.499.
128 Ibid., p.505.
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Nevertheless, for Chabod, Croce’s weakest book was La Storia d ’Europa, 
since it did not portray in a vivid manner the characters and protagonists of nineteenth 
century Europe, and lapsed into abstraction. Here, the ‘spiritual’ and ‘moral forces’
1 ?Qexisted in a sort of ‘other world’ separated from everyday life.
Chabod’s analysis has had an enormous influence on the interpretation of 
Croce’s work and established the tone of the debate about the originality and 
limitation of Croce’s theory of history. In Chabod’s view, on the one hand there was 
the ‘Hegelian Croce’ with his uncanny and rather outmoded philosophy of the spirit; 
on the other, there was ‘Croce the historian’ whose ‘instinct’, attention to detail, and 
‘sense of reality’ made him produce ‘good historiography’.
However, Chabod did not altogether give due weight to the complexity of 
Croce’s position. As a practising historian, with an unwavering empiricist faith in 
‘historical reality’ which could be ‘objectively’ grasped, he found Croce’s reflections 
on history ‘abstract’ and almost dangerous for the stability of the profession. That is 
why he saw Croce’s theory of history with suspicion:
In realta, mentre Croce sino al 1929 ammette ancora, almeno nel 
giudizio storico concreto, un problema storico in se, successivamente 
accentua sempre piu il ‘problema’ che lo storico si pone.130
What Chabod perceived as dangerous ‘metaphysical speculations’ were in 
reality fundamental issues which questioned the very core of historical inquiry and its 
function. We have seen how thoroughly Croce analyzed the different issues relating to 
history and historical narration and how he constructed a flexible epistemology in 
order to avoid any kind of reductionism. In reality, Croce’s inquiry on the nature of 
historical knowledge was never, not even in its earliest phase, abstract speculation. 
What Chabod identified as a regrettable mixture between (idealist) philosophy and 
history was precisely the original core of Croce’s thought which was not, as we have 
shown in the previous chapters, a metaphysical attempt to encase reality in the 
straightjacket of a ‘philosophy of history’. On the contrary, Croce aimed to question
129 Ibid., p.493.
130 Ibid., p.511.
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the image of a grand, unified single historical narrative, drawing attention to the
• 131various elements which constitute narrative and history.
Although Chabod may have been right to claim that there was a tension 
between Croce’s theory of history and the actual historiography, this did not exist in 
quite the terms expressed by Chabod. From our point of view, after having analyzed 
Croce’s reflections, we are quite disappointed to see that his innovative and open- 
ended views were not followed by a radically different form of historical narrative. 
Croce’s historical works appear more traditionally cast and more ‘cautious’ in form 
than his epistemology lead one to expect. Nevertheless, one can show that, despite the 
traditional stamp of Croce’s historiography, in the final analysis the tension between 
his theory and historiography is not as dramatic as it seems.
First, an element that has not been sufficiently explored in analyzing Croce’s 
historical works is the particular period in which these histories were written. As 
Hayden White put it, Croce
never intended his works to be read in vacuo. Most of his historical 
productions were collections of lectures or occasional pieces that had 
been delivered and were meant to be heard in special social 
situations.132
Indeed, it is not a coincidence that all Croce’s major historical works were conceived 
and published under the Fascist dictatorship, more precisely between 1925 and 1932 
when Fascism was establishing a totalitarian regime. These years coincided with 
Croce’s activity as the leader of the senatorial opposition to Mussolini before Fascism 
became completely dictatorial. To Croce, in an attempt to give Fascism historical 
validation, Mussolini and his entourage were recasting fundamental aspects of Italian 
and modem European history. New emphasis on the ‘glorious past’ of Italy, and 
consequent historiographical misrepresentation were the unavoidable outcome. 
Inaugurating a trend typical of all totalitarian regimes, Fascism isolated the elements 
of the past which were functional to its propaganda, providing an oversimplified and 
often distorted version of history. Thus, as scholar and citizen, Croce felt the need to
131 Recently a scholar, probably inspired by Chabod’s interpretation, has defined ‘La storia di Croce’ as 
‘espressiva innanzi tutto di un’idea filosofica, essendo fortemente condizionata da motivi teoretici.’ R. 
Ajello, ‘Croce e la storia meridionale’ in AA. W .,  Croce quarant’anni dopo (Pescara-Sulmona: 
Istituto Nazionale di Studi Crociani, 1993), p.373. This view on Croce betrays a blatant naivety about 
the profession and aims o f the historian, who is seen as a sort of archivist o f the ‘facts’ o f history.
132 White, ‘The abiding influence of Croce’, p. 121.
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‘rectify’ the records and find a solid historical foundation for the values of the young 
democratic society that Fascism had crushed. Indeed, in 1927, talking about his Storia 
d ‘Italia, Croce reported in his Taccuini’.
I legami di questa storia con il presente mi hanno portato a meditare e 
fantasticare dolorosamente sul presente e suH’avvenire. Mi costa uno 
sforzo penoso attendere alia storia che mi sono proposto di scrivere 
come dovere da adempiere verso i miei connazionali.1 3
In Croce’s view, this ‘dovere verso i miei connazionali’ did not involve 
betraying the historiographical methodology he had so far theorized, nor did it require 
the ‘committed’ kind of historical narrative of which he had up to now been critical 
for wearing its values on its sleeve. In a period of such mobilized cultural distortion it 
was a mistake to respond with distortions in the opposite direction. As Gramsci had 
also come to recognize, there are periods during which simply ‘telling the truth is a 
revolutionary act.’ There were, in other words, moments in history in which the 
normal activities even of the intellectual appear militant and subversive. Tyranny 
requires a polemical frame of mind to sustain the telling of truths which would in 
different times be innocent.
These points were made by Croce himself in an autobiographical postscript 
added to his Contributo alia critica di me stesso in October 1934, later collected in 
Etica e politica. He indicates that his historical and philosophical writings, written in 
a spirit of analytical rigour, have been given a new meaning by the times themselves:
Gli studi per se stessi, anche quelli che paiono distaccati dalla pratica, 
come il gusto per la poesia o la diligenza nell’indagine filologica, 
hanno sempre il potere di introdurre negli animi qualcosa di universale, 
che contrasta e tempera l’esclusiva caccia delle utilita immediate. Ma 
da allora i miei lavori filosofici e storici, senza cessar di essere 
severamente scientifici, perche mi sarei vergognato di abbassarli a 
strumento di partito o di contaminarli con tenderize pratiche, e, del 
resto, cosi facendo ne avrei inaridito in me la sorgente, si mossero con 
maggiore e piu rapida corrispondenza che per l’innanzi, secondo le 
nuove esigenze che la coscienza morale poneva e per apportarle la luce 
che essa domandava. Cio si vede nei libri dei quali ho fatto di sopra 
ricordo, segnatamente nei saggi sui concetti politici e nelle storie che 
sono venuto componendo, le quali, ideate gia prima della guerra, dai 
nuovi eventi ricevettero un’accentuazione che prima non avrebbero
133 Croce, Taccuini, 8 July 1927, p.28.
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avuto, oltreche una chiaroveggenza di certi processi che prima non 
sarebbe stata altrettanto limpida.134
But his insistence on analytical rigour has been misunderstood by opponents 
of Fascism who, in Croce’s view, wished to combat its distortions through the 
assertions of a ‘politicismo’ which would conscript the work of the scholars to the 
‘class interests’ of their own ideology:
Non sempre questo intento che ha guidato il mio lavoro e stato
compreso da coloro stessi che sono nel campo dell’opposizione, perche
molti di essi recano nel sangue lo stesso politicismo che e nei loro
awersari e stimano assai poco l’importanza della vita religiosa e
morale e della filosofia e della critica, e continuano a pensare la storia
come cieca lotta di interessi economici e sopraffazione compiuta ora da
• 1 uno ora da un altro partito o classe.
Such considerations are something of a dramatic illustration of the 
hermeneutical point we shall return to later in relation to the interpretation of history; 
namely the history (and philosophy) are constantly being reinterpreted and seen 
according to the perspectives of the epoch during which the analysis is undertaken.
If we return to Croce’s Storia d ’Italia we find a heightened consciousness of 
the fact in the writer himself that a ‘dovere verso i connazionali’ was its driving force. 
Undoubtedly, Croce gave a positive account of the first forty years of the newly 
constituted nation state. He called attention to the merits of usually unpopular 
politicians such as De Pretis and Giolitti and described the development of Italian 
socialism and the cultural ferment of the beginning of the twentieth century with great 
sympathy. However, the ‘praise’ of pre-Fascist Italian political life should be put into 
context. We have already mentioned Croce’s polemic with Fascism and its reading of 
the Risorgimento and early democratic Italy as ‘Italietta’ allegedly humiliated by the 
international treaties after the Great War. Democracy, along with demagogy and 
corruption, were reviled as opposed to the ‘order’ established by Mussolini’s regime,
134 B. Croce, ‘Note autobiografiche’, Etica epolitica, pp. 357-73 (pp.369-70).
135 Ibid., p.370.
136 ‘Giolitti is singled out for having adopted ... [a] spirit o f accommodation when ruling the country, 
and his hated policy o f trasformismo praised accordingly ... He is favourably compared with Crispi, 
who sought to provide a social consensus through abortive schemes for imperial expansion, whilst 
repressing political expression by socialists and liberals at home. In contrast Giolitti attempted to 
involve groups previously excluded from politics, and defuse both nationalism and Marxism.’ R. 
Bellamy, Modern Italian social theory. Ideology and Politics from Pareto to the Present, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987), pp.91-2.
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the real hero of the modem Italian state. According to Fascism, Italy had failed to 
accomplish its mission of promoting for itself a new role among international powers. 
In reality Fascism, in Croce’s interpretation, was undermining the very existence of 
the Italian state. Thus, Croce’s aim was to show his countrymen that the past fifty 
years were a real turning point for the development of a modem Italy. It was during 
this period that the Italian state had begun to develop its basic democratic structures 
and institutions. The economic, social, and political situation of the Italian kingdom 
was, for the philosopher, rich in positive and constructive changes despite its 
inexperience by comparison with the major European states.
The tone of Croce’s Storia d ’ltalia was deliberately polemical, a component 
which has often been underplayed despite the overwhelming amount of evidence 
available. Indeed, in a letter to the scholar Lombardo Radice, Croce wrote:
Lo spirito civile ... ha sempre riscaldato l’anima mia ... La verita e,
che nei tempi di calma i pratici curano la pratica e gli studiosi gli studi.
Nei tempi di crisi i pratici si smarriscono o vengono eliminati, e gli
• 1T7uomini di studio assumono la parte di critici.
In the previous section we have already shown that Croce’s writing was 
reacting to particular historiographical models, namely the ‘racist’ and the purely 
economic ones. The problem with these kinds of histories, in Croce’s view, was their 
inherent reductionism. The main example of this kind of history was to be L ’Italia in 
cammino by Gioacchino Volpe published in 1927, just after Croce’s work on Italy.
1 o o
Here Volpe, after charging Croce’s Storia d ’ltalia with lack of ‘objectivity’, 
described the advent of the Fascist Revolution as the inevitable outcome in a nation in 
which the liberal institutions had proven inadequate to bringing Italy onto the map of 
Europe. However, Croce never aimed to give an ‘objective’ and definitive historical 
account:
137 Croce, Epistolario,\ol. i, p. 141.
138 It is interesting to read what Volpe thought about the ‘good historian’: ‘Penso che lo storico ... 
debba, dimenticato il travaglio critico e polemico, le molte filosofiche distinzioni e defmizioni e 
costruzioni ... mettersi con cuore semplice, con animo religioso, davanti al flusso delle cose, quasi 
tuffarsi in esso per awertime con tutta immediatezza vibrazioni e moti, forze e direzione.’ G.Volpe, 
L'Italia in cammino (Milan: Treves, 1931), p.xx. This sketch o f the impartial historian who follows the 
‘flux o f  the things’ stands in stark contrast with Croce’s writing which, according to Volpe, is 
‘polemica politica ... in ogni pagina, in ogni rigo.’ Ibid.
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Ma dove mai mi sono sognato di affermare o pensare che un’eta storica 
sia un blocco compatto, una massa di ferro fuso, e che la caratteristica 
che se ne da escluda il moto della vita? ... E non ho io stesso 
dichiarato che non credo ai libri ‘definitivi’, ma solo a quelli che
i ™
stimolano nuove ricerche?
The image of the ‘blocco compatto’ suggests a monolithic conception of 
historiography, where narrative and ‘facts’ are ascertained for good, whereas for 
Croce historiography is an unending process which needs to be probed and verified 
whenever a new problem arises. Indeed, we have already seen that for Croce 
historiography is an open process which rejects Tutopia del libro completo e 
definitivo’:140
L’unica realta e, invece, quella storia che si suole chiamare 
discontinua, frammentaria, soggettiva e non mai definitiva, la storia 
come lavoro originale, che le menti filosofiche e critiche vengono di 
continuo producendo e di continuo correggendo e accrescendo.141
Hence, historiography, in Croce’s view, far from being characterized by a 
smooth and continuous process is ‘fragmentary’, ‘subjective’ and ‘never definitive’. 
Thus one cannot agree with the observation of Roberts:
Although movement is ‘dialectical’ ... the overall impression is one of 
smoothness and continuity. Croce seemed to view any historical 
process as a linear series of problems, solutions, and new problems ... 
Thus there is little room in Croce’s thinking for crisis, rupture, 
discontinuity or contingency, and little premium on attempts by 
historians to unearth the buried layers deposited in the past.142
We see here how even one of the most sympathetic commentators on Croce’s 
work has been misled. The role of the historian is a constant critique and correction of 
the concepts and contents of what we call ‘facts’. Consequently, the historian, 
according to Croce, does not establish the ‘Truth’ once and for all. He, or she, rather 
determines, in relation to the time and the conditions in which he or she operates, the 
validity of one reading in contrast to another. Croce made his position clear at the end 
of La Storia di Europa when, referring to his work, he wrote:
139 B. Croce, ‘Obbiettanti e seccatori’, La Critica, i (1930), p.80.
140 B. Croce, ‘L’utopia dell’opera complessiva’, La Critica vi (1938), pp. 482-83 (p.482).
141 Ibid.p.483. Italics mine.
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Queste, rapidamente qui accennate, non sono previsioni, a noi tutti e a 
tutti vietate non per altro che per essere vane, ma indicazioni di vie che 
la coscienza morale e l’osservazione del presente tracciano a coloro i 
quali, nei concetti direttivi e nella interpretazione degli eventi, del 
secolo decimonono, concordano con la narrazione datane in questa 
storia. Altri, con diversa mente, diversi concetti, diversa qualita di 
cultura, e diverso temperamento, presceglieranno altre vie, e, se cio 
faranno con animo puro, obbedendo al comando interiore, anch’essi 
bene prepareranno l’awenire. Una storia informata al pensiero liberale 
non puo, neppure nel suo corollario pratico e morale, terminare con la 
ripulsa e la condanna assoluta dei diversamente senzienti e pensanti. 
Essa dice soltanto a quelli che pensano con lei: - Lavorate secondo la 
linea che qui vi e segnata, con tutto voi stessi, ogni giomo, ogni ora, in
143ogni vostro atto.
These words stand in stark contrast to the widespread opinion of a dogmatic thinker 
with a conservative conception of historiography. Croce saw in Volpe’s interpretation 
the risk of legitimizing the existing dictatorship as the unavoidable outcome of a 
nation otherwise destined to perish. The further development of his ethico-political 
component and its emphasis on freedom (liberta) which drew attention to the fact that 
history also had strong moral and political dimensions, was aimed to correct this 
distortion.
Moreover, if we take into account the time and the conditions in which Croce 
wrote his major histories we can also better understand why he did not place emphasis 
on revolutions and upheavals. We have already mentioned Gramsci’s view on Croce’s 
major historical writings of the 1920’s and the early 1930’s. According to the Marxist 
thinker, Croce chose to focus on periods of consensus and intellectual direction: he 
began his History o f Italy in 1871, when the upheavals of unification were over, and 
his History o f Europe in 1815, with the ending of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
disorders. Indeed, Croce ‘overlooked’ the revolutionary periods in the history of Italy 
and Europe precisely because he wanted to contrast the ‘revolutionary culture’ of both 
Fascism and Stalinism, drawing attention instead to a democratic way of dealing with 
problems. Hence, Croce chose to focus on the ethico-political aspects of history, 
namely the values and principles embodied in particular institutions and times, which 
were central in the struggle against totalitarianism:
142 Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p.309.
143 B. Croce, Storia di Europa nel secolo decimonono (Bari: Laterza, 1932), pp.361-62. Italics mine.
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L’attivismo144 si dispiega irruente ... gl’impeti nazionalistici e 
imperialistic! scuotono i popoli vincitori perche vincitori e i vinti 
perche vinti; i nuovi stati, che sono sorti, aggiungono nuovi 
nazionalismi e imperialism^ l’impazienza per gli ordini liberi ha dato 
luogo a dittature aperte o larvate, e, per ogni dove, a desideri di 
dittature.145
It has been argued, and Gramsci did so forcefully, that Croce’s position, in 
‘removing’ the moment of revolution from his histories was just as ideologically 
motivated as the position of Marxists and others. This would be true if we could find 
in Croce’s writings the idea that Liberal institutions and practices are inherently the 
bearers of progress. Although he may well have been convinced that, in many ways, 
and in some situations, these were the best available during his own lifetime, he was 
careful not to nail any Liberal flag to the mast in search of the ‘great solution’. We 
should see Liberalism, rather, as the perspective which allowed him most flexibility of 
movement in his determination to avoid ‘metaphysical’ and deterministic principles of 
analysis. The idea, for example, that a revolution was likely to change the situation for 
the better was for Croce a deterministic one. A revolution taken per se was a historical 
fact which had to be followed by a period of ‘new order’ and possibly a new (form of) 
government or a period of restoration. However, revolution in itself did not guarantee 
any kind of positive outcome. Indeed, Croce maintained with obvious reference to 
modem times, that often revolutions were followed by a period of dictatorship with a 
consequent loss of freedom.146 We should not mistake Croce’s emphasis on reform 
instead of revolution for a denial of the historical significance of the latter. We have 
already abundantly referred to Croce’s preoccupation for the forces which shape 
history. Revolutions, tensions and struggle are, for Croce, a part of a history which 
cannot be ignored:
La superficialta dei correnti concetti storici [indusse] a cullarsi nelle 
credenze di un roseo progressismo, quasi che si fosse trovata una volta 
per sempre -  con le elezioni, i parlamenti e la libera stampa -  la via
144 In Croce’s writings o f the period, ‘attivismo’, ‘irrazionalismo’, and ‘antistoricismo’ are often 
synonyms for Fascism, which could not be used for obvious reasons of censorship.
145 Croce, Storia di Europa, p.352.
146 ‘Un esempio e in tal riguardo offerto dal periodo della Rivoluzione ffancese che si disse “del 
Terrore”, e che, creduto processo necessario nelle rivoluzioni a garanzia della loro attuazione e 
salvezza, come tale passo non solo nelle immaginazioni e nelle dottrine, ma anche nelle operazioni dei 
rivouzionari che seguirono ... con l ’effetto di suscitare, con la loro minaccia rivestita di storica 
necessita, un irrigidimento conservatore che si fa poi reazionario, e di ffapporre impedimenti a 
trasformazioni sociali e politiche.’ Croce, II carattere, pp.230-31.
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regia, le chemin de velours, per andare sempre innanzi accumulando 
comodi, ricchezze e potenza, accrescendo cultura e affinamento e 
splendore di civilta senza piu duri e crudeli conflitti e devastazioni, 
senza ne guerre ne rivoluzioni, senza rischi di ridiscese a forme 
inferiori di politica e di convivenza sociale, solo con lievi burrasche, 
tutte pacificamente da calmare e risolvere merce dibattiti e accordi. 
Senonche ... il cor so storico ... procede per vie scabrose, dirupi, tra 
sbalzi e cadute e ferite e morti.147
The conventional interpretation of a detached thinker linked with an elitist and 
optimistic vision of historical progress does not fit with these words. In reality, Croce 
did not espouse the grand liberal discourse of history as unstoppable advancement 
towards the good. The historical process is indeed full of ‘devastazioni’, ‘rivoluzioni’, 
‘sbalzi e cadute’. Croce did not conceive history as a display of a sort of abstract 
rationality. Our response to these disruptive events is historical and has to take into 
account the very situation in which it arises. The ‘rationality of history’ to which 
Croce referred was the sacrosanct duty on the part of the historian to make sense of 
past events avoiding the shortcuts of irrationalism, which was one of the most 
powerful voices of the time:
Finanche il pessimismo e le voci di decadenza, che si udivano nella 
letteratura di prima della guerra, si riodono ora, e vanno predicando la 
decadenza dell’Occidente o addirittura del genere umano, che, dopo 
aver tentato di assorgere dalla bestia all’uomo, starebbe per cadere 
(secondo i nuovi filosofi e profeti) nella vita ferina.148
Plurality of views and ideas, freedom of press and speech, liberal customs, 
were opposed to the ‘new world’ that people like Mussolini, and later Hitler, were 
envisaging. Furthermore, Communism or Catholicism were not excluded from 
Croce’s sharp polemic:
II comunismo, che era stato, sotto il nome di socialismo immesso nella 
vita della politica e dello stato e nel corso della storia, e ricomparso 
nella sua scissione e crudezza ... e, al pari dell’attivismo, ... quel 
comunismo e sterile e soffocatore di pensiero ...D ’altra parte, il 
cattolicesimo, che gia aveva tentato di pigliar forza attraverso 
l’irrazionalismo e il misticismo, ha accolto e viene accogliendo, in gran
147 Ibid., p .l 18. Italics mine.
148 Croce, La Storia di Europa, p.353.
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numero, anime deboli o indebolite e torbidi e malfidi awenturieri dello 
spirito.149
The three antagonists of an authentically immanent and free conception of history and 
culture were, in Croce’s interpretation, Fascism, Communism and Clericalism. All 
these ideologies need T’ideale di un ordine trascendente di verita, di regola morale e 
pratica, di congiunto govemo dall’alto’. 150 Indeed the philosopher acutely remarked 
that
II motivo spirituale che ha spinto ... a rifugiarsi nel cattolicesimo ... e 
stato non altro che il bisogno, nel tumulto delle idee e dei sentimenti 
cozzanti e cangevoli, di una verita fissa e di una regola imposta: ossia 
una sfiducia e una rinunzia ... all’esigenza di una continua critica e 
autocritica onde la verita si accresce e si rinnova.151
Thus, if we consider the particular political climate in which the histories of 
Naples, Italy and Europe were written, a period in which hostile battle lines were 
drawn up, we can understand, if not justify, the allegations concerning Croce’s lack of 
social and economic coordinates claimed by some critics.152 It has been shown in the 
previous sections that Croce did not deny the influence of elements such as the 
environment, society and the economy.153 However, the needs of the moment required 
a different kind of narrative which would avoid reductionism but at the same time 
focus on the values and ideas under threat. Indeed, it has rightly been maintained that 
all these histories were conceived as a ‘momento di organica opposizione al fascismo
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.,p.355.
151 Ibid., pp.355-56.
,52‘Croce, in armonia con il suo sistema filosofico, non era neanche sfiorato dai problemi del 
condizionamento estemo ... e del formarsi di strutture economiche, culturali e sociali capaci di favorire 
o ostacolare la produttivita materiale.’ Ajello, ‘Croce e la storia meridionale’, p.372.
153 The Storia di Napoli, for instance, remains a fundamental point of reference for the history o f the 
kingdom with its attempt to explain the history of southern Italy in a non-deterministic way, focusing 
on the cultural and political structures rather than finding a simplistic explanation in the adversity of  
the climate, or in the innate indolence of its inhabitants. Galasso has rightly pointed out that the 
originality o f Croce’s Storia di Napoli lies in this breaking with both a naive eulogy and a brisk 
dismissal o f the city: ‘In una storia, come quella napoletana, che la maggior parte della tradizione 
presentava, o con ingenuo campanilismo, quale alto modello di storia civile o, con radicale 
pessimismo, come una sciagurata successione di eventi rovinosi e di epoche infelici ... Croce 
ravvisava, grazie ai criteri metodologici da lui adottati, il filo preciso e lineare di uno svolgimento ... la 
formazione cioe della classe intellettuale nella quale gli sembravano riassumersi la “nazione 
napoletana” e la sua storia. Cosi la Storia del Regno di Napoli diventava la storia di una delle nazioni 
dell’Europa modema.’ Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p. 372.
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e alia sua politica antidemocratica’.154 The wide circulation of these works during the 
years of the dictatorship points to the polemical and in a broad sense ‘civil’ nature of 
their intent:
La liberta, che prima della guerra era una fede statica o una pratica con 
iscarsa fede, e caduta dagli animi anche dove non e caduta nelle 
istituzioni, sostituita dal libertarismo attivistico [fascismo], che sogna 
piu di prima guerre e sconvolgimenti e distruzioni, e irrompe in moti 
incomposti, e mira ad opere vistose ed aride, incurante o dispregiatore 
di quelle che si edificano con la meditazione e con l’amore, col pio
* • 155sentimento del passato e con la forza ardita che schiude Tawemre.
Although the notion will be fully discussed in the next chapter, we can 
anticipate that the idea of history as ‘history of liberty’ will be the framework within 
which Croce’s own historical writing should be understood. This was not a statement 
of belief in a metaphysical doctrine of automatic progress a la Hegel, as many 
commentators have argued, but rather a commitment to the value of freedom, and thus 
a serious analysis of whether the actual course of events is contributing or not to the 
historical realization of this value in the concrete world of human institutions:
e necessario l’esame, e in ogni caso il riesame, degli ideali che sono 
oggi accettati, o proposti, o tentati, per vedere se abbiano virtu di 
dissolvere o superare o correggere quello ch’e il nostro, e, insieme, per 
cangiare e modificare il nostro in conseguenza della critica in cui e 
passato.156
The above statement is perhaps the most substantial piece of evidence of Croce’s 
aversion to dogmatic thought represented by La storia di Europa. Generally speaking 
the book has been read as a sort of eulogy of 19th century liberalism. However, 
Croce’s aim was not to write in praise of the political life of Europe. Indeed, Croce’s 
reflections, in tune with his conception of history, were aimed at assessing or 
criticizising the limits of liberalism itself. Hence, the book should be read as an 
enquiry into the inability of liberals to construct a political project which could create 
a freer world, instead of a triumphalist statement of a political position.157 One cannot
154 T. Iermano, Lo scrittoio di Croce (Naples: Fausto Fiorentino, 1992), p.286.
155 Croce, Storia di Europa, p.354.
I56Ibid., pp.354-55.
157 David Ward, for instance, referring to Storia di Europa argues that, ‘Croce’s historicism ...far from 
being the dispassionate tracing o f the triumphant ideals o f idealism through the ages, becomes a
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dismiss Croce’s major historical works as an operation of political propaganda as 
many critics have done. We have already seen how Croce was too aware of the issues 
involving the historiographical process to fall into the trap of producing historical 
caricatures. Croce, in accord with his theory, simply drew attention to certain values 
which he found crucial in a particular period of time according to the needs of the 
situation. It has been justly remarked that
Long before Albert Camus had popularized a similar idea in The Rebel, 
Croce had held that it was the chief task of the historian to speak out 
for that side of thought and action suffering from neglect and abuse at 
the hand of the ‘simplificateurs’ who are always a threat to our 
humanity.158
It was against this simplification of history in its methods and aims that Croce 
exercised his powerful critique. The historian, in Croce’s view, cannot yield to the 
temptation of fanciful anticipations but rather must try to understand, in the light of 
the needs of the present the sense of our past:
Non la ‘storia del futuro’ (come i vecchi trattatisti defmivano la 
vecchia profezia) ma quella del passato che si ricapitola nel presente, e 
necessaria all’opera e all’azione ... e da tale necessita e nata anche 
questa rimeditazione che abbiamo voluto fare, e invitare a fare, della 
storia del secolo decimonono.159
In reality, if we adopt Croce’s own methodology and read his ‘histories’ 
within the polemical context in which they were produced, we find that the charge of 
conservatism against the philosopher does not do justice to the complexity of these 
works. In fact, Croce’s historiography could find a better ‘home’ in what we now call 
‘intellectual history’. Indeed, without excluding other kinds of history Croce was 
interested, in that critical phase, in the critique, promotion and development of certain 
critical ideas which would shape the history of Italy and Europe. Hence, Croce’s 
historiography was not intended to produce a eulogy of the good old times, but rather 
it aimed to criticize some of the simplistic views abounding in the historiography of
performance o f that triumph, and thus a mode of controlling and ultimately destroying rival 
ideologies.’ Antifascism, p.69.
158 White ‘The abiding influence’, p. 121
159Croce, Storia di Europa, p.354. Italics mine.
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his era, and also to explore the limits of 19th century Liberalism.160 This interpretation 
of Croce’s work, which is centred on his antimetaphysical method, has many 
advantages. First, it demonstrates that Croce’s ideas are better understood if we 
connect them with his theoretical views rather than with an alleged political agenda, 
or even worse a metaphysical plan that Croce was allegedly following. Secondly, it 
provides us with a more convincing explanation of the need Croce felt to engage with 
his times. Instead of a dogmatic philosopher struggling to hold on to his outdated 
system, we are offered the image of a thinker who was continuously challenging the 
prejudices and commonplaces of his contemporaries.161 Finally, this particular reading 
of Croce’s theory of history and historiography undermines the received interpretation 
of an Olympian philosopher wedded to an elitist and optimistic view of historical 
progress, who later in his life became increasingly pessimistic about the direction of 
history. Indeed, we will see that Croce’s reflections on the ‘end of civilization’ need 
not have given rise to the interpretative acrobatics they did in order to accommodate 
them to the ‘lapsed’ metaphysical Croce, since he never embraced the grand liberal 
discourse of automatic progress in the first place. Instead, Croce’s historiographic 
works focused on the application of his conception of ‘storia come storia 
contemporanea’. History, for Croce, is a preparation for action through the constant 
critique of the past, stimulated by the needs of the present, in order to be valuable and 
effective. Such a critique allows us to envisage a different world which could be freer. 
Thus, as we will see more specifically in the next chapter, history becomes a process 
of liberation both from the past and the limitations of the present.
Furthermore, one can admit that Croce’ theory was not always totally 
consistent with his writings without discarding, for this reason, his theory. In other 
words, one can suppose that whilst Croce expressed the need for a new kind of 
historiography, nevertheless he was not always able to fully apply it to his writing. To 
assume that there is a complete correspondence between Croce’s theory of 
historiography and his historical output is similar to presupposing that a professor of
160 Richard Bellamy has rightly maintained that, ‘Croce’s histories aimed to shed light on why 
liberalism failed to produce a moral consensus against fascism. His answer falls in two parts -the 
insufficiency o f liberal politics, and the inability o f liberalism to become a ‘moral ideal’- and are 
treated in the History o f  Italy and the History o f  Europe respectively. ’Bellamy, Modern Italian Social 
History, p. 91.
161 It has rightly been observed that, ‘Croce’s abiding enemy was fanaticism, whether the fanaticism of 
belief (which is the surrender o f the individual to supposedly eternal rules) or the fanaticism o f unbelief 
(which is the surrender o f the will to a slothful skepticism)’. White, ‘The abiding influence’, p. 121.
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ethics must be inherently good because he or she knows what it is to be morally good. 
To understand what Croce had in mind we must go beyond this misleading equation 
and be able to give due attention to his theories without being distracted by his 
occasional inability to translate these into historiographical practice.
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CHAPTER FIVE
‘ALL HISTORY IS CONTEMPORARY’
5.1 FASCISM AND POST-FASCISM
Before analyzing the further developments of the antimetaphysical method implied in 
Croce’s theory of history from the consolidation of Fascism to his death, we need to 
give a brief account of his opposition to the regime, since the philosopher’s 
intellectual and political views are closely related to this.
As we have seen in chapter one Croce’s attitude towards Fascism and his role 
in the aftermath of the Second World War contributed substantially to the view of 
Croce as a conservative philosopher detached from events. In reality, the philosopher 
played a major cultural and political role in the struggle against the Fascist 
dictatorship and the re-establishment of a democratic Italy. More importantly, Croce’s 
output, in line with his historicism, according to which the way in which historians 
analyze events is fundamentally a manifestation of the concerns of their own time, 
was markedly influenced by contemporary events: dictatorship, war, and the 
reconstruction of a democratic state.
It is well known that the philosopher initially saw in Fascism a potential for 
applying some remedies to the problematic political and social life of Italy. It is easy 
to condemn in retrospect some of Croce’s attitudes, but we should not forget that at 
the time there was no clear sense of the direction in which Fascism would develop.1 
Indeed, during the first months of Fascism many intellectuals considered the new 
political movement as a necessary provisional measure for reestablishing democracy. 
Before the elections of April 1924 Mussolini presented an image of relative 
moderation, and his government seemed to follow a strategy of caution in relation to 
both domestic and foreign affairs. Mussolini was also very shrewd in persuading the 
public that the restrictions on civil liberties were only a temporary measure in a 
situation of extreme emergency.
In two interviews to the daily II Giornale d ’ltalia, in October 1923 and 
February 1924, Croce expressed a sort of provisional benevolence towards Fascism, 
but at the same time criticized its ideological basis and its unorthodox methods
1 This is the opinion of the renowned historian Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell ’Italia moderna 
1700-1950 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1986), vol. 9, pp. 26-7.
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towards the opposition.2 Even the murder of the Socialist Giacomo Matteotti did not 
convince Croce that Fascism was turning into a dictatorship, although, according to 
his friend and biographer Fausto Nicolini, Croce felt ‘un disorientamento profondo’. 
Croce would later remember in his Taccuini his naivety in believing Mussolini’s 
speech after the assassination of the young political leader.
It is extremely difficult to ascertain the reasons for Croce’s attitude towards 
Fascism, but perhaps one of the causes can be found in the chameleon-like nature of 
the movement. Indeed, Fascism could appeal to different people from 
ultraconservatives to ‘revolutionaries’. Moreover, Gentile played a big role in 
reassuring Croce about the ‘liberal’ nature of the regime and although the two 
philosophers did not share the same theoretical views, Croce still trusted Gentile’s 
integrity and judgement. However, the best explanation of Croce’s choice was 
probably provided by the philosopher himself. In a letter to Gioacchino Volpe, dated 
28 August 1927, in which the historian accused Croce of having ‘civettato col 
fascismo’, he rejected the charges and explained the reasons for his initial openness to 
the regime:
Io non ho mai accarezzato, adulato, o in qualsiasi modo mi sono mai 
offerto al fascismo, e anzi ho lasciato cadere le avances a me fatte. Ho 
bensi in un certo tempo sperato e creduto che esso non si sarebbe 
allontanato dalla via liberale dell’Italia, e questo, se mai, e amore ... 
per l’ltalia.4
After this period of uncertainty, when Fascism displayed its true colours, Croce 
became a fierce opponent of the dictatorship. The notorious speech delivered by 
Mussolini at the Camera dei Deputati in January 1925 made it clear that the 
democratic system would not be restored, and would be replaced instead by a 
dictatorship. The already mentioned 1925 counter-manifesto, penned at the request of 
Amendola and many other antifascist intellectuals, is one of the first documents 
testifying to Croce’s firm opposition to the regime.
2 Bedeschi does not seem to notice that Croce’s interviews did not offer unconditional support to the 
regime when he maintains that, Tatteggiamento di Croce verso la nascita e l ’avvento del fascismo al 
potere fu non solo di benevola attesa, ma anche di calda simpatia.’ Bedeschi, La fabbrica delle 
ideologie, p.205. The charge o f philo-Fascism seems to me extravagant, particularly when we consider 
Croce’ later activity as an anti-Fascist.
3 Nicolini, Croce, p. 347.
4 Lettera a Gioacchino Volpe, Meana di Susa, 28 August 1927, Epistolario I, p. 140.
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Before the advent of Fascism Croce’s interest in active politics was very 
circumscribed, despite the fact he was made senator in 1910 and served as ‘Ministro 
della Pubblica Istruzione’ under Giolitti’s government in 1920-21. From 1925, 
however, the situation in Italy forced Croce to become more ‘political’. After the exile 
of leaders of banned political parties in 1926, Croce established himself as the main 
exponent of the opposition. Croce’s resistance, as scholars like Garin and Bobbio 
have noted, was primarily intellectual, although in the most critical phase for the fate 
of Italy, namely during the provisional government led by General Badoglio, the old 
philosopher did not hesitate to enter the political fray.
Croce attacked Fascism’s ideas refuting the theoretical foundations of the 
movement through a sharp and trenchant cultural critique. We have already analyzed 
the political importance of Croce’s historiography in opposing the Fascist 
interpretation of the Rinascimento and the fledgling Italian democracy. The other 
major instrument of criticism was represented by La Critica. Indeed, the journal 
became one of the most important voices speaking out against the dictatorship, 
although Croce never yielded to the temptation of turning the paper into an instrument 
of propaganda:
La Critica non era rivista politica e percio non e intervenuta nelle cose 
politiche propriamente dette, come tali che uscivano dai confini del suo 
programma, a discutere, per es., di legislazione, di economia, di guerra, 
di alleanze e simili, e ha contenuto le sue discussioni e polemiche nella 
severa cerchia teorica delle idee. Se qualcosa io ho dovuto dire o fare 
come cittadino nella politica attiva, l’ho detto e l’ho fatto in altra sede, 
nei giomali politici, quando mi era possibile, o nel Senato del Regno.5
On more than one occasion Mussolini tried to suppress La Critica but 
eventually kept it to show that freedom of speech was still alive in Italy.6 It was 
probably the international prestige of Croce, together with the schizophrenic 
relationship between Mussolini and culture, which contributed to the survival of the
n
paper. The historian Renzo De Felice has underlined the importance of the journal in
5 B. Croce ‘F ilosofi, universita, regime’, La Critica,vi (1940) p.424.
6 The Minister o f Education suspended the publication of La Critica in June 1940 with the preposterous 
excuse o f limiting the amount of paper wasted. Croce managed to restart the bimonthly.
7 It has been rightly observed that, ‘misure drastiche e risolutive avrebbero potuto avere una 
ripercussione sull’immagine del regime all’intemo e all’estemo piu costosa della relativa tolleranza con 
cui si finiva col comportarsi.’ G. Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.339.
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keeping the cultural and moral life of Italy alive, during the crucial years of the 
establishing of Fascism:
Da quanto siamo venuti dicendo ci pare che dovrebbe risultare chiara 
una cosa: la profonda differenza che negli anni tra il ‘29 e il ’34 vi era 
tra la posizione di B. Croce e del gruppo raccolto intomo alia ‘Critica’ 
e quella del resto del mondo intellettuale, non solo -ovviamente- di 
quello fascista o apertamente fiancheggiatore, ma anche di quella parte 
di esso che ... era in questo periodo ancora in un atteggiamento di non 
opposizione verso il regime, senza, per altro, accettame in toto la 
politica, specie per quel che riguardava la cultura. Rispetto a queste 
posizioni quella del gruppo crociano era l’unica chiaramente 
antifascista e che si traduceva in una precisa opposizione
o
immediatamente culturale e mediatamente politica.
However, although the philosopher may have been allowed more latitude as a writer 
than other opponents of Fascism, this was based more on the regime’s fear of 
increasing the antagonism of intellectuals rather on any sympathy Croce was showing 
towards the regime. And certainly, the thesis of a ‘cultural dictatorship’ enjoyed by 
the philosopher during this period is untenable.
First one needs to stress that the intellectual atmosphere during Fascism was 
not as monochromatic as some scholars still maintain. In reality, the ‘soft’ censorship 
of the regime allowed a certain amount of circulation for national and foreign culture. 
Giuseppe Galasso has rightly pointed out the cultural complexity of the period:
Istanze cattoliche, marxistiche, esistenzialistiche e neopositivistiche, 
interesse per la psicanalisi, per letterature e arti diverse da quelle 
tradizionali (basti pensare ai romanzi americani, al cinema, al jazz) ... 
agivano perfino all’intemo dell’area fascista.9
In fact, a closer look at the actual philosophical and cultural movements during 
Fascism shows the presence of a large number of cultural groups and philosophical 
movements. It is true that Croce’s philosophy represented a strong point of reference 
for many anti-fascists but in reality there were other forces, particularly the 
‘gentiliani’ and the neo-thomists, which had a much firmer control over the academic 
world.
8 R. De Felice, Mussolini il duce. Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936 (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), p.l 16.
9 Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.340.
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The influence of the Catholics in the philosophical field went back to the 
Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, founded in Milan in 1921 and approved by the 
Fascist regime in 1924. Padre Agostino Gemelli, a highly influential cleric, well- 
connected in the Vatican, was the rector of this fortress of Catholicism and a keen 
promoter of neo-thomist philosophy through the periodical ‘Rivista di filosofia 
neoscolastica’.10 The Catholic movement represented a direct response to both Croce 
and Gentile, considered corruptors of the young with their ‘atheistic’ philosophies.11 
The most conservative part of the Church, which eventually prevailed, saw in 
Mussolini the man who could re-establish the supremacy of Catholicism in public 
institutions. After the Concordat between the Italian state and the Vatican in 1929, the 
Catholic Church became the official religion of Italy and Catholic religious 
instruction was introduced as a compulsory subject in schools. This represented a 
severe defeat for those, like Croce, who had promoted a secular State within which 
the Church would have its place, but no particular privileged status. The Concordat 
had reversed the relationship between Church and State:
Non e ... l’organizzazione cattolica che si sottopone alia autorita dello 
stato ... ma e il Sommo Pontefice, la suprema e sovrana Autorita della 
Chiesa che dispone quello che giudica potersi e doversi fare per la 
maggior Gloria di Dio e per il maggior bene delle anime.12
Croce fiercely opposed the Lateran Pacts, together with only 6 senators, while
316 voted in favour. Croce, with his stress on the anti-metaphysical function of
1 ^  • • philosophy as a replacement for religion, was the mam target of the neo-thomists. In
1932 the philosopher’s works were put on the Index since they allegedly spread anti-
10 For a comprehensive account o f this period see the already quoted Cronache di filosofia italiana by 
Garin and V. Mathieu, La filosofia del novecento. La filosofia italiana contemporanea (Florence: Le 
Monnier, 1984).
11 During a philosophical congress in 1929 Gemelli maintained that ‘Nulla vi e piu di anticristiano ... 
di piu dissolvitore dell’idealismo, perche nessun sistema e tanto negatore del sentimento cristiano della 
vita quanto l ’idealismo ... In un paese cattolico, a giovani figli di genitori cattolici il maestro non ha 
diritto di propinare il veleno filosofico, il veleno dell’idealismo.’ G. Calogero, ‘Cronaca e morale del 
VII congresso nazionale di filosofia’, Educazione fascista, 7 (1929), pp. 390-400 (p. 392).
12 M. Bendiscioli, ‘I patti lateranensi’, in Terzo programma, ii (1962), pp.155-71 (p.155). See also the 
sharp remark of Garin: ‘La Conciliazione ... aveva dato forza ai neoscolastici, aprendo loro la 
possibility di costituire il fulcro del pensiero ufficiale italiano ... Con la rozzezza che lo caratterizzava, 
Mussolini parlava di conciliazione tra San Tommaso e Kant.’ Garin, Cronache di filosofia italiana,
p. 458.
13 ‘La religione nasce da un bisogno di orientamento circa la realta e la vita, dal bisogno di un concetto 
della vita e della realta. Senza religione, ossia senza questo orientamento non si vive, o si vive con
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religious ideas. The programme of Gemelli was the revival of an updated medieval 
philosophy in contemporary culture in order to legitimate the claims of the Church in 
the secular world. After a series of clashes between the ‘actual idealists’ of Gentile 
and the neo-thomists led by Gemelli, the catholic movement penetrated Italian 
academia, establishing itself as a strong current which counterbalanced the power of 
the ‘gentiliani’. Croce, who had refused any kind of university career before and 
during Fascism, was left out. It is important to stress the fact that Croce’s philosophy 
never enjoyed a status of hegemony in Italian academia.14 Croce’s ideas never 
penetrated the universities as a ‘philosophy’, namely as a system of thought. Indeed, 
some critics have pointed out that Croce’s role was inflated by the couple Gramsci- 
Togliatti who chose the Neapolitan philosopher as the exponent of a certain 
philosophical perspective.15 In fact Croce’s role was far from being as all-pervasive as 
the two Communist leaders maintained.
We have already seen that as early as 1914 Croce’s already shaky intellectual 
empathy with Giovanni Gentile collapsed and that from that point the two thinkers 
took different paths. However, the friendship between the two philosophers ended 
abruptly only when Gentile adhered enthusiastically to the Fascist regime.16 This was 
the dramatic epilogue to a long period of reciprocal criticism. From 1926, the year of 
the suppression of freedom of the press, Gentile’s position in academia was 
increasingly strengthened whereas Croce was ostracized by virtually all public 
institutions. The pressure of the Catholics on the one hand, and the attack from the 
academic world on the other, did not make Croce’s life easy.
Another commonplace about the period concerns Croce’s alleged aloofness 
from the dramatic events during Fascism. However, a look at the Taccuini di lavoro, 
published in a limited edition by the Istituto italiano per gli studi storici in 1987, gives
animo diviso e perplesso, infelicemente. Certo, meglio quella religione che coincide con la verita 
filosofica che una religione mitologica.’ Croce, Cultura e vita morale, pp.34-35.
14 The simplistic view o f an idealistic hegemony in the first fifty years o f twentieth century Italy is still 
very strong. See, for instance, G. Semerari, ‘Neoidealismo e fascismo’ in Novecento filosofico italiano 
(Naples: Guida, 1988), pp.47-67.
15 See, for instance F. Restaino who argues that the whole cultural propaganda o f Togliatti was focused 
on the Italian tradition ‘nella strategia volta a ricostruire storicamente, per un confronto politico- 
filosofico di rinnovamento, la tradizione tradizione De Sanctis-Spaventa-Labriola-Croce-Gentile- 
Gramsci.’ F. Restaino, ‘II dibattito filosofico in Italia (1925-1990)’ in G. Fomero, F. Restaino, Storia 
della filosofia (Milan: TEA, 1996), p. 306.
16Croce’s last letter to Gentile is dated 24 October 1924: ‘Caro Giovanni ... da molti anni ci troviamo 
in un dissidio mentale, che per altro non era da riflettersi sulle nostre relazioni personali. Ma ora se n’e 
aggiunto un altro di natura pratica e politica, anzi il primo si e convertito nel secondo; e questo e piu 
aspro. Non c ’e che fare.’ Croce, Lettere a Giovanni Gentile, p. 670.
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us a completely different picture of the philosopher. For example, in 1926 Croce’s 
house was vandalized during the night by a group of camicie nere\
Stanotte alle 4, siamo stati svegliati da un gran ffacasso di vetri rotti e 
di passi affrettati: era una dozzina o una quindicina di fascisti, venuti 
con un camion a devastarmi la casa: hanno rotto tutti i vetri, sfondato 
quadri e spezzato vasi e mobili delle stanze in cui sono passati.17
The same year Croce recorded his distress at the suppression of freedom of speech. 
The following passage is fundamental for giving a more faithful picture of Croce’s 
feelings:
Penoso senso di soffocamento per la soppressa liberta di stampa, 
ribellione deH’animo a questa ingiustizia penosa e ipocrita insieme. Ho 
riesaminato ancora una volta la situazione presente; e il riesame mi 
avrebbe lasciato nella depressione e nella tristezza.18
Terms such as ‘soffocamento’, ‘depressione’ and ‘tristezza’ are terms that hardly 
square with the serene and detached observer that so much Crocean folklore has 
disseminated. The Taccuini are interspersed with this sense of angst. Even the alleged 
historical optimism of Croce, namely his supposed absolute certainty of an end of 
Fascism, is completely disproved:
La sera e parte della notte in dolorosi pensieri, ormai consueti. Ora non 
e piu possibile lotta di opposizione, per la soppressione dei giomali. Al 
senato daro voto contrario alle leggi teste presentate; e sara tutto. Ma 
non e possibile nemmeno accettare la situazione; e non e dato morire, 
pei doveri che legano alia famiglia, agli studi, alia societa. Dunque 
bisogna vivere come se il mondo andasse o si avviasse ad andare 
secondo i nostri ideali.19
Only the thought of death could relieve Croce from the anguish, as the following 
extract shows:
Resisto tuttora perche ho esempio da dare ... E nondimeno mi sento 
stanco e l’immagine della morte mi appare come il solo riposo che mi
17 Croce, Taccuini, p.503.
18 Ibid., pp.441-42.
19 Ibid., p.452.
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possa ripromettere, e, sulla caduta di tutte le speranze, una certezza che
• • • 20si riveste di una pallida luce di gioia.
The animated political life of the first twenty years of the century had been replaced 
by a climate of suspicion and deceitfulness. Elena, Croce’s daughter remembers in her 
Ricordi familiari how the situation in casa Croce had changed:
I primi anni del fascismo incisero immediatamente e radicalmente 
nella vita sociale [di Croce], portando percio mutamenti di abitudini 
che allora furono angosciosi ... Qualche tempo dopo il delitto 
Matteotti cominciarono le voci sulle Tiste’ che in questura si tenevano 
dei nostri visitatori, le sorveglianze notate o immaginate dei poliziotti, 
che effettivamente dovevano poi per anni sostare sulla nostra 
portineria, tanto da divenire presenze quasi domestiche.21
Croce’s life during Fascism, far from being a cocooned one, was marked by an
incessant concern for Italy, its people and its cultural life. The Taccuini help us to
form a better picture of both the thinker and the man. Here is Croce’s account of one 
meeting in Parliament at the end of 1928:
A Roma ... ho fatto atto di presenza in aula. Pena di rivedere i piu dei 
senatori: molti paurosi e sfuggenti ogni discorso e guardantisi intomo a 
ogni parola un po’ libera ... altri esibenti distintivi di una nuova fede, 
specie fra coloro che furono ultrademocratici, repubblicani, massoni, 
socialisti. Una delle esperienze piu singolari e dolorose di questi tempi 
e la prova che si ha che uomini con i quali si conviveva e coi quali non 
si dubitava di essere d’accordo in certi concetti e in certi sentimenti 
essenziali, che risonavano sulle loro labbra e si mostravano nei loro atti 
esteriori, non li avevano in cuore dove noi li avevamo e li abbiamo 
ritrovati viventi e imperiosi. Credevamo di conoscerci e non ci
conoscevamo ed eravamo estranei, uomini di diversa razza. Ora la
diversita e venuta fuori.
The Taccuini also suggest that Croce’s role as an opponent of Fascism was not 
without danger. During the dictatorship not only was the philosopher stalked by the
20 Ibid., p. 128.
21 E. Croce, Ricordi, p.9 and p.22. See also Galasso: ‘Corrispondenti, amici, visitatori, chiunque 
insomma prendesse in qualche modo contatto con Croce fii schedato. Di lui stesso fu sorvegliata ... la 
casa e furono seguiti i movimenti e i viaggi. La circolazione delle sue opere, cosi come ‘La Critica’, 
furono oggetto di attenzione particolare.’ Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.337.
22 Ibid., p.51.
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police, but also his correspondence dutifully inspected, his moves checked by officials 
in direct contact with Mussolini, as the following passage shows:
Sono andato a parlare con l’Alto Commissario Castelli per il 
passaporto da rinnovare ... e gli ho mostrato di essermi aweduto cosi 
della sorveglianza e pedinamento che intomo a me esercita la polizia, 
come nella mia corrispondenza che e tutta aperta e rincollata e non
• -i • 23sempre mi e nconsegnata mtera.
Moreover, Croce’s travels abroad were often an opportunity to meet with exiles, as in 
the case of Luigi Sturzo and the Rosselli brothers in Paris.24 Croce was also connected 
with the Turin anti-fascist movement (his wife was from the capital of Piedmont). 
Among his friends there were Luigi Einaudi, Francesco Ruffini, Gioele Solari and 
Piero Gobetti. Ada, Gobetti’s wife, was helped financially by the philosopher after the 
death of her husband.25
In 1934, after refusing the ‘tessera fascista’, Croce was expelled from all
• Of i  * •cultural organizations and excluded from academia . The regime was growing more 
and more hostile to any kind of opposition, whether political or intellectual. The racial 
laws, approved in 1938, left Croce angry and frustrated:
Cio che mi opprime veramente e la condizione generale degli spiriti in 
Italia e fuori d’ltalia; la menzogna, la malvagita e la stupidita in cui 
siamo come immersi e quasi sommersi; gli atroci delitti ai quali si 
assiste impotenti ... com’e ora la fredda spoliazione e persecuzione 
degli ebrei, nostri concittadini, nostri compagni, nostri amici, che per 
l’ltalia lavoravano e l’ltalia amavano ne piu ne meno di noi.27
This passage, along with a number of articles published at the time, make it difficult 
to believe that Croce had anti-Semitic feelings as even discerning scholars such as
23 Ibid., p. 138. See also Iermano: ‘Accanitamente pedinato dalla polizia politica, Croce, airindomani 
del 1925, divenne un vero e proprio esule in patria.’ Lo scrittoio di Croce, ibid., p.258.
24 In December 1928 Croce paid a visit to ‘la tomba del povero Gobetti.’ A few days later he met don 
Sturzo, the exiled leader o f the partito popolare. See Croce, Taccuini, p.94.
25 For more details see S. Caproglio (ed.), Carissima Ada-Gentilissimo senatore. Carteggio Ada 
Gobetti-Benedetto Croce, 1928-1952 (Turin: Franco Angeli), 1990.
26 ‘Leggo sui giomali che un nuovo decreto impone il giuramento di fedelta al regime a tutti i 
componenti delle accademie, delle societa storiche ecc. Ed eccomi gia virtualmente fuori da tutte 
codeste istituzioni.’ Croce, Taccuini, p.393.
27 Ibid., p. 128.
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David Ward have more or less covertly suggested.28 We should not forget that Croce 
wrote references for scholars like Attilio Momigliano, victim of racial discrimination 
who hoped to obtain a teaching position in Oxford29 and Leo Spitzer, a Jewish 
professor of Romance literature expelled from the University of Koln.30 Croce never 
publicized his acts of solidarity towards fellow intellectuals, and only very recently 
with the reading of his diary have we been able to fully appreciate his commitment to 
the cause of anti-Fascism. Croce’s way of manifesting his opposition to Fascism was 
less theatrical than that of other intellectuals but nonetheless essential for the 
antifascist cause.
The activity of Croce as one of the main leaders of the antifascist movement 
continued through the 40s to the end of the war. It would be a big mistake to 
underestimate the cultural and political role played by the philosopher during the 
years of the ‘Resistenza’. Indeed, Croce’s house became a centre of political 
opposition and the philosopher acted as a privileged interlocutor between the Allies 
and the new government which was taking shape during the fall of the Fascist regime. 
During the war Croce travelled around Italy making contacts with antifascist friends 
in Rome, Florence, Turin and Milan. Moreover, if the role of general Badoglio in 
Mussolini’s defeat in July 1943 is widely recognised, the part played by Croce, 
Bonomi, Casati, Sforza and the group of the elderly Tiberali’ is still underestimated. 
Galasso has recently drawn attention to the fact that
Sfugge, per lo piu, anche agli storici piu attend, l’alta misura in cui la 
ripresa politica dell’Italia dalla caduta del fascismo in poi sia stata 
opera di uomini gia giunti alia vecchiaia, o alle sue soglie, che 
appartenevano alle generazioni maturate nell’Italia pre-fascista.31
28 Ward attributes the following sentiments to Croce: ‘Insofar as Jewish culture does not share in the 
eternal and common motives o f humanity, it is to be considered a worrisome and incompatible 
outsider.’ Ward, Antifascism, pp.81-82.
29 ‘E venuto a Firenze Attilio Momigliano, un altro degli ebrei scacciati dalle cattedre; e ho scritto per 
lui un certificato da servirgli per la ricerca di un posto all’estero.’ Croce, Taccuini, 15 January 1939, 
p.1232.
30 It is worth reporting Croce’s letter to Nicholas M. Butler, president o f Colombia University, dated 
18th May 1933: ‘Nella deplorevole persecuzione che si sta facendo in Germania contro i professori 
ebrei, e stato congedato tra molti altri, il prof. Leo Spitzer, della universita di Koln. Lo Spitzer e uno 
dei maggiori rappresentanti della filologia romanza in Germania e ha scritto una serie di importanti e 
originali lavori sull’argomento ... A quarantasei anni, egli, che ha moglie e figli, e gettato ... sul 
lastrico. Mi rivolgo a Lei. Non si potrebbe chiamarlo alia Colombia University o in un’altra universita 
o istituto americano? Sarebbe un acquisto scientifico e, al tempo stesso, un atto di umana ffatellanza. ’ 
Croce, Epistolario I, p. 171.
31 G. Galasso, ‘Quell’Italia divisa del vecchio Croce. II carteggio 1943-47’, Corriere della Sera, 3 
September 1999.
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In reality, these elderly individuals who, in the eyes of fresh politicians like Togliatti, 
represented the compromised old guard, carried out incessant mediating operations 
with Roosevelt, Churchill, and many other British and American military and political 
leaders, as well as liaising with the newly restored parties in Italy, travelling from one 
city to another. We should not forget that at the time Croce was in his eighties.
When the dictatorship ended Croce was among the first to realize the 
limitations imposed on the country by its lowly status as co-belligerent. Hence, he 
used his prestige and rhetorical skills to strike a better deal for his country, which at 
the postwar negotiating table was penalized for its former alliance with Germany. It is 
in this context that the famous speech given by the philosopher at the Eliseo Theatre 
in September 1944 should be read. Here Croce maintained that Fascism had to be 
considered a parenthesis, or a temporary disease, in the development of an otherwise 
healthy Italian democracy. Many detractors have read the speech as palpable evidence 
of Croce’s flawed historicism. Ward, for instance, maintains that in the Eliseo speech 
there are,
strong echoes ... of one of the cornerstones of Croce’s thought: namely 
that history is a rational, positive discourse that holds within itself the 
necessary creative energies to self-correct its own errors.32
Moreover, Ward continues:
Informing all of Croce’s sympathies and antipathies, valorization and 
condemnations ... is his overwhelming desire to distinguish between 
the living and the dead. Once the dead had been dispensed with and 
their living elements arrogated, Croce could then push Italy into line 
with whoever appeared at a given moment in time to be history’s 
leading light.33
Finally Ward concludes that
rather than distortions of Croce’s thought, the main points of his 
speech -  the integrity of Italy, Italians, and the Italian tradition; 
Fascism as an invading foreign virus- represent versions ... of
32 Ward, Antifascism, p.78.
33 Ibid., p.83.
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positions he had already elaborated upon or were implicit in his earlier
• • 34wn tings.
In reality, Ward’s argument is flawed in at least three respects. First, we have seen 
that Croce never maintained that history was a continuous and rational progress 
towards the best. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the historical process could 
take completely different paths from those that we expect (‘il corso storico... procede 
per vie scabrose, sbalzi e cadute e ferite e morti’),35 and explicitly denied that progress 
was the inevitable outcome of history.
Secondly, Croce did not argue that history could be given a final verdict. He 
conceived of historical judgement as a continuous reassessment to be verified in the 
light of the present. What we consider the ‘living elements’ of a given historical cycle 
might well change with our needs to confront the past under a different optic. The task 
of the historian is to construct a plausible narrative, find a rationale which gives a 
plausible account of the events if one does not want to slip into the murky waters of 
irrationalism. In any case, to reduce the complexity of Croce’s historicism to a slogan 
(‘what is living and what is dead’) is an easy and unproblematic way of disengaging 
from a serious analysis.
Thirdly, Ward confused Croce’s theoretical views on history with the 
philosopher’s legitimate concerns, as an Italian citizen, for the future of his nation. In 
June 1944 in a speech for the first congress of the ‘Partito Liberale’, Croce had 
reminded his audience of the ever-present dangers of a dictatorship:
Giova non dimenticare mai che l’attrattiva delle dittature e delle piu 
comuni e tenaci o sempre risorgenti, e, nonostante la fioritura affatto 
recente, nella filosofia, nella letteratura e nella politica, delle figure dei 
superuomini, dei duci, dei furer e di altrettanti personaggi che, sotto 
nomi nuovi, sono di tutti i tempi, essa risponde a una forma di mente 
semplicistica, restia all’intelligenza, della complessita della vita e della 
storia ... per modo che sempre si toma all’invocazione dell’uomo 
straordinario ... o anche del bonario onest’uomo e pater familias ... 
che prenda tra le sue mani il govemo dei popoli e metta pace e 
soddisfazione a tutti.36
34 Ibid., pp.77-78.
35 Croce, II carattere, p .l 18.
36 B. Croce, ‘II partito liberale, il suo ufficio e le sue relazioni con gli altri partiti’, Scritti e discorsi 
politici (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1993) vol. i, pp. 129-30.
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We can see that for Croce Fascism, far from being a ‘temporary disease’, was the 
Italian incarnation of the permanent risk democracies run, since it represents a quick 
and simplistic answer to the complexity of life and history. Moreover, we have 
remarked that in La storia d ’ltalia Croce had sought to comprehend the reasons for 
the downfall of the ‘ideale liberale’ and the victory of Mussolini and Fascism. Croce 
had clearly stressed a number of problems inherent in Italian cultural and social life 
(growing nationalism, hostility for Germany, lack of social unity) which had led to a 
regression of the flegdling Italian democracy. This analysis was in tune with his 
dictum according to which every history is a contemporary one.
A few months after his speech for the Liberal party, during a gathering 
attended by all major political leaders at the Eliseo theatre in Rome, the emergency of 
the situation required a powerful speech, one which was not directed to a group of 
academics and did not aim to be a piece of historiography. Croce was addressing his 
speech to a country fighting a civil war and it was in this context that he defined 
Fascism as a ‘parenthesis’ or ‘virus’ in Italian history. Most importantly, there was an 
international audience to be convinced, if the Italians wanted support. Croce’s 
objective in the Eliseo speech was the abolition of the clauses of the armistice that 
significantly reduced Italy’s autonomy and let foreign powers dominate internal 
affairs, consigning the Italian governing coalition to the margins. Hence, to extend the 
simplistic argument of Fascism as a ‘virus’, used by Croce in that particular speech, to 
his whole theory of history is a gross misunderstanding of his intentions. One should 
not confuse Croce’s theoretical posture, which clearly aimed at a non-reductionist and 
open analysis of history, with a quite contingent and politically charged attempt to 
portray Italy and its culture in a better light in a politically highly-charged forum.
A similar kind of argument could be applied to those who claim that Croce’s 
philosophy is inherently a conservative one. We have seen the originality of Croce’s 
insights on the theory of history and historiography, and how unconvincing is the 
argument which finds conservatism the main trait of Croce’s speculations. In a letter 
to Togliatti dated 31 December 1945 Croce expressed his amazement at finding 
himself among the ranks of the reactionaries, or worse still, the philo-Fascists:
Le diro ... che provo un curioso effetto ... di maraviglia ...
nell’udirmi talvolta designare come ‘reazionario’ o come ‘filofascista’.
La modestia e il pudore mi vieta di rammentare che io sono stato il piu
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radicale ... rivoluzionario nella vita mentale e culturale italiana della
37prima meta del novecento.
After the Second World War Croce was active as a political leader in the 
Partito Liberale and his involvement in active politics made him an easy target for 
similar allegations. In reality, one needs to make a clear distinction between Croce as 
a member of the Italian Parliament and leader of the Partito Liberale and Croce as 
theoretician of history and historiography. It is true, to be fair, that Croce himself 
encouraged this confusion when he defined the Liberal party as a pre-partito, namely, 
not a run-of-the-mill party but one which would guarantee the stability and freedom 
of parliamentary life, almost exclusively through its intellectual strength for which 
reason it did not concern itself too much about its small membership. However, if 
this attitude on the one hand betrays a certain naivety on the part of Croce in matters 
of active politics, on the other hand it shows that he did not have a strong political 
ideology to defend, unlike the Communists or the Christian Democrats, for instance. 
Had Croce been a man of political aspirations, he could have exploited his prominent
• .  • • 3 9position to be appointed Prime Minister or even President of the Italian Republic. 
The truth is that Croce’s political involvement was dictated by the critical situation in 
which Italy found itself. It is within this context, namely the chaos that followed the 
fall of Fascism, and the uncertain future of Italian democracy, that we need to take 
account of his more explicitly political statements.
37 M. Griffo (ed.), D a li’‘Italia tagliata in due’ a ll’Assemblea Costituente. Documenti e testimonianze 
dai carteggi di Benedetto Croce (Bologna: II Mulino, 1998), p.254.
38‘Non ci si inganni sul nome di “partito liberale”. Questo ... dovrebbe paradossalmente definirsi un 
partito senza partito.’ Croce, ‘ Movimento liberale e partiti politici’ in Scritti e discorsipolitici, p. 88.
39‘Nel giugno del 1946, dovendosi procedere all’elezione del presidente prowisorio della repubblica, il 
Croce oppose una volta ancora un rifiuto cortese ma reciso a quei molti rappresentanti dei diversi 
partiti che avrebbero voluto portarlo lor candidato.’ Nicolini, Croce, p.416.
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5.2 History and action: Croce’s last phase
The last phase of Croce’s reflections on history goes from the period covering 1938, 
the year of the publication of La storia come pensiero e come azione to the ten lessons 
he gave for the Istituto italiano per gli studi storici in 1951, the year before his death. 
The most important works on the theory of history in this last period are: La Storia 
come pensiero e come azione published in 1938 and II carattere della filosofia 
moderna, based on a series of articles which appeared in La Critica and published in 
1941.
The present section aims to show a continuity in Croce’s thought in so far as it 
was in line with his antimetaphysical method in history and historiography. He 
reinforced and developed it according to the conditions and the problems of his time. 
History became closely related to action and liberty, action seen as the application of 
research into history, and liberty the leading principle. Moreover, it will be shown that 
in Croce these developments, despite some external similarities, are not like those of 
Hegel or Marx. For Croce, past history does not determine present action, but 
prepares it.
A group of prominent critics, by contrast, sees this final phase of Croce’s 
output as reflecting a drastic change of course. Gennaro Sasso, for instance, talks 
about the crumbling of the imposing structure of the Filosofia dello Spirito. 
According to the prominent Crocean scholar, the philosopher was forced to face the 
internal contradictions of his system.40 Also, the historian Galasso talks about a 
‘seconda filosofia dello spirito’ characterized by a ‘profondo ripensamento 
teoretico’.41 Galasso sees this phase as a conservative involution42. Croce, allegedly, 
embraced a 19th century conception of Liberalism.
As a matter of fact, the term ‘storicismo assoluto’, used by Croce to define this 
phase of his research, has been a major source of misunderstanding, often being read
40‘Lungo l’intero corso della sua vita, Benedetto Croce s ’impegno nella difesa, nella rielaborazione, nel 
perfezionamento del “sistema” ... Era una visione complessa e ... non semplice, quella che in tal modo 
Croce aveva messa al mondo... Fondata, in ultima istanza, sulla sintesi della forma e della correlativa 
materia, si comprende bene che era nella saldezza di questa che la concezione crociana aveva il suo 
fondamento e trovava la sua garanzia. E anche si comprende che la sua luce si sarebbe offuscata, se 
non addirittura spenta, se per qualche ragione la sintesi avesse conosciuta la sua crisi e i suoi termini si 
fossero allontanati l ’uno dall’altro.’ G. Sasso, ‘Quello spirito cosi lacerato’ in La Repubblica, 19 
November 2002.
41 Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.390.
42 ‘II pensiero storico di Croce, e piu in generate, il suo pensiero tout court fu ... un pensiero 
‘conservatore ... Quella di Croce fu una resistenza che si svolse sul mero piano culturale e che ne 
tradiva chiaramente la connotazione ... liberal-borghese.’ Galasso, Croce e lo spirito, p.358.
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as the ultimate imposition of a straightjacket on history. Some critics (Pietro Rossi, 
Fulvio Tessitore and Giuseppe Cacciatore in particular) relate absolute historicism to 
a Hegelian Weltanschauung.43 Furthermore, even more perceptive critics who 
emphasized the openness of Croce’s theoretical enterprise, such as Roberts, ended up 
considering ‘storicismo assoluto’ as an all-encompassing vision of reality, namely a 
piece of metaphysics instead of an attempt to free us from any grand narrative.44
However, ‘storicismo assoluto’ does not refer to a metaphysical categorization 
in Croce’s intentions. On the contrary, it is the ultimate rejection of all metaphysical 
plans and the acknowledgement that history considered both in its course and 
narrative is a totally immanent process. Croce’s historicism ultimately argues that we 
need to get rid of all-encompassing and reductionist explanations of reality and accept 
history as the main tool for liberating ourselves from the past, live the present, and 
prepare the future in a non-deterministic way. This can be achieved only when one 
accepts that knowledge, far from being a static corpus of ideas handed down in the 
correct form from generation to generation, is in fact more like a patchwork of notions 
needing to be re-thought, re-interpreted and re-lived according to the changing fabric 
of concrete historical situation. In this context, Croce talked about history as the only 
‘religion’ now viable for modem men and women in a world where the transcendent 
has disappeared and has been replaced with an immanent and anti-metaphysical 
conception of reality.
Indeed, it has been shown that Croce’s attitude was characterized by a 
profound hostility to metaphysics which, in his opinion, was the opposite of a critical 
attitude towards reality. We have seen throughout the various phases of Croce’s 
thought that the main characteristic of his epistemology was to underline history as an 
open discourse where there is no single, fundamental problem. The obsession with the 
fundamental problem is what Croce called the ‘metaphysical attitude’. In II Carattere 
della filosofia moderna Croce reiterated this criticism:
II nome stesso ‘metafisica’ esprime ... il vano conato d’innalzamento
da un mondo di oggetti a un mondo di entita, di supremi oggetti non
43 See for instance, Tessitore: ‘In Croce la rilevanza assegnata alia presenza di Hegel ... piega 
irrimediabilmente lo storicismo assoluto verso l’idealismo assoluto assai poco storicismo.’ F. Tessitore, 
‘Fare i conti con Croce’, IlMattino, 25 July 1990.
44 In reality Roberts’ criticism does not escape the reification of Croce’s method. Indeed, the American 
scholar insists on the image o f a continuous, steadfast ‘growth’ o f the Spirit. In doing so Roberts 
introduces an optimistic, and even providential component which is not present in Croce’s thought.
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oggetti e 1’invito e la spinta al passo della trascendenza, dal quale ogni 
spirito critico sempre rifugge, awertendo vicina la caduta nel vuoto. In 
questo suo fare, la metafisica ... disconosce l’ufficio della genuina 
filosofia, ergendosi sopra di lei come ‘filosofia prima’ o ‘filosofia 
generale’.45
The trouble with metaphysics, for Croce, is its rejection of the concrete historical 
dimension of our thoughts and actions, its incongruous presumption to be above the 
mundane. A metaphysical view needs to tie its vision to an external non-temporal 
universe:
E la metafisica trascende ... altresi anche la storia, per attingere un 
mondo fuori o sopra di questa, e chiudersi in un sistema che in questa 
chiusura si atteggia a ‘definitive’.46
We know that for Croce there is no ‘problema unico’ but an assortment of problems 
which emerge according to the time and situation in which we find ourselves. 
According to the philosopher, the obsession with ‘the one cause’ is part of our 
incapacity to deal with the complexity of life in general. It is easy and comforting to 
encapsulate the world in a grand overarching plan. However, we need to understand 
that
In realta, come non e’eun  ultimo termine e sistema definitivo, cosi non 
e’eun  primo in se, da cui procedano gli altri; e primo, di volta in volta, 
e il concetto al quale l’interessamento mentale di ciascuno di noi risale 
in relazione al problema che attualmente lo occupa.47.
The criticisms of Sasso, Galasso and others, are ultimately based on the 
assumption that Croce’s philosophy started as a grandiose project to ‘encapsulate 
reality’. However, it has been demonstrated that Croce’s aim was not to build a 
definitive system but a ‘strumento di lavoro’ with which he could better understand 
some specific problems concerning history and literary criticism. If one considers 
Croce’s enterprise as a search for a suitable epistemological method for ensuring the 
openness of historical (and literary) enquiry, we not only read his intellectual itinerary
45 Croce, II carattere p.3.
46 Ibid., p.4.
47 Ibid., p.60.
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in a different way, but are able to make sense of his antimetaphysical assertions which 
have been so stubbornly and systematically ignored by his critics and commentators.
It is worth insisting on the fact that the philosophy of the spirit was from the 
outset an attempt to provide a hermeneutic methodology for reading history, which 
would on the one hand retain the distinctiveness and complexity of cognitive 
procedures against the incursions of a crude scientific positivism, without on the other 
hand falling into a reductionist metaphysics. In this sense the four ‘modes’ in Croce’s 
‘circolarita dello spirito’, despite their idealist lexical echoes, are the antithesis of the 
alleged neo-Hegelian revival. For the German philosopher not only was the ‘Spirit’, 
as we have seen, a transcendent historical force in Croce’s view, but the course of 
history was on a predetermined telelological path. The ‘absolute historicism’ of 
Croce’s final phase is in effect a consolidation of his rebuttal of Hegel’s historicism.
In the first place Croce’s famous ‘circolarita dello spirito’ is given a new depth 
by his ‘storicismo assoluto’. The ‘circolarita’ in history is no longer simply the 
interplay between its four ‘modes’ (aesthetic, theoretical/logical, moral/ethical and 
economic) but becomes an extraordinary anticipation of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ 
much later more formally theorized by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Our reading of history 
in the light of our present perspectives influences the way we understand our present, 
which in turn affects the way we shape our future, which in its own turn produces new 
readings of the past. The tradition is thus a never-ending re-reading with no ‘eternal’ 
once-and-for-all interpretations of the past. Croce’s ‘absolute historicism’ is thus the 
direct antithesis of the ‘system’ he has been understood to create by even his most 
sympathetic readers.
In addition, the four ‘modes’ retain the epistemological function of providing 
the historian a method o f narrating history which takes into account its different 
modes of articulation.
It is significant that Croce intensified his theoretical labours in the throes of 
the Fascist dictatorship. We have seen his own testimony to how this spurred him on 
in his old age. His conviction, however, was that such painful historical moments 
were best responded to, by the historian in his role as such, by increased efforts to 
understand the historical process itself, and not by camouflaging opposition and 
propaganda as historiography.
Thus, according to Croce, the historian should know that there will never be a 
definitive account in historical discourse, and he argued that the main feature of
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modem thought — il carattere della filosofia moderna — is the acknowledgement of 
the radical historicity of our thinking. To understand our ‘historical being’ is to 
recognize that our concepts of tmth and values are historically determined and open- 
ended.
We have seen that Croce rejected the idea that historical method should aim 
for the objectivity of science. On the contrary, it takes into account the subjectivity of 
judgements, which is not a limitation but a great resource for history. This attitude, for 
Croce, far from encouraging skepticism, promoted a constant drive to advance our 
own discovery of the past in the light of the present. Indeed, it is the 
acknowledgement of a subjective component in history that allows us to read the past 
as a never-ending narrative to which we constantly refer to make sense of our own 
lives. Hence it is dogmatism, not relativism, which is the most dangerous posture in 
history.48 Croce maintained that, in reality, skepticism was connected with a 
‘mancanza di fmalita pratica e morale’,49 which occurred when the philosophical 
critique confined itself to the theoretical sphere without seeking to go beyond itself. 
However, it is a practical drive, at the core of historiography, which in its turn ‘suscita 
problemi storiografici e rende possibile alia critica di porli in problemi definiti e 
risolverli nella verita.’50 The real test of historical accounts, their tmth content, lies in 
their explanatory power and capacity to become integral in civil society:
Nella sua cerchia, il lavoro della speculazione non resta chiuso, ma 
raccoglie Tenergia necessaria per operare nel ... mondo; il che non 
solo si adempie con la comunicazione del processo logico di quel 
lavoro ... ma soprattutto per la conversione che accade in molte delle 
conclusioni ragionate in verita evidenti, in detti comuni, in proverbi, 
alleggerite del loro processo dimostrativo, mutate in articoli di fede, e 
fattesi guida sicura delle anime.51
The most original feature of this last phase of Croce’s thought is the 
exploration of the relation between history and praxis, and its connection with liberty. 
History became a practical problem connected with action. The fundamental question 
was: why do we write history? In other words: why do we need historical narratives?
48 ‘II nostro indefesso pensare filosofico e, in perpetuo, questo integrare i pensieri passati, cioe farli 
morire nella loro assolutezza. ’ II carattere, p .41.
49Ibid., p. 176.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p . l l l .
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For Croce the answer is simple: historical narration is indispensable for overcoming 
the past, creating the conditions for understanding the present and preparing the 
future. Hence, Croce insisted with new emphasis on the functional aspects of 
historical knowledge:
Specificata ed individuata, e non generica ed astratta, e dunque la 
conoscenza storica, perche specificato e individuato e il bisogno 
pratico a cui essa risponde, specificata e individuata l’azione pratica a 
cui mette capo.52
History is now expressly connected with action although it does not determine it. The 
historiographical problem is related to a ‘bisogno del fare’. In other words, the 
historical narrative depends on this need for practical application. Within this 
perspective, Croce’s historical method with his four modes represented a concrete 
way of approaching the complexity of reality:
La genesi del problema storiografico e sempre in un bisogno del fare  
... Questo bisogno e sempre specificato come bisogno di un fare 
economico o etico o estetico o filosofico (o come altrimenti si formuli 
o si determini), e l’indagine correlativa procede secondo una di queste 
categorie.53
Insisting on such concrete requirements, Croce maintained that history’s vital role is 
to ‘svegliare e formare l’abitudine a intendere situazioni reali, riportandole alia loro 
genesi e collocandole nelle loro relazioni.’54 At first sight this emphasis on the 
practical aspects of history could be assimilated to Marx’s. Indeed, the German 
philosopher also strove to construct a form of thought which would address itself 
more effectively to ‘reality’. However, for Croce, history does not determine action, it 
simply prepares it. In other words, we need historical knowledge to prepare our 
action, but this knowledge does not determine in a causal or deterministic way, our 
activities. Hence, historiography conditions our vision of future events but it does not, 
in any way, determine them:
II rapporto tra storiografla e attivita pratica, tra conoscenza storica e 
azione, pone bensi un legame tra le due, ma non punto un legame
52 Ibid., p. 198.
53 Ibid., p.28 Italics mine.
54 Ibid.
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causalistico e deterministico ... L’azione, pur nella sua ideale 
corrispondenza con la visione storica che la precede e condiziona, e un 
atto nuovo e diverso ... Puo dirsi dunque, che la storiografia, rispetto 
all’azione pratica, sia preparante ma indeterminante.55
One can grasp the originality of Croce’s view when it is compared with Hegel’s and 
Marx’s. Hegel had a completely different vision of history. The development of 
events for the German idealist philosopher could be determined from the ‘signs’ of 
the past. Thus, according to the Hegelian scheme, one could predict future 
developments from the evidence of the past. Also Marx, with his forecasting of the 
crumbling of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat, had a 
deterministic view of history. On the other hand, for the Italian philosopher history’s 
function is not to speculate about our future. When confronted with events, the notion 
of a past superseded by a brighter future, like the notion of an inexorable progress 
towards a perfect state of affairs, is untenable. Croce’s radically immanent view 
prevented him from using historiography in the manner of a clairvoyant. Instead, the 
knowledge of the past has to be applied to the present since it seeks to
serbare viva la coscienza che la societa umana ha del proprio passato, 
cioe del suo presente, cioe di se stessa, di fomirle quel che le occorre 
sempre per le vie da scegliere, di tenere pronto quanto per questa parte 
potra giovarle in avvenire. In questo alto suo pregio morale e politico 
si fonda lo zelo di promuoverla e di accrescerla.56
It is this constant negotiation and relationship between past and present which makes 
historical knowledge problematic but also essential. And in this sense, in its constant 
attempt to make sense of past events with a rational explanation, history is logical:
Se la logica e nell’uomo e anche nella storia, e se il pensiero umano 
pensa questa, la pensa ... logicamente.57
The alternative to a history which embodies an open, critical and non­
reductionist account of the past, is a regression to mythical or religious narratives. 
Indeed, for the philosopher, any attempt to break the basic relation between history
55 Croce, La storia come pensiero, pp. 170-01.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p.21.
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and reason and find forms of irrationality in history itself was in effect itself a 
capitulation to the irrational:
Se una trattazione storiografica esclude da se un fatto col pronunziarlo 
irrazionale e negativo, dimostra con cio non l’irrazionalita e 
l’insufficienza di quel fatto, ma la sua propria irrazionalita e 
insufficienza, perche la sua ragione e potenza consiste nel ritrovare la 
ragione di ogni fatto.58
The loss of a sense of history, with a shortcut into declarations about the 
irrationality of events to explain the complexity of reality was, Croce argued, the sign 
of an acute crisis of modernity. Croce was convinced that at stake here was not a 
particular ideal but rather the very condition in which ideas are possible. Indeed, 
reflecting on the condition of his time, he remarked:
La conclusione a cui si e indotti dinnanzi all’esperienza del presente 
non e dunque che la crisi sia di un ideale particolare ... ma che sia 
invece dell’idealita stessa ... che come nobilita la vita dell’individuo, 
cosi rende alta quella dell’umanita e ne segna le grandi epoche.59
However, Croce was firm in the distinction between the necessity of a rational 
explanation in historiography on the one hand, and an assumed logicality intrinsic in 
the historical events on the other, which in his eyes was unacceptable. His insistence 
on the rationality of the historian’s discourse did not entail seeing a metaphysical 
rationality at work in the course of history. One can, indeed should, employ rationally 
ordered discourse to explain events which may proceed on a non-rational basis. In 
other words, the logic of discourse does not imply the logic of events:
La parola Togica’... significa cosa ben di versa dalla logicita, un 
di segno o un pro gramma secondo il quale la storia s’inizierebbe, 
svolgerebbe e terminerebbe, e che alio storico spetterebbe di ritrovare, 
sottostante ai fatti apparenti, nascosta matrice di questi fatti e ultima e 
vera interpretazione. 0
Indeed, Croce maintained, with reference to Hegel and Marx in particular, that their 
attitudes hid a ‘theological’ posture. Indeed, Croce argued that,
58 Ibid., p.168.
59 Ibid.,p.l09.
60 Ibid.
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piu volte i filosofi hanno ragionato un siffatto disegno svolgendolo dal 
concetto dell’Idea o da quello dello Spirito, o, altresi della Materia: 
senonche Idea, Spirito e Materia travestivano in varie guise il Dio 
trascendente.61
One of the purposes of Croce’s antimetaphysical posture was to preserve the 
connection between history and liberty. After the failure of grand metaphysical 
narratives such as idealism and Marxism, Croce’s problem was how to relate 
historiography to a purposive dimension. To Croce idealism and Marxism, with their 
different visions of history as having a purpose of its own, rendered nonsensical the 
idea that human beings could engage in meaningful activity which was not identified 
with the greatest purpose of the historical process. These ideologies also made it 
difficult to see what sense could be given to human liberty within such transcendental 
frameworks. Croce’s radically immanent conception of history, therefore, was faced 
with the problem of how to conceive of human liberty and human purposive activity 
within the historical process without depriving them of meaning. His answer was 
articulated in a number of directions. History operates at different levels: a) 
individual. It is the liberation from the burden of the past, b) Collective. The aim of 
history is to render the collectivity more aware and thus freer, c) Ideal. History as a 
process of liberation and /or purposive action is the only viable ‘teleology’ in an 
antimetaphysical conception of reality. Indeed, the philosopher argued that the very 
reason for history lies in its capacity to free men and women from the burden of the 
past. This process, which is both individual and collective, is for Croce, the motor of 
history, its very raison d ’etre. In this sense the philosopher insisted that history is 
history of liberty, namely an incessant process of liberation from the past through a 
constant critique of the present. Croce held that writing history is an attempt to settle 
accounts with the past so that,
tanto piu energicamente si conosce il passato e tanto piu energico sorge 
1’impeto di andare oltre di esso.
61 Ibid.
62 In this sense, teleology can be retained as a useful term or concept for designating the purposive 
dimension o f human activity, without which human history would be reduced to a simple recounting o f  
meaningless events. It does not necessarily therefore, imply a predetermined final destination, in which 
sense it is frequently used.
63 Croce, La storia come pensiero, p.34.
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Here the knowledge of history becomes the main instrument for overcoming the past 
and going beyond it. This process of liberation bears some similarities to the 
procedures of Psychoanalysis. It is a principle of psychoanalysis that our early 
patterns of adaptation to reality are repeated and constitute our basic mode of 
comportment in later life. Similarly, our basic attitudes are built on in this way. Lack 
of reflection on our past simply consolidates and rigidities these stock responses and 
attitudes. Theurapeutic activity thus requires us to unearth the origins of these patterns 
which are causing dysfunctional disturbances and critically examine them in order to 
move forward. In an analogous way, at a different level, historical understanding is 
essential if we are to achieve a full understanding of the present, and what it is in the 
past which has led to our present predicaments. The outcome of historical 
understanding is not an idle or simply speculative contemplation of the past, but an 
awareness of the past which can liberate us from its negative conditioning moments. 
In this sense we need to be freed from history:
Scrivere storie ... e un modo di togliersi di su le spalle il passato. II 
pensiero storico lo abbassa a sua materia, lo trasfigura in suo oggetto, e 
la storiografia ci libera dalla storia.64
Historiography ‘frees us from history’ in so far as it addresses the problems we are 
facing and provides useful suggestion for our acting.
On a more practical level for the time in question, in connection with the 
emergence of different kinds of totalitarianism, Croce related history to liberty. 
Croce’s statement on ‘history as history of liberty’ has also often been misunderstood. 
Indeed, we have seen how many critics relate Croce’s views on liberty either to a 
nineteenth century conservative view or to Hegel’s philosophy which regards history 
as the unfolding of Liberty through the Spirit. Bobbio, for example charged Croce’s 
conception of liberty with being abstract and reactionary, and the recently republished 
work by Sartori, Studi Crociani also insists on the purely theoretical meaning given 
by Croce to Tiberta’ thus excluding the philosopher from the Liberal-democratic
64 Ibid.
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tradition and questioning the effectiveness of Croce’s position.65 However, Bobbio 
and Sartori missed the complexity of Croce’s point.
Firstly, Croce did not deny the historical connection between liberty and 
classical liberalism. In La storia come pensiero e come azione, when Croce talked 
about the emergence of the concept of liberty in the nineteeth century, we can read:
E da tener presente che una rivoluzione mentale, veramente piena e 
viva, si lega ... a un nuovo orientamento e atteggiamento rispetto ai 
problemi della vita pratica; e tra i due si stabilisce un circolo mediante 
il quale si rinvigoriscono e si ampliano a vicenda. II correlativo dello 
storicismo, erede deH’illuminismo, era, nella vita attiva e pratica, 
l’indirizzo nuovo della liberta non piu astratta e atomica come 
neH’illuminismo, ma concreta e unificata con la vita sociale e storica.66
Far from exhuming it from an abstract idealist tradition, as we can see from the above 
passage, Croce related the emergence of a new idea of liberty to the concrete and 
practical historical circumstances of the society in which this idea was conceived. 
Moreover, it is not true, as is usually claimed to his discredit, that Croce maintained
c n
that Germany was the homeland of historical Liberalism. On the contrary he argued 
that
la concezione storico-liberale della vita ... non ebbe nascimento in 
Germania, ne in Germania ha avuto altro che fuggevole fortuna e di 
riflesso, e solo negli anni che precedettero e in quelli che dappresso 
seguirono il 1848. II paese e il tempo in cui quella fusione si compie fu 
la Francia ... e dalla Francia la nuova concezione si sparse in tutto il 
mondo, opero altresi sulla vecchia liberta inglese ... Allora 
l’illuminismo, integrato dallo storicismo, si trasfuse e si rigenero
/TO
praticamente nel liberalismo.
Croce did not deny that historical Liberalism originated in France and Great Britain.
Indeed, he argued that
65 Sartori argues that Croce’s concept o f ‘liberta senza aggettivi, si invola verso una rarefatta stratosfera 
metastorica, rivelandosi incapace di aderire e di spiegare dawero le vicissitudini della liberta storica.’ 
G. Sartori, Studi Crociani II. Croce etico-politico e filosofo della liberta (Bologna: il Mulino, 1997), 
pp. 158-59.
Croce, La storia come pensiero, p. 68.
67 See Bobbio’s argument in chapter one.
68 Ibid.,p.71.
232
In Germania, per le particolari condizioni politiche del paese, arretrate 
rispetto a quelle dell’Inghilterra e della Francia ... il processo si 
squilibro verso la teoria a scapito della pratica ... Questa scissione del 
pensiero dall’azione, questa rivoluzione meramente ideale di fronte a 
una rivoluzione reale, fu notata dai tedeschi stessi al prorompere della 
rivoluzione francese.69
The charge that Croce got the genealogy of classic Liberalism wrong is unfounded 
and linked to the preconception of his historicism as an abstract philosophy which 
does not take into account the concrete historical process. Indeed, it has been shown 
that Croce’s aim was not to reinstate the old Tiberale’ view. In reality, Croce carried
70out a stringent critique of liberalism, underlining its flaws in La Storia d ’Europa. 
We have also seen that Croce’s view on history was profoundly different from 
Hegel’s. In reality, we have demonstrated that Croce’s concern with history was so 
central in his philosophical quest that he defined philosophy as ‘methodology of 
history.’
It is true, however, that in this period of Croce’s writing, he was more 
interested in the principle of liberty itself than in its history. But this was connected to 
his search for an immanent conception of history as a counter to Hegelian idealism. 
Indeed, Croce distinguished liberty as an expression of political life from liberty as a 
principle. The Italian philosopher had to face a major problem. If there is no 
metaphysical plan in history, which Croce sees instead as an open and immanent 
process, how can we state its purpose? In order to answer this question Croce had to 
put liberty at the core of the historical narrative and acknowledge that liberty involves 
our writing history. In other words, history is not a ‘thing’ with a ‘purpose’. We 
should not make the mistake of reifying into some kind of ontological substance an 
abstraction we have formed to describe the flux of events. History has no existence 
apart from the free and purposive activity of human beings. But the fact that human 
activity is purposive does not guarantee the fulfilment of any human activity. Thus, 
Croce made clear that the historical process does not lead necessarily to a better 
world. It is not, like in Hegel or Marx, the unfolding of a process which will reach
69 Ibid., p.69.
70‘History o f Europe in the nineteenth century ... is not at all, as has been charged, an uncritical tribute 
to nineteenth century liberalism. Nor is it a sanguine assertion o f the inevitability o f liberalism’s 
triumph, which would have made it a sort of Divine comedy. It is rather a study o f the failure o f liberals 
to create a world in conformity to their own laboriously articulated and heroically affirmed ethical 
ideal, which make their story a sort o f tragedy.’ H. White, ‘The abiding influence’, p .123.
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liberty as the ultimate goal. History considered as events which happen might well 
end badly.
Only in one sense, for Croce, can we conceive history as liberty; namely when 
we focus on the liberating component that history has for humanity. In this context, 
Croce distinguished liberty as the purposive element which represents the very 
foundation for history from an historically determined idea of liberty. Indeed, Croce 
differentiated liberty as a practical ideal aimed at creating a better society, from 
liberty as ‘forza creatrice della storia’.71 This is a very important point. Croce here 
was drawing attention to the purposive dimension which all historical activity has. We 
know that for Croce there is no Spirit hovering above the events and no eschatology. 
There is, instead, a constant tension in our understanding of the past through the light 
of our present. This concept of liberty, far from being fruitless is the very foundation 
of historiography and, indeed, Croce defined it as a ‘criterio di interpretazione
72storica.’ Thus, liberty far from being a useless notion is crucial for a radically 
immanent conception o f history. For Croce, only a critical approach to reality which 
does not neglect its complexity, and still has a purposive dimension can provide us 
with the tools for understanding and changing the world.
Let us summarize what has been argued so far. During his last phase, Croce 
developed his theory of history with particular attention to action and liberty. Indeed, 
the philosopher argued that to be effective, history has to prepare action through a 
critique inspired by the situation in which we live. This critique allows us to create the 
conditions for a different world. Hence, history becomes a process of liberation from 
the past and the limitations of the present for both the individual and society. Thus, 
history maintains a strong purposive element which permeates the tensions involved 
in creating a better awareness and understanding of our problems. Croce insisted that 
this critical awareness was the only possible ‘teleology’ we can expect from history, 
excluding all ‘philosophies of history’ involving a prededetermined objective.
The Italian philosopher was conscious of the fact that an immanent conception 
of history which rejected all grand narratives and utopias was something that could 
not be easily accepted:
71 Croce, La storia come pensiero, p .l 12.
72 Ibid.
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Come fomire ai ricercatori di un ‘non so che’, agli insoddisfatti della 
vita reale, a coloro che s’immaginano di essere dalla realta delle cose 
stretti in limiti che li opprimono e ne vogliono uscire o saltar fuori, 
come fomire a costoro il serbatoio delle incomposte e contraddittorie 
e vacue speranze, dei pensieri non pensabili, delle cave nebbie e delle 
inquiete larve? Dove manca l’esperienza, non nasce il problema, e la 
filosofia non ha niente da dire.
Uncertainty in intellectual and practical life had to be faced and responded to. For 
Croce, easy enthusiasm or easy pessimism both displayed the same metaphysical 
attitude, namely the abandonment of criticism in favour of ‘theological’ explanations 
of the world. Existentialism, with its stress on the anguish of man ‘thrown’ into the 
world, was for Croce the worrying sign of a rationale which alienated itself in order to 
construct a transcendent world, forgetting the real one. This is reason why Croce 
criticized existentialism so harshly.
It is very easy in retrospect to criticize Croce’s alleged lack of sympathy for the 
existentialist movement. However, if we take into account the historical context 
within which this critique was carried out we arrive at a more balanced view of what 
Croce feared. The philosopher was reacting, or perhaps overreacting, to a trend that he 
found worrying: the idea that there was nothing to be done to change the existing 
situation. Indeed, Croce feared that in a world dominated by a paralyzing existential 
‘angst’, democracy and dictatorship offered no fundamentally different prospects. The 
alternative was mysticism or apathy as in the case of Meursault, the character of 
Camus’s Outsider, for whom life and death are the same. Moreover, we should not 
forget that when Croce wrote his criticism on existentialism, Heidegger had just given 
his assent to the Nazi regime with his notorious speech at Heidelberg University.
Ironically, Croce was subjected to two opposing and contradictory kinds of 
criticism. Indeed, from the existentialist point of view his idea of history was too 
narrow, since it did not take into account the very condition of humanity which was 
represented by its alienation and frailty. On the other hand, from the ‘progressive’ 
point of view, Croce was not active enough, and his philosophy did not leave room 
for drastic social change. We can now understand better why Croce’s philosophy was 
quickly discarded. Croce’s position did not provide magic formulas or easy slogans 
for changing the world. It yielded neither to an easy pessimism which would keep the 
status quo, nor to an equally easy optimism which promised a bright future with the
73 Croce, II carattere, pp.34-35.
235
end of all conflicts. Croce’s antimetaphysical position was too realistic to be enticed 
by these extremes. These critiques from opposing directions reflect the discrepancy 
but also the combined force of the attack unleashed on Croce’s philosophy. We have 
seen that the philosopher did not have the Olympian detachment for which many 
detractors blamed him, and that his historicism was firmly rooted in an immanent 
conception of history and culture. Nevertheless, it was easy for many, after Croce’s 
death, to overlook the complexity, the richness of his position, to make him a sort of 
punch - ball to be quoted only for denigration. But, in hindsight we can see that 
Croce was in reality providing a scheme of historical narrative which aimed to avoid 
the contradictions of both existentialism and Marxism, powerful ideological forces in 
post-war continental Europe.
The valid claims of existentialism, namely those against an abstract use of 
reason, against the overwhelming power of scientific schemes, its critique of 
academic philosophy, were in large part shared by Croce. However, he could not 
accept the fatalism attached to many existentialist thinkers who put ‘angst’ at the 
centre of their philosophical concern. On the opposite side was Marxism, or, to be 
more precise, a dogmatic Marxism whose optimistic views obliterated the complexity 
and tragic dimension of life. Most importantly, Croce’s main concern was the 
possibility of a critical method in history which did not yield to ‘metaphysical’ 
explanations. If we consider Croce’s endeavour a genuine quest for a more suitable 
method for historical enquiry we can also consider his last reflections on the 
possibility of the end of civilization under a different light.74 Instead of a disconsolate 
manifestation of Croce’s growing pessimism they can be integrated as an important 
part of his research.
74 I am referring in particular to the essays ‘La fine della civilta’ and ‘L’Anticristo che e in noi’, Ultimi 
Saggi (Bari: Laterza, 1963).
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5.3 CROCE TODAY
We have seen that the core of Croce’s approach is his remarkably consistent and 
uncompromising reliance on a non-metaphysical and non-reductionist method from 
the very beginning of his career. This was Croce’s reaction to those ‘grand narratives’ 
which in his eyes were doomed attempts to restore a metaphysical view.
One should not forget that from the beginning of his literary career Croce was 
in one way or another always attempting to counter strong reductionist tendencies 
which he found initially with late 19th century positivists, then in Saussure in 
linguistics, Freud in psychoanalysis and Weber in sociology, to name but a few. He 
was always alert to intellectual tendencies, or methodological systems and models 
which attempted to reduce the complexity of reality to an overarching system. The 
age seemed to demand rapid and at times one-dimensional responses to a world in 
which values and certainties were changing drastically. His own intellectual 
propensity was always to resist such temptations, and to challenge them whenever 
they made their appearance.
The inclination to seek immediate historical panaceas became even more 
pronounced in Italy after the Second World War, when the Left, riding the wave of 
anti-fascism, became the dominant force among a variety of ‘progressive’ groupings 
struggling for a cultural hegemony which would rapidly fill the vacuum. A 
momentum was injected into this new enterprise by a mind-set dominated by the need 
for ‘reconstruction’. Theoretical issues were impregnated with strong purposive 
dimensions driven by ideological constructions. Croce was going against the current. 
Indeed, for him there was a sort of original sin in all theoretical constructions which 
attempted to channel or shape the course of history according to ideological schemes. 
We know that for Croce there was no single fundamental problem of reality to be 
solved, such as class domination, but a group of historically given issues which 
emerged from the needs of the present situation. Underpinning this approach was the 
conviction that philosophy does not dictate the fundamental laws of reality but is 
rather a critical attempt to analyze and define our experience. In this respect Croce is 
very modem and his mistrust for systems was a direct result of his antimetaphysical 
attitude. Indeed, his antimetaphysical method of reasoning allowed him to reflect on 
the ineffectuality of all-encompassing theoretical structures and was decisive in the 
development of his theory of history.
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In relation to his reflections on history, there are similarities between Croce’s 
antimetaphysical methodology and some contemporary currents of thought. 
Moreover, I believe that Croce could trigger interesting questions about the status of 
history in the contemporary debate. The first point that needs to be emphasized is that 
Croce’s conception of history bears strong similarities to postmodernism. Croce, as 
have postmodern thinkers, raised the question of the meaning of history in a non­
metaphysical world. Indeed, for the Italian philosopher, as in many postmodern 
thinkers, the meaning of history cannot be found in a transcendental plan. Croce 
shared with postmodernism the rejection of ‘grand narratives’ to use Lyotard’s term.75 
The question of the meaning of history is central both in Croce and postmodernism. 
Indeed, thinkers such as Foucault, White, and Croce have in common a conception of 
history as an open process which needs to be continuously discussed and reassessed. 
This is the condition of the modem world: history as an open narrative. There is in all 
of these thinkers a rejection of what Foucault defines in his Archeology o f knowledge 
as ‘total history’. Foucault rejects ‘total history’ and replaces it with the idea of 
‘general history’:
The theme and possibility of a total history begin to disappear, and we 
see the emergence of something very different that might be called 
general history. The project of a total history is one that seeks to 
reconstitute the overall form of civilization, the principle -  material or 
spiritual -  of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena 
of the period, the law that accounts for their cohesion.76
The acknowledgement of a different attitude to history has important consequences in 
both the discourse and the practice of historiography:
A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre -  a 
principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general 
history on the contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion.77
Similarly, we have seen that in Croce there is no ‘grand narrative’ to be built. 
History is not an imposing project with a predetermined teleological path which the 
historian has the duty to uncover, but is revealed in the ‘particolare situazione storica
75 J. F. Lyotard, La Condition postmoderne (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979).
76 M. Foucault, The Archeology o f  Knowledge, p. 15.
77 Ibid., p. 10.
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in cui il pensatore di volta in volta si trova.’78 Following this method we come to the 
conclusion that
il problema di cui si puo e si deve dare la storia e soltanto quello ben 
determinato e individuato, che si lega a un nuovo e individuato
• 79concetto di cui il nuovo pensatore indaga e trova la genesi.
In philosophical terms, the parallel with Gianni Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’ is 
striking. For Croce, the all-encompassing plan of a universal compendium of 
knowledge is now replaced by the specificity of the research. This method has 
important repercussions in historiography which is now seen as an essential tool in 
understanding where our values, beliefs and social practices come from. If we admit 
that our understanding of the world is historically conditioned we acknowledge that 
our views are partial and not fixed. However, attention to the role of subjectivity does 
not diminish the importance of the historical resource but it does make it more 
complex. For Croce, it is when we want to look at the past ‘as it really was’, namely 
as a thing separated from the present concerns, that we ossify history into a sort of 
museum. Croce’s approach is close to what the postmodern historian Alun Munslow 
calls ‘epistemic relativism’.80 However, one should not confuse historical and moral 
relativism.81 In other words, ‘epistemic relativism’ does not imply that anything goes 
in history, but rather it opens up history to new sets of problems which no amount of 
sources and documentation can resolve. Munslow is reacting against the tradition in 
historiography represented by an untheorized empiricism which believes that all 
historiographical issues can be resolved with access to the appropriate sources. His 
argument is that the very same sources are open to a multiplicity of interpretations if 
viewed from different epistemological starting points. Croce’s four ‘modes’ as 
providing an epistemological basis for different kinds of historical narratives would 
undoubtedly qualify as instances of Munslow’s ‘epistemic relativism’. An even more 
fundamental point of agreement, however, is the conviction of both historians that no 
intepretation of historical events can be definitively closed, since history itself will
78 Croce, II carattere, pp. 21-22.
79 Ibid., p.77.
80A. Munslow, ‘Where does history come from?’ History Today, 3 (2002), pp. 18-22 (p.21).
81 Maurice Mandelbaum, one of the first American commentators o f Croce’s thought, considered the 
Italian philosopher together with Dilthey, and Manheim, a relativist.
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continually be changing the epistemological starting points from where interpretations 
begin.
In this connection Croce’s hermeneutics is remarkably close to Gadamer’s 
theories of interpretation. The German philosopher claims that in our approach to the 
understanding of texts (and this applies equally to a period of history seen as a text), 
‘the logic of the human science is the logic of the question.’82 This means that we 
‘understand historical events only if we reconstruct the question to which the 
historical actions of the person involved were the answers’, or at least the attempted 
answers. Gadamer comments on the closeness of his ideas to those of Collingwood, 
who used the ‘logic of the question’ in a critique of the Oxford ‘realist’ school. He 
also observes that Collingwood’s discoveries of what was missing in the ‘naive 
hermeneutics founded on the prevailing philosophical critique’ were influenced by 
Croce who had understood, earlier, in his Logica ‘every definition as an answer to a 
question and hence historical.’84
Gadamer’s observations on Croce require a brief elaboration, since they point 
to one of the Italian’s most important, but also most neglected and misinterpreted, 
insights. It may, at first sight, have the appearance of a truism to observe that 
historical events can only be understood if we understand the question to which they 
to be an answer. But Croce’s observation contains critical requirements which are 
easily missed. The difficulty of the historian’s task lies in finding the correct question, 
which is not always the one which springs to mind most easily. As we have observed, 
and will comment on again shortly, the historian’s quest is necessarily related to his 
‘interests’, and although these provide an essential link between past and present, they 
can also mislead, and this in a number of ways. Quite apart from the issue of the 
historian’s subjective preferences for certain ‘questions’, even the historian who 
exercises sufficient critical self-awareness is in this regard still at risk. For example, if 
we call to mind Croce’s ‘modes’ of narration, the further point he is making is that in 
any period under analysis we cannot assume that the same ‘question’ (or historical 
issue) arises simultaneously, with equal force, or even arises at all in every sphere. 
The historian narrating in the economic ‘mode’ cannot assume that issues/questions 
arising in the philosophical, aesthetic or ethical spheres should be given equal weight
82 H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 370.
83 Ibid., p. 371.
84 Ibid., p. 370, n.315.
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in his current narrative. Issues are not to Croce historically homogeneous at all given 
points in history, as if in any given period the same historical sensibilities are 
transferred across all spheres. But even when the sensibilities are shared, we cannot 
assume that the questions being raised are necessarily being responded to. Can we 
assume, for example, in a global situation in which we are all aware of the fact that 
two-thirds of the world’s population lives in poverty, and that our industrial and 
commercial practices are threatening our environmental survival, that the policies of 
the International Monetary Fund are intended as answers to questions which these 
facts pose?
Absurd as it would seem to us to answer these question in the affermative, 
such a response might not seem so absurd to a historian three or four hundred years in 
the future, far removed from the living context, swamped with masses of empirical 
data, and searching for the ‘spirit of the age’ for clues to guide interpretation. The 
‘spirit of the age’ approach is, of course, to Croce a hopelessly crude piece of 
metaphysics; but equally metaphysical were the more rigorously defined ‘grand 
discourses’. The historian’s ability to detect the ‘real’ question to which history’s 
protagonists seek to repond lies in the ability to discriminate between their different 
discourses, which always arise within specific spheres of ‘interest’, which determine 
the ‘questions’ of the protagonists.
To take up the issue of the ‘interests’ of the present, Croce thought that history 
was essential to us in order to understand where we are and where we are going. 
When we look at past events we see them through the lenses of our present ‘interest’. 
Indeed, the significance of history has to be found in what Croce defined as the 
‘interest’ and perspectives of the present. In this, also, we find a parallel in Gadamer 
who argues that the historian’s naivete ‘becomes truly abysmal when he ... demands 
that in understanding history one must leave one’s own concepts aside and think only 
in the concepts of the epoch one is trying to understand.’85 This leads to what 
Gadamer refers to in the historian’s work as the ‘fusion of horizons’ which is the 
equivalent of Croce’s claim that ‘every history is a contemporary one.’ But for Croce 
the contemporary ‘interest’ assumed different aspects or modes: the aesthetic, logical, 
economic, and ethical. Thus Croce conceived a non-reductionist epistemology which 
took as its starting point whichever facet was warranted by the circumstances.
85 Ibid., p.396.
241
The emphasis on narration rather than on a source-based conception of history 
is another element which Croce shares with postmodern thinkers like Hayden White, 
for instance. We have seen that in Croce narrative is the essential requirement for the 
historical discourse: ‘prima condizione per avere storia vera ... e che sia possibile una 
narrazione’.86 It is not a coincidence that Hayden White early in his academic career 
produced a number of works on Croce’s thought, among which his Metahistory which 
devotes the last chapter to the theory of history of the Italian philosopher. White’s 
Metahistory, published in 1973, is an excellent example of a study on Croce’s 
importance for the idea of history in the 20th century. White associates Croce with 
intellectual giants such as Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche and their attempt to reformulate 
a new idea of history. White’s view is that Croce is an ironist who tried to counter the 
debilitating consequences of relativism. For White, Croce saw irony as the only viable 
position for the modem age. The aim of irony was to avoid skepticism and 
pessimism . However, White maintains that Croce’s ironic attitude was inherently 
contradictory and likened it to Nietzsche’s:
How could one live with a history explained and emplotted in the 
Ironic mode without falling into that condition of despair which 
Nietzsche had warded off only by a retreat into irrationalism?88.
White’s work has the great merit, however, of considering Croce as a central 
figure in the development of contemporary thought, and draws attention to the 
differences between Croce and the other great philosophers of history. However, one 
cannot accept White’s reading of Croce’s thought. The ironic mode, unlike the tragic 
or the comic, does not incorporate any purposive direction. It does little justice to 
Croce’s insistence on the permanence of the ethico-political dimension of his 
historiography. Croce’s dedication to tradition, far from being ironical, was 
passionately engaged. In effect, where Croce parts company with postmodernism, at 
least in its most extreme forms, is in the almost umbridled relativism of some of its
86 Croce, Primi scritti, p. 38.
87‘[Croce’s] criticism of the historical thinkers of the age was characteristically Ironical: the 
philosophers o f history had very little “historical” sense; the historians lacked in “philosophical” 
understanding ... For, ironically, Croce maintained, history was philosophy and philosophy was 
history, and one could not do history without philosophical consciousness, anymore than one could not 
do philosophy without historical consciousness.’ H. White, Metahistory, (Baltimore & London: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 380.
88 Ibid., p. 378.
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protagonists, in their contempt for ‘tradition’, and his own insistence on the rational 
dimension of the historian’s discourse.
We have seen that Croce did not share the liberal confidence of a progressive 
history. History has no predetermined plans and the present is not necessarily better 
than the past or the past than the present. History, in Croce’s view, knows 
degeneration and barbaric periods. Nevertheless, Croce drew attention to the 
purposive direction that history should have in order to preserve its meaning. In this 
sense Croce talked about history as history of liberty, a process through which we 
become aware of the historicity of our values and beliefs. The present is the 
dimension through which we examine the past, and in particular the place of the 
ethico-political dimension as a fundamental component of historical narrative. Every 
narration, and most specifically the historical one, has a purpose that transcends the 
ideological dimension and projects beyond the simple dichotomy between useful and 
useless, profitable and unprofitable touching on issues linked to our moral 
sensibilities. It is true that Croce never ceased to insist that he did not intend to encase 
history within a rigid framework or teleology, but this does not imply that he had an 
ironical view of the past. Although he foreshadow many of the ways in which 
postmodernism has attacked grand narratives, if we leave out of the account the strong 
purposive dimensions of historical narration, we miss what might be a valuable 
corrective to the purely negative or destructive aspects of some postmodernist 
tendencies. Moreover, we should not make the mistake of assuming that his respect 
for tradition implied either a conservative attachment to the past, or any 
predetermined outcomes embedded in tradition. Rather, it reflected an acute 
awareness of the links between past and present, and the inescapable consequences of 
the hermeneutic circle.
Given the parallels discussed above between Croce and important figures on 
the contemporary scene, it is disappointing to find them sometimes even denied in 
recent comprehensive studies such as that of Roberts. The American scholar 
recognizes the importance of Croce in relation to many contemporary currents of 
thoughts. However, Roberts fails to spot the most important affinities of Croce with 
modem thought, often indicating superficial similarities, as in the case of the 
comparison that he makes with Hans-George Gadamer and German hermeneutics:
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It is striking that Croce, especially compared with Gadamer, seems to 
play down the need for -  and the possibility of -  a kind of historical 
dialogue with those who have lived before. Historical understanding is 
crucial for Croce, of course; but, just as it is not problematic for him as 
it is for the Germans, neither is it interesting, challenging, perhaps even 
liberating. From Croce’s perspective, we are privileged because we 
came after those who came before, because all that remains real of 
what they were lives on in us.89
Regrettably, this is almost a point by point misinterpretation of Croce’s work. In 
reality, we have seen that Croce was closer to Gadamer’s hermeneutics than generally 
acknowledged. It is thanks to Croce’s antimetaphysical approach that one is made 
aware that ‘objectivity’ is not the main pursuit in history. Indeed, Croce was among 
the first to relate history to subjectivity, and his ideas could well inspire historians 
with an interest in a deeper understanding of the subjective dimension of the way in 
which historians reconstructed the past, without thereby embracing the skepticism 
which he was constantly at pains to refute. Indeed, a better understanding of Croce’s 
distinction between a healthy relativism and skepticism still needs to be achieved.
Moreover, it has been shown that he put the dialogue with the past at the core 
of his historical theory. From the very outset of his career Croce reflected on the role 
of subjectivity and pre-conceptions in historical discourse, which is very much in tune 
with contemporary hermeneutics. Indeed for both Gadamer and Croce ‘prejudices’ are 
essential in our perception of history.90 They both stressed that without prejudices one 
cannot construct a historical narrative and both had very similar views on the role of 
tradition. They shared the idea that tradition far from being a static corpus of past 
events, is a powerful force which conditions and shapes our present life; hence, the 
importance of a constant critique which allows us to re-visit and re-asses the past in 
the light of our present concerns. Another common trait between Gadamer and Croce 
is their rejection of the dichotomy conservatism- radicalism and their arguments for a 
broader view which encloses the two in the same movement of restoration and 
regeneration:
89 Roberts, Benedetto Croce, p.341.
90 See, for example, Gadamer’s historical-philological reconstruction o f the various meanings o f  
‘prejudice’ in Truth and Method, pp. 277-300, where he analyzes the Enlightenment denigration of the 
notions o f ‘authority’ and ‘tradition’. The positive ‘prejudices’ which Gadamer urges the historian to 
make critical use of are in effect the ethico-political components o f the sensibility the historian takes 
with him or her from the present in the ‘fusion o f horizons’ with the past.
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Even the most genuine and solid tradition does not persist by nature 
because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, 
embraced, cultivated. It is essentially preservation, such as is active in 
all historical change. But preservation is an act of reason, though an 
inconspicuous one. For this reason, only what is new, or what is 
planned, appears as the result of reason. But this is an illusion. Even 
where life changes violently, as in ages of revolution, far more of the 
old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything than 
anyone knows, and combines with the new to create a new value. At 
any rate, preservation is as much a freely chosen action as revolution 
and renewal.91
When one looks closely at the concept of tradition, one realizes that this historical 
flow can be also conceptualised as the result of complex struggle and negotiation 
between competing forces which all strive to achieve a narrative which can never be 
definitive since it changes with the requirements of the epoch in which it is being 
recounted.
It is truly astonishing that there is no study on the influence that Croce might 
have exerted on hermeneutics. A recent book by the scholar Maurizio Ferraris, Storia 
dell’Ermeneutica, published in 1998, is a good example of this neglect. Indeed, 
Ferraris never mentions Croce even when similarities of themes and issues with those 
discussed strike the reader familiar with Croce as obvious. The effect is an enormous 
gap in the history of philosophy. This neglect of Croce, and in general of Italian 
philosophical thought during the first half of the twentieth century, far from being 
accidental, is the result of a conscious decision which betrays a deep-seated hostility 
on the part of Italian academia for Croce. In fact, Italy has not been able to produce 
thinkers of the calibre of Croce, Gentile or Gramsci in the post World War Two era, 
and the constant disregard of these thinkers can be read as a worrying sign of a 
country incapable of a mature settling of accounts with a patrimony of considerable 
intellectual depth.
The reasons behind this attitude towards Croce are various: the heritage of an 
ideologically-charged cultural environment initiated with the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the inferiority complex that a relatively young European country like 
Italy has in relation to the German, French, English and American traditions, and
91Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 281-82. Like Croce, Gadamer also came under fire from thinkers of  
the Left who interpreted his defence o f the importance o f tradition as inherently conservative. In this 
connection, his polemical engagement with Habermas is o f particular interest. See, in particular, his
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finally the monopoly exerted by a coterie of ‘crociani’ in Naples who treat the 
philosopher as a holy relic to be preserved from the contamination of the present. A 
series of subliminal cultural preconceptions has led post World War Two Italian 
intellectuals to read Croce as a believer in, and builder of, ‘grand narratives’. Liceo 
textbooks on philosophy have consistently presented summaries of Croce as the pre­
war idealist system-builder, somewhat detached from the reality of the historical 
process. The construction of an Olympian, systematic and idealist Croce was a 
process which began just after the philosopher’s death. As a matter of fact, this image 
was created and spread with the help of a group of fervent Croceans through their 
theoretical reconstruction of the philosopher’s thought.
Carlo Antoni in his Commento a Croce, published in 1955, focused almost 
exclusively on the systematic aspects of Croce’s thought, providing a solid theoretical 
basis for future commentators. His important Commento remains one of the most 
widely read works in Croce criticism. The centre of gravity of Antoni’s Croce was the 
Filosofia dello Spirito taken as a new Weltanschauung. The Crocean scholar insisted 
particularly on the moral significance of Croce’s work. Justice, beauty and truth were 
the eternal values around which the philosopher’s idealist speculation revolved. These 
values, according to Antoni, were undermined after the Second World War and
• 0 9replaced by a darker notion of history and its aims.
Another contribution to the profile of a moralistic Croce came with a 
hagiographical biography penned by his life-long collaborator and friend Fausto 
Nicolini in 1962. His Croce, published by the Unione Editori Torinesi, contributed to 
strengthening and extending further the image of a peaceful and aloof Neapolitan 
thinker able to rise above the turbulent events surrounding him. Nicolini’s prose is 
interspersed with expressions such as ‘II nostro Benedetto’, which gives the book a 
strange sense of over-familiarity. The biographer indulges in portraying Croce as a 
conservative and stem husband and father, conveniently overlooking the thirteen-year 
‘illicit’ relationship of the philosopher with Angelina Zampanelli, and depicting Croce 
as a fierce anti-communist. The result is a biography at times excessively anecdotal 
written in the tones of a passionate devotee.93
response to Habermas’s charges in H-G Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (California: University 
o f California Press, 1977), pp. 26-38.
92 C. Antoni, Commento a Croce (Venice: Neri Pozza, 1955), pp. 105-07.
93 This is how Nicolini reports his first encounter with Croce: ‘Mi vidi venire incontro un uomo agile, 
vivace, gioviale, sorridente, un uomo dai baffetti biondi: un uomo che, dall’aspetto giovanile, sebbene
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Another ‘orthodox’ Crocean, Alfredo Parente, founded in 1964 the Rivista di 
studi crociani, a journal with a vast international readership (the periodical even had 
subscribers from Japan) which lasted until 1984, the year of Parente’s death. Parente’s 
laudable aim was to keep the thought of Croce alive and discuss the philosopher’s 
main theoretical issues.94 Indeed, Rivista had the great merit of keeping critical 
studies, bibliographies, articles, and essays on Croce constantly updated for twenty 
years. However, despite the indisputable scholarship of the editor and his 
collaborators, the journal, extremely polemical in relation to contemporary 
philosophy, was perceived as the fortress of hardcore Croceanism and consolidated 
the image of a Croce prejudicially hostile to new philosophies. Indeed, Rivista opened 
a yawning chasm between the Croceans and the rest of the philosophical community, 
confining the study of Croce to the South of Italy, and inhibiting any constructive 
dialogue between his philosophy and the main European philosophical currents. 
Naples became the hallowed sanctuary where the ideas of the philosopher were 
defended and perpetuated. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the overwhelming 
majority of studies on Croce in Italy have came and are still coming from the capital 
city of Campania. 95
More recently, scholars such as Gennaro Sasso and Michele Maggi have 
promoted the image of Croce as a classical philosopher to be read within a systematic 
framework. All attempts at alternative readings of Croce have been dismissed as non- 
philosophical and defective.
The problem with ‘crociani’ like Sasso and Maggi is their obsession with unity 
in Croce’s thought. According to these interpreters the coherence of the Italian 
philosopher should be sought in his adherence to an idealistic perspective in relation 
to which his itinerary was in reality transgressive. Furthermore, for Maggi ‘Croce e 
sempre “logico” e la sua e sempre “filosofia dello spirito” and one can find ‘la storia 
autentica e segreta di un pensatore come Croce’ only ‘andando a fondo nella
contasse allora trentasette anni, mostrava di non esser giunto nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita; un 
uomo, infine, che indossava un gaio vestito chiaro dal taglio inappuntabile.’ Nicolini, Croce, p. 185.
94 Parente published the programme o f Rivista di studi crociani in 1962: ‘L’idea di formare il periodico 
che qui si annuncia e nata dal proposito di dare un nuovo impulso alio studio dell’opera di Benedetto 
Croce e di costruire un punto d’incontro di quanti gia sparsamente attendono o pensano di volgersi a 
quello studio.’ R. Cavaliere, ‘ II dibattito sullo storicismo nella “Rivista di studi crociani’” (1964-1984) 
Archivio di storia della cultura- Quaderni, Nuova Serie 3 (Naples: Liguori, 2002), pp. 413-27 (p. 416).
95 Recently the Neapolitan publishing house Bibliopolis has started to republish, with philological 
reverence, the whole opus o f Croce.
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comprensione della sua opera filosofica’, otherwise, Maggi argues, the risk is ‘un 
melange di storia politico-culturale e di storia psicologica.’96
However, this study has sought to demonstrate that Croce’s writing requires a 
different reading, which takes into account his hostility towards any grand discourse, 
and considers the various phases of the philosopher’s journey as an attempt to avoid 
reductionism. The idealistic coherence of Croce’s thought is in part the result of those 
studies which have tended to smooth out its ‘contradictions’ in order to construct an 
idealistic framework, which was then considered to be the main source of his 
thinking. However, I have tried to show that despite the common view of Croce as a 
system builder, the philosopher’s way of thinking was closer to many later- developed 
aspects in postmodernist and hermeneutical thinking than to 19th century Hegelianism.
Thanks to Croce we have come to understand that our idea of history is not 
based exclusively on the information extracted from documents and primary sources. 
In reality, historical narrative is rooted in a much more complex process of 
interpretation of and reflection on historical remains. Indeed, historians do not 
reconstruct ‘objective facts’ through the deciphering of historical remains. Nor is 
there some historical ‘being-in-itself that is increasingly revealed to a passively 
receptive subject. Croce’s appropriation of tradition is seen as a genuine dialogue in 
which an understanding emerges that is located in neither side by itself. Croce’s 
approach does not allow us to draw an ‘exact image’ of the past, but strengthens our 
understanding of problems of historical methodology and encourages us to engage 
more closely with the dimension of historical time. Those familiar with the 
contemporary debate between scientific and narrative history will see how Croce can 
play a major role in the epistemological debate between historians and philosophers. I 
believe that Croce’s work represents a key-element in 20th century debate on history 
and should now be read in the context of ongoing critical concerns with historical 
methods of analysis.
96 M. Maggi, ‘Nuove prospettive per Croce? p.l 1.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis started by analyzing the reasons for Croce’s widespread neglect in post-war 
Italy, connecting them to the extremely charged political atmosphere of the period of 
reconstruction. The agenda of the Communists, led by Palmiro Togliatti, was to 
marginalize Croce in order to create a new political, social, and cultural order. 
Moreover, the strength of the attack carried out by ‘progressive’ intellectuals of the 
calibre of Gramsci, Bobbio, Garin, and Abbate, deeply affected the reception of 
Croce. Indeed, despite several positive points emerging from these critiques, it was 
Abbate’s which seemed to summarize those of the others. The result was a powerful 
cultural assault on Croce.
There were also other forces which were eager to dismiss Croce as a 
conservative and out-of-date thinker, namely ‘neoilluministi’ such as Geymonat and 
Abbagnano. An analysis of the strategy used by these theorists took us to the very root 
of the most widespread interpretations of Croce’s work: Hegelian idealism, 
conservativism, provincialism, obsession with system, prejudicial hostility towards 
the social and analytical sciences.
The political environment in post-war Italy was not favourable to a careful 
assessment of the positive features of Croce’s philosophy, and the cumulative effect 
of these attacks was extensive. Very rapidly, the myth of the ‘Olympian’ Croce was 
created.
The second chapter sought to demonstrate how readings of Croce as a 
marginal and conservative thinker were mistaken. Indeed, Croce’s ideas developed in 
an extremely cosmopolitan environment, and far from being insular, were part of a 
broader European debate. I also identified what I think is the hallmark of Croce’s 
theory of history, namely his antimetaphysical method. It was demonstrated that 
Croce’s aim was to devise an approach to history and literature which rejected 
metaphysics, which, in the eyes of the philosopher, represented the futile aspiration of 
philosophy to be concerned with ‘ultimate reality’, or, in Croce’s words, the 
‘problema fondamentale’. After an analysis of his first attempt to theorize the nature 
of history, ‘La storia sussunta sotto il concetto generale dell’arte’, it became clear that 
Croce was entering a debate on history which involved the whole European continent, 
and specifically Germany. Thus, Croce’s debut in 1893, far from being provincial, 
was an integral part of a debate on a number of issues relating to the nature of history 
that is still going at the present time. In fact, in his first paper, Croce addressed a
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number of crucial problems on the status of history: the role of narrative and 
subjectivity and the distinction between history and the exact sciences. Moreover, it 
was demonstrated that Croce did not have a prejudicial view on positivism and the 
social sciences and, contrary to much Crocean mythology, he was extremely 
suspicious of Hegel’s thought.
The encounter with Marxism and its consequent ‘deconstruction’ confirmed 
Croce’s antimetaphysical posture. Indeed, the Italian philosopher conceived Marxism 
as an effective empirical method to be applied to historiography by stark contrast with 
his friend Giovanni Gentile, who saw Marx as a system-builder similar to Hegel. In 
Croce’s developing conception of history, economics and power became powerful 
forces to be taken into account in historical discourse. Thus, Marxism marked a phase 
of renewed ‘realism’ in Croce’s quest for a suitable methodology of history.
The founding of the journal La Critica in 1902 also marked Croce’s concern 
to explore the possibility of a non-reductionist method of analysis for the humanities 
rather than the revival of the idealist system. Moreover, the antimetaphysical 
intentions of the Italian philosopher were clearly stated in the programme of La 
Critica.
The polemical exchanges through letters and essays between Croce and his 
friend-collaborator Gentile enabled me to illustrate the dissimilarity of views of the 
two thinkers on philosophy, culture and politics. Moreover, I showed how the alleged 
empathy between the two was the result of a superficial, and perhaps ideological, 
reading of their association. Indeed, if Gentile was obsessed with the establishment of 
an all-encompassing idealistic philosophy to be applied in all fields of knowledge and 
politics, Croce on the other hand, made clear from the very outset that his ‘idealismo 
critico’ or ‘realistico’ was only a tool to be applied to historiography and literature 
and was not intended as a Weltanschauung. Furthermore, Croce, despite the 
presentational structure of some of his books, rejected the idea of a ‘systematic 
philosophy’.
In chapter three, after giving a brief account of the historical framework within 
which Croce’s ideas were formed, I defined Croce’s strategy of constructing an 
antimetaphysical epistemology. By now, it was clear to Croce that in order to theorize 
an immanent conception of history he had to device a non-reductionist epistemology. 
I read the three volumes of the ‘Filosofia dello Spirito’ as his attempt to draft this 
epistemology. Aesthetics, Logic, Economics, and Ethics, in Croce’s view, encompass
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the broad fabric of the four ‘modes’ through which historians can construct a non­
reductionist narrative. My reading of Croce’s ‘Philosophy of the Spirit’ stressed their 
normative rather than ontological value. In other words Croce’s endeavour is regarded 
as a technique for forming critical judgements on history within the contours of one 
‘mode’ at a time. They each share a proportion of explanatory power, and their 
disarticulation enables the historian to calibrate their usefulness according to the 
nature of the historical events discussed. Any attempt to provide a total historical 
explanation according to an all-embracing vision of reality is a pure metaphysical 
fantasy.
The idea that Croce created a method prejudicially hostile to science has also 
been refuted. The Italian philosopher acknowledged the necessity of scientific thought 
and did not underrate its achievements. However, he was not willing to apply the 
scientific method to history and the arts. Indeed, in his definitive version of Logica 
(1909) Croce made clear that history could not be reduced to an empiricist set of 
rules, since the narrative and the aims of this discipline are profoundly different from 
those of the exact sciences. In tune with the development of ‘historicist’ thought in 
Germany pioneered by figures such as Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband, Croce drew 
a distinction between science, which is concerned with exactitude, and history in 
which the concept of truth and values play a crucial role. It is in this context that 
Croce explored the importance of subjective judgements in historical discourse. If for 
the scientist ‘objectivity’ is a major requirement for research, the historian has to 
acknowledge the presence of the subjective element which needs to be taken into 
account in the historical narrative. Furthermore, Croce underlined the interdependence 
of concepts and their historical genesis, denying any aprioristic approach to our 
understanding of history. This can be read as another example of Croce’s 
antimetaphysical posture.
For the Italian philosopher the historian cannot have a simple empirical 
approach to the past, since there are many other elements to be taken into account. 
Historical enquiry requires a more complex method which includes the rhetorical, the 
logical, the economic and the ethical dimensions. Furthermore, one of the most 
important tasks for the historian is to bring to light the historical framework in which 
concepts are created and relate them to the present.
Chapter four analyzed the historical climate in which Croce’s ideas developed, 
and related them to his need for an epochal breaking open of conceptual horizons. The
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Great War and the general disorientation of intellectuals in Italy and Europe spurred 
Croce on to clarify further his position on the method of philosophy and the role of 
history. Once again, Croce reiterated on several occasions that his work should not be 
read as an attempt to encapsulate the complexity of the world but seen as a simple tool 
to understand history and the arts. Indeed, in 1915 he firmly rejected the interpretation 
of his work as ‘systematic’ and began to show a marked preference to write in the 
form of articles, essays and marginalia in contrast to his earlier treaties and 
‘systematic’ volumes. I also showed how ill-founded was the image of a Croce 
holding himself aloof from events. The itinerary of his intellectual trajectory, and a 
reading of his epistolary, gave us a very different perception of the Italian thinker.
Croce, like the most perceptive minds of the time, realized that Europe had 
entered a new phase of its history which required a radical reappraisal of its reading.
Teoria e storia della storiografia (1917) marked a watershed in Croce’s 
research since here he drew the conclusions of his antimetaphysical method. The 
metaphysical attitude, with its obsessive desire to find the key to interpreting the 
world in one fundamental problem, had to be replaced by a methodology in which 
concepts and their historical genesis had to be closely related. In this sense Croce 
defined philosophy as methodology o f historiography.
Writing within a historical setting with strong roots in the Scholastic religious 
tradition, Croce frequently associated ‘metaphysical’ with the theological notion of 
transcendence. He advocated the need for a new secular ‘faith’ which rejected all 
forms of transcendence in favour of the analysis of concrete problems. In this sense, 
philosophy ceased to be a ‘theological’ discipline and became a tool to be applied to 
specific issues. The consequence of this conception was a broadening of philosophy, 
which was no longer a specific discipline but rather a critical reflection on the 
methods of any given discipline. This entailed the disappearance of the ‘philosophus 
purus’. Moreover, historical experience became the terrain on which knowledge is 
tested. There is no final meaning to be discovered in the world. Philosophy is a 
critical method to be applied to specific problems which change with time, with the 
nature of research, and with the interests of a given social and cultural situation.
If there is some defence to found for the ‘idealist’ interpreters of Croce in the 
form, and occasional idealist lexical lapses, in his earlier writings, this is 
unambiguously no longer the case after his Teoria e storia della storiografia. First, 
for the Italian philosopher there is no absolutely defining concept in history. Croce
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firmly rejected any aprioristic interpretation of history. History is seen as an open- 
ended process to be constantly discussed and negotiated. Hence, there is no 
‘philosophy of history’ or definitive historical account, which is the opposite of 
Hegel’s conception.
The other original feature of Croce’s thinking is his view on tradition, which is 
no longer seen as a monolith but rather a flow of loosely articulated events with which 
we need to relate our present situations if we are to understand them. We have a 
genuine awareness of our thoughts and actions when we are able to write a history of 
them; and tradition, seen as their dynamic repository, plays a crucial role in this 
never-ending reconstruction of the past. Indeed, the core of Croce’s antimetaphysical 
method lies in this constant dialogue-polemic with the past. His analyses of 
Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positivism are all examples of this dialogue with 
tradition.
Croce’s critique of Enlightenment was in tune with this antimetaphysical 
method, rather than the sign of an alleged antidemocratic attitude. Enlightenment with 
its detachment from history and its faith in universal reason and atemporal laws, was 
for Croce a clear example of a metaphysical posture. Indeed, Croce pointed out that 
institutions and values are not timeless, but embodied in a given social and cultural 
framework or ‘epoca storica’.
Croce also explored the ethico-political aspects and practical repercussions of 
historical discourse. History began to be observed from its practical side. During this 
period he developed his reflections on historiography in its relation to ethics, politics 
and power. We saw how Croce’s reflections were misinterpreted and labeled as 
conservative or even proto-fascist. In reality, Croce was reflecting on the relations and 
tensions between civil society and state. He insisted on the fact that there is an 
inherent tendency in society for control to be exerted by a minority. It was easy 
enough to construct an interpretative line of continuity in Italy going back to the elite 
theories of Pareto and Mosca. But Croce’s antimetaphysical posture and his quest for 
a more open form of historiography was the real drive behind his analysis of politics, 
power and ethics. Gramsci made use of these reflections on civil society and state to 
construct his concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘organic intellectual’.
Like Marx, Croce acknowledged the presence of an ideological element in the 
historical narrative. However, he also recognized the existence of an ‘ethical mode’ 
which was related to but distinct from the ideological. Croce maintained that ethics
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and politics are in dialectical relation, namely one implies the other but we need to 
distinguish the two domains. Neither did he underestimate the importance of 
economics.
After the advent of Fascism Croce was led to place emphasis on the ethical 
mode which drew out in more detail important implications in his antimetaphysical 
conception of history. Every historical discourse has, for Croce, an ethico-political 
element which, with the rhetorical, logical and economic, is fundamental to the 
construction of the idea of ‘truth’. However, the ethico-political element is not a 
privileged dimension and above all should not degenerate into a sort of moralistic 
historiography.
The last section of chapter four was devoted to the tensions between Croce’s 
innovative theory of history and his own historiography. We have seen that despite 
some undeniable limitations Croce’s major historical work contains numerous 
original aspects which have often been overlooked. I examined in particular the 
polemical context within which these histories were written. During this turbulent 
period Croce was concerned with the promotion and development of critical ideas 
which would contribute to shaping the history of Italy and Europe. Moreover, we 
have seen that Croce’s Storia d ’Europa should be read as a critique of 19th century 
Liberalism rather than a glorification of it.
Chapter five analyzed the latest developments of Croce’s antimetaphysical 
method and his emphasis on the concept of history as contemporary (‘every history is 
a contemporary one’). Before examining Croce’s theoretical position I gave a short 
description of the historical framework within which Croce’s ideas were developed. I 
challenged the received reading of Croce as a kind of ‘lay pope’ and pointed out that 
during the Fascist era he was strongly criticized by different groups such as the 
‘gentiliani’ and the neo-thomists, who had a powerful influence in Italian academia. 
He had a difficult time during the Fascist dictatorship and his relatively privileged 
position as the unofficial leader of the opposition was counterbalanced by a constant 
threat to his life and work. Moreover, his work-notes show that he was following the 
fate of his country and the antifascist movement with great trepidation. Croce also 
played a crucial role in the immediate post World War Two period. This once again 
contradicts the image of a philosopher detached from events. Croce’s distrust for 
definitive solutions was also reflected in his political views. He regarded politics as a 
practical sphere with no dogmatic or permanent solutions. In any given situation,
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political practice should be conducted with an eye to what is to be historically 
effective, rather than according to the dictates of an ideology. This is the reason why, 
when Communism took the path of totalitarianism, he became a fierce opponent of it. 
Croce did not like ‘grand master plans’, whether political or theoretical.
In reality Croce’s writings, in tune with his antimetaphysical approach to 
reality tried to understand events instead of pigeon-holing them into a ready-made 
aprioristic system. This is particularly marked in his later writings, where he reflected 
on the relations between history and action, clarifying his immanent conception of 
history with its strong purposive dimension. Here, he related history to liberty. 
History became a process of liberation at different levels: individual, collective and in 
the realm of ideas. Indeed, for Croce, history frees the individual from the ‘burden of 
the past’, yielding a better awareness of the present, creating awareness for the 
collectivity and preparing the ground for new ideas and action. There is a great 
distance here between Croce’s conception of the world and that of Hegel and Marx. 
Croce maintained that history did not determine action but prepared it. In the Italian 
philosopher there is an open-ended conception of history which is not present in 
Hegel or Marx. Indeed, Croce maintained that we need constantly to reconceptualize 
and revitalize history in the light of the present. There is no eschatology or final end 
of history.
Croce also talked about the need for a rational history. Rationality in history 
does not imply a sort of determinism or logicality in historical events themselves. He 
was simply claiming the right of the historian to construct a narrative based on a 
critical approach rather than a religious, mythological or metaphysically determined 
one.
Moreover, we have seen that Croce’s vision of history aimed to transcend the 
dichotomy ‘optimism-pessimism’. The polemic with Existentialism should be read in 
this context. Indeed, for Croce, Existentialism was an attempt to escape into a 
skeptical metaphysics disengaged from the world. If history is to be a process of 
liberation from the past and the limitations of the present, for both individual and 
society, there is little room for pessimism. However, we have seen that Croce was 
equally hostile to optimistic readings, since his vision of history contemplated arrest 
and regression and was not linear or teleological.
The last part of chapter five was devoted to relating Croce’s thought to the 
present. I have drawn attention to similarities with aspects of postmodernism and with
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contemporary Hermeneutics. Croce’s antimetaphysical method in history anticipated 
the same suspicion of ‘grand narratives’. There is no overarching system but a number 
of interpretative problems emerging from the present. In this connection Croce also 
anticipated Gadamer’s critique of 19th century historicism, and argued that the 
historian’s own cultural mileu and perspectives, far from being ‘suspended’ in a futile 
attempt to divest one’s ability to think imaginatively of the very conditions which 
make this possible, should be used productively to link our understanding of the past 
with the present. Croce’s notion that all history is contemporary, an idea repeated by 
Gadamer, forms the basis of the latter’s ‘fusion of horizons’. Moreover, Croce 
historicized the role of philosophy by insisting that it should cease attemping to define 
any universal laws of reality, but instead be a critical endeavour to uncover the 
problematic components of our historical experience.
Croce raised some issues which are still at the centre of discussion about 
history and its status. Like Foucault, Croce rejected the idea of ‘total history’ 
replacing it with specific areas of research. This emphasis on narration, almost 
entirely opaque to Croce’s contemporary readership, is now seen, by postmodernists 
and others, as an essential tool for articulating the different strands of historical 
discourse, and avoiding all forms of reductionism in the process. Moreover, Croce’s 
ethico-political stance, culminating in the concept of liberty could well provide an 
antidote to the extremes of skepticism to which some forms of postmodernism are 
prone. Rather than ‘libertarian’, Croce’s liberty, with its ethical dimension is a 
constant recall to the seriousness of the historian’s task, if, in the present, we wish to 
consolidate the gains from the past and possibly recover some useful ‘debris’ in the 
process. In the current debate on the status of history, Croce’s voice is one which 
could be recovered with profit.
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